Chapter 1.

Wars are often measured in territory gained, military positions destroyed, and the number of combatants killed. Yet behind the visible battlefield exists another dimension of modern warfare: a largely unseen struggle involving intelligence gathering, surveillance, intelligence analysis, and the identification of individuals believed to be responsible for planning and carrying out attacks.

For Israel, this invisible battlefield has become a central element of its confrontation with Hamas.

While Israeli soldiers conduct operations on the ground and aircraft operate overhead, intelligence officers, military analysts, and security agencies work to understand an organization whose leadership, military networks, and operational capabilities have evolved over several decades.

The objective extends beyond locating armed fighters. Israeli security institutions seek to identify commanders, understand chains of command, uncover weapons infrastructure, investigate financing networks, locate hostages, and prevent future attacks.

But how does this system actually work?

How do Israeli intelligence agencies identify individuals suspected of belonging to Hamas? What role do informants, intercepted communications, surveillance technology, drones, and artificial intelligence play in military intelligence? How is information assessed before a military operation is authorized? And what happens when the intelligence is incomplete or incorrect?

These questions lie at the center of Israel's modern counterterrorism strategy.

October 7 and the Transformation of Israel's Security Priorities

On October 7, 2023, Hamas-led armed groups crossed from the Gaza Strip into southern Israel, attacking communities, military positions, and a music festival.

Approximately 1,200 people were killed, most of them civilians, and 251 people were taken hostage into Gaza.

The attacks represented one of the most devastating security failures in Israel's history.

Despite possessing sophisticated surveillance systems, advanced military technology, and extensive intelligence capabilities, Israeli authorities failed to prevent the assault.

The events exposed serious weaknesses in intelligence assessments, operational preparedness, communication between security institutions, and the assumptions that had shaped Israeli policy toward Hamas.

The consequences were immediate and far-reaching.

Israel launched a large-scale military campaign in Gaza, declaring the destruction of Hamas's military and governing capabilities and the return of the hostages among its principal objectives.

The campaign brought together conventional military operations, intelligence-led targeting, underground warfare, and efforts to locate Hamas's senior leadership.

It also resulted in extensive destruction, mass displacement, and a devastating humanitarian crisis for Palestinian civilians.

The central question became whether Israel could dismantle Hamas as an organized military force while confronting an adversary embedded within a densely populated territory.

The Intelligence Network Behind Military Operations

Israel's campaign against Hamas involves several institutions with different responsibilities.

The Israel Defense Forces conduct military operations and maintain their own intelligence capabilities.

Aman, Israel's military intelligence directorate, analyzes threats, military organizations, and information relevant to defense planning.

Shin Bet, also known as the Israel Security Agency, focuses on internal security, counterterrorism, and intelligence concerning threats involving Israel and the Palestinian territories.

Mossad, Israel's foreign intelligence service, operates primarily beyond Israel's borders and addresses external security threats.

Although their responsibilities differ, these institutions can cooperate on matters involving Hamas's leadership, organizational networks, and activities.

Their work involves evaluating information from multiple sources, identifying patterns, assessing threats, and supporting decisions made by political and military authorities.

Yet the existence of advanced intelligence institutions does not guarantee that every threat will be detected.

October 7 demonstrated that intelligence can fail not only because information is unavailable, but also because existing information is misunderstood, underestimated, or inadequately communicated.

Technology and the Changing Nature of Warfare

Modern intelligence operations increasingly depend on technology.

Satellite imagery, aerial surveillance, communications intelligence, digital analysis, and unmanned aircraft can provide information that earlier generations of military commanders could scarcely have imagined.

Artificial intelligence has introduced additional possibilities for processing large quantities of information.

However, technological capabilities also create difficult questions.

How reliable are automated assessments? Can surveillance data accurately distinguish between a combatant and a civilian? How much human judgment is involved in decisions that may result in lethal force?

Investigations into Israel's use of data-driven targeting systems have generated international debate about the role of artificial intelligence in warfare.

The central concern is not simply whether technology can identify potential targets, but whether the information is sufficiently reliable and whether subsequent military action complies with international humanitarian law.

Technology may accelerate intelligence analysis, but it cannot remove the responsibility to distinguish legitimate military objectives from protected civilians.

The Search for Hamas's Leadership

One of the most closely followed aspects of Israel's campaign has been the pursuit of Hamas's senior military and political figures.

The search for Yahya Sinwar, a central architect of the October 7 attacks according to Israeli authorities, became a major focus of Israeli military and intelligence efforts.

His death during an encounter with Israeli troops in Rafah in October 2024 illustrated an important limitation of intelligence operations: even an extensively pursued individual may ultimately be encountered without a precisely planned operation directed at that person's known location.

Other operations, including the strike that killed Mohammed Deif in July 2024, demonstrated the role that intelligence assessments can play in identifying and attacking senior military figures.

These cases raise broader questions about the effectiveness of leadership targeting.

Does removing a commander substantially weaken an armed organization? Can another individual assume the same responsibilities? And how does an organization adapt when its leadership is repeatedly disrupted?

The answers depend on more than the outcome of any single operation.

The Human Cost Behind the Intelligence War

The pursuit of Hamas cannot be examined solely through military operations and intelligence achievements.

Every decision involving lethal force takes place within a wider human reality.

Israeli families continue to carry the consequences of the October 7 attacks, including the deaths of relatives, the experiences of survivors, and the trauma of hostage-taking.

Palestinian families in Gaza have endured widespread civilian casualties, destruction of homes, displacement, and severe disruptions to essential services.

Military operations against armed organizations operating in populated areas create substantial risks for civilians, including those who have no connection to the fighting.

Allegations that Hamas has used civilian infrastructure for military purposes require careful examination. Such conduct, when established, can violate international humanitarian law. It does not, however, remove Israel's independent obligations to distinguish civilians from combatants, assess proportionality, and take feasible precautions.

Understanding these legal and humanitarian questions is essential to understanding the campaign itself.

What This Investigation Will Examine

This investigation explores the development of Israel's counterterrorism strategy, the institutions responsible for gathering intelligence, and the military operations directed against Hamas.

It examines the historical evolution of Israeli intelligence services, Hamas's organizational structure, the role of modern technology, and publicly documented operations involving senior Hamas leaders.

Particular attention is given to the search for Yahya Sinwar, the targeting of Mohammed Deif and other commanders, the challenges of underground warfare, and the intelligence cooperation behind hostage-rescue missions.

The investigation also considers the failures that preceded October 7, the consequences of intelligence mistakes, the legal standards governing military operations, and the broader question of whether an armed organization can be defeated through military force alone.

Where information remains disputed or classified, the distinction between verified events, official claims, and independent reporting is essential.

The objective is not to portray intelligence operations as flawless or military force as a simple solution.

It is to examine how Israel's campaign against Hamas has developed, what its publicly documented operations reveal, and where the limits of intelligence-led warfare become visible.

To understand that campaign, we must first return to the origins of Israel's counterterrorism strategy.

Chapter 2 — Understanding Hamas's Leadership and Military Structure

The Organization Behind Israel's Most Complex Security Challenge

To understand how Israel identifies, tracks, and targets Hamas operatives, it is first necessary to understand the organization itself.

Hamas is not structured like a conventional army. It developed as a Palestinian Islamist political and armed movement with political leadership, social institutions, financial networks, and a military wing. Its organizational structure has evolved considerably since its establishment in 1987, particularly following its takeover of the Gaza Strip in 2007.

For Israeli intelligence agencies, this complexity presents a fundamental challenge.

Identifying an armed fighter is different from understanding the network in which that individual operates. A military commander may be connected to political officials, financial intermediaries, local administrators, and other members of an organization, but those relationships do not automatically establish that everyone involved is a lawful military target.

Israeli intelligence institutions therefore seek to understand not only individual identities but also organizational responsibilities, command relationships, military capabilities, and the connections between different branches of Hamas.

The events of October 7, 2023, demonstrated that Hamas retained the capacity to organize and execute a large-scale assault despite years of Israeli surveillance and intelligence collection.

Understanding how that was possible requires examining Hamas's origins, leadership, military development, and internal organization.

The Origins of Hamas

Hamas was established in December 1987, during the early stages of the First Intifada, the Palestinian uprising against Israeli occupation.

The organization's name is an Arabic acronym for Harakat al-Muqawama al-Islamiyya, meaning the Islamic Resistance Movement.

Its founders emerged from Palestinian networks associated with the Muslim Brotherhood, an Islamist movement established in Egypt in 1928.

Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, a Palestinian religious leader in Gaza, became one of Hamas's most influential founding figures.

Before Hamas's establishment, Muslim Brotherhood-associated networks in Gaza had developed religious, educational, charitable, and community institutions.

These activities provided an organizational foundation from which Hamas could expand.

Unlike the predominantly secular Palestinian nationalist organizations that dominated the Palestine Liberation Organization, Hamas incorporated Islamist ideology into its political identity and opposition to Israel.

Its original 1988 charter contained antisemitic language and called for Israel's destruction.

In 2017, Hamas issued a new political document that presented a Palestinian state along the lines preceding the June 1967 war as a formula for national consensus, while continuing to reject recognition of Israel's legitimacy.

The new document did not formally replace the original charter.

These ideological positions remain important to understanding Hamas's political objectives and its conflict with Israel.

Over time, Hamas developed into an organization combining political participation, armed operations, religious identity, and administrative authority.

That combination became particularly significant after Hamas gained control of Gaza.

From Political Movement to Armed Organization

During its early years, Hamas developed an armed capability that became increasingly prominent during the 1990s.

Its military wing, the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades, was established in the early 1990s and became responsible for armed operations against Israel.

The Brigades are named after Izz ad-Din al-Qassam, a Syrian-born religious preacher and militant who was killed by British forces in Mandatory Palestine in 1935.

The military wing initially operated through relatively small networks, but its capabilities expanded over subsequent decades.

During the 1990s and the Second Intifada, Hamas carried out suicide bombings and other attacks that killed Israeli civilians and military personnel.

These attacks contributed to Israel's decision to intensify counterterrorism operations against Hamas's armed networks and leadership.

The organization later developed rocket capabilities, underground military infrastructure, and larger armed formations.

By the period preceding October 7, Hamas's military wing had evolved considerably beyond its original structure.

Israeli military assessments described an organization with regional commands, organized fighting units, weapons infrastructure, and specialized military functions.

However, publicly available information about Hamas's internal structure has often depended on Israeli intelligence assessments, Hamas statements, investigative reporting, and material recovered during military operations.

Not every organizational detail can be independently verified.

This uncertainty is important when examining how Israeli intelligence agencies attempt to identify individual responsibilities within Hamas.

Hamas's Political Leadership

Hamas has historically maintained political leadership structures responsible for organizational policy, political relationships, negotiations, and strategic decisions.

The Political Bureau became one of the organization's most important leadership institutions.

Its responsibilities have included relations with foreign governments and organizations, diplomatic contacts, internal political decisions, and involvement in negotiations.

Senior political figures have operated both within the Palestinian territories and abroad.

For many years, Hamas maintained an important external political presence in Qatar, where several senior leaders resided.

Other leadership networks have operated in different parts of the Middle East.

Among the most prominent figures was Ismail Haniyeh, who served as chairman of Hamas's Political Bureau from 2017 until his assassination in Tehran in July 2024.

Haniyeh had previously served as Palestinian prime minister following Hamas's electoral victory in 2006, although the Palestinian political system subsequently became divided between Hamas-controlled Gaza and the Fatah-led Palestinian Authority in the West Bank.

Another influential political figure was Khaled Mashal, who led Hamas's Political Bureau for many years before Haniyeh assumed the position.

Yahya Sinwar, who became Hamas's leader in Gaza in 2017, held an especially important position because of his influence within the organization and his relationship with its military leadership.

Following Haniyeh's death, Sinwar was named head of Hamas's Political Bureau in August 2024.

His death in October of the same year created another major leadership disruption.

The distinction between political and military leadership is significant.

Political officials may influence organizational strategy, but the nature of their responsibilities and their involvement in military activities can vary.

Under international humanitarian law, political affiliation alone does not automatically make an individual a lawful military target.

Assessing the status of an individual requires examining their actual role and the applicable legal framework.

The Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades

Hamas's military wing, the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades, has been central to the organization's armed conflict with Israel.

Over time, the Brigades developed capabilities associated with both guerrilla warfare and more organized military formations.

These included armed personnel, weapons storage, rocket units, military engineering functions, and underground infrastructure.

Before October 7, Israeli military assessments described Hamas as possessing a command structure organized across different geographical areas of Gaza.

The Brigades were associated with regional formations and local units, although the precise number, composition, and operational strength of these formations have varied over time.

Mohammed Deif became one of the most prominent figures in Hamas's military leadership.

For many years, he was regarded as the commander of the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades and was associated with the development of Hamas's military capabilities.

Israel repeatedly attempted to target Deif before announcing that he had been killed in a July 2024 airstrike in the Khan Younis area.

Hamas subsequently confirmed his death in January 2025.

Marwan Issa, another senior military figure, served as an important deputy within Hamas's military leadership.

Israel announced that Issa had been killed in a March 2024 strike.

These leadership figures became major priorities in Israel's campaign against Hamas.

However, the removal of senior commanders does not necessarily mean that an organization's entire military structure immediately collapses.

Armed organizations may redistribute responsibilities, appoint replacement commanders, or reorganize their remaining networks.

This ability to adapt is one of the reasons leadership targeting must be evaluated within a broader military and political context.

The Relationship Between Political and Military Leadership

One of the most important questions concerning Hamas is how its political leadership relates to its military wing.

The relationship has not always been transparent.

Hamas has historically maintained distinctions between political institutions and military command, but the degree of separation has varied depending on the period, individuals involved, and strategic circumstances.

Political leaders have participated in negotiations and public diplomacy, while military leaders have been responsible for armed operations.

At the same time, senior organizational figures have sometimes exercised influence across both spheres.

Yahya Sinwar was a particularly important example.

His background within Hamas, his leadership position in Gaza, and his relationships with senior military figures made him an influential participant in the organization's strategic direction.

Israeli authorities identified Sinwar as a principal architect of the October 7 attacks.

The extent to which other political leaders possessed advance knowledge of the operational details has been a subject of investigation and competing claims.

Understanding these relationships matters because intelligence assessments must distinguish between organizational association, political authority, and direct military responsibility.

A person's position within a political organization does not, by itself, establish participation in hostilities.

This distinction is essential when examining targeted military operations.

Hamas's Control of the Gaza Strip

Hamas's organizational development changed significantly after the Palestinian legislative elections of January 2006.

Hamas won a majority of seats in the Palestinian Legislative Council, defeating Fatah in the parliamentary contest.

The election result led to political tensions, international disputes, and a struggle over authority within the Palestinian political system.

In June 2007, following violent fighting between Hamas and Fatah forces, Hamas consolidated control over the Gaza Strip.

The Palestinian Authority, dominated by Fatah, retained its principal governing institutions in the West Bank.

This division created two competing centers of Palestinian political authority.

For Hamas, control of Gaza provided access to administrative institutions, local policing structures, public services, and territorial authority.

The organization was no longer only an armed movement operating within a territory.

It had become the de facto governing authority over a population of approximately two million people.

This created additional complexity for Israeli intelligence assessments.

Civilian administration, public employment, humanitarian services, political institutions, and military activities existed within the same territory.

Not every person employed by a Hamas-run administrative institution was a combatant or directly involved in military operations.

The distinction between civilian functions and military participation is therefore essential when assessing individual responsibility.

Following the October 7 attacks and the subsequent Israeli military campaign, Hamas's governing and military structures experienced extensive disruption.

The extent to which different institutions continued functioning varied across locations and periods.

Financing and External Relationships

Like other large political and armed organizations, Hamas has relied on financial resources to maintain its activities.

Its funding has come through different channels over time, including donations, business-related revenue, taxation and fees in Gaza, and external support.

Iran has been an important supporter of Hamas's military capabilities, providing financial assistance, training, and other forms of support over many years.

The relationship between Hamas and Iran is particularly significant because Hamas is a Sunni Islamist organization, while Iran is governed by a Shia Islamist political establishment.

Their cooperation reflects shared strategic interests, particularly opposition to Israel, rather than identical religious or political ideologies.

Qatar has also played an important role in Gaza, including through financial assistance intended to support civilian needs and administrative functions.

The purposes, oversight, and political consequences of different funding arrangements have generated considerable debate.

It is important to distinguish humanitarian assistance and civilian financial transfers from funding specifically intended for military operations.

Israel has sought to disrupt financial networks it believes support Hamas's armed activities.

These efforts have included financial sanctions, investigations, restrictions on transfers, and cooperation with international authorities.

The financial dimension demonstrates that counterterrorism extends beyond direct military confrontation.

However, measures targeting financial networks can also affect civilian economic activity, making accurate identification and appropriate safeguards important.

Hamas's Military Infrastructure in Gaza

One of the defining characteristics of Hamas's military development has been its investment in infrastructure within the Gaza Strip.

Over the years, the organization constructed underground tunnels, weapons storage facilities, and other military installations.

Some tunnels were designed for movement and concealment, while others were associated with military operations and cross-border activity.

Israel has repeatedly identified Hamas's underground infrastructure as a major security threat.

The tunnels created significant challenges for conventional military operations because they complicated efforts to determine the location of armed personnel, military equipment, and command facilities.

The presence of underground infrastructure beneath densely populated areas also increased the potential consequences of military action for civilians.

Not every tunnel in Gaza has been a military tunnel. Gaza has also had civilian and commercial tunnels, particularly near the Egyptian border, during periods when restrictions on movement and goods encouraged underground trade.

Distinguishing between different types of underground infrastructure requires evidence about their use.

Following October 7, the identification and destruction of Hamas's military tunnel network became a major Israeli operational objective.

The network also became closely connected to the search for hostages, some of whom were held underground.

This created an especially difficult challenge.

Military action against underground infrastructure could potentially endanger the very hostages Israeli forces were seeking to rescue.

The underground dimension of the conflict will be examined in greater detail in a later chapter.

October 7 and Hamas's Operational Capabilities

The October 7, 2023, attacks demonstrated that Hamas had developed the capacity to coordinate a large-scale assault involving multiple locations and types of targets.

Hamas-led armed groups breached Israeli border defenses and attacked military installations, residential communities, and a music festival.

Approximately 1,200 people were killed in Israel, most of them civilians, and 251 people were taken hostage.

The assault involved coordinated armed units and exposed serious weaknesses in Israeli intelligence assessments and military preparedness.

For Israeli authorities, the attack challenged long-standing assumptions about Hamas's intentions and capabilities.

Before October 7, parts of Israel's security establishment had assessed that Hamas was primarily interested in maintaining its governing position in Gaza and could be deterred from initiating a major confrontation.

The scale and coordination of the attack demonstrated the dangers of relying on assumptions that were not adequately tested against available evidence.

Subsequent Israeli investigations and reporting raised questions about warnings, intelligence assessments, and the interpretation of Hamas's military preparations.

The attack also highlighted the difference between possessing extensive surveillance capabilities and correctly understanding an adversary's intentions.

Hamas's organizational structure, leadership relationships, and military planning became central subjects of renewed Israeli intelligence scrutiny.

Why Identifying Hamas Operatives Is Complex

Identifying members of an armed organization involves more than recognizing individuals carrying weapons.

Military intelligence must distinguish between different roles, assess the reliability of available information, and understand how individuals relate to an organization's activities.

A person may be a political representative, civilian administrator, financial intermediary, military commander, or armed fighter.

These categories can sometimes overlap, but they are not legally interchangeable.

A suspected organizational connection is not sufficient by itself to establish that a person may lawfully be attacked.

Under international humanitarian law, members of organized armed groups who perform a continuous combat function may be targetable in a non-international armed conflict. Civilians are protected against direct attack unless and for such time as they directly participate in hostilities.

The application of these principles to particular individuals can be legally and factually disputed.

Reliable identification therefore requires careful examination of an individual's actual function and conduct.

Mistakes can have severe consequences.

Incorrect intelligence may lead to the targeting of civilians, while incomplete information may allow individuals involved in planning attacks to remain undetected.

This tension between preventing violence and protecting civilians is a central challenge of intelligence-led military operations.

The Effects of Leadership Losses

Since October 7, Israel has conducted operations against numerous senior Hamas figures.

The deaths of Yahya Sinwar, Mohammed Deif, Marwan Issa, and other leaders represented significant losses for the organization.

Such operations can disrupt command relationships, reduce institutional experience, and complicate coordination.

However, measuring their long-term effectiveness is difficult.

Armed organizations may continue operating after losing senior leaders, particularly when they retain local networks, ideological support, access to resources, or the ability to recruit new members.

Leadership losses may weaken particular capabilities without eliminating an organization's broader political or military presence.

The consequences also depend on whether replacement leaders emerge, whether communications and financing remain functional, and whether the conditions supporting recruitment change.

For Israel, the challenge extends beyond identifying individual commanders.

It involves determining whether military operations can reduce Hamas's capacity to organize attacks over time.

This question becomes increasingly important when assessing the strategic results of targeted operations.

Understanding the Organization Before Understanding the Hunt

Hamas's evolution from a Palestinian Islamist movement into an organization combining political leadership, armed capabilities, and territorial governance has made it a complex subject for Israeli intelligence.

Its military wing developed from smaller armed networks into more organized formations with substantial weapons and underground infrastructure.

Its political leadership operated across different locations, while its control of Gaza created relationships between governance, civilian institutions, and military activity.

The events of October 7 demonstrated the organization's ability to conduct a large-scale attack despite years of Israeli surveillance.

The subsequent Israeli campaign inflicted major losses on Hamas's leadership and military infrastructure, but questions remain about the organization's ability to reorganize and sustain its activities.

Understanding Hamas therefore requires distinguishing between its political institutions, military wing, civilian administration, and wider support networks.

These distinctions are not merely academic.

They influence intelligence assessments, military decisions, legal responsibilities, and the protection of civilian life.

For Israeli security institutions, identifying who belongs to Hamas is only one part of a much larger challenge.

The more difficult questions concern what particular individuals do, how different parts of the organization interact, and whether disrupting those relationships can prevent future attacks.

The next chapter examines the institutions responsible for answering those questions: Mossad, Shin Bet, and Aman, the three major pillars of Israel's intelligence establishment.

Chapter 3 — Mossad, Shin Bet and Aman: Israel's Intelligence Network

Inside the Intelligence Establishment Behind Israel's Campaign Against Hamas

Behind Israel's military operations against Hamas stands an intelligence establishment developed over more than seven decades.

Its responsibilities extend far beyond collecting information about potential attacks. Israeli intelligence agencies investigate armed organizations, assess regional threats, analyze military capabilities, monitor developments abroad, and provide information to political and military decision-makers.

Three institutions form the central pillars of this system: Mossad, Shin Bet, and Aman.

Although their responsibilities differ, each plays a role in Israel's national security strategy. Together with military units, police organizations, and specialized security institutions, they contribute to a system intended to identify threats before they materialize and support operations when military or law-enforcement action is considered necessary.

The existence of this network has given Israel significant intelligence capabilities.

Yet the attacks of October 7, 2023, demonstrated that even highly developed intelligence institutions can fail to recognize or respond effectively to a major threat.

Understanding these agencies requires examining not only what they are designed to accomplish, but also how their responsibilities differ, how they cooperate, and where their limitations have become visible.

The Historical Development of Israeli Intelligence

Israel's intelligence establishment has its origins in the period before the creation of the state in 1948.

During the British Mandate, Jewish underground and defense organizations developed networks for collecting information about British authorities, Arab political and military activity, and regional security developments.

One of the most important organizations was Shai, the intelligence branch of the Haganah, the principal Jewish paramilitary organization before independence.

Following Israel's establishment, its leadership began reorganizing these intelligence capabilities into state institutions.

The objective was to create separate organizations responsible for military intelligence, domestic security, and foreign intelligence.

This division reflected the different requirements of national defense.

Military commanders needed information about enemy forces and regional threats.

Domestic security authorities needed to investigate espionage, political violence, and potential attacks within areas under Israeli control.

Foreign intelligence officers needed to gather information and develop relationships beyond Israel's borders.

Over time, these responsibilities became associated with Aman, Shin Bet, and Mossad.

Their organizational development was influenced by wars, terrorist attacks, international crises, technological change, and the expanding complexity of Middle Eastern politics.

Although the agencies became highly specialized, they also faced the challenge of ensuring that important information moved effectively between institutions.

That challenge remains central to modern intelligence work.

Mossad: Israel's Foreign Intelligence Service

Mossad is perhaps the most internationally recognized of Israel's intelligence agencies.

Its formal Hebrew name is commonly translated as the Institute for Intelligence and Special Operations.

Established in the early years of Israeli statehood, Mossad developed into an institution responsible primarily for foreign intelligence collection and certain covert activities outside Israel.

Unlike Aman, which operates within the military establishment, Mossad is a civilian intelligence organization that reports directly to Israel's prime minister.

Its responsibilities include gathering information about foreign security threats, assessing hostile organizations operating abroad, and supporting national security objectives beyond Israel's borders.

Mossad has also been associated with covert operations, clandestine relationships, and efforts to obtain information that cannot be collected through ordinary diplomatic or publicly available channels.

Because much of its work remains classified, public understanding of Mossad is shaped by official disclosures, historical investigations, judicial proceedings, and investigative journalism.

Popular portrayals often emphasize dramatic operations, but intelligence work also involves long-term research, analysis, recruitment, and the evaluation of uncertain information.

An intelligence agency's effectiveness cannot be measured solely by its most publicly recognized missions.

Mossad's Historical Operations

Several historical operations illustrate the international reach of Israeli intelligence.

One of the best-known occurred in 1960, when Israeli operatives captured Adolf Eichmann in Argentina.

Eichmann had played a major role in organizing the deportation of European Jews during the Holocaust.

He was secretly transported to Israel, where he was tried, convicted, and executed in 1962.

The operation became a defining event in Mossad's history.

It demonstrated Israel's determination to pursue individuals associated with Nazi crimes, while also generating controversy because the capture took place without Argentina's consent.

Another significant period followed the 1972 Munich Olympic attack.

Israeli intelligence services conducted operations against individuals believed to be connected to Palestinian militant organizations.

The campaign became associated with Mossad's reputation for conducting operations beyond Israel's borders.

However, the mistaken killing of Ahmed Bouchikhi in Lillehammer, Norway, in 1973 exposed the dangers of inaccurate intelligence and the consequences of unauthorized operations in foreign countries.

These episodes illustrate two different aspects of intelligence activity.

Covert operations can achieve objectives that governments consider strategically important, but they can also create legal disputes, diplomatic crises, and irreversible harm when information is incorrect.

Mossad and the International Dimension of Hamas

Hamas has maintained political representatives, organizational relationships, and external networks beyond the Gaza Strip.

These international connections have included political activity, diplomatic engagement, financial relationships, and contacts with regional governments and organizations.

Because Mossad focuses primarily on external intelligence, developments involving Hamas figures and networks outside Israel and the Palestinian territories can fall within its area of responsibility.

Public reporting has associated Israeli foreign intelligence efforts with the investigation of Hamas's external leadership, international relationships, and financial activities.

However, responsibility for specific covert operations is not always publicly acknowledged.

It is therefore important to distinguish between operations officially attributed to Israeli institutions and those attributed through media investigations or statements by other governments.

The assassination of Hamas political leader Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran in July 2024 illustrates this distinction.

Haniyeh was killed while visiting Iran for the inauguration of the country's president.

Iran and Hamas blamed Israel for the killing, and Israel later publicly acknowledged responsibility.

The incident demonstrated how the conflict involving Hamas extended beyond Gaza and into the wider regional security environment.

It also raised questions about sovereignty, escalation, and the consequences of conducting lethal operations outside an active battlefield.

For Mossad, the international dimension of the conflict represents a different intelligence environment from the military operations conducted inside Gaza.

Shin Bet: Israel's Internal Security Agency

Shin Bet, also known as Shabak or the Israel Security Agency, is responsible for internal security and counterintelligence.

Its work includes preventing terrorist attacks, investigating espionage, and addressing threats involving Israel and the Palestinian territories.

Unlike Mossad, whose primary focus is abroad, Shin Bet has historically played a central role in intelligence concerning Palestinian armed organizations.

Its responsibilities have included investigating militant networks, identifying individuals suspected of involvement in attacks, and supporting security operations.

The agency works with other Israeli institutions, including the IDF and police, when their responsibilities overlap.

Much of Shin Bet's operational work remains classified.

Nevertheless, its role in Israeli counterterrorism has been visible through public statements, court proceedings, government investigations, and reporting about major security operations.

Shin Bet occupies a particularly important position because counterterrorism frequently involves information about individuals rather than conventional military formations.

Determining whether a person presents a security threat requires assessing evidence, organizational relationships, and specific conduct.

These assessments can have serious consequences for the people involved.

Shin Bet and Palestinian Armed Networks

For decades, Shin Bet has focused extensively on Palestinian armed organizations.

Its work has included investigations involving Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and other groups responsible for attacks against Israel.

The agency has developed expertise in analyzing organizational structures, identifying suspected participants in attacks, and assessing threats involving armed networks.

Its activities have also been controversial.

Human rights organizations have criticized aspects of Israeli security detention, interrogation practices, surveillance, and the treatment of Palestinian suspects.

Israel's Supreme Court has examined the legal limits of interrogation methods, including in a landmark 1999 ruling restricting the use of physical pressure by security interrogators.

These legal debates demonstrate that intelligence gathering is not separate from questions of civil liberties and human rights.

Security agencies possess significant powers, but those powers remain subject to legal obligations and public scrutiny.

The protection of civilians from attacks is a legitimate security objective.

At the same time, counterterrorism measures must be evaluated according to applicable law, including prohibitions on torture and other forms of ill-treatment.

These considerations are particularly important in a prolonged conflict in which security operations affect large civilian populations.

Shin Bet's Role After October 7

The Hamas-led attacks of October 7, 2023, represented a major failure for Israel's security establishment.

Shin Bet was among the institutions that faced serious questions about its ability to recognize the threat and prevent the assault.

Subsequent investigations examined intelligence assessments, warning indicators, organizational assumptions, and the exchange of information between security institutions.

The attack revealed the dangers of believing that an adversary's intentions are fully understood.

An organization may appear deterred or focused on other priorities while continuing to develop military capabilities.

Following October 7, Shin Bet became deeply involved in Israel's efforts to investigate Hamas's operational networks and support military and hostage-rescue operations.

The agency's cooperation with the IDF became especially significant in operations requiring information about individuals, locations, and the possible presence of hostages.

However, public accounts of such operations generally reveal only part of the intelligence process.

The full nature of individual sources, assessments, and internal decisions often remains classified.

This makes independent evaluation of specific intelligence claims difficult.

Aman: The Military Intelligence Directorate

Aman is the intelligence directorate of the Israel Defense Forces.

Unlike Mossad and Shin Bet, Aman operates within Israel's military command structure.

Its responsibilities include military intelligence collection, threat assessment, strategic analysis, and the provision of information to military commanders and national decision-makers.

Aman examines the capabilities and intentions of hostile states, armed organizations, and other potential military threats.

Its work supports military planning, operational assessments, and the development of Israel's broader defense strategy.

Aman includes specialized capabilities associated with signals intelligence, imagery analysis, technological intelligence, and military research.

One of its best-known components is Unit 8200, which is associated with signals intelligence and cyber-related capabilities.

Other military intelligence units specialize in different forms of information collection and analysis.

The precise organization and activities of many of these units are not fully public.

What is clear is that military intelligence has become increasingly important as modern warfare depends on large quantities of information.

Unit 8200 and the Digital Intelligence Environment

Unit 8200 has attracted international attention because of its association with signals intelligence, communications analysis, and advanced technological capabilities.

Its work forms part of Israel's broader military intelligence system.

In contemporary conflicts, electronic communications and digital information can provide valuable insights into military organizations and potential threats.

However, the collection of information is only the beginning of the intelligence process.

Information must be interpreted, compared with other evidence, and assessed for reliability.

Digital systems can process large quantities of material, but they do not automatically establish the meaning or significance of what they collect.

A communication may be misunderstood.

An individual's association with another person may be interpreted incorrectly.

Information may be incomplete, outdated, or deliberately misleading.

These problems become particularly serious when intelligence contributes to decisions involving lethal military force.

The increasing use of artificial intelligence and automated analysis has intensified debate about the reliability of intelligence assessments.

Investigative reporting about Israeli targeting practices in Gaza has raised questions concerning data-driven systems, human review, and the standards used to identify potential military targets.

The Israeli military has disputed aspects of this reporting and has stated that its systems are intended to assist analysts rather than independently authorize attacks.

The full operation of these systems is not publicly available for independent examination.

The distinction between automated analysis and human responsibility is therefore central to understanding modern military intelligence.

Aman and the October 7 Intelligence Failure

The October 7 attacks placed Aman under intense scrutiny.

Israel's military intelligence establishment had extensive responsibilities for assessing Hamas's capabilities and intentions.

Yet the assault demonstrated that intelligence collection and analysis had failed to produce an adequate defensive response.

Public investigations and reporting identified concerns about assumptions that Hamas was deterred from launching a major attack.

Warnings and indications of military preparations were not translated into an effective assessment of the immediate threat.

The failure raised questions about organizational culture, analytical disagreement, and the treatment of information that contradicted established expectations.

One of the most important lessons concerns the difference between possessing information and understanding its significance.

An intelligence agency may collect extensive data while still reaching an incorrect conclusion.

Technology cannot fully compensate for flawed assumptions or failures in judgment.

The events of October 7 consequently became a major case study in the limitations of modern intelligence.

Three Agencies, Different Responsibilities

Although Mossad, Shin Bet, and Aman all contribute to Israeli national security, their responsibilities are not identical.

Mossad primarily addresses foreign intelligence and external security threats.

Shin Bet focuses on internal security, counterintelligence, and threats involving Israel and the Palestinian territories.

Aman provides military intelligence and threat assessments within the IDF.

These distinctions are important because the campaign against Hamas involves different types of activity.

An investigation into an international financial network may require different expertise from an assessment of Hamas's military capabilities in Gaza.

Similarly, the identification of a suspected participant in an attack involves different questions from the assessment of regional military developments.

The agencies may contribute information to shared assessments, but they retain different institutional responsibilities and lines of authority.

Their cooperation is intended to bring together expertise that no single organization possesses in full.

Nevertheless, cooperation does not eliminate the possibility of competing assessments, communication failures, or institutional disagreements.

Intelligence Cooperation in the Campaign Against Hamas

Following October 7, cooperation between Israeli intelligence and military institutions became a central feature of the campaign against Hamas.

Publicly documented operations have involved combinations of military intelligence, internal security assessments, specialized military capabilities, and operational planning.

One prominent example was the rescue of four Israeli hostages from Nuseirat in June 2024.

The operation involved the IDF, Shin Bet, and Israel's police counterterrorism unit, Yamam.

The hostages were rescued alive, while the operation and accompanying Israeli military action caused substantial Palestinian casualties. The number of people killed and the circumstances of individual deaths have been disputed.

The mission illustrated the importance of cooperation between organizations with different capabilities.

It also demonstrated that operational success in recovering hostages must be examined alongside the consequences for civilians in the surrounding area.

Other operations against Hamas leaders have similarly involved intelligence assessments supporting military decisions.

However, the precise contribution of each agency is not always publicly disclosed.

Journalistic examination therefore requires caution when attributing particular actions to a specific institution.

The Importance of Intelligence Verification

One of the most consequential responsibilities of an intelligence establishment is evaluating whether information is reliable.

An intelligence assessment may draw upon several sources, each with different limitations.

The presence of multiple sources does not necessarily guarantee accuracy, particularly when they rely on the same original information.

Analysts must consider whether information is current, whether alternative explanations exist, and whether conclusions are supported by sufficient evidence.

These concerns become especially important when intelligence is used to identify a person for possible military targeting.

International humanitarian law requires parties to distinguish between civilians and combatants or other lawful military targets.

It also requires proportionality assessments and feasible precautions to reduce civilian harm.

Intelligence confidence alone does not determine whether an attack is lawful.

A military decision must also consider the status of the proposed target, the anticipated civilian consequences, and the applicable legal requirements.

Mistaken identification can lead to irreversible harm.

The history of Israeli intelligence includes incidents demonstrating these risks, including the Lillehammer affair and other controversial operations.

These examples remain relevant when examining contemporary intelligence-led warfare.

Oversight, Secrecy and Accountability

Intelligence institutions operate under conditions of secrecy because public disclosure of sensitive information can compromise legitimate security activities.

However, secrecy creates challenges for democratic oversight and accountability.

In Israel, intelligence and security institutions operate within different legal and administrative frameworks.

Government officials, parliamentary bodies, courts, and internal oversight mechanisms have varying responsibilities for supervising their activities.

The degree of transparency differs between institutions and types of operations.

Certain activities become publicly known through official investigations, court cases, government disclosures, or investigative reporting.

Others remain classified for years or decades.

This makes it difficult for journalists and the public to evaluate every claim concerning intelligence successes or failures.

Official statements may provide important information, but they do not necessarily reveal the full evidence behind an operation.

Likewise, anonymous accounts and investigative reports require careful verification.

A responsible examination of intelligence activity must therefore distinguish established facts from allegations, institutional claims, and unresolved questions.

The Limits of an Advanced Intelligence System

Israel's intelligence establishment possesses extensive experience, specialized institutions, and sophisticated technological capabilities.

Yet its history demonstrates that no intelligence system is infallible.

The failure to prevent October 7 exposed weaknesses that could not be explained simply by a lack of technology.

It raised deeper questions about assumptions, leadership, organizational communication, and the interpretation of warning signs.

The same intelligence establishment has also contributed to operations that located hostages, identified senior armed-group figures, and supported military action.

These different outcomes demonstrate that intelligence performance cannot be reduced to a single measure of success or failure.

An agency may possess significant capabilities while still making consequential mistakes.

Its assessments may help prevent attacks, but incorrect conclusions can also contribute to unlawful or harmful decisions.

The challenge is not merely to collect more information.

It is to understand that information accurately, recognize uncertainty, and ensure that decisions based upon it are subject to appropriate scrutiny.

Understanding the Intelligence Network Behind the Hunt

The campaign against Hamas involves more than Israeli soldiers operating in Gaza.

It draws upon an intelligence establishment whose responsibilities extend across military analysis, internal security, and foreign intelligence.

Mossad, Shin Bet, and Aman each contribute different forms of expertise.

Their work helps Israeli authorities investigate threats, understand armed organizations, assess military capabilities, and support decisions about security operations.

Yet the events of October 7 demonstrated that even an extensive intelligence network can fail when information is misunderstood or institutional assumptions go unchallenged.

The subsequent campaign against Hamas has brought renewed attention to the capabilities, responsibilities, and limitations of these agencies.

Understanding their separate roles provides the foundation for examining how intelligence cooperation functions in practice.

The next chapter explores that relationship in greater detail: how Israel's security agencies coordinate their work, how information moves between institutions, and why cooperation can be essential to complex military and hostage-rescue operations.

Chapter 4 — How Israel's Security Agencies Work Together

Inside the Coordination Between Intelligence, Military Command and Special Operations

Behind many of Israel's military operations against Hamas stands a complex network of intelligence agencies, military commanders, specialized units, and political decision-makers.

Although Mossad, Shin Bet, and Aman each have distinct responsibilities, modern security threats rarely fit neatly within the boundaries of a single institution.

A Hamas commander may operate inside Gaza while maintaining connections with political representatives abroad. A financial network may involve individuals in several countries. Information concerning hostages may originate from different intelligence sources, while any rescue attempt requires military planning and coordination.

These circumstances make cooperation between security institutions an important part of Israel's counterterrorism strategy.

However, cooperation is not simply a matter of sharing information.

Different organizations have separate leadership structures, operational responsibilities, analytical methods, and institutional priorities. Their assessments may sometimes reinforce one another, but they may also conflict.

The challenge is to combine relevant expertise without allowing institutional assumptions, incomplete information, or communication failures to undermine decision-making.

The Hamas-led attacks of October 7, 2023, exposed serious weaknesses in Israel's security system. The military campaign that followed placed renewed emphasis on cooperation between intelligence agencies and operational forces.

Understanding how these institutions work together helps explain both the capabilities and limitations of Israel's campaign against Hamas.

Different Institutions, Shared Security Objectives

Israel's intelligence and security establishment is built around several organizations with different mandates.

Aman, the IDF's Military Intelligence Directorate, is responsible for military intelligence and assessments concerning potential adversaries.

Shin Bet, also known as the Israel Security Agency, focuses on internal security, counterterrorism, and intelligence concerning threats involving Israel and the Palestinian territories.

Mossad primarily handles foreign intelligence and certain covert activities outside Israel.

The IDF's operational commands are responsible for planning and conducting military operations, while specialized military and police units may carry out particular missions.

These institutions do not form a single organization under one intelligence commander.

They operate within separate administrative and command structures, although their activities can overlap.

Aman belongs to the military establishment. Mossad and Shin Bet report directly to the prime minister through their respective institutional arrangements.

The IDF's operational commands function through the military chain of command, subject to civilian political authority.

This separation creates opportunities for specialization.

It also makes coordination necessary whenever a security issue involves more than one institution.

Why Intelligence Sharing Matters

Intelligence agencies rarely possess a complete understanding of a complex security threat.

One institution may have information about an organization's leadership, while another may hold assessments concerning military capabilities or activities in a different geographical area.

Information can also be incomplete, outdated, contradictory, or open to multiple interpretations.

Cooperation allows analysts and decision-makers to compare different assessments and identify questions requiring further investigation.

In principle, this process can improve the reliability of intelligence conclusions.

However, the existence of multiple sources does not automatically establish that information is correct.

Several reports may ultimately originate from the same source. Different agencies may also interpret similar evidence through different institutional assumptions.

Intelligence sharing is therefore most useful when it includes critical examination rather than simple confirmation.

Analysts must remain willing to challenge conclusions, identify uncertainty, and consider alternative explanations.

The consequences of failing to do so became particularly visible before October 7.

The Role of Military Intelligence in Joint Operations

Aman plays an important role in providing military intelligence to the IDF.

Its assessments help military commanders understand potential threats, adversary capabilities, and developments relevant to operational planning.

Within the military, intelligence personnel work alongside operational commands and other specialized units.

The Southern Command has been particularly important in military operations involving Gaza.

Military intelligence can contribute to assessments concerning Hamas's armed formations, weapons infrastructure, and broader military capabilities.

However, intelligence assessments and operational decisions are not identical.

Information about a suspected military objective must be evaluated alongside legal requirements, the anticipated effects of military action, and the responsibilities of the relevant commanders.

Military planners must also consider uncertainty.

The fact that intelligence identifies a location or individual as potentially significant does not automatically mean that an attack is authorized or lawful.

These distinctions become especially important in densely populated areas, where the consequences of inaccurate information can be severe.

Shin Bet and the Investigation of Hamas Networks

Shin Bet has historically played a central role in Israeli counterterrorism involving Palestinian armed organizations.

Its expertise includes investigations of suspected militant networks, assessments of individuals believed to be involved in attacks, and information relevant to internal security.

During operations involving Hamas, Shin Bet may contribute intelligence and analytical expertise that complements the IDF's military capabilities.

The agency's involvement has been publicly acknowledged in several major operations, including hostage rescues.

Its role illustrates the importance of combining information about individuals with broader military assessments.

However, intelligence concerning a person's suspected organizational affiliation requires careful interpretation.

A political connection, family relationship, civilian administrative role, or other association does not necessarily establish direct participation in hostilities.

The distinction matters because intelligence assessments can influence detention, investigation, and military decisions.

Security cooperation must therefore operate within applicable legal requirements and safeguards.

Mossad and the International Dimension

Hamas's activities and relationships have extended beyond the Gaza Strip.

Its external political leadership has maintained contacts with regional governments and other organizations, while allegations concerning international financing and military support have attracted the attention of several governments.

Mossad's foreign intelligence mandate makes it relevant to security questions involving international networks and developments outside Israel.

Its activities may intersect with those of Shin Bet and Aman when an external issue has consequences for Israeli security.

However, the precise division of responsibilities in particular operations is not always publicly known.

Foreign intelligence cooperation may also involve diplomatic relationships, international legal questions, and the sovereignty of other states.

These considerations distinguish overseas intelligence activity from military operations conducted within an active conflict zone.

Not every operation attributed to Israeli intelligence has been officially acknowledged, and journalistic reporting must distinguish verified involvement from allegations.

From Intelligence Assessment to Military Decision

One of the most consequential aspects of intelligence cooperation is the relationship between collected information and decisions involving military force.

Intelligence personnel may assess whether an individual or location is associated with an armed organization.

Military commanders must then consider the operational relevance of that information.

Legal advisers may be involved in evaluating the applicable rules governing a proposed operation.

The exact procedures vary according to the nature of the operation, the circumstances, and the relevant authorities.

The public record does not provide a complete account of Israel's internal authorization processes for every type of military action.

Nevertheless, international humanitarian law establishes obligations that apply independently of an intelligence agency's confidence in its conclusions.

Parties to an armed conflict must distinguish between civilians and lawful military targets.

They must also comply with the prohibition on indiscriminate attacks, assess whether expected incidental civilian harm would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated, and take feasible precautions to minimize civilian harm.

Intelligence cooperation can support these assessments, but it does not replace them.

The ultimate responsibility for a military decision cannot be transferred to a database, automated system, or intelligence estimate.

The Role of Special Operations Units

Israel maintains specialized military and police units capable of conducting missions requiring particular training and capabilities.

Among the best-known are Sayeret Matkal, Shayetet 13, Shaldag, and Yamam.

These units have different responsibilities.

Sayeret Matkal is associated with special reconnaissance and certain high-risk military operations.

Shayetet 13 is the Israeli Navy's commando unit.

Shaldag is a specialized unit within the Israeli Air Force.

Yamam is the Israel Police's national counterterrorism unit and has extensive experience in hostage-rescue operations.

Their missions and institutional relationships differ, and they should not be treated as interchangeable.

Publicly documented operations sometimes involve cooperation between specialized units and intelligence agencies.

Such cooperation can be particularly important in hostage-rescue missions, where military action must be coordinated with efforts to protect captives.

However, the operational details of many missions remain classified.

Public understanding is therefore usually limited to information released by the authorities, testimony, and independent reporting.

Hostage Rescue as a Test of Cooperation

Hostage-rescue operations represent some of the most demanding situations confronting security institutions.

The central objective is to recover captives alive.

However, the presence of armed captors, uncertainty about hostage conditions, and the risk of civilian casualties can create difficult operational and legal questions.

Information relevant to a rescue may involve several institutions.

Intelligence agencies can contribute assessments concerning the hostages and the circumstances of their captivity.

Military and specialized police units may be responsible for conducting an authorized rescue operation.

Medical and other emergency services may become involved in its aftermath.

The success of a mission depends on more than the actions of the personnel who physically recover the hostages.

It also depends on the reliability of the underlying information and the ability of different institutions to fulfill their responsibilities.

Even when hostages are successfully rescued, the broader consequences of the operation require examination.

This became particularly clear in June 2024.

The Nuseirat Rescue Operation

On June 8, 2024, Israeli forces rescued four hostages from the Nuseirat area of central Gaza.

The rescued hostages were Noa Argamani, Almog Meir Jan, Andrey Kozlov, and Shlomi Ziv.

All four had been abducted during the October 7 attack on the Nova music festival.

The operation involved the IDF, Shin Bet, and Yamam.

Israeli authorities described the mission as the result of extensive intelligence work and coordination between security institutions.

The four hostages were recovered alive and returned to Israel.

For their families, the operation brought an end to months of captivity and uncertainty.

However, the rescue also took place amid intense fighting and Israeli military action in a densely populated area.

Palestinian health authorities reported a large number of deaths, including civilians. Israeli authorities disputed aspects of the casualty reporting and described the military action as necessary to support the rescue.

The exact circumstances surrounding individual deaths have remained subjects of investigation and debate.

The operation therefore illustrates two realities simultaneously.

It demonstrated that cooperation between intelligence agencies and specialized forces could contribute to the successful recovery of hostages.

It also demonstrated the potentially devastating consequences of military operations conducted in populated areas.

A comprehensive assessment must consider both the rescue and the civilian harm associated with the operation.

Cooperation During Operations Against Hamas Leaders

Israel's campaign against Hamas has included operations directed at senior military and political figures.

The identification and targeting of these individuals have been important elements of Israel's declared objective of dismantling Hamas's military capabilities.

Publicly reported operations have involved intelligence assessments and military action against figures such as Mohammed Deif, Marwan Issa, and other senior commanders.

However, the precise role of each intelligence agency in particular operations is not always disclosed.

Official announcements may identify the military units involved or state that intelligence agencies contributed information without revealing the full process.

This limitation matters for journalism.

It is possible to describe the confirmed outcome of an operation without claiming knowledge of classified intelligence methods or internal decision-making.

It is also important to distinguish between an operation intended to kill a particular individual and an encounter in which that person's identity becomes known afterward.

The death of Yahya Sinwar in Rafah in October 2024 is a notable example.

Israeli troops encountered and killed Sinwar during a military engagement, but the encounter was not publicly described as the culmination of a precisely directed raid against his confirmed location.

His death demonstrated that an intelligence priority and the actual circumstances of a military operation do not always coincide.

October 7: When Coordination Failed

The October 7 attacks exposed profound weaknesses in Israel's security and intelligence establishment.

Despite extensive intelligence capabilities and sophisticated border surveillance, Hamas-led armed groups were able to breach Israeli defenses and attack military and civilian locations.

Subsequent investigations raised questions about intelligence assessments, the handling of warnings, military preparedness, and communication between institutions.

Some warning signs had been available before the attack.

The central failure was not necessarily the complete absence of information, but the inability to interpret and act upon it adequately.

Institutional assumptions about Hamas's intentions played an important role in public examinations of the failure.

The belief that Hamas was deterred from launching a major confrontation influenced the way information was assessed.

When evidence contradicted that assumption, it was not always given sufficient weight.

The consequences were catastrophic.

The attacks killed approximately 1,200 people in Israel and resulted in 251 people being taken hostage.

The events demonstrated that an intelligence system can possess substantial resources while still failing to understand an adversary's intentions.

The Danger of Institutional Assumptions

Intelligence cooperation is not effective merely because agencies exchange information.

The quality of the conclusions matters.

Organizations may develop assumptions based on previous experiences, established assessments, and political expectations.

Over time, those assumptions can become difficult to challenge.

When several institutions share the same underlying interpretation, information that appears inconsistent with it may receive insufficient attention.

This is a recognized danger in intelligence analysis.

The problem is particularly serious when decision-makers interpret an adversary's behavior primarily through expectations about what that adversary is likely to do.

October 7 demonstrated the consequences of underestimating an organization's willingness and capacity to carry out a major attack.

Improving coordination therefore requires more than technical information-sharing systems.

It requires analytical independence, institutional accountability, and a willingness to examine uncomfortable conclusions.

Accountability and Independent Oversight

Cooperation between intelligence and military institutions can concentrate significant power within a national security system.

This makes oversight important.

Intelligence agencies operate with a high degree of secrecy, while military operations may involve information that governments consider too sensitive for immediate disclosure.

However, secrecy complicates public accountability.

In Israel, different institutions are subject to legal, administrative, parliamentary, and judicial forms of oversight.

The effectiveness and transparency of these mechanisms have been debated, particularly in relation to security operations involving Palestinians.

Independent investigations, judicial proceedings, and credible journalism can help establish what occurred when official information is incomplete.

Oversight is relevant not only after intelligence failures but also after operations that governments describe as successful.

A military operation may achieve its immediate objective while still raising legitimate questions about its authorization, proportionality, or wider consequences.

The assessment of intelligence cooperation should therefore include both operational outcomes and compliance with applicable law.

Technology and Interagency Cooperation

Modern intelligence cooperation increasingly involves large quantities of digital information.

Different institutions may rely on satellite imagery, aerial surveillance, communications intelligence, databases, and analytical systems.

Technological developments can improve the ability to compare information and identify possible connections.

Artificial intelligence may also assist analysts in processing data.

However, automated analysis introduces additional concerns.

Information may contain errors, reflect incomplete records, or produce misleading associations.

The use of technology does not eliminate the need for independent verification.

Investigative reporting about Israeli targeting systems has raised questions about how automated tools are used, the degree of human review, and the reliability of resulting assessments.

The IDF has disputed elements of this reporting and maintains that human personnel remain responsible for military targeting decisions.

Because many technical details are classified, the full operation of these systems cannot be independently assessed from public information alone.

The central issue is whether technology improves the reliability of decisions without weakening accountability.

The Strategic Limits of Intelligence Cooperation

Effective cooperation can help security institutions understand threats and coordinate responses.

It may contribute to preventing attacks, rescuing hostages, and disrupting armed organizations.

Yet intelligence cooperation cannot by itself resolve every strategic challenge.

The removal of a senior commander may disrupt an armed network without eliminating the organization.

The destruction of military infrastructure may reduce immediate capabilities while leaving political grievances and recruitment conditions unresolved.

Likewise, successful information-sharing does not guarantee that political and military leaders will make effective decisions.

Intelligence provides assessments, not certainty.

The distinction between operational achievement and long-term strategic success is therefore essential.

Israel's campaign against Hamas involves questions that extend beyond the capabilities of its intelligence agencies.

These include the future governance of Gaza, the protection of civilians, regional security arrangements, and the conditions under which further violence might be prevented.

No intelligence system can resolve those questions through surveillance or military targeting alone.

The Network Behind the Military Campaign

The cooperation between Mossad, Shin Bet, Aman, the IDF, and specialized security units forms an important part of Israel's national security strategy.

Each institution brings different responsibilities and capabilities.

Together, they contribute to investigations, threat assessments, military planning, and selected security operations.

Publicly documented hostage rescues and operations against senior Hamas figures demonstrate the role that cooperation can play in achieving particular objectives.

At the same time, the failures preceding October 7 reveal the dangers of incomplete communication, flawed assumptions, and inadequate responses to warning signs.

The central lesson is that effective intelligence cooperation requires more than advanced technology or extensive information.

It requires reliable analysis, clearly defined responsibilities, critical examination of assumptions, and accountability for decisions.

These principles become particularly important when intelligence is used to identify individuals or support operations involving lethal force.

Understanding the institutions behind Israel's campaign provides the foundation for examining the next element of intelligence work: the role of human sources and the difficult process of evaluating information obtained from people.

The next chapter explores Human Intelligence and the Search for Information, examining the historical importance of informants, witnesses, interviews, and human intelligence assessments in Israel's security operations.

Chapter 5 — Human Intelligence and the Search for Information

The Human Sources Behind Israel's Intelligence Operations

In an era dominated by satellites, drones, artificial intelligence, and sophisticated surveillance technology, one of the oldest forms of intelligence gathering remains important: information obtained from human beings.

Known within the intelligence community as human intelligence, or HUMINT, this form of information collection has played a significant role in Israel's security strategy for decades.

Human intelligence can include information provided by witnesses, informants, voluntary sources, individuals questioned during investigations, and people with knowledge of events or organizations.

Unlike technological surveillance, which may reveal movements, communications, or physical activity, human sources can sometimes provide information about intentions, personal relationships, organizational decisions, and events that have not been recorded electronically.

For Israeli intelligence agencies, these forms of information have historically been relevant to investigations involving Palestinian armed organizations, including Hamas.

However, human intelligence is also one of the most complicated and controversial areas of security work.

A person may provide accurate information, misunderstand an event, exaggerate their knowledge, deliberately mislead investigators, or make statements under pressure.

The challenge is not simply obtaining information. It is determining whether that information can be trusted.

This distinction becomes particularly important when intelligence contributes to military operations, detention decisions, or attempts to locate hostages.

What Human Intelligence Actually Means

Human intelligence is often portrayed in films as a world of secret agents, concealed identities, and dramatic meetings.

In reality, the category is much broader.

Information from human beings can emerge through ordinary witness testimony, interviews with individuals familiar with a particular situation, reports from people concerned about potential violence, and formal security investigations.

Some information is voluntarily provided.

Other information may be obtained through structured interviews or interrogations conducted by authorized institutions.

Intelligence organizations may also maintain confidential relationships with individuals who possess relevant knowledge.

The precise nature of these relationships is often classified, making it difficult to determine how particular intelligence assessments were produced.

In the context of Israel's conflict with Hamas, publicly available information indicates that human intelligence has been one component of a wider system involving military intelligence, internal security investigations, and technological collection.

However, the public record rarely reveals the full origin of information used in a particular operation.

Official statements may describe an operation as intelligence-led without explaining whether its underlying information came from human sources, technological surveillance, recovered documents, or a combination of different methods.

This limitation is important.

A responsible examination of intelligence activity must distinguish between the known outcome of an operation and assumptions about the methods that produced it.

The Historical Role of Human Sources in Israeli Security

Human intelligence has been part of Israel's security establishment since before the creation of the state in 1948.

During the British Mandate, Jewish defense and political organizations developed intelligence networks to gather information about regional developments and security threats.

Following independence, Israeli intelligence institutions expanded their activities as the country faced conventional military threats, cross-border attacks, and the emergence of organized Palestinian armed movements.

As organizations such as Fatah, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and later Hamas developed, Israeli security agencies increasingly sought to understand their leadership structures, political objectives, and armed activities.

Technological capabilities were more limited during the early decades of Israeli statehood.

Human reporting consequently occupied an important place in intelligence assessments.

Over time, communications intelligence, aerial imagery, and digital analysis became increasingly sophisticated.

Nevertheless, technological development did not eliminate the potential value of information obtained from people.

A photograph might show that individuals entered a building, but it would not necessarily explain the purpose of their meeting.

A communication might indicate contact between two individuals without establishing the nature of their relationship.

Human testimony could provide additional context, although that testimony would still require verification.

The relationship between human and technological intelligence therefore developed as one of complementary capabilities rather than complete replacement.

Shin Bet and Human Intelligence

Among Israel's security institutions, Shin Bet has been particularly associated with investigations involving individuals and armed networks.

The agency's responsibilities include internal security, counterterrorism, and intelligence concerning threats involving Israel and the Palestinian territories.

For decades, its work has included investigations into Palestinian armed organizations and individuals suspected of involvement in attacks.

Human intelligence has been relevant to these activities because identifying an organization's structure often requires understanding personal relationships, responsibilities, and events that are not publicly documented.

However, Shin Bet's intelligence activities have also generated substantial controversy.

Human rights organizations have criticized Israeli interrogation practices, administrative detention, restrictions on Palestinian movement, and the treatment of individuals suspected of security offenses.

Israeli authorities have argued that security investigations are necessary to prevent attacks against civilians.

The tension between national security and individual rights has consequently become a recurring subject of legal and political debate.

One landmark development occurred in 1999, when Israel's Supreme Court ruled against the use of several physical interrogation methods previously employed by security investigators.

The decision reinforced the principle that security objectives do not provide unlimited authority to use coercive methods.

The prohibition of torture and cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment remains a fundamental legal obligation.

This is particularly important because coercion can undermine both human rights and the reliability of information.

Why Human Intelligence Can Be Unreliable

Information obtained from people is not automatically accurate.

Human memory is imperfect, particularly when events involve fear, violence, confusion, or prolonged stress.

Witnesses may remember the same event differently.

Individuals may confuse names, locations, dates, or relationships.

A person may sincerely believe that information is correct while being mistaken.

Other sources may possess motives to exaggerate, conceal facts, or deliberately provide false information.

These limitations are especially significant in intelligence investigations, where information may be incomplete and difficult to verify independently.

The risks become greater when a person's statement contributes to an accusation against someone else.

An individual may identify another person as a member of an armed organization without having direct knowledge of that person's activities.

A relationship between two people may be interpreted as evidence of military cooperation when it is actually familial, professional, or social.

Similarly, information obtained during detention may be affected by fear, pressure, or expectations about what interrogators want to hear.

These possibilities do not mean that all human intelligence is unreliable.

They mean that credibility must be assessed rather than assumed.

The consequences of inaccurate information can be severe, particularly when intelligence contributes to decisions involving lethal force.

The Difference Between Information and Evidence

One of the most important distinctions in intelligence work is the difference between receiving information and establishing a fact.

An intelligence report may contain a claim that has not yet been independently verified.

A source may describe an event without possessing direct knowledge of it.

An assessment may combine confirmed facts with interpretations and assumptions.

These categories should not be treated as interchangeable.

For example, information suggesting that an individual has connections to Hamas does not necessarily establish that the person participates in its military activities.

Hamas has historically maintained political, administrative, social, and armed structures.

The legal status of an individual depends on their actual role and conduct, not merely on an organizational association.

This distinction matters when intelligence is used to support military targeting.

International humanitarian law requires parties to distinguish civilians from lawful military targets.

An intelligence agency's belief that a person is connected to an armed organization does not, by itself, resolve whether an attack would be lawful.

The assessment must consider the individual's status, the available evidence, the circumstances of the conflict, and other applicable legal obligations.

Accurate intelligence is therefore essential, but it is only one element of a lawful military decision.

Human Intelligence and the Search for Hamas Leadership

Following the October 7, 2023, attacks, identifying Hamas's senior leadership became a major objective of Israel's military campaign.

Israeli authorities publicly identified Yahya Sinwar, Mohammed Deif, and other senior figures as important targets.

The search for these individuals involved a wider intelligence effort whose full details remain classified.

Public reporting indicates that Israeli security institutions drew upon different intelligence capabilities while investigating Hamas's leadership and military infrastructure.

Human information may contribute to such investigations, but the specific role of confidential sources in individual operations is often impossible to establish independently.

This distinction is particularly relevant to the search for Yahya Sinwar.

Sinwar became one of Israel's most prominent targets after October 7.

He had served as Hamas's leader in Gaza since 2017 and was regarded by Israeli authorities as a central figure in planning the attacks.

For months, Israeli military and intelligence institutions sought to locate him.

His movements and whereabouts became subjects of extensive public speculation.

Yet the circumstances of his death in October 2024 revealed an important difference between a long-running intelligence search and a precisely directed operation.

Sinwar was killed during an encounter with Israeli soldiers in Rafah.

According to Israeli accounts, the soldiers did not initially know that the individual they had encountered was Sinwar.

His identity was established afterward.

The episode demonstrated that extensive intelligence efforts do not always lead directly to a planned operation against a confirmed location.

Sometimes the outcome of a military encounter is established only after the event.

The Search for Hostages

Human intelligence has also been relevant to efforts to locate people taken hostage during the October 7 attacks.

Hamas and other armed groups abducted 251 people into Gaza.

The hostages included civilians and members of the Israeli security forces.

Their captivity created one of the most urgent challenges facing Israeli authorities.

Locating hostages required information about their possible whereabouts, health, conditions of detention, and the individuals or groups holding them.

However, the precise information available to Israeli intelligence agencies at different stages of the conflict has not been fully disclosed.

The search also involved difficult decisions.

A military operation intended to attack an armed group could endanger hostages if their location was unknown.

Likewise, an operation based on inaccurate information could place captives and nearby civilians at additional risk.

The rescue of four hostages from Nuseirat in June 2024 demonstrated the importance of intelligence and coordination between security institutions.

The operation involved Shin Bet, the IDF, and Yamam, Israel's national police counterterrorism unit.

The four hostages were recovered alive.

However, the operation and associated military action caused substantial Palestinian casualties, including civilians, highlighting the humanitarian consequences of rescue missions conducted in populated areas.

The case illustrates the importance of evaluating both operational outcomes and the wider human cost.

Interrogations and the Treatment of Detainees

Interrogations have long been part of security investigations conducted by governments around the world.

They may involve questioning individuals suspected of involvement in armed activity or people believed to possess relevant information.

In Israel's conflict with Hamas, detention and interrogation practices have attracted considerable scrutiny.

Israeli authorities have described questioning detainees as one source of information about armed organizations.

However, the treatment of Palestinian detainees has been the subject of serious allegations, including claims of physical abuse, coercion, degrading treatment, and torture.

These allegations have been raised by human rights organizations, United Nations bodies, detainees, and investigative journalists.

Israeli authorities have disputed some allegations and have acknowledged or investigated certain incidents.

The legal standards governing detention and interrogation remain essential regardless of the security circumstances.

Torture is prohibited under international law.

Coerced statements also raise serious questions about reliability.

A person subjected to extreme pressure may provide inaccurate information in an attempt to end the experience.

This creates a direct connection between human rights protections and the quality of intelligence.

Information obtained through unlawful coercion may harm innocent people while also producing misleading assessments.

Effective security investigations therefore require both reliable information and compliance with applicable legal standards.

Civilian Populations and the Risks of Suspicion

Intelligence operations involving armed organizations in populated areas create particular risks for civilians.

Gaza has been home to a large civilian population living alongside political institutions, administrative structures, and armed groups.

This environment complicates efforts to distinguish between military participation and ordinary civilian activity.

A person may have relatives associated with Hamas without participating in armed operations.

Someone may work in a civilian institution administered by Hamas without belonging to its military wing.

A resident may possess information about local events without having any involvement in violence.

These distinctions are fundamental.

Treating broad social or political associations as proof of military participation risks misidentifying civilians.

It can also contribute to collective suspicion, restrictions, and other consequences affecting people who have not engaged in hostilities.

International humanitarian law prohibits direct attacks against civilians unless and for such time as they directly participate in hostilities.

It also prohibits collective punishment.

The protection of civilians therefore remains an independent obligation even when armed organizations operate within civilian communities.

The Psychological Pressure of Intelligence Investigations

Human intelligence is not only a technical or institutional activity.

It also involves people who may face considerable psychological pressure.

Witnesses may fear retaliation.

Families may be concerned about the consequences of speaking to authorities.

Individuals questioned during investigations may experience anxiety about their safety, legal position, or treatment.

People living in conflict zones may also distrust security institutions because of previous experiences or broader political circumstances.

These realities can affect whether individuals are willing to provide information and how accurately they communicate what they know.

The emotional impact of prolonged conflict can further complicate testimony.

Trauma, grief, displacement, and uncertainty may influence memory and perception.

These factors do not invalidate the experiences of witnesses.

They demonstrate why intelligence assessments should consider the circumstances in which information is obtained.

Understanding human behavior is therefore an important part of evaluating human intelligence.

Technology Cannot Replace Human Judgment

Modern intelligence systems can process enormous quantities of information.

Digital surveillance, satellite imagery, communications analysis, and artificial intelligence can assist investigators in identifying possible patterns and relationships.

However, these systems cannot eliminate the need for human judgment.

A technological system may identify an apparent connection without understanding its social or political context.

A database may contain inaccurate information.

An automated assessment may produce a conclusion that appears authoritative despite relying on incomplete evidence.

Human intelligence can sometimes provide additional context, but it also carries its own uncertainties.

The challenge is to avoid treating either technological output or human testimony as automatically reliable.

This is particularly important when intelligence assessments contribute to decisions involving detention or military force.

Human review must be meaningful rather than a formality.

Decision-makers remain responsible for evaluating uncertainty and considering the potential consequences of mistakes.

Intelligence Failures and the Lessons of October 7

The Hamas-led attacks of October 7 demonstrated the limitations of Israel's intelligence establishment.

Despite extensive surveillance capabilities and years of intelligence activity concerning Gaza, Israeli authorities failed to prevent the assault.

Subsequent investigations raised questions about the interpretation of warnings, assumptions about Hamas's intentions, and the treatment of information that contradicted established assessments.

The failure was not simply technological.

It also involved human analysis and institutional judgment.

Intelligence agencies can collect information while misunderstanding its significance.

They may focus on familiar patterns and underestimate unexpected developments.

They may also become overly confident in assessments that have not been adequately challenged.

October 7 demonstrated that understanding an adversary requires more than knowing its organizational structure or possessing advanced surveillance technology.

It requires the willingness to reconsider assumptions and recognize uncertainty.

Human intelligence can contribute to that process, but it cannot guarantee accurate predictions.

The Ethical Responsibilities of Intelligence Agencies

Human intelligence raises important ethical questions because it involves relationships between institutions and individuals who may possess unequal power.

Security agencies have legitimate responsibilities to investigate threats and protect civilians.

However, the methods used to obtain information must comply with legal obligations.

The prohibition of torture, protection against arbitrary detention, and safeguards concerning personal information remain relevant even during armed conflict.

These obligations are not obstacles to reliable intelligence.

They are part of the framework within which legitimate security institutions are expected to operate.

The consequences of mistakes also require accountability.

When inaccurate information contributes to unlawful detention or civilian deaths, the underlying decisions should be subject to meaningful examination.

Secrecy may be necessary to protect legitimate intelligence activities, but it should not eliminate responsibility for unlawful conduct.

The credibility of an intelligence institution depends not only on its ability to identify threats but also on the reliability and legality of its actions.

The Human Dimension of the Hunt for Hamas

Israel's campaign against Hamas has brought renewed attention to the role of human intelligence.

Behind technological systems and military operations are individuals attempting to understand an armed organization operating within a complex political and social environment.

Human sources can provide information that technology alone may not reveal.

They can also be mistaken, misinformed, frightened, or deliberately deceptive.

The value of human intelligence therefore depends on careful assessment, independent verification, and responsible decision-making.

The search for Hamas leaders and hostages demonstrates both the importance and limitations of intelligence obtained from people.

It also illustrates why information must never be confused with certainty.

In a conflict where inaccurate assessments can result in civilian deaths, wrongful detention, or failed rescue attempts, the consequences of intelligence errors are profound.

The central challenge is not merely to obtain information about Hamas.

It is to determine what can be established reliably, what remains uncertain, and how that information may lawfully and responsibly be used.

Human intelligence remains an important part of Israel's security system, but it operates alongside increasingly sophisticated technological capabilities.

The next chapter examines those technologies in greater detail: Drones, Satellites and Digital Surveillance, and how they have transformed the modern intelligence environment surrounding Israel's campaign against Hamas.

Chapter 6 — Drones, Satellites and Digital Surveillance

How Advanced Technology Has Transformed Israel's Intelligence War Against Hamas

Modern warfare is no longer fought exclusively by soldiers on the ground, aircraft in the sky, and naval forces at sea.

A significant part of contemporary military activity now takes place through information systems, electronic communications, surveillance platforms, and digital analysis.

For Israel, technological intelligence has become an important component of national security.

Over several decades, the country has developed advanced capabilities in unmanned aircraft, satellite observation, communications intelligence, cyber technology, and military data analysis.

These systems have changed how Israeli security institutions observe potential threats, assess military developments, and support operations against armed organizations.

In the conflict with Hamas, technological intelligence has been particularly significant because of the difficulties associated with monitoring an armed organization operating within the densely populated Gaza Strip.

Hamas has developed military capabilities that include armed units, rockets, underground infrastructure, and decentralized networks.

Israeli security institutions have attempted to understand these capabilities through a combination of human intelligence and technological information.

Yet technology has not eliminated uncertainty.

The Hamas-led attacks of October 7, 2023, demonstrated that sophisticated surveillance systems do not necessarily guarantee that a threat will be recognized or prevented.

Understanding the role of technology therefore requires examining both what modern intelligence systems can accomplish and what they cannot reliably establish.

The Evolution of Israeli Military Technology

Israel's investment in military technology developed partly from its geographical and strategic circumstances.

The country's relatively small territory, history of armed conflict, and concern about attacks from neighboring areas contributed to a long-standing emphasis on early warning and military preparedness.

During the early decades of statehood, Israeli intelligence relied heavily on human reporting, conventional reconnaissance, and military observation.

As electronic systems developed, intelligence agencies gained access to additional forms of information.

Radar, aerial photography, communications monitoring, and increasingly sophisticated computers expanded the possibilities for military intelligence.

Over time, Israel developed a domestic defense technology industry involving companies such as Israel Aerospace Industries, Elbit Systems, and Rafael Advanced Defense Systems.

These companies became important participants in the development of aircraft, surveillance equipment, sensors, communications systems, and other defense technologies.

Israeli technological development has also been influenced by cooperation with foreign governments, particularly the United States.

The result has been a security environment in which military institutions increasingly depend on information collected and analyzed through technological systems.

However, possessing advanced equipment is not the same as accurately understanding an adversary.

The interpretation of information remains a separate challenge.

Drones and the Expansion of Aerial Surveillance

Unmanned aerial vehicles, commonly known as drones, have become an important feature of modern military operations.

Israel was among the countries that invested extensively in military drone development during the late twentieth century.

Early unmanned aircraft were used primarily for reconnaissance and observation.

They provided military commanders with aerial information without requiring a pilot to be physically present in the aircraft.

Over time, drone technology became more sophisticated.

Modern systems can support observation, mapping, reconnaissance, and other military functions.

Some unmanned aircraft are designed primarily to gather information, while others can carry weapons.

These different roles should not be confused.

In the context of Gaza, Israeli drones have been used extensively during periods of conflict.

They can provide aerial imagery of buildings, roads, open areas, and changes in the physical environment.

Such information may contribute to broader military assessments.

However, aerial observation has important limitations.

A drone may record a person's movement without establishing that person's identity or legal status.

The presence of individuals near a suspected military location does not automatically demonstrate involvement in armed activity.

Likewise, footage of a building cannot necessarily reveal what is happening inside it.

These limitations become especially important when surveillance information is used in decisions involving military force.

Surveillance Over a Densely Populated Territory

The Gaza Strip presents particular challenges for aerial intelligence.

It is a relatively small territory with a high population density, extensive urban development, and infrastructure that has been severely damaged during repeated periods of armed conflict.

Civilian homes, hospitals, schools, markets, roads, and other facilities exist within areas where armed organizations have also operated.

This physical environment makes it difficult to distinguish civilian activity from military activity based solely on visual information.

An individual moving through a neighborhood may be a resident, humanitarian worker, medical professional, armed fighter, or someone performing an entirely different function.

Aerial surveillance alone cannot reliably determine every person's identity or purpose.

The same applies to vehicles and buildings.

An object may appear significant in imagery while its actual use remains uncertain.

This creates a fundamental challenge for intelligence analysis.

Technological observation can provide valuable information, but the meaning of that information must be assessed carefully.

Inaccurate interpretation can contribute to mistaken military decisions.

The protection of civilians therefore requires more than the technical ability to observe an area.

It requires reliable identification, appropriate legal assessments, and feasible precautions.

Israel's Military Satellite Capabilities

Satellite technology has become another important component of Israel's intelligence infrastructure.

Israel has developed a series of reconnaissance satellites, including the Ofek family.

These satellites form part of the country's wider ability to observe geographical areas and assess developments relevant to national security.

Satellite imagery can provide information about physical infrastructure, changes in terrain, construction activity, and other visible developments.

Unlike aircraft, satellites operate from orbit and can contribute to observation across large geographical areas.

However, satellites also have limitations.

The usefulness of imagery depends on factors such as resolution, viewing conditions, timing, and the nature of the object being observed.

Satellite images do not automatically reveal the intentions of individuals or the purpose of every structure.

They also cannot provide a complete picture of activity occurring underground or inside buildings.

For Israeli military intelligence, satellite information is one potential component of broader assessments.

Its significance depends on how it is interpreted and compared with other available evidence.

The existence of satellite imagery does not establish that a particular military conclusion is correct.

Mapping and Geospatial Intelligence

Modern intelligence institutions increasingly rely on geospatial information.

Geospatial intelligence involves analyzing information connected to physical locations and geographical environments.

This can include satellite images, aerial photographs, maps, terrain information, and other location-based data.

Such information can help analysts understand how an area has changed over time.

It can also support assessments of infrastructure, transportation routes, and the effects of military operations.

In Gaza, geospatial information has been relevant not only to military assessments but also to humanitarian investigations.

Satellite imagery has been used by journalists, researchers, and international organizations to document destruction, damaged infrastructure, and changes in civilian areas.

This demonstrates that the same broad category of technology can serve different purposes.

Military institutions may use geographical information to support security assessments.

Humanitarian organizations may use it to examine civilian harm or access to essential services.

Investigative journalists may use it to compare official statements with visible evidence.

The value of geospatial information therefore extends beyond the battlefield.

However, imagery must be interpreted within its proper context.

A photograph can show physical damage without necessarily establishing who caused it, whether an attack was lawful, or what information was available to those responsible at the time.

Signals Intelligence and Electronic Communications

Signals intelligence, often abbreviated as SIGINT, involves collecting and analyzing information associated with electronic signals and communications.

It has become an important component of modern national security systems.

In Israel, Unit 8200 is widely associated with signals intelligence and advanced technological capabilities.

The unit operates within Aman, the IDF's Military Intelligence Directorate.

Public reporting has described its involvement in communications intelligence, technological analysis, and cyber-related activities.

However, the precise methods and capabilities of the unit are not fully public.

Electronic information can sometimes contribute to assessments of relationships, activities, and potential threats.

Yet communications data can also be incomplete or misleading.

A connection between two individuals does not necessarily establish that they share military responsibilities.

An electronic record may lack context.

A communication may be misunderstood or attributed incorrectly.

These uncertainties are especially important when digital information contributes to identifying suspected members of armed organizations.

The presence of an individual's information in an intelligence database does not automatically establish involvement in hostilities.

Digital Surveillance and Personal Information

Modern digital technology produces large quantities of information.

Mobile devices, online services, communications systems, and other electronic technologies can generate records associated with individuals and organizations.

Governments and intelligence agencies around the world have developed capabilities to analyze certain forms of digital information for security purposes.

Such capabilities raise important questions about privacy, oversight, and the treatment of personal data.

In the Israeli-Palestinian context, surveillance practices have attracted criticism from human rights organizations and investigative journalists.

Concerns have included the collection of personal information, the extent of surveillance over Palestinian populations, and the potential consequences of incorrect or intrusive data analysis.

Israeli authorities have maintained that intelligence capabilities are necessary to prevent attacks and protect national security.

The legal and ethical questions nevertheless remain significant.

Broad surveillance can affect people who are not suspected of participating in armed activity.

Information collected for one purpose may also be interpreted in ways that have consequences for individuals who are unaware of its existence.

The challenge is to ensure that security measures remain subject to appropriate legal safeguards and accountability.

The Difference Between Monitoring and Understanding

One of the most important limitations of technological intelligence is the distinction between observing activity and understanding its meaning.

A surveillance system may collect extensive information about movements, communications, or physical changes.

However, it cannot automatically explain why an event occurred or what an individual intended.

An armed organization may deliberately conceal information, but intelligence failures can also result from ordinary analytical mistakes.

A military analyst may interpret unfamiliar behavior through assumptions based on previous experience.

An institution may focus on information that supports its established assessment while overlooking evidence that suggests a different conclusion.

Technology can increase the amount of information available without necessarily improving the quality of interpretation.

This problem became particularly visible in the period preceding October 7.

October 7: When Advanced Surveillance Failed

Before October 7, 2023, Israel maintained extensive surveillance and defensive systems along the Gaza border.

These included observation capabilities, sensors, physical barriers, and military monitoring infrastructure.

The systems were intended to detect and respond to threats approaching or crossing the border.

Yet Hamas-led armed groups were able to launch a coordinated assault against southern Israel.

The attackers breached border defenses and attacked military positions and civilian communities.

Approximately 1,200 people were killed in Israel, and 251 people were taken hostage into Gaza.

The attack exposed serious weaknesses in Israeli preparedness and intelligence assessments.

Subsequent investigations raised questions about warnings that had been available before the assault, the interpretation of Hamas's intentions, and the assumptions guiding Israeli security policy.

The failure demonstrated that sophisticated monitoring cannot compensate for incorrect conclusions about an adversary's intentions.

Information must be interpreted accurately and acted upon effectively.

Technology may detect activity, but institutions must still decide what that activity means.

The Growing Importance of Data Analysis

As surveillance systems become more sophisticated, intelligence institutions face a growing challenge: the amount of information available can exceed what human analysts can examine individually.

Large collections of imagery, electronic records, and other data require organization and interpretation.

Computer-assisted analysis can help identify patterns and highlight information for further examination.

Artificial intelligence has increased interest in automating parts of this process.

However, automated analysis does not guarantee accurate conclusions.

Systems may reflect errors in their underlying data.

They may identify statistical relationships that do not establish actual military involvement.

They may also produce results that appear precise while containing substantial uncertainty.

These risks become particularly serious when technological assessments are used to support military targeting.

Investigative reporting concerning Israeli military systems has raised questions about the use of artificial intelligence and automated tools in Gaza.

The IDF has disputed elements of that reporting and has maintained that military targeting decisions require human involvement and legal review.

Because the full details of these systems remain classified, their operation cannot be independently verified in every respect.

The subject requires careful distinction between documented technology, official explanations, investigative allegations, and unresolved questions.

A separate chapter will examine artificial intelligence and military targeting in greater detail.

Technology and the Search for Hamas Leadership

Following October 7, Israeli authorities made the identification of Hamas's senior leadership a major priority.

Public reporting described an extensive intelligence effort involving different forms of information collection and analysis.

Technological capabilities formed part of the broader environment in which these investigations occurred.

However, the precise intelligence used in individual operations is not always publicly known.

The search for Yahya Sinwar illustrates the limitations of assuming that advanced technology can reliably locate a particular individual.

Despite months of intensive Israeli efforts, Sinwar was killed during an encounter with Israeli troops in Rafah in October 2024.

According to Israeli accounts, the soldiers did not initially know that they had encountered him.

His identity was confirmed afterward.

The episode demonstrated that an extensive intelligence campaign does not necessarily result in a precisely planned operation against a confirmed individual location.

Technology can contribute to the search for an adversary without guaranteeing a predictable outcome.

Technology and the Search for Hostages

The search for people abducted during the October 7 attacks created another major intelligence challenge.

Israeli authorities sought information about hostages held by Hamas and other armed groups in Gaza.

The possible presence of captives in buildings, underground facilities, and other locations complicated military decision-making.

Technological information could potentially contribute to broader assessments, but the precise sources used in particular hostage operations are often classified.

The rescue of four hostages from Nuseirat in June 2024 demonstrated the role of intelligence and cooperation between security institutions.

However, the operation also caused substantial Palestinian casualties during intense Israeli military action.

The case illustrates why intelligence accuracy and civilian protection are closely connected.

Information about a hostage's possible location can be important, but military action based on that information still requires consideration of the risks to the hostages and surrounding civilians.

Technological capability does not remove these responsibilities.

The Humanitarian Consequences of Surveillance-Based Warfare

The expansion of military surveillance has changed the relationship between armed forces and civilian populations.

In areas subject to extensive monitoring, ordinary civilian activities may become part of large intelligence datasets.

People may be observed without knowing what information is being collected or how it will be interpreted.

This raises concerns about privacy, discrimination, and the possibility of mistaken identification.

In Gaza, the consequences of intelligence-based military operations have become particularly serious because of the scale of civilian suffering and destruction.

Surveillance information may be used to support military decisions in areas where large numbers of civilians live.

The reliability of that information therefore has direct humanitarian significance.

International humanitarian law requires distinction between civilians and lawful military targets, prohibits indiscriminate attacks, and imposes obligations concerning proportionality and feasible precautions.

The availability of sophisticated surveillance technology does not reduce these obligations.

Indeed, where reliable information is available, it may be relevant to what precautions are feasible in a particular situation.

The central question is not simply whether a military possesses advanced technology.

It is whether that technology is used responsibly and whether decisions based upon it comply with the law.

Can Technology Prevent Future Attacks?

Israel's experience demonstrates that advanced intelligence technology can provide significant capabilities while still leaving major vulnerabilities.

Drones can observe physical activity.

Satellites can document geographical changes.

Signals intelligence can contribute information about electronic communications.

Digital analysis can assist in examining large quantities of data.

Yet none of these capabilities guarantees that a government will correctly understand an adversary's intentions.

An organization may conceal its plans, but institutions may also overlook warnings because they do not fit established expectations.

The October 7 attacks revealed the consequences of such failures.

Preventing future attacks therefore requires more than expanding surveillance systems.

It also requires reliable intelligence analysis, effective institutional communication, critical examination of assumptions, and appropriate political and military decision-making.

Technological development may improve security capabilities, but it cannot eliminate uncertainty or replace responsible judgment.

The Limits of the Digital Battlefield

Drones, satellites, communications intelligence, and digital surveillance have transformed Israel's ability to collect information.

These capabilities have become important elements of its broader campaign against Hamas.

They can support the examination of military infrastructure, contribute to threat assessments, and provide information relevant to military and security operations.

However, technology cannot automatically establish a person's identity, intentions, or legal status.

Nor can it guarantee that an intelligence assessment is correct.

The history of Israeli intelligence, particularly the failures surrounding October 7, demonstrates that technological sophistication and accurate understanding are not the same thing.

As military systems become increasingly dependent on automated analysis, questions concerning reliability, accountability, and civilian protection become even more important.

The future of intelligence-led warfare will depend not only on what technology can detect, but also on how governments interpret that information and what decisions they make as a result.

The next chapter examines one of the most controversial developments in modern warfare: Artificial Intelligence and Modern Warfare, including the reported use of automated targeting systems, the debate surrounding Lavender and other technologies, and the question of human responsibility when algorithms contribute to military decisions.

Chapter 7 — Artificial Intelligence and Modern Warfare

Inside the Technological Transformation of Israel's Campaign Against Hamas

Artificial intelligence is transforming the way modern armed forces collect information, analyze threats, and make decisions.

What once required teams of intelligence analysts examining photographs, communications records, and military reports can increasingly be supported by computer systems capable of processing enormous quantities of information.

For Israel, a country that has invested heavily in military technology and intelligence capabilities, artificial intelligence has become an important part of the wider debate surrounding modern security operations.

The Israel Defense Forces have publicly discussed the use of artificial intelligence and advanced data-processing systems in military intelligence. These technologies can assist with organizing information, analyzing imagery, and identifying patterns that human analysts may need to examine further.

However, the use of AI in military operations has also generated serious controversy.

Investigations published during Israel's military campaign in Gaza raised questions about automated target recommendations, the reliability of intelligence databases, the level of human review, and the possibility that technological systems contributed to attacks resulting in civilian casualties.

The debate intensified following reporting about systems identified as Lavender and Habsora, commonly translated as The Gospel, as well as an alleged tracking system referred to as Where's Daddy?

These names became central to international discussions about the role of algorithms in warfare.

Yet the public record remains incomplete. Some descriptions come from anonymous intelligence sources, while the Israeli military has disputed important aspects of the reporting.

Understanding the issue therefore requires separating confirmed technological developments from investigative allegations and unresolved questions.

The central issue is not whether artificial intelligence can process military information.

It is whether its use improves decision-making without weakening the human responsibility to distinguish lawful military targets from civilians.

The Rise of Artificial Intelligence in Military Intelligence

Military intelligence has always depended on the ability to collect and interpret information.

Historically, this work involved human sources, aerial reconnaissance, intercepted communications, photographs, and written reports.

As digital technology developed, intelligence agencies gained access to increasingly large collections of electronic information.

Modern surveillance systems can produce substantial amounts of imagery, communications data, and other records.

The difficulty is no longer simply obtaining information.

It is determining which information is relevant, what it means, and how reliably it can support a particular conclusion.

Artificial intelligence offers potential advantages in this environment.

Machine-learning systems can identify statistical patterns, classify certain types of data, and assist analysts in examining large collections of material.

Computer vision can help analyze images.

Automated tools can assist with organizing reports and identifying information that may require additional human attention.

These capabilities can be useful in military and civilian settings.

However, artificial intelligence does not possess independent knowledge of the real-world circumstances behind every piece of information it processes.

Its conclusions depend on data, system design, assumptions, and the way results are interpreted.

A system can produce an apparently precise assessment that is nevertheless incorrect.

This becomes particularly consequential when automated analysis contributes to decisions involving human life.

Israel's Development of AI-Assisted Military Systems

Israel has developed a substantial defense technology sector involving government institutions, military research, private companies, and universities.

The IDF has also established specialized technological capabilities within its intelligence and operational organizations.

Public statements by Israeli military officials have described the use of advanced data analysis and artificial intelligence to support intelligence work and military planning.

These developments reflect a broader international trend.

The United States, China, and other military powers have invested in AI-related defense applications, including intelligence analysis, autonomous systems, logistics, and decision-support technologies.

Israel's military use of AI has attracted particular attention because of the intensity of its operations in Gaza and the extensive civilian consequences of the conflict.

The technological question cannot be separated from the operational environment.

Gaza is densely populated, and military activities have taken place in areas containing homes, hospitals, schools, markets, and essential civilian infrastructure.

Hamas has maintained military facilities and armed networks within the territory, including underground infrastructure.

This creates serious challenges for identifying lawful military objectives and evaluating the consequences of attacks.

In such circumstances, the reliability of intelligence assessments is especially important.

The Gospel: AI-Assisted Target Recommendations

One of the systems discussed publicly in connection with Israeli military operations is Habsora, or The Gospel.

The IDF has described technological tools that assist intelligence personnel in identifying and examining potential military targets.

According to Israeli military explanations, such systems are intended to support analysts and commanders rather than independently authorize attacks.

Investigative reporting has raised additional questions about the scale and speed of target generation.

Some reports have suggested that automated systems enabled Israeli intelligence units to produce potential target recommendations at a substantially faster rate than traditional analytical processes.

The concern is that accelerating target identification may also increase the risk of insufficient scrutiny.

A building, facility, or other location identified by a computer-assisted system is not automatically a lawful military objective.

International humanitarian law requires an assessment of whether an object qualifies as a military objective under the applicable rules.

Civilian objects are protected against direct attack unless they meet the legal criteria for military objectives.

Even when an objective is lawful, attackers must consider the expected incidental harm to civilians and civilian objects.

The use of automated tools does not eliminate these requirements.

The critical question is whether human review is sufficiently informed and meaningful to identify errors before military action is taken.

Lavender: The Controversy Over Identifying Suspected Operatives

In April 2024, investigative reporting by +972 Magazine and Local Call brought international attention to an alleged Israeli military intelligence system known as Lavender.

The investigation, based largely on accounts from anonymous Israeli intelligence sources, described Lavender as a system used to identify individuals suspected of affiliation with the military wings of Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad.

According to the reporting, the system analyzed large quantities of information and generated assessments concerning potential members of armed organizations.

The investigation alleged that thousands of individuals were identified through the system and that some targeting decisions involved limited human examination of its outputs.

These allegations raised serious concerns.

If an automated system incorrectly classifies a civilian as a member of an armed group, the consequences could be fatal if that classification contributes to a military attack.

The IDF disputed important elements of the investigation.

It stated that Lavender was not an AI system that independently identified individuals as lawful targets, describing it instead as a database used to cross-reference intelligence information.

The military also maintained that its targeting procedures required appropriate assessments and compliance with international law.

These competing accounts cannot be fully reconciled using the information publicly available.

The underlying technical documentation, internal instructions, and complete operational records have not been made available for independent examination.

Nevertheless, the controversy illustrates a broader challenge in modern warfare.

When algorithms contribute to assessments about individuals, the distinction between a statistical prediction and verified military status becomes critically important.

Can an Algorithm Identify a Combatant?

One of the most difficult questions surrounding AI-assisted intelligence is whether a computer system can reliably determine that a particular individual is a member of an armed organization.

Machine-learning systems generally identify relationships within data.

They may classify information according to patterns learned during development or statistical associations identified during analysis.

However, a statistical association does not necessarily establish an individual's actual role.

A person may have family members, colleagues, or acquaintances associated with an armed organization without participating in military activity.

An individual may appear in a database because of an administrative role, an incorrect record, or information that lacks sufficient context.

Digital activity can also be misinterpreted.

These possibilities demonstrate why automated classification should not be treated as equivalent to legal target verification.

International humanitarian law distinguishes between civilians and persons who may lawfully be attacked.

In a non-international armed conflict, members of organized armed groups performing a continuous combat function may be targetable, while civilians are protected unless and for such time as they directly participate in hostilities.

The precise application of these rules to particular individuals may be contested.

An algorithmic classification does not settle those legal questions.

The responsibility remains with the humans and institutions making military decisions.

Where's Daddy? — Allegations About Tracking Individuals

Another controversial element of the 2024 investigations involved a system reportedly referred to as Where's Daddy?

According to the reporting, the system was associated with tracking individuals identified as potential targets and generating information about their presence at particular locations.

The investigation alleged that some attacks were conducted when suspected operatives were believed to be at family residences.

The allegations generated serious concern because attacks on residential buildings can place family members, neighbors, and other civilians at risk.

The Israeli military disputed the characterization of its targeting practices and stated that its operations were subject to legal requirements.

The existence, technical design, and precise operational role of the reported system have not been independently established in full.

However, the underlying legal questions are clear.

A residence does not automatically become a lawful military objective merely because a suspected member of an armed organization may be present.

The legality of an attack depends on the status of the intended target, the available information, the expected civilian harm, and the precautions taken.

Even when an individual is lawfully targetable, an attack may still be prohibited if the expected incidental civilian harm would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.

These obligations remain applicable regardless of whether information comes from human intelligence, surveillance technology, or automated analysis.

The Question of Human Oversight

A recurring issue in the debate about military artificial intelligence is the meaning of human oversight.

Governments and armed forces frequently state that humans remain responsible for decisions involving lethal force.

However, the existence of a human decision-maker does not automatically guarantee meaningful review.

A person may be presented with an automated recommendation without receiving enough information to evaluate its reliability.

An analyst may face institutional pressure to process large quantities of material quickly.

A computer-generated assessment may appear authoritative because it is expressed through a numerical score or formal classification.

These problems are sometimes described as automation bias: the tendency to place excessive confidence in computerized recommendations.

The risk is especially serious when a system's underlying reasoning is difficult to explain.

Meaningful human review requires more than approving an automated output.

It requires understanding the limits of the information, considering alternative explanations, and retaining the ability to reject a recommendation.

When decisions involve military force, human oversight must also include the relevant legal assessments.

The use of AI cannot transfer responsibility away from commanders and other authorized decision-makers.

Artificial Intelligence and Civilian Casualties

The use of AI-assisted targeting systems has become part of the broader debate over civilian casualties during Israel's military campaign in Gaza.

The conflict has resulted in extensive Palestinian deaths, injuries, displacement, and destruction of civilian infrastructure.

Investigative reports have questioned whether automated target recommendations, targeting policies, and the pace of military operations contributed to the scale of civilian harm.

The IDF has maintained that it targets military objectives and seeks to comply with international humanitarian law, while acknowledging that civilians have been harmed during operations.

Determining the responsibility for particular incidents requires examination of the available intelligence, the intended military objective, the anticipated civilian harm, and the decisions made before an attack.

The mere use of artificial intelligence does not establish that a military operation was unlawful.

Likewise, the involvement of human personnel does not automatically establish that an operation complied with the law.

The legality of each attack must be assessed according to the applicable rules and circumstances.

The technological debate therefore cannot be reduced to a simple choice between automated and human decision-making.

The more important questions concern accuracy, accountability, legal compliance, and the protection of civilians.

The Problem of Incomplete and Incorrect Data

Artificial intelligence depends on information.

If the underlying information is incomplete, inaccurate, outdated, or misleading, automated analysis may reproduce or amplify those problems.

This is a familiar challenge in civilian applications of AI, including healthcare, finance, and criminal justice.

In military intelligence, the consequences can be substantially more severe.

A database may contain incorrect personal information.

An automated system may identify a relationship that does not reflect military activity.

An intelligence record may remain in use after the circumstances surrounding an individual have changed.

The presence of multiple data points does not necessarily establish that a conclusion is reliable.

Different records may originate from the same mistaken source.

These limitations make independent verification important.

They also raise questions about whether intelligence organizations adequately identify uncertainty within automated systems.

An assessment that appears highly confident may still be wrong if the underlying assumptions are flawed.

Artificial Intelligence and the Speed of Warfare

One of the main attractions of AI-assisted analysis is speed.

Computer systems can process certain types of information much faster than human analysts.

In a military environment, faster analysis may help identify threats, organize intelligence, or support time-sensitive decisions.

However, speed can create additional risks.

The ability to generate potential targets rapidly does not necessarily mean that each target can be reviewed adequately at the same pace.

Legal assessments, intelligence verification, and civilian-harm evaluations require sufficient information and careful judgment.

If the pace of operations increases beyond the capacity for meaningful review, technological efficiency may undermine reliability.

This is one of the central concerns raised by investigations into automated military targeting.

The question is not simply how many potential targets a system can identify.

It is how many can be assessed accurately and lawfully before action is taken.

In modern warfare, the ability to act quickly must be balanced against the obligation to avoid unlawful harm.

October 7 and the Limits of Technological Confidence

The Hamas-led attacks of October 7, 2023, demonstrated that extensive surveillance and intelligence technology do not guarantee security.

Israel possessed sophisticated monitoring capabilities along the Gaza border.

Its intelligence agencies had years of experience examining Hamas's organization and military activities.

Yet the attack was not prevented.

Subsequent investigations revealed failures involving threat assessments, institutional assumptions, military preparedness, and the interpretation of warnings.

The lesson extends directly to artificial intelligence.

More data does not necessarily produce better understanding.

A technologically advanced system may still reflect the assumptions of the people and institutions that develop and use it.

If analysts underestimate an adversary's intentions, automated tools may not correct that error.

They may even reinforce it if the systems are built around the same flawed expectations.

Artificial intelligence can assist intelligence analysis, but it cannot guarantee sound strategic judgment.

AI and the Search for Hamas Leadership

Following October 7, Israel intensified efforts to identify and locate senior Hamas figures.

These included Yahya Sinwar, Mohammed Deif, Marwan Issa, and other military leaders.

The broader intelligence effort involved advanced technological capabilities, but the precise role of AI systems in particular operations has not always been publicly disclosed.

It would therefore be misleading to claim that an algorithm independently located or identified a particular commander without reliable evidence.

The death of Yahya Sinwar in October 2024 illustrates this limitation.

Despite months of intelligence efforts, Sinwar was killed during an encounter with Israeli troops in Rafah.

According to Israeli accounts, the soldiers did not initially know that he was present.

His identity was confirmed after the encounter.

The circumstances demonstrate that modern surveillance and analytical systems do not guarantee that the location of a particular individual will be known in advance.

Military outcomes can result from a combination of intelligence work, operational developments, and events that were not anticipated.

AI and the Search for Hostages

The search for hostages taken into Gaza on October 7 presented another major intelligence challenge.

Israeli authorities sought information about the whereabouts and conditions of captives held by Hamas and other armed groups.

Advanced information-processing tools may assist intelligence institutions in examining large quantities of material relevant to such investigations.

However, the specific contribution of AI systems to individual hostage-rescue operations is not fully documented in public sources.

The rescue of four hostages from Nuseirat in June 2024 was publicly attributed to cooperation between the IDF, Shin Bet, and Yamam.

The operation demonstrated the importance of intelligence coordination and specialized rescue capabilities.

It also resulted in substantial Palestinian casualties during the surrounding military action.

The case highlights the need to distinguish between the technological capabilities available to security institutions and the specific information publicly established about a particular operation.

Not every successful intelligence operation can be attributed to artificial intelligence.

International Humanitarian Law and Automated Decision-Making

International humanitarian law applies to military operations regardless of the technology used.

The principles of distinction, proportionality, and precautions in attack remain central.

Parties to an armed conflict must distinguish between civilians and lawful military targets.

They must not conduct indiscriminate attacks.

They must also assess whether expected incidental civilian harm would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.

Feasible precautions must be taken to verify targets and minimize civilian harm.

These obligations cannot be delegated to a computer system.

Artificial intelligence may assist with information analysis, but the use of automated tools does not change the legal responsibilities of the parties involved.

Questions also arise concerning transparency.

If an automated system contributes to a military decision, investigators may need to understand what information it used, how its output was interpreted, and whether decision-makers were aware of relevant limitations.

Without adequate records and oversight, accountability becomes more difficult.

This challenge is not unique to Israel.

It is increasingly relevant to military organizations around the world.

The Global Debate Over Military Artificial Intelligence

Israel's use of advanced intelligence technology forms part of a much wider international discussion.

Governments, researchers, humanitarian organizations, and legal experts have debated the risks associated with artificial intelligence in armed conflict.

One concern involves autonomous weapons systems capable of selecting and engaging targets with varying degrees of human involvement.

Another involves AI-assisted decision-support systems that influence human military decisions without independently operating weapons.

These are related but distinct categories.

A system that analyzes information and recommends potential targets is not necessarily an autonomous weapon.

Nevertheless, decision-support technology can have serious consequences if its recommendations are treated as authoritative without adequate scrutiny.

International discussions have focused on human control, accountability, reliability, testing, and compliance with humanitarian law.

There is no universal agreement on every aspect of military AI regulation.

However, the underlying principle remains that technological innovation does not remove legal responsibility for military conduct.

Transparency and the Challenge of Independent Investigation

One of the greatest difficulties in examining military AI is the limited availability of reliable information.

Military institutions frequently classify the design, capabilities, and operational use of intelligence systems.

This secrecy can serve legitimate security purposes.

However, it also makes independent assessment difficult.

Journalists may rely on anonymous sources, leaked documents, official statements, and testimony from individuals with knowledge of military institutions.

Each type of evidence has limitations.

Anonymous sources may provide important information, but their claims require careful corroboration.

Official military statements may clarify institutional positions without disclosing all relevant evidence.

Technical claims may be difficult to verify without access to the systems themselves.

The controversy surrounding Lavender, The Gospel, and Where's Daddy? demonstrates these challenges.

Investigative reporting has raised serious questions, while Israeli authorities have disputed aspects of the allegations.

A responsible investigation must preserve these distinctions rather than presenting every claim as independently established fact.

Can Artificial Intelligence Make Warfare More Precise?

Supporters of AI-assisted military analysis argue that advanced technology may improve the ability to process information, identify relevant threats, and reduce certain forms of human error.

In principle, better information could support more accurate military assessments.

However, the existence of AI does not automatically make warfare more precise.

A system may process information efficiently while still producing inaccurate conclusions.

The speed of automated analysis may encourage greater reliance on recommendations that have not been adequately examined.

Errors may also affect large numbers of assessments if they originate from a common dataset or flawed analytical model.

Precision must therefore be evaluated through actual outcomes, not merely technological claims.

An operation is not necessarily precise because a computer system contributed to its planning.

The relevant questions concern whether the intended military objective was correctly identified, whether civilian harm was properly assessed, and whether the attack complied with international humanitarian law.

The Future of AI in Israel's Security Strategy

Artificial intelligence is likely to remain an important area of development for military intelligence organizations.

Its potential applications extend across information analysis, surveillance, logistics, defensive systems, and other military functions.

For Israel, the experience of the Gaza conflict has intensified scrutiny of how these technologies are used.

The controversy surrounding AI-assisted targeting systems raises questions that cannot be resolved through technical explanations alone.

They concern the relationship between military efficiency and human responsibility.

They also concern the reliability of intelligence assessments, the protection of civilians, and the ability of independent institutions to investigate possible mistakes.

The lessons of October 7 reinforce the importance of recognizing the limitations of technology.

A system can process enormous quantities of information without necessarily understanding an adversary's intentions.

Likewise, an algorithm can produce a recommendation without establishing that acting upon it would be lawful.

The future of military AI will therefore depend not only on technological development, but also on the standards governing its use.

The Human Responsibility Behind the Algorithm

Artificial intelligence has introduced new capabilities into military intelligence, but it has not removed the fundamental responsibilities associated with warfare.

Military institutions must still evaluate information, identify lawful objectives, assess civilian risks, and remain accountable for their decisions.

The debate surrounding Lavender, The Gospel, and Where's Daddy? demonstrates how difficult these responsibilities can become when automated systems influence military assessments.

Some aspects of the reported technologies remain disputed or classified.

Other concerns reflect broader problems associated with algorithmic decision-making, including unreliable data, automation bias, and insufficient transparency.

Israel's campaign against Hamas has become an important case study in the consequences of introducing advanced data analysis into an active armed conflict.

The central question is not whether artificial intelligence can assist military intelligence.

It is whether the institutions using it can ensure that speed, scale, and technological sophistication do not replace accurate judgment and legal responsibility.

Ultimately, algorithms do not bear responsibility for military decisions.

People and institutions do.

The next chapter examines how Israeli intelligence agencies assess the identities and roles of suspected Hamas members and commanders, and why the distinction between intelligence suspicion and lawful military targeting is essential.

Chapter 8 — How Hamas Members and Commanders Are Identified

Inside Israel's Intelligence Efforts to Identify Hamas's Military Leadership and Armed Networks

Identifying members of an armed organization is one of the most consequential responsibilities of military intelligence.

For Israel, the challenge of identifying Hamas operatives extends far beyond recognizing armed individuals on a battlefield.

Hamas has developed political institutions, military formations, administrative structures, financial relationships, and organizational networks over several decades. Its members and associates have performed different functions, and not everyone connected to the organization has participated in armed activity.

This distinction is fundamental to understanding Israel's intelligence operations.

Israeli security agencies seek to identify individuals involved in planning attacks, commanding military formations, managing weapons infrastructure, and carrying out armed operations.

However, determining an individual's actual responsibilities can be difficult, particularly when information is incomplete, organizational structures change, or individuals operate within densely populated civilian environments.

The consequences of identification errors can be severe.

Incorrect intelligence may lead to the wrongful detention of civilians or contribute to unlawful military attacks. Conversely, failures to recognize individuals planning violence can leave serious threats undetected.

The central challenge is therefore not simply discovering who may be associated with Hamas.

It is establishing what particular individuals do, whether available information is reliable, and what actions may lawfully follow from that assessment.

Understanding the Difference Between Membership and Military Activity

Hamas is a Palestinian Islamist movement with a history of political organization, territorial governance, and armed operations.

Its military wing, the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades, has been responsible for attacks against Israeli civilians and military personnel.

The organization has also maintained political leadership structures and, following its takeover of Gaza in 2007, administrative institutions responsible for aspects of civilian governance.

These different functions create important distinctions.

An armed commander responsible for directing attacks occupies a different position from a civilian employee working in a public administrative institution.

A person involved in military planning is not necessarily comparable to someone who supports a political movement or has family members associated with it.

Even when an organization is designated as a terrorist organization, that designation does not automatically make every individual connected to it a lawful target under the laws of armed conflict.

International humanitarian law requires distinctions based on an individual's status and conduct.

In a non-international armed conflict, members of organized armed groups who perform a continuous combat function may be targetable, while civilians remain protected unless and for such time as they directly participate in hostilities.

The precise application of these rules can be legally disputed.

For intelligence agencies, the distinction between organizational association and military function is therefore essential.

The Challenge of Understanding Hamas's Command Structure

Before the October 7, 2023, attacks, Hamas's military wing had developed an increasingly organized structure.

Israeli military assessments described geographical formations, local commanders, specialized functions, and senior leadership responsible for broader military planning.

However, the full internal structure of Hamas has not been publicly documented.

Much of the available information comes from Israeli military statements, Hamas publications, investigative journalism, and material disclosed following military operations.

These sources can provide important insights, but they do not necessarily establish every organizational relationship.

Command responsibilities may also change during armed conflict.

Senior leaders may be killed, detained, or replaced. Local units may lose contact with higher leadership. Organizational responsibilities may be redistributed.

These changes complicate intelligence assessments.

A person identified as holding a particular position at one point may no longer perform that role later.

Likewise, an individual may assume new responsibilities without those changes becoming publicly known.

Accurate identification therefore requires attention to the timing and reliability of available information.

The Role of Human Intelligence

Human intelligence has historically been an important component of Israeli security investigations.

Information obtained from witnesses, interviews, informants, and other human sources can contribute to assessments concerning armed organizations.

Such information may help investigators understand personal relationships, organizational responsibilities, or events that are not documented in public records.

However, the value of human intelligence depends on its reliability.

A witness may misunderstand an event.

An informant may possess incomplete knowledge.

A person questioned during detention may provide inaccurate statements, particularly if subjected to pressure or coercion.

Human testimony can also reflect personal motives, fear, or deliberate deception.

These limitations make independent corroboration important.

A claim concerning an individual's alleged involvement in military activity should not automatically be treated as an established fact simply because it originated from a human source.

This is particularly important when intelligence contributes to decisions involving detention or lethal force.

The history of intelligence operations demonstrates that mistaken identification can have irreversible consequences.

Digital Intelligence and Identity Assessments

Modern intelligence institutions increasingly use digital information to support investigations.

Electronic communications, surveillance imagery, and other technological records may contribute to broader assessments of individuals and organizations.

Israel's military intelligence establishment possesses substantial technological capabilities, including signals intelligence and advanced data analysis.

However, digital information has important limitations.

An electronic connection between two people does not necessarily establish that they share military responsibilities.

An individual's presence in a particular location does not automatically demonstrate involvement in armed activity.

Information may also be outdated, incorrectly attributed, or lacking essential context.

The interpretation of digital evidence therefore requires caution.

Technological systems can assist analysts in examining large quantities of information, but they cannot automatically establish an individual's legal status.

This distinction becomes especially important when digital records contribute to identifying suspected members of Hamas's military wing.

Artificial Intelligence and Suspected Membership

The increasing use of artificial intelligence in military intelligence has intensified debate about how suspected members of armed organizations are identified.

Investigative reporting published in 2024 described an alleged Israeli intelligence system known as Lavender.

According to the investigation, the system was used to generate assessments concerning individuals suspected of affiliation with the military wings of Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad.

The reporting raised concerns about automated classifications, the reliability of underlying information, and the extent of human review.

The IDF disputed important aspects of the investigation, describing Lavender as a database used to cross-reference intelligence information rather than an autonomous system that independently determines lawful targets.

The full technical operation of the reported system has not been made available for independent examination.

Nevertheless, the controversy highlights an important distinction.

An algorithm may identify statistical associations, but those associations do not automatically establish military membership or direct participation in hostilities.

A computer-generated assessment must not be confused with verified evidence of an individual's actual conduct.

The consequences of such confusion can be particularly serious in a densely populated conflict zone.

Identifying Senior Hamas Commanders

Senior military commanders have been among Israel's principal intelligence priorities.

These individuals may exercise authority over armed formations, participate in military planning, or hold responsibility for particular military capabilities.

Publicly documented Israeli operations have targeted senior Hamas figures, including Mohammed Deif and Marwan Issa.

Deif was widely regarded as the commander of Hamas's military wing.

Israel announced that he had been killed in a July 2024 airstrike in the Khan Younis area. Hamas confirmed his death in January 2025.

Marwan Issa, an important deputy within Hamas's military leadership, was killed in March 2024 according to Israeli authorities.

These operations demonstrate the significance Israel places on disrupting senior military leadership.

However, the public record does not disclose every intelligence source or internal assessment associated with these operations.

It would therefore be misleading to present specific classified methods as established facts without reliable evidence.

The confirmed outcome of an operation and the intelligence process that preceded it are separate subjects.

The Search for Yahya Sinwar

Yahya Sinwar became one of Israel's most prominent targets following the October 7 attacks.

Sinwar had led Hamas in Gaza since 2017 and was regarded by Israeli authorities as a central figure in the planning of the assault.

His influence extended across Hamas's political and military leadership.

Following the assassination of Ismail Haniyeh in July 2024, Sinwar became head of Hamas's Political Bureau.

For months, Israeli authorities sought to locate him.

Public reporting described extensive intelligence efforts, but many claims concerning his movements and whereabouts remained unverified.

On October 16, 2024, Sinwar was killed during an encounter with Israeli troops in Rafah.

According to Israeli accounts, the soldiers involved did not initially know that the individual they had encountered was Sinwar.

His identity was established afterward.

The circumstances are significant.

They demonstrate that identifying an individual as a major intelligence priority is different from knowing that person's precise location.

Despite extensive surveillance and intelligence capabilities, the final encounter was not publicly described as a planned operation directed at a confirmed location occupied by Sinwar.

The case illustrates both the importance and limitations of intelligence-led military operations.

Why Leadership Identification Does Not Guarantee Operational Success

Identifying a senior commander does not necessarily mean that the person can be located, detained, or attacked lawfully.

Intelligence assessments may establish that an individual occupies an important position within an armed organization without providing reliable information about that person's current circumstances.

Even when an individual is located, the presence of civilians or other protected persons can create legal and humanitarian constraints.

The military significance of a commander does not remove the obligation to assess the expected consequences of an attack.

The removal of senior leadership also does not automatically dismantle an armed organization.

Responsibilities may be transferred to other individuals.

Local networks may continue operating.

New commanders may emerge.

For this reason, the strategic effectiveness of leadership targeting must be assessed over time.

The death of an important figure may represent a significant organizational loss without necessarily ending the group's capacity for armed activity.

Mistaken Identity and the History of Intelligence Failures

Israel's intelligence history includes incidents demonstrating the dangers of mistaken identification.

One of the most prominent occurred in Lillehammer, Norway, in July 1973.

Israeli operatives killed Ahmed Bouchikhi, a Moroccan waiter, after mistakenly identifying him as a Palestinian militant figure.

Bouchikhi was not the intended target.

The killing generated an international scandal and led to criminal proceedings in Norway.

The incident remains an important historical example of the consequences of intelligence errors.

It demonstrates that even intelligence institutions with substantial resources and experience can reach incorrect conclusions.

The dangers are especially serious when information is used to justify irreversible action.

A mistaken identity assessment can lead to the death of an innocent person.

It can also undermine public confidence, damage diplomatic relationships, and raise questions about institutional accountability.

Modern technological capabilities do not eliminate these risks.

Indeed, automated systems may create additional difficulties if incorrect information is reproduced across multiple databases or analytical processes.

Civilian Identity and the Risks of Broad Suspicion

In Gaza, identifying individuals associated with Hamas is complicated by the organization's history of territorial governance.

Since 2007, Hamas has exercised administrative authority over civilian institutions in the Gaza Strip.

These institutions have included public services, local administrative offices, and other functions affecting everyday life.

Employment within a Hamas-run institution does not automatically establish participation in armed activity.

Similarly, family relationships, political beliefs, or residence in a particular neighborhood do not make someone a combatant.

These distinctions are essential.

Broad assumptions about entire communities can contribute to mistaken identification and unlawful harm.

International humanitarian law prohibits direct attacks against civilians unless and for such time as they directly participate in hostilities.

It also prohibits collective punishment.

The responsibility to distinguish between military participants and protected civilians remains applicable even when armed organizations operate within civilian populations.

Accurate intelligence must therefore focus on relevant conduct and responsibilities rather than broad social associations.

The Importance of Intelligence Verification

Reliable identification depends on more than collecting information.

It requires evaluating what the information actually establishes.

Different sources may provide conflicting accounts.

Some information may be outdated.

Other information may reflect assumptions rather than direct knowledge.

A conclusion supported by several reports may still be incorrect if those reports ultimately rely on the same mistaken source.

This is why intelligence analysis must distinguish between confirmed facts, reasonable assessments, and unresolved uncertainties.

Such distinctions are particularly important when intelligence contributes to decisions involving lethal force.

The existence of intelligence suggesting military involvement does not eliminate the need to verify that an intended target qualifies as a lawful military objective.

Nor does it remove the obligation to consider expected civilian harm.

The reliability of intelligence is therefore inseparable from legal and ethical responsibility.

The Legal Meaning of a Military Target

International humanitarian law does not permit the deliberate targeting of civilians merely because they are suspected of supporting an armed organization.

The legal status of a person depends on the applicable conflict classification and the individual's actual role or conduct.

In non-international armed conflict, members of organized armed groups performing a continuous combat function may be attacked subject to the other rules governing hostilities.

Civilians remain protected against direct attack unless and for such time as they directly participate in hostilities.

Political affiliation, administrative employment, or ideological sympathy does not automatically establish a continuous combat function.

Even when a person is lawfully targetable, an attack must comply with the principles of distinction, proportionality, and precautions.

These rules require consideration of the expected civilian consequences and the information reasonably available at the time.

The presence of a lawful target does not make every method of attack permissible.

This distinction is particularly important when operations take place in residential areas or other locations where civilians may be present.

Identification and the Protection of Hostages

The presence of hostages creates additional challenges for military intelligence.

Following October 7, Israeli authorities sought to identify Hamas members involved in the attacks while also locating people held captive in Gaza.

These objectives could intersect.

A suspected Hamas operative might possess information relevant to a hostage investigation.

An area associated with military activity might also contain captives.

However, the precise intelligence available in particular situations has often remained classified.

The risks associated with inaccurate information were substantial.

A military operation based on an incorrect assessment could endanger hostages, civilians, or military personnel.

The rescue of four hostages from Nuseirat in June 2024 demonstrated the importance of intelligence cooperation.

The operation also resulted in substantial Palestinian casualties during surrounding military action.

It illustrates the need to evaluate military objectives alongside the consequences for people who are not participating in hostilities.

The Difference Between Intelligence Success and Strategic Success

Identifying and killing a senior commander may represent a significant intelligence and military achievement.

However, the broader strategic consequences can be more difficult to measure.

An armed organization may retain personnel, resources, local networks, and the capacity to recruit replacements.

Its political influence may continue even after major military losses.

Likewise, an organization may experience substantial disruption without being completely dismantled.

The effectiveness of intelligence-led operations must therefore be evaluated against broader objectives.

Has the organization's capacity to conduct attacks been reduced?

Have particular military capabilities been disrupted?

Can surviving networks reorganize?

And do military operations contribute to conditions that reduce the likelihood of future violence?

These questions cannot be answered solely by counting the number of senior figures killed.

They require longer-term examination of military, political, and humanitarian developments.

Accountability When Identification Goes Wrong

Intelligence institutions operate under conditions of secrecy.

This can protect legitimate security activities, but it also makes independent scrutiny difficult.

When an individual is wrongly identified, the consequences may remain hidden unless an investigation reveals the mistake.

Accountability is particularly important when intelligence contributes to detention, injury, or death.

An effective investigation should examine not only the immediate decision but also the reliability of the information on which it was based.

Questions may include whether relevant uncertainty was recognized, whether legal requirements were followed, and whether decision-makers acted reasonably on the information available.

Independent oversight is essential to maintaining public confidence.

Military and intelligence institutions cannot be evaluated solely through their own claims of success.

Their mistakes, limitations, and treatment of civilians must also be subject to examination.

Understanding the Limits of Identification

Israel's campaign against Hamas has placed considerable emphasis on identifying military leaders, armed personnel, and organizational networks.

Advanced surveillance systems, human intelligence, digital analysis, and institutional cooperation can all contribute to this process.

However, none of these capabilities guarantees certainty.

A person's organizational relationships may be misunderstood.

Information may be incomplete or outdated.

Automated systems may reproduce errors.

And the circumstances surrounding an individual may change.

The identification of a suspected Hamas member is therefore not the same as establishing that the person may lawfully be attacked.

That distinction is central to understanding modern intelligence-led warfare.

The history of Israeli intelligence demonstrates both the potential value of accurate information and the serious consequences of mistakes.

Operations against senior Hamas figures have shown that intelligence can contribute to significant military outcomes.

At the same time, the search for Yahya Sinwar and the controversies surrounding automated targeting systems reveal the limits of surveillance and analysis.

Ultimately, the challenge is not simply to identify individuals.

It is to determine what can be established reliably, understand the legal significance of that information, and ensure that decisions based upon it remain subject to human judgment and accountability.

The next chapter examines what happens after intelligence agencies identify a potential military objective: how intelligence assessments relate to military planning, authorization, legal review, and the conduct of targeted operations.

Chapter 9 — From Intelligence to Targeted Military Operations

How Israel Turns Intelligence Assessments into Military Action Against Hamas

Behind every intelligence-led military operation lies a series of decisions that may have consequences far beyond the intended target.

Information must be collected, interpreted, and assessed. Military objectives must be identified. Commanders must determine whether action is justified, while the applicable legal requirements must be considered before force is used.

For Israel, this process has become central to its military campaign against Hamas.

Following the Hamas-led attacks of October 7, 2023, Israeli authorities declared the destruction of Hamas's military and governing capabilities among their principal objectives.

Senior Hamas commanders, armed formations, weapons infrastructure, and underground facilities became priorities within the military campaign.

Israeli intelligence agencies sought to provide information supporting these objectives, while the Israel Defense Forces carried out military operations.

However, the relationship between intelligence and military action is not automatic.

An intelligence assessment may identify an individual as an important figure within an armed organization without establishing that the person can be attacked lawfully in every circumstance.

Similarly, information about a suspected military facility does not remove the obligation to evaluate the surrounding civilian environment.

The transformation of intelligence into military action therefore involves questions of accuracy, authority, military necessity, civilian protection, and accountability.

Understanding this process is essential to evaluating Israel's campaign against Hamas.

The Difference Between Intelligence Collection and Military Action

Intelligence agencies collect and assess information.

Military institutions use relevant information to support planning and operational decisions.

Although these responsibilities frequently overlap, they are not identical.

An intelligence report may describe the suspected activities of an individual or organization.

It may identify a possible military objective or assess the significance of particular infrastructure.

However, the existence of such a report does not itself authorize the use of force.

Military decisions require consideration of the operational circumstances and the applicable legal framework.

The distinction matters because intelligence assessments are not always certain.

Information may be incomplete, outdated, or incorrectly interpreted.

A person may have been identified through records that do not accurately reflect their present activities.

A location may have been used for military purposes previously but no longer serve that function.

These possibilities create risks when intelligence is treated as definitive proof.

Responsible military decision-making requires recognizing the limits of the available information.

Israel's Military Command Structure

The Israel Defense Forces operate within a military command structure headed by the IDF chief of staff.

The military is subject to Israel's civilian political leadership, with the government exercising authority over national security policy and the defense minister holding responsibility within the relevant governmental framework.

Operational commands are responsible for military activity in their assigned areas.

The Southern Command has played a central role in operations involving the Gaza Strip.

Military intelligence is provided through Aman and other intelligence capabilities, while specialized military units may contribute information and operational support.

Shin Bet has also been publicly identified as a participant in major operations involving Hamas.

Mossad's foreign intelligence responsibilities may become relevant when threats or organizational networks extend beyond Israel and the Palestinian territories.

However, the precise internal procedures used to authorize particular operations are not always publicly disclosed.

Different missions may involve different authorities and levels of approval.

It would therefore be misleading to suggest that every intelligence-led operation follows one identical process.

The essential distinction remains that intelligence agencies provide assessments, while authorized decision-makers retain responsibility for the actions taken.

Establishing a Military Objective

One of the most important questions in military planning is whether a proposed target qualifies as a lawful military objective.

International humanitarian law distinguishes between civilians and persons who may lawfully be attacked.

It also distinguishes civilian objects from military objectives.

The applicable rules depend partly on the classification of the armed conflict and the status or conduct of the individual concerned.

In a non-international armed conflict, members of organized armed groups who perform a continuous combat function may be targetable, while civilians remain protected unless and for such time as they directly participate in hostilities.

Political affiliation or ideological sympathy alone does not establish that a person may lawfully be attacked.

For objects, the legal assessment considers whether their nature, location, purpose, or use makes an effective contribution to military action and whether their destruction, capture, or neutralization offers a definite military advantage in the circumstances ruling at the time.

These distinctions are particularly important in Gaza, where civilian infrastructure and military activities have existed in close proximity.

The presence of a suspected Hamas member inside a building does not automatically make every person or object within that building a lawful target.

Each proposed attack requires assessment under the applicable legal rules.

The Role of Intelligence Confidence

Military intelligence rarely provides absolute certainty.

Analysts may assess information according to its reliability, consistency, and relevance.

Different sources may support a conclusion, while other information may raise doubts.

The challenge is determining whether the available evidence is sufficient for the decision being considered.

A high level of confidence in an intelligence assessment does not necessarily mean that the assessment is correct.

History contains numerous examples of intelligence institutions reaching mistaken conclusions despite substantial resources and experience.

Israel's own intelligence history includes the Lillehammer affair in Norway in 1973, when Israeli operatives mistakenly killed an innocent man.

The October 7 attacks also demonstrated the consequences of flawed intelligence assessments and institutional assumptions.

These examples show why uncertainty must be treated seriously.

The consequences of an intelligence error become particularly grave when a military operation involves lethal force.

The Legal Review of Military Operations

Legal advisers play an important role in modern military institutions.

Within the IDF, military legal authorities provide advice concerning the laws of armed conflict and other legal obligations.

The precise involvement of legal advisers in individual Israeli operations is not always publicly known.

Nevertheless, the legal framework governing military attacks is clear in several important respects.

Attacks must comply with the principle of distinction.

Indiscriminate attacks are prohibited.

Expected incidental civilian harm must not be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.

Parties must also take feasible precautions to verify targets and reduce civilian harm.

These requirements apply even when an intended target is a senior military commander.

The importance of a target does not eliminate the protection afforded to civilians.

Nor does the presence of fighters among civilians remove the attacking party's legal obligations.

The assessment must consider the information reasonably available at the time, rather than relying solely on the eventual outcome.

Targeted Operations Against Senior Hamas Leaders

Israel has conducted operations against senior Hamas figures for decades.

These operations have included attempts to disrupt armed networks by killing or capturing individuals believed to hold important military responsibilities.

The strategy reflects the view that removing experienced commanders can weaken organizational coordination, planning, and military capabilities.

However, the legal and strategic implications of such operations vary.

A senior military commander may be a lawful target under the applicable rules of armed conflict.

That does not mean every proposed method or circumstance of attack is lawful.

Civilian presence, the anticipated effects of the attack, and the feasibility of precautions remain relevant.

The removal of a commander may also have consequences that are difficult to predict.

An organization may lose experience and coordination.

It may also appoint replacements, decentralize its activities, or change its structure.

The effectiveness of leadership targeting therefore requires evaluation beyond the immediate outcome.

The Operation Against Mohammed Deif

Mohammed Deif was one of the most prominent figures in Hamas's military leadership.

For years, he was associated with the development and command of the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades.

Israeli authorities regarded him as a central figure in Hamas's military operations and attributed major responsibility for the October 7 attacks to him.

On July 13, 2024, Israel carried out an airstrike in the al-Mawasi area near Khan Younis, targeting Deif and another senior Hamas figure.

The operation caused significant Palestinian casualties.

Israeli authorities later announced that Deif had been killed.

Hamas confirmed his death in January 2025.

The operation became an important example of Israel's campaign against senior Hamas commanders.

However, it also generated serious controversy because of the civilian casualties and the location of the attack in an area where displaced Palestinians had sought shelter.

The fact that a senior military commander was targeted does not, by itself, establish that every aspect of the attack complied with international humanitarian law.

A complete legal assessment would require examining the information available before the strike, the anticipated military advantage, the expected civilian harm, and the precautions taken.

Much of that information has not been made public.

The case therefore illustrates both the military significance and the legal complexity of targeted operations.

Marwan Issa and the Disruption of Military Leadership

Marwan Issa was another senior figure within Hamas's military command.

He was widely described as a deputy to Mohammed Deif and an important member of the organization's military leadership.

Israeli authorities announced that Issa had been killed during an operation in March 2024.

His death was presented as a significant loss for Hamas's command structure.

Senior commanders may possess institutional knowledge, operational experience, and relationships developed over many years.

Their removal can disrupt organizational continuity.

However, the degree of disruption is not always immediately visible.

Armed organizations may maintain replacement structures or distribute responsibilities among surviving members.

The strategic significance of Issa's death therefore depends on developments extending beyond the operation itself.

The broader question is whether removing senior figures produces lasting reductions in military capability.

Yahya Sinwar: When the Outcome Was Not a Planned Targeted Strike

The death of Yahya Sinwar in October 2024 provides a different example.

Sinwar had become one of Israel's most prominent targets following the October 7 attacks.

Israeli authorities considered him a central figure in Hamas's leadership and the planning of the assault.

For months, his whereabouts were the subject of extensive intelligence efforts and public speculation.

On October 16, 2024, Israeli troops encountered and killed Sinwar in Rafah.

According to Israeli accounts, the soldiers did not initially know that they had encountered him.

His identity was confirmed afterward.

This distinction is important.

Although Sinwar had been a major intelligence priority, the encounter was not publicly described as a precisely planned operation against his confirmed location.

His death demonstrates that intelligence priorities and operational outcomes do not always align in a predictable manner.

It also illustrates the limits of advanced surveillance and intelligence analysis.

Even an extensive search may not produce certainty about an individual's whereabouts.

The Role of Air Power

Air power has played a major role in Israel's military operations in Gaza.

Israeli aircraft have been used against suspected military infrastructure, armed formations, and individuals identified as military targets.

Air operations can be conducted without placing ground personnel at the immediate location of an intended target.

However, they also raise serious questions concerning intelligence accuracy and civilian harm.

The consequences of an airstrike depend on factors including the weapon used, the surrounding environment, the presence of civilians, and the physical characteristics of the intended objective.

In densely populated areas, the risk to civilians can be substantial.

Buildings may contain families, displaced people, or individuals who are not participating in hostilities.

The destruction of a structure can also affect neighboring buildings and essential infrastructure.

These risks must be considered when assessing the legality and consequences of an attack.

Technological precision does not automatically mean that civilian harm will be limited.

A weapon may strike its intended location accurately while still causing extensive casualties.

Ground Operations and Intelligence-Led Encounters

Not every operation against Hamas involves an airstrike.

Ground forces have also played a major role in the campaign.

Military operations inside Gaza have included engagements with armed groups, searches of areas believed to contain military infrastructure, and the recovery of information or material relevant to ongoing investigations.

Ground operations create different risks from aerial attacks.

Soldiers may encounter armed individuals without knowing their identities in advance.

The situation may develop rapidly, and the information available during an engagement may be incomplete.

The circumstances surrounding Sinwar's death demonstrate this reality.

A military encounter can result in the death of an important commander even when the troops involved did not begin the engagement with confirmed knowledge of that individual's presence.

This is why it is important to distinguish between a targeted operation and a battlefield encounter.

Both may produce significant military outcomes, but the intelligence and decision-making processes behind them can differ substantially.

The Underground Dimension

Hamas's extensive tunnel infrastructure has complicated Israel's military campaign.

Underground facilities have been used for military purposes, including movement, storage, command functions, and, in some cases, the detention of hostages.

The presence of underground infrastructure creates difficulties for intelligence assessments.

Aerial imagery cannot directly reveal every activity occurring beneath the surface.

The location, purpose, and condition of underground facilities may also change.

However, the existence of tunnels does not automatically make every building above them a lawful military objective.

The relationship between an underground military facility and surrounding civilian infrastructure requires specific assessment.

Military operations involving tunnels can also affect civilian buildings and essential services.

The underground campaign therefore illustrates the intersection between military objectives, intelligence uncertainty, and humanitarian consequences.

The Controversy Over Automated Target Recommendations

Investigative reporting during the Gaza war raised questions about the role of automated systems in Israeli targeting decisions.

Systems identified in reporting as Lavender and The Gospel became central to debates about artificial intelligence and military operations.

The investigations alleged that automated analysis contributed to the identification of individuals or locations for potential attack.

Some reports also raised concerns about the extent of human review and the speed at which targets were processed.

The IDF disputed important aspects of these allegations and maintained that targeting decisions remained subject to human responsibility and applicable legal requirements.

The full technical and operational details of the systems have not been made available for independent examination.

The controversy highlights a broader issue.

A system that generates possible targets does not establish that those targets are lawful.

Automated recommendations must be assessed according to the reliability of the underlying information and the legal requirements governing military action.

The speed of analysis must not replace meaningful verification.

Civilian Casualties and the Principle of Proportionality

One of the most contested aspects of Israel's campaign against Hamas concerns civilian casualties.

Military operations in Gaza have caused extensive deaths, injuries, displacement, and destruction.

Israel has maintained that its operations are directed against Hamas and other armed groups.

Palestinian authorities, international organizations, human rights groups, and independent investigators have raised serious concerns about the scale of civilian harm and the legality of particular attacks.

The principle of proportionality is central to these debates.

Under international humanitarian law, an attack is prohibited if the expected incidental civilian harm would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.

This is a forward-looking assessment based on the information reasonably available before the attack.

It is not simply a comparison between the number of civilians and combatants killed afterward.

A high civilian death toll may raise serious concerns and require investigation, but the legal assessment must examine the circumstances of the particular operation.

Likewise, the presence of a lawful military target does not automatically justify extensive civilian harm.

The distinction is essential for accurate reporting.

Human Shields and the Limits of Military Justification

Israel has repeatedly accused Hamas of operating within civilian areas and using civilians as human shields.

There is evidence that Hamas has used civilian environments for military purposes, including locating military infrastructure within populated areas.

However, allegations concerning specific incidents require individual examination.

The term human shield has a particular legal meaning and should not automatically be applied to every civilian located near an armed group.

International humanitarian law prohibits the use of civilians to shield military objectives from attack.

Nevertheless, violations by one party do not remove the legal obligations of the opposing party.

Even where human shielding occurs, an attacker must still comply with distinction, proportionality, and feasible precautions.

Civilians do not lose their protection merely because an armed organization operates nearby.

This principle is especially important in Gaza, where many civilians have had limited ability to move safely during military operations.

The presence of armed groups in populated areas creates serious military challenges, but it does not eliminate civilian rights.

The Strategic Question: Does Leadership Targeting Work?

Targeted operations against senior commanders are often justified as a means of disrupting an armed organization's capabilities.

Removing experienced leaders can create immediate difficulties.

An organization may lose institutional knowledge, established relationships, and individuals responsible for coordinating military activity.

However, the long-term effects vary.

Some organizations are highly dependent on particular leaders.

Others possess structures capable of replacing them.

Leadership losses may weaken military operations without eliminating the broader organization.

Hamas has survived the deaths of numerous senior figures over several decades.

This history demonstrates that leadership targeting alone has not permanently ended the movement.

The question is therefore not simply whether individual operations succeed.

It is whether they contribute to lasting strategic objectives.

A military campaign may achieve substantial operational results while leaving unresolved the political and security conditions that contributed to the conflict.

The Relationship Between Military Action and Political Strategy

Intelligence-led military operations form one part of a broader national security strategy.

They can address immediate threats and disrupt armed capabilities.

However, they cannot independently determine the future political order of a territory.

In Gaza, questions concerning governance, reconstruction, humanitarian assistance, and future security arrangements have remained central to discussions about the conflict.

The removal of Hamas commanders does not automatically create a functioning alternative governing authority.

Nor does the destruction of military infrastructure necessarily prevent future recruitment or armed activity.

Long-term security therefore depends on factors extending beyond the battlefield.

These include political decisions, regional relationships, economic conditions, and the treatment of civilian populations.

Military intelligence can inform decision-makers about threats, but it cannot substitute for a comprehensive political strategy.

Accountability After Military Operations

Military operations may be described as successful when they achieve their immediate objective.

However, the broader assessment should also consider their legality and consequences.

If an operation results in civilian casualties, questions may arise concerning the reliability of the intelligence, the anticipated civilian harm, and the precautions taken.

If a target was incorrectly identified, investigators may need to examine how the error occurred.

If automated systems contributed to the decision, their role may also require scrutiny.

Accountability is particularly difficult when intelligence information remains classified.

Governments may argue that disclosure would compromise national security.

Yet excessive secrecy can make it difficult for victims, journalists, and independent investigators to establish what occurred.

Effective oversight must balance legitimate security concerns with the need to investigate possible violations.

Military success does not remove the obligation to examine unlawful conduct.

From Intelligence to Responsibility

The transformation of intelligence into military action is one of the most consequential processes in modern warfare.

For Israel, intelligence assessments have supported operations against Hamas's military leadership, armed formations, and infrastructure.

Some operations have resulted in the deaths of senior commanders considered important to Hamas's military capabilities.

Others have demonstrated the limits of intelligence and the unpredictable nature of battlefield encounters.

The cases of Mohammed Deif, Marwan Issa, and Yahya Sinwar illustrate different dimensions of this campaign.

They also demonstrate that the outcome of an operation does not, by itself, establish the reliability of the intelligence or the legality of the methods used.

Every decision involving military force carries responsibilities.

The intended objective must be lawful.

The information must be assessed carefully.

Expected civilian harm must be considered.

And the decision must remain subject to human accountability.

Advanced surveillance, artificial intelligence, and intelligence cooperation may improve military capabilities, but they cannot replace these obligations.

Ultimately, the effectiveness of intelligence-led operations must be judged not only by the individuals or infrastructure targeted, but also by their legal compliance, humanitarian consequences, and contribution to lasting security.

The next chapter examines the specialized military and police units that have played important roles in Israel's security operations, including their institutional responsibilities, historical missions, and involvement in the campaign against Hamas.

Chapter 10 — Israel's Special Forces and Elite Military Units

Inside the Specialized Forces Behind Israel's Counterterrorism Operations

When Israeli intelligence agencies identify a potential security threat, gathering information is only one part of the challenge.

Certain situations require military or police units with specialized training, equipment, and responsibilities.

Israel has developed a range of elite military and counterterrorism units over several decades. Their missions include special reconnaissance, maritime operations, hostage rescue, counterterrorism, and other specialized military activities.

Among the best-known are Sayeret Matkal, Shayetet 13, Shaldag, Duvdevan, Egoz, Maglan, and Yamam.

Although these units are frequently grouped together in public discussions about Israeli special forces, they do not all perform the same functions.

Some operate within the Israel Defense Forces. Others belong to the national police.

Their organizational structures, responsibilities, and historical missions differ.

Following the Hamas-led attacks of October 7, 2023, specialized Israeli forces became important participants in the wider military and security response.

Their activities included fighting armed attackers inside Israel, supporting military operations, and participating in efforts to recover hostages.

However, the public record does not disclose the full operational activities of every unit.

Understanding their role requires distinguishing confirmed operations from speculation and recognizing that even highly trained forces remain subject to the laws governing armed conflict.

Why Israel Developed Specialized Military Units

Israel's development of specialized military units reflects its history of armed conflict and security threats.

Following the establishment of the state in 1948, Israeli military leaders faced challenges involving conventional warfare, cross-border attacks, intelligence collection, and irregular armed organizations.

These challenges encouraged the development of units capable of carrying out missions beyond the responsibilities of conventional infantry formations.

One important historical example was Unit 101, established in 1953 under the command of Ariel Sharon.

The unit conducted cross-border reprisal operations and became influential in the development of Israeli commando tactics.

However, its history also includes serious controversy.

The October 1953 raid on Qibya in the Jordanian-controlled West Bank resulted in the deaths of dozens of Palestinian civilians and drew international condemnation.

The incident demonstrates that the historical development of special operations cannot be examined solely through military achievements.

The legality and consequences of operations are also part of the record.

Over subsequent decades, Israel developed specialized units within different branches of its military and security establishment.

Some focused on reconnaissance and intelligence support.

Others developed capabilities associated with maritime operations, counterterrorism, and hostage rescue.

The growth of these units reflected changing threats, technological developments, and lessons drawn from previous conflicts.

Sayeret Matkal: Israel's General Staff Reconnaissance Unit

Sayeret Matkal is among Israel's most widely recognized elite military units.

Established in 1957, the unit developed a reputation for special reconnaissance and certain high-risk operations.

It operates within the IDF's special operations structure and has historically been associated with missions requiring specialized intelligence and military capabilities.

Many details concerning its activities remain classified.

Nevertheless, several historical operations have become publicly known.

The unit is particularly associated with the 1976 hostage-rescue operation at Entebbe Airport in Uganda.

During that crisis, an Air France aircraft was hijacked, and hostages were held at the airport.

Israeli forces conducted a long-range rescue operation that resulted in the recovery of most of the remaining hostages.

The operation became one of the most internationally recognized examples of Israeli special forces activity.

However, it also involved fatalities, including the death of Israeli commander Yonatan Netanyahu, several hostages, and Ugandan military personnel.

The operation demonstrated the ability of specialized forces to participate in complex missions far from Israel.

It also became a defining event in the country's national security history.

The Legacy of Operation Entebbe

Operation Entebbe, also known as Operation Thunderbolt, remains an important reference point in discussions about Israeli hostage-rescue capabilities.

The mission followed the hijacking of an Air France flight in June 1976.

The aircraft was eventually taken to Uganda, where the hostages were held at Entebbe Airport.

Israeli forces launched their rescue operation on July 4, 1976.

The operation required extensive preparation and involved several military elements, including Sayeret Matkal.

Most of the remaining hostages were rescued.

The operation was widely celebrated in Israel and became an enduring symbol of the country's commitment to recovering citizens held captive abroad.

At the same time, it raised questions about the use of military force within another sovereign state.

The circumstances were different from the present conflict in Gaza, but the operation illustrates how hostage rescue became an important component of Israeli security thinking.

Its historical significance extends beyond the military outcome.

It helped shape the public image of Israeli special forces and influenced expectations about the state's ability to respond to hostage crises.

Shayetet 13: Israel's Naval Commando Unit

Shayetet 13 is the Israeli Navy's specialized commando unit.

Its history extends to the early years of Israeli statehood, and it has participated in maritime and other special military operations.

The unit is associated with naval reconnaissance, maritime security, and specialized missions involving coastal environments.

Publicly documented operations have included activities during regional conflicts and counterterrorism missions.

Its responsibilities differ from those of Sayeret Matkal because of its institutional connection to the navy and its maritime specialization.

However, modern military operations can involve cooperation between units from different branches of the armed forces.

During the campaign against Hamas, Israeli authorities have publicly described the involvement of Shayetet 13 personnel in military operations.

The unit's activities on October 7 also became part of the public record.

Israeli naval commandos participated in fighting against Hamas-led attackers during the assault on southern Israel.

The unit's involvement illustrates how specialized forces can be employed outside the narrow geographical settings with which they are traditionally associated.

Nevertheless, the details of individual missions should be based on documented information rather than assumptions about the unit's capabilities.

Shaldag: A Specialized Israeli Air Force Unit

Shaldag is an elite unit within the Israeli Air Force.

It is associated with specialized military missions and cooperation with other air and ground elements.

The unit has participated in Israeli military operations across different periods of conflict.

Because much of its work remains classified, public information about particular missions is limited.

Shaldag became especially prominent in reporting about the events of October 7.

Its personnel were among the Israeli forces involved in responding to the Hamas-led attacks.

The fighting demonstrated the challenges faced by specialized units when confronted with a large-scale assault involving numerous locations.

The October 7 response was not a single coordinated special forces operation.

It involved military personnel, police officers, local security teams, emergency responders, and civilians acting under extremely difficult circumstances.

Some units encountered severe losses while attempting to respond to the attacks.

The experience challenged assumptions about preparedness and demonstrated that specialized training does not eliminate the dangers created by unexpected large-scale violence.

Duvdevan: Counterterrorism and Operations in the West Bank

Duvdevan is a specialized IDF unit associated particularly with counterterrorism operations in the West Bank.

The unit was established in the 1980s and became known for operations involving Palestinian armed networks.

Its historical activities have included arrests and other military missions.

Duvdevan is often discussed in connection with undercover capabilities, although the details of particular operations are not necessarily public.

The unit's work has also been controversial because Israeli military operations in the occupied West Bank raise significant legal and human rights questions.

These include the use of force, detention practices, civilian protection, and the legal framework governing military activity in occupied territory.

Duvdevan's responsibilities should not be confused with those of intelligence agencies.

The unit is a military formation, not a separate national intelligence service.

It may operate in situations where intelligence information contributes to military planning, but its institutional function remains distinct from that of Shin Bet or Aman.

Following October 7, Duvdevan personnel also participated in operations connected to the wider conflict.

Egoz and the Development of Specialized Ground Forces

Egoz is an Israeli military unit associated with specialized ground combat.

Its modern history is linked to the security challenges Israel faced in southern Lebanon during the 1990s.

The unit developed experience in operations against armed organizations, including Hezbollah.

Over time, Egoz became part of Israel's broader special operations and commando structure.

Its role differs from that of units primarily associated with hostage rescue or foreign reconnaissance.

Egoz is more closely connected with specialized ground warfare.

Following October 7, its personnel participated in the fighting and subsequent military campaign.

The involvement of such units illustrates the range of capabilities Israel has employed against Hamas.

However, it is important not to assume that every specialized ground unit performs intelligence-led assassination missions.

Many military activities involve conventional combat responsibilities carried out by personnel with additional specialized training.

The distinction matters when examining the actual contribution of particular units to Israel's campaign.

Maglan and Specialized Military Operations

Maglan is another specialized unit within the IDF's commando structure.

Its publicly known history includes participation in military operations requiring specialized ground capabilities.

Like Egoz and Duvdevan, Maglan forms part of Israel's wider system of elite military formations.

The unit has participated in different periods of conflict, including operations involving Palestinian armed organizations.

During the war following October 7, specialized units such as Maglan were among the formations deployed in military operations.

However, the public record does not establish every mission carried out by each unit.

This limitation is significant for investigative journalism.

The reputation of an elite unit should not be treated as evidence of its involvement in a particular operation.

Reliable reporting requires confirmation through official disclosures, credible independent investigations, or other verifiable evidence.

Yamam: Israel's National Counterterrorism Unit

Yamam occupies a distinctive position within Israel's security establishment.

Unlike the military units discussed above, Yamam belongs to the Israel Police.

It operates as a national counterterrorism unit and has extensive experience in high-risk security operations, including hostage rescue.

Its institutional responsibilities differ from those of the IDF.

Nevertheless, Yamam has cooperated with military and intelligence institutions during major security incidents.

This cooperation became especially visible following October 7.

Yamam personnel were involved in responding to the Hamas-led attacks and later participated in operations connected to the recovery of hostages.

The unit's role illustrates the importance of coordination between civilian law-enforcement institutions and the military.

Hostage-rescue missions may require expertise and authorities that extend across organizational boundaries.

However, the fact that a police unit participates in an operation does not remove the need to examine the legal framework governing the mission.

The applicable rules depend on the circumstances and nature of the operation.

October 7: Elite Forces Confront an Unprecedented Assault

The Hamas-led attacks of October 7, 2023, represented a catastrophic failure of Israel's security and defensive preparations.

Armed groups crossed the Gaza border and attacked Israeli military installations, communities, and civilian gatherings.

Approximately 1,200 people were killed in Israel, and 251 people were taken hostage into Gaza.

The assault occurred across numerous locations, creating severe challenges for Israeli military and police forces.

Specialized units were among those deployed to respond.

However, the scale and speed of the attacks overwhelmed elements of Israel's initial defensive response.

Some units encountered intense fighting, while others were required to respond to rapidly developing situations with incomplete information.

The events demonstrated that even a country with extensive military capabilities and elite formations can experience major security failures.

Special forces are designed for particular types of missions.

They cannot independently compensate for failures in intelligence assessment, border defense, command coordination, or military preparedness.

October 7 therefore became a turning point not only for Israeli intelligence but also for the country's wider security institutions.

The Role of Special Forces in the Gaza Campaign

Following October 7, Israeli military operations in Gaza involved a wide range of conventional and specialized forces.

The IDF conducted air operations, ground offensives, and activities involving military intelligence and specialized units.

Elite formations participated in aspects of the campaign, although their precise roles varied.

Public statements have described special forces involvement in combat operations, the investigation of military infrastructure, and missions involving hostages.

However, not every operation against Hamas was conducted by an elite unit.

Conventional infantry, armored formations, engineering units, air crews, and other military personnel have played major roles in the campaign.

The emphasis on special forces in public discussion can sometimes obscure the broader military structure.

Complex military operations generally involve many different institutions and personnel.

The significance of elite units lies in their specialized responsibilities, not in the assumption that they conduct every important mission.

Hostage Rescue and the Importance of Specialized Units

The recovery of hostages has been one of Israel's most urgent security objectives since October 7.

Hostage-rescue operations present exceptional challenges because military action must be considered alongside the immediate safety of captives.

Specialized units may participate in such missions because of their training and institutional responsibilities.

However, successful hostage recovery depends on more than the personnel conducting the rescue.

Intelligence assessments, command decisions, medical support, and coordination between organizations can all be relevant.

The public record contains several important examples.

These include the rescue of Ori Megidish in October 2023, the recovery of two hostages in Rafah in February 2024, and the rescue of four hostages from Nuseirat in June 2024.

Each operation occurred under different circumstances.

They should therefore be examined individually rather than treated as identical examples of special forces activity.

The Rescue of Ori Megidish

In October 2023, Israeli soldier Ori Megidish was rescued from Gaza.

Israeli authorities announced that the operation involved the IDF and Shin Bet.

Megidish had been abducted during the October 7 attacks.

Her recovery was one of the earliest publicly announced successful hostage rescues following the assault.

The operation demonstrated that Israeli security institutions could recover a captive through military action.

However, relatively limited operational details were released publicly.

This makes it difficult to reconstruct every aspect of the mission independently.

The distinction between confirmed facts and undisclosed operational information is important.

A successful outcome does not justify speculation about intelligence methods or the involvement of units that have not been publicly identified.

The February 2024 Rafah Rescue

On February 12, 2024, Israeli forces rescued two hostages, Fernando Simon Marman and Louis Har, from Rafah in southern Gaza.

The operation involved cooperation between Israeli security institutions, including the IDF, Shin Bet, and Yamam.

The hostages were recovered alive.

Israeli authorities described the operation as a successful rescue.

However, the mission took place amid Israeli military strikes that caused Palestinian casualties.

The operation therefore raised questions about the relationship between hostage recovery and civilian protection.

The success of recovering hostages must be considered alongside the consequences of military action in surrounding areas.

This distinction is essential when evaluating special operations conducted in densely populated environments.

The Nuseirat Rescue Operation

On June 8, 2024, Israeli forces rescued four hostages from the Nuseirat area of central Gaza.

The rescued hostages were Noa Argamani, Almog Meir Jan, Andrey Kozlov, and Shlomi Ziv.

All four had been abducted from the Nova music festival during the October 7 attacks.

The operation involved the IDF, Shin Bet, and Yamam.

Israeli authorities described the mission as the result of extensive intelligence work and coordination between security institutions.

The four hostages were returned alive to Israel.

For their families, the rescue ended eight months of captivity and uncertainty.

However, the operation and associated Israeli military action caused substantial Palestinian casualties.

Palestinian health authorities reported more than 270 deaths, while Israeli authorities disputed aspects of the reported figures.

The precise circumstances of individual deaths remain difficult to establish from the publicly available record.

The operation therefore illustrates both the capabilities and the consequences of complex hostage-rescue missions.

It demonstrated effective cooperation between specialized security institutions in recovering captives.

At the same time, it raised serious questions about civilian harm and the conduct of military operations in populated areas.

Special Forces and the Search for Hamas Leaders

Israel's campaign against Hamas has included efforts to locate and kill senior military and political figures.

However, not every operation against a Hamas leader has involved special forces.

Some senior figures have been killed in airstrikes.

Others have died during ground engagements.

The death of Yahya Sinwar in October 2024 illustrates the distinction.

Sinwar was killed during an encounter with Israeli troops in Rafah.

According to Israeli accounts, the soldiers did not initially know that he was present.

His identity was confirmed afterward.

The encounter was not publicly described as a planned special forces raid against his confirmed location.

Similarly, the operation that killed Mohammed Deif involved an Israeli airstrike rather than a publicly documented hostage-rescue-style commando mission.

These distinctions matter because the public image of elite units can encourage inaccurate assumptions.

The campaign against Hamas has involved intelligence agencies, conventional military forces, specialized units, and air power.

Each has contributed in different ways.

The Human Cost of Special Operations

Specialized military units are often discussed in terms of training, discipline, and operational achievements.

However, their missions can involve significant human consequences.

Military personnel may be killed or injured.

Hostages may face additional danger.

Civilians may be harmed during fighting or military strikes associated with an operation.

These risks are particularly serious in densely populated areas.

The presence of an important military objective does not eliminate the obligation to protect civilians.

International humanitarian law requires distinction, proportionality, and feasible precautions in attack.

These obligations apply to specialized forces as well as conventional military units.

The reputation or training of a unit does not establish that every operation it conducts is lawful.

The circumstances of each mission must be examined individually.

Accountability and the Laws of Armed Conflict

Elite military units operate within legal and command frameworks.

Their personnel remain subject to applicable domestic and international law.

When military operations involve allegations of civilian harm or other unlawful conduct, questions may arise concerning command responsibility, operational decisions, and the actions of individual personnel.

The classification of an operation does not automatically remove the need for accountability.

However, secrecy can complicate independent investigation.

Governments may withhold information concerning specialized units for legitimate security reasons.

At the same time, excessive secrecy can make it difficult to establish what occurred during controversial incidents.

A responsible journalistic examination must therefore distinguish between confirmed facts, official claims, credible allegations, and unresolved questions.

Military achievements and legal accountability are not mutually exclusive subjects.

Both are necessary to understanding the full consequences of special operations.

Can Elite Units Defeat an Armed Organization?

Specialized military units can contribute to particular security objectives.

They may rescue hostages, support intelligence operations, or participate in efforts to disrupt armed networks.

However, their capabilities have strategic limits.

An armed organization may survive the loss of commanders, weapons, or infrastructure.

Its members may reorganize, recruit replacements, or adapt to changing conditions.

The effectiveness of special operations therefore depends partly on the broader political and military strategy within which they occur.

Israel's experience with Hamas illustrates this challenge.

Over several decades, Israeli forces have killed or captured numerous senior figures associated with Palestinian armed organizations.

Yet Hamas continued to develop military capabilities and ultimately carried out the October 7 attacks.

This history does not mean that individual operations lacked military significance.

It means that operational achievements do not automatically produce lasting strategic outcomes.

The distinction is essential when evaluating the role of elite units in prolonged conflicts.

The Future of Israel's Special Operations Forces

The experience of October 7 and the subsequent Gaza campaign has intensified scrutiny of Israel's military preparedness and security institutions.

Specialized units remain important elements of the country's defense establishment.

Their future development will likely be influenced by lessons concerning intelligence cooperation, command coordination, hostage rescue, and military operations in complex environments.

However, technological and tactical improvements cannot resolve every strategic problem.

The effectiveness of elite units depends on accurate intelligence, responsible leadership, appropriate legal safeguards, and clearly defined objectives.

Their capabilities must also be understood within the broader context of conventional military forces and national security policy.

The central question is not whether Israel possesses highly trained special forces.

It is how those forces are employed, what objectives they can realistically achieve, and whether their operations contribute to sustainable security.

Beyond the Image of the Elite Soldier

Israel's special forces occupy a prominent place in the country's military history.

Sayeret Matkal, Shayetet 13, Shaldag, Duvdevan, Egoz, Maglan, and Yamam have developed different areas of specialization.

Their publicly documented operations include reconnaissance, counterterrorism, military combat, and hostage rescue.

Following October 7, specialized forces became part of Israel's response to one of the most devastating attacks in its history.

The recovery of hostages demonstrated the importance of cooperation between intelligence agencies and specialized operational units.

At the same time, the Gaza campaign revealed the humanitarian and legal challenges associated with conducting military operations in densely populated territory.

The history of these units cannot be understood solely through accounts of successful missions.

It also requires examining intelligence failures, operational limitations, civilian consequences, and questions of accountability.

Ultimately, special forces are instruments of national security policy.

They can accomplish particular military objectives, but they cannot independently resolve the political and strategic conditions underlying a prolonged conflict.

The next chapter turns to one of the most difficult environments in which Israeli forces have operated: the extensive underground infrastructure developed by Hamas beneath the Gaza Strip.

Chapter 11 — Inside the Underground War Against Hamas

Beneath Gaza: The Hidden Battlefield That Transformed Israel's Campaign Against Hamas

Above ground, the war between Israel and Hamas has been defined by airstrikes, military operations, destroyed buildings, displaced families, and intense international scrutiny.

Beneath the surface lies another dimension of the conflict.

Over many years, Hamas developed an extensive network of underground tunnels and facilities beneath the Gaza Strip. These structures have been used for different purposes, including military movement, storage, command functions, and the detention of hostages.

For Israel, the underground network became one of the most difficult challenges of its military campaign following the Hamas-led attacks of October 7, 2023.

The tunnels complicated efforts to locate senior Hamas commanders, identify military infrastructure, and recover people taken hostage during the assault.

They also created serious humanitarian and legal questions because underground military facilities have existed beneath or near densely populated civilian areas.

Israeli authorities have described the tunnel system as a central component of Hamas's military strategy.

Hamas has acknowledged constructing underground military infrastructure and has portrayed it as necessary for its armed struggle against Israel.

However, the precise extent of the network, the functions of individual tunnels, and the relationship between underground facilities and civilian infrastructure have not always been independently verified.

Understanding the underground war requires separating documented discoveries from broader military claims and examining how the tunnels have affected both military operations and civilian life.

The Origins of Gaza's Tunnel Networks

Underground tunnels have existed in Gaza for decades, but their purposes have changed over time.

Before Hamas developed its extensive military infrastructure, tunnels were used along the border between Gaza and Egypt for smuggling goods and moving people.

Their importance increased as restrictions on movement and trade intensified.

Following Israel's withdrawal of settlements and permanent ground forces from Gaza in 2005, the political and security situation changed significantly.

Hamas won the 2006 Palestinian legislative elections and took control of Gaza in 2007 after violent conflict with Fatah.

Israel subsequently imposed extensive restrictions on Gaza, citing security concerns, while Egypt also controlled and restricted access through its border.

The restrictions contributed to the expansion of underground smuggling networks, particularly near Rafah.

These tunnels were used to transport a range of goods, including consumer products, construction materials, fuel, and weapons.

They became an important part of Gaza's informal economy.

However, the civilian smuggling tunnels and Hamas's later military tunnel system should not be treated as identical.

Some tunnels primarily supported economic activity under conditions of restricted trade.

Others were developed specifically for military purposes.

Over time, Hamas invested increasingly in underground military infrastructure intended to support its armed operations and improve its ability to survive Israeli attacks.

Why Hamas Invested in Underground Infrastructure

Hamas's investment in tunnels reflected the substantial military imbalance between its armed forces and the Israeli military.

Israel possesses advanced aircraft, surveillance technology, armored vehicles, intelligence capabilities, and sophisticated weapons systems.

Hamas, by comparison, has relied on irregular warfare, rockets, armed units, and other capabilities developed under very different conditions.

Underground infrastructure offered several potential advantages.

It could provide concealment from aerial observation.

It could protect personnel and equipment from some forms of attack.

It could also allow military activities to continue despite damage to above-ground facilities.

Israeli authorities have argued that Hamas's underground infrastructure was intended to preserve its command structure and military capabilities during periods of intense fighting.

Hamas has presented the tunnels as part of its strategy for confronting a technologically superior adversary.

However, the military value of underground facilities does not eliminate the legal obligations governing their use.

Armed groups must comply with applicable international humanitarian law, including obligations concerning the protection of civilians and the treatment of hostages.

The location of military infrastructure within civilian areas can create serious risks for surrounding populations.

The Difference Between Smuggling, Defensive and Attack Tunnels

Public discussion often refers to Gaza's tunnels as though they form one uniform system.

In reality, underground structures have served different purposes.

Smuggling tunnels historically connected Gaza with areas across the Egyptian border.

Military tunnels have been used for movement, storage, shelter, and other functions associated with armed operations.

Some tunnels were constructed toward or across the border with Israel.

These cross-border tunnels became a major Israeli security concern.

During earlier conflicts, Israeli authorities reported discovering tunnels intended to facilitate attacks or the movement of armed personnel into Israeli territory.

The distinction matters because the purpose of a particular tunnel cannot always be determined from its existence alone.

An underground passage used to transport consumer goods is not equivalent to a tunnel constructed for an armed attack.

Similarly, the existence of a tunnel beneath an area does not automatically establish that every nearby building or resident is involved in military activity.

Accurate reporting requires examining the function and circumstances of individual facilities.

The 2006 Abduction of Gilad Shalit

One of the most significant incidents involving cross-border tunnel activity occurred in June 2006.

Palestinian armed militants attacked an Israeli military position near the Gaza border.

Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit was captured and taken into Gaza.

The operation involved Hamas's military wing and other Palestinian armed organizations.

Shalit's captivity lasted more than five years.

He was released in October 2011 as part of a prisoner exchange in which Israel released more than 1,000 Palestinian prisoners.

The incident became an important part of Israeli security discussions concerning Gaza.

It demonstrated that underground access routes could contribute to attacks on military positions and the capture of soldiers.

It also reinforced the significance of hostage-related issues in Israeli military planning.

However, the 2006 incident occurred under different circumstances from the mass hostage-taking of October 7, 2023.

The two events should not be treated as operationally identical.

Their common significance lies in the role of captivity and underground infrastructure within the prolonged conflict.

Operation Protective Edge and the 2014 Tunnel War

The 2014 Gaza war marked a major turning point in Israel's public understanding of Hamas's tunnel infrastructure.

During Operation Protective Edge, Israeli authorities identified cross-border tunnels that they said posed a threat to Israeli communities and military positions.

Israeli ground forces conducted operations intended to locate and destroy these tunnels.

The underground infrastructure became one of the central issues of the campaign.

Israeli officials argued that the tunnels could enable armed militants to enter Israeli territory and carry out attacks.

Hamas regarded the tunnels as part of its military capabilities.

The 2014 conflict resulted in extensive casualties and destruction in Gaza, as well as deaths in Israel.

The experience demonstrated that underground warfare could complicate military operations even when one side possessed overwhelming technological superiority.

It also encouraged Israel to invest further in detecting and countering underground threats.

However, the destruction of tunnels during one conflict did not prevent Hamas from developing additional underground infrastructure in subsequent years.

This became increasingly clear after October 7.

The Scale of the Underground Network

Israeli authorities have described Hamas's tunnel infrastructure as extending for hundreds of kilometers beneath Gaza.

Public estimates have varied, and the precise total length has not been independently established.

The network is not necessarily one continuous, uniformly connected system.

Different sections may have been constructed at different times and for different purposes.

Some facilities have been described as relatively simple passages.

Others have included more substantial structures with rooms, electrical installations, or other infrastructure.

Israeli military footage and statements have documented the discovery of numerous underground facilities during operations in Gaza.

However, official photographs and videos generally show selected locations rather than the entire system.

This creates an important limitation for independent analysis.

The discovery of a particular tunnel can be documented without confirming broader claims about the full network.

Likewise, an estimate of total tunnel length should be presented as an estimate rather than a precisely established measurement.

The scale of the system is strategically important, but uncertainty concerning its exact dimensions remains.

Underground Command Facilities

Israeli authorities have accused Hamas of using underground facilities for military command and coordination.

Such facilities may provide protection from some forms of aerial attack and allow military personnel to operate away from direct observation.

Publicly released Israeli material has shown underground rooms and installations described as military infrastructure.

However, the precise purpose of every discovered location is not always independently verifiable.

A room containing electrical equipment or communications infrastructure may be consistent with military use, but its function must be established through reliable evidence.

The existence of a tunnel also does not necessarily demonstrate that a particular senior commander used it.

This distinction is important because intelligence assessments concerning underground command facilities have influenced Israeli military operations.

When military authorities identify a location as a command center, the claim may have significant consequences for nearby civilians.

Independent verification is therefore especially important.

The Challenge of Finding Underground Facilities

Underground infrastructure presents difficulties for intelligence collection.

Satellite imagery and aerial surveillance can reveal physical changes above ground, but they cannot directly observe every activity occurring beneath the surface.

The existence, condition, and purpose of a tunnel may remain uncertain even when its approximate location is suspected.

Israeli military and intelligence institutions have invested in technological capabilities intended to address underground threats.

Public reporting has described the use of specialized detection systems, engineering expertise, and intelligence analysis.

However, the precise capabilities and limitations of these systems are not fully public.

The October 7 attacks demonstrated that extensive technological investment does not guarantee complete awareness of an adversary's activities.

The same principle applies to underground warfare.

A military may discover significant infrastructure while remaining uncertain about other sections of the network.

The existence of advanced surveillance does not eliminate the possibility of incomplete or incorrect assessments.

Israel's Underground Military Campaign

Following October 7, Israeli forces conducted extensive operations against Hamas's military infrastructure in Gaza.

The IDF identified underground facilities as an important military objective.

Israeli authorities released photographs and videos showing tunnels, shafts, rooms, and other structures discovered during operations.

Military engineering units and specialized personnel participated in activities involving underground infrastructure.

The precise details of many operations remain classified.

However, public information establishes that the underground campaign became a major component of Israel's broader effort to weaken Hamas's military capabilities.

The operations also carried substantial risks.

Underground facilities can be difficult to assess, and military action against them may affect surrounding structures.

In densely populated areas, the consequences can extend to civilian homes, roads, and essential infrastructure.

The military significance of a tunnel must therefore be evaluated alongside the potential effects of any proposed attack.

The Hostage Dimension of the Underground War

The presence of Israeli and other hostages in Gaza created an additional challenge.

Following the October 7 attacks, Hamas and other armed groups held captives in different locations.

Evidence from released hostages, recovered remains, and Israeli military investigations established that some hostages had been held in underground facilities.

The use of tunnels for captivity complicated efforts to determine the hostages' whereabouts and conditions.

It also increased the risks associated with military operations in areas where captives might be present.

An operation against suspected military infrastructure could endanger hostages if their location was unknown.

Conversely, information about a possible hostage location could influence military decisions concerning a particular area.

The full intelligence available to Israeli authorities during individual operations has not been publicly disclosed.

This makes it difficult to reconstruct the decision-making process in every case.

Nevertheless, the underground detention of hostages became one of the most disturbing aspects of the conflict.

The Discovery of Six Hostages in Rafah

In August 2024, Israeli forces recovered the bodies of six hostages from an underground tunnel in the Rafah area.

They were Hersh Goldberg-Polin, Eden Yerushalmi, Carmel Gat, Alexander Lobanov, Almog Sarusi, and Ori Danino.

Israeli authorities said the hostages had been killed shortly before their bodies were recovered.

The discovery caused profound grief in Israel and intensified debate about the government's strategy for securing the release of remaining captives.

It also highlighted the dangers facing hostages during continuing military operations.

The circumstances reinforced the difficulty of conducting military action in areas where captives may be held.

For families, the discovery demonstrated the devastating consequences of prolonged captivity.

For Israeli authorities, it raised further questions about intelligence, military pressure, and the relationship between rescue efforts and negotiations.

The incident remains a significant part of the human history of the underground war.

Hospitals and Allegations of Underground Military Infrastructure

One of the most controversial aspects of the Gaza campaign involved Israeli allegations that Hamas used tunnels and military facilities beneath or near hospitals.

Israeli authorities made particularly prominent claims concerning al-Shifa Hospital in Gaza City.

The IDF released material showing underground structures and stated that Hamas had used the hospital complex for military purposes.

Hamas denied using hospitals as military command centers.

Independent investigations established the existence of some underground infrastructure at the complex but did not conclusively substantiate every element of Israel's more extensive public claims.

This distinction is important.

Evidence of a tunnel or underground structure does not automatically establish the full nature of its use or confirm every allegation about a command facility.

Hospitals enjoy special protection under international humanitarian law.

That protection may be lost under limited circumstances if a medical facility is used to commit acts harmful to the enemy outside its humanitarian function, subject to the applicable legal requirements.

Even where protection is lost, other obligations concerning civilians, patients, medical personnel, proportionality, and precautions remain applicable.

The presence of underground infrastructure therefore does not automatically justify an attack on a hospital.

Each allegation requires careful factual and legal examination.

Civilian Infrastructure Above the Tunnels

Gaza's dense urban environment creates particular difficulties when military infrastructure exists beneath civilian areas.

Buildings, roads, water systems, and other facilities may be located above or near underground passages.

Military action affecting a tunnel can also affect the structures surrounding it.

The consequences may include damage to homes, disruption of essential services, and additional dangers for civilians.

This raises questions concerning the responsibility of armed organizations that place military infrastructure in populated areas.

It also raises questions concerning the precautions required of forces attacking such infrastructure.

International humanitarian law requires parties to take feasible precautions to protect civilians.

It prohibits using civilians to shield military objectives from attack.

However, violations by one party do not remove the legal obligations of the other.

The presence of a military tunnel beneath a civilian neighborhood does not make every resident a combatant.

Nor does it automatically make all nearby civilian infrastructure a lawful military objective.

These distinctions are essential to evaluating the underground campaign.

The Human Shields Debate

Israel has repeatedly accused Hamas of exploiting civilian areas to protect military infrastructure and personnel.

The construction and use of military tunnels beneath or near populated locations have become part of this debate.

However, the legal concept of human shielding requires careful application.

Not every instance of military infrastructure near civilians necessarily establishes the specific unlawful use of civilians as shields.

The circumstances and purpose of particular conduct matter.

International humanitarian law prohibits the use of civilians to shield military objectives.

It also requires attackers to distinguish between military targets and protected persons.

Even where an armed organization unlawfully places military infrastructure among civilians, the opposing force must continue to comply with proportionality and feasible precautions.

The issue cannot be resolved through broad accusations alone.

Specific incidents require evidence.

The protection of civilians remains a legal obligation regardless of the conduct of an opposing armed group.

The Destruction of Tunnels and Its Wider Consequences

Destroying underground military infrastructure has been an important Israeli objective.

Israeli authorities have argued that eliminating tunnels can reduce Hamas's ability to move personnel, store weapons, maintain military facilities, and conduct operations.

However, underground destruction can have consequences above ground.

The effects depend on the location, structure, surrounding buildings, and nature of the military action.

In Gaza, where large areas have experienced extensive destruction, distinguishing damage caused by different military activities can be difficult.

Satellite imagery and independent investigations have documented widespread destruction across the territory.

However, establishing the precise cause of damage to a particular building may require additional evidence.

The strategic effectiveness of tunnel destruction is also difficult to measure.

A destroyed section may reduce a particular military capability.

Other sections may remain functional.

An armed organization may also attempt to rebuild underground infrastructure over time.

The long-term consequences therefore extend beyond the number of tunnels discovered or destroyed.

Egypt and the Destruction of Smuggling Tunnels

Egypt has also played an important role in the history of Gaza's tunnels.

For years, underground passages along the Gaza-Egypt border were used for smuggling goods and weapons.

Egyptian authorities conducted operations to close or destroy many of these tunnels, particularly during the 2010s.

The Egyptian government cited border security concerns and the need to prevent illicit activity.

These operations significantly affected Gaza's underground economy.

They also demonstrated that tunnel infrastructure was not solely an issue between Israel and Hamas.

The network developed within a wider regional environment involving border restrictions, security concerns, economic pressures, and political developments.

However, Egypt's operations against cross-border smuggling tunnels should be distinguished from Israel's military campaign against Hamas's underground facilities inside Gaza.

The two involved different authorities, objectives, and circumstances.

Can the Tunnel Network Be Completely Eliminated?

One of the most important strategic questions is whether Israel can permanently eliminate Hamas's underground military infrastructure.

Destroying tunnels can disrupt particular capabilities.

It may limit access to facilities, reduce protected movement, and damage military resources.

However, the complete elimination of an extensive underground network is difficult to verify.

Some sections may remain undiscovered.

Others may be damaged without being permanently unusable.

New infrastructure may also be constructed if the organization retains the resources and opportunity to do so.

The long-term effectiveness of the campaign therefore depends on more than the immediate destruction of physical structures.

It also depends on Hamas's remaining organizational capabilities, the security environment, and future political developments.

The experience of earlier conflicts demonstrates that destroying existing tunnels has not necessarily prevented the construction of new ones.

This raises broader questions about the relationship between military operations and lasting security.

The Strategic Limits of Underground Warfare

The underground campaign has become a significant component of Israel's effort to weaken Hamas.

Tunnels have provided Hamas with military advantages that complicate conventional operations.

Israeli forces have discovered and destroyed substantial underground infrastructure.

However, the precise extent of the remaining network is not publicly established.

Nor can the strategic effectiveness of tunnel destruction be measured solely through official announcements.

The removal of underground facilities may weaken particular military capabilities without ending the organization itself.

Hamas's future ability to operate depends on factors extending beyond its tunnels.

These include surviving personnel, weapons, leadership structures, political influence, and opportunities for reorganization.

The underground war is therefore one part of a much larger strategic problem.

Beneath the Surface of the Conflict

The tunnels beneath Gaza have transformed the military environment in which Israel and Hamas confront one another.

For Hamas, underground infrastructure has offered protection, concealment, and military capabilities that help offset Israel's technological advantages.

For Israel, the network has created major intelligence and operational challenges.

For hostages, underground captivity has brought isolation, fear, and in some cases death.

For Palestinian civilians, military activity involving tunnels has added to the dangers of a conflict fought within densely populated communities.

The underground war illustrates how physical infrastructure can influence an entire military campaign.

It also demonstrates the limits of technological superiority.

Advanced surveillance systems, military engineering, and specialized units can contribute to the discovery and destruction of tunnels, but they do not guarantee complete knowledge of what lies beneath the surface.

The legal and humanitarian consequences remain central.

The existence of underground military infrastructure does not eliminate the protection of civilians or justify every method used to destroy it.

Ultimately, the significance of the tunnel network extends beyond its physical dimensions.

It reflects the military imbalance between Israel and Hamas, the difficulties of prolonged urban warfare, and the challenge of achieving lasting security through military operations alone.

The next chapter turns to one of the most prominent figures in Hamas's leadership and one of Israel's most intensive intelligence priorities following October 7.

Chapter 12 — The Hunt for Yahya Sinwar

The Man Israel Spent a Year Searching For

For more than a year after the Hamas-led attacks of October 7, 2023, one man became the central figure in Israel's campaign to dismantle the organization's leadership: Yahya Sinwar.

He was not simply another senior Hamas official.

Sinwar had spent decades within the movement, helped establish its internal security apparatus, served more than twenty years in Israeli prisons, and eventually became Hamas's most powerful leader inside the Gaza Strip.

Israeli authorities regarded him as one of the principal architects of the October 7 attacks, which killed approximately 1,200 people in Israel and resulted in 251 people being taken hostage into Gaza.

His capture or death became a major Israeli objective.

Yet despite Israel's extensive intelligence capabilities, advanced surveillance technology, military operations, and prolonged ground campaign, Sinwar remained beyond the confirmed reach of Israeli forces for months.

His whereabouts became the subject of intelligence assessments, political speculation, and international media attention.

Was he hiding deep within Gaza's underground tunnel network? Was he surrounded by hostages? How much control did he continue to exercise over Hamas's military operations?

Some of these questions were answered only partially. Others remained unresolved.

When Sinwar was finally killed in Rafah on October 16, 2024, the circumstances differed from the image of a carefully planned intelligence operation against a precisely identified location.

Israeli soldiers encountered him during a military engagement without initially knowing his identity.

The episode became one of the most revealing moments of Israel's campaign against Hamas.

It demonstrated both the importance of intelligence and the limits of even the most sophisticated surveillance systems.

From Khan Younis to Hamas's Inner Circle

Yahya Ibrahim Hassan Sinwar was born in 1962 in the Khan Younis refugee camp in the Gaza Strip.

His family originated from the area of al-Majdal, now part of the Israeli city of Ashkelon, and was displaced during the 1948 Arab-Israeli war.

Sinwar grew up in Gaza under conditions shaped by displacement, poverty, political conflict, and Israeli military occupation following the 1967 war.

His political development occurred during a period when Palestinian nationalism, Islamist movements, and armed resistance organizations were becoming increasingly influential.

He studied at the Islamic University of Gaza, where he became involved in Islamist political activism.

During the 1980s, he developed connections with the emerging movement that would become Hamas.

Hamas was established in 1987 during the First Intifada, drawing upon networks associated with the Palestinian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood.

Its ideology combined Palestinian nationalism with political Islam, while its armed activities increasingly brought it into conflict with Israel.

Sinwar became one of the movement's important early figures.

However, his rise was not based primarily on public political leadership.

He became closely associated with internal security and the identification of people suspected of cooperating with Israeli authorities.

That role would shape his reputation for decades.

The Development of Hamas's Internal Security Apparatus

During Hamas's early development, Sinwar helped establish an internal security organization commonly known as Majd.

The organization was associated with investigating suspected collaborators and enforcing internal discipline.

This role became central to Sinwar's reputation within Hamas.

He was known for his suspicion of Israeli intelligence penetration and his willingness to use severe methods against individuals accused of cooperation with Israel.

The history of Majd reflects a broader characteristic of clandestine armed organizations: the fear that informants or internal divisions may compromise their activities.

However, accusations of collaboration can also lead to serious abuses.

Individuals suspected of providing information to an opposing authority may face threats, detention, torture, or execution without adequate legal safeguards.

Sinwar's involvement in this environment contributed to his image as a particularly uncompromising figure.

For Israeli intelligence agencies, his early activities also made him a person of significant interest.

His subsequent imprisonment would provide Israeli authorities with extensive opportunities to study him, although that familiarity did not ultimately prevent his rise to Hamas's highest leadership.

Arrest, Conviction and Imprisonment in Israel

In 1988, Israeli authorities arrested Sinwar.

He was subsequently convicted of offenses involving the killing of Palestinians accused of collaborating with Israel, along with other security-related offenses.

He received multiple life sentences.

Sinwar spent more than twenty years in Israeli prisons.

During that period, he became an influential figure among Hamas prisoners.

Prison was not merely a period of isolation from the movement.

For some Palestinian political and security prisoners, Israeli prisons also became environments in which organizational relationships, internal hierarchies, and political influence developed.

Sinwar learned Hebrew and gained extensive familiarity with Israeli society and political debates.

His imprisonment also became an important part of his later political identity.

Israeli authorities had substantial knowledge of his background, personality, and organizational relationships.

Yet knowledge of an individual does not necessarily translate into an accurate prediction of that person's future decisions.

Sinwar's later leadership would expose the limits of assuming that familiarity with an adversary guarantees an understanding of their intentions.

The Gilad Shalit Prisoner Exchange

Sinwar's release came in October 2011.

He was among more than 1,000 Palestinian prisoners released by Israel as part of an agreement securing the freedom of Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit.

Shalit had been captured by Palestinian armed groups during a cross-border attack in June 2006 and held in Gaza for more than five years.

The prisoner exchange became one of the most significant and controversial agreements in Israel's history.

For Shalit's family and many Israelis, the agreement represented the successful recovery of a soldier after years of captivity.

For critics, the release of prisoners convicted of serious violent offenses created concerns about future security risks.

Sinwar's inclusion in the exchange would later become especially controversial.

After his release, he returned to Gaza and resumed his involvement in Hamas.

His imprisonment had not removed his influence within the organization.

Instead, he emerged with considerable standing among members who regarded his years in prison as evidence of commitment to the movement.

The exchange demonstrated the difficult choices governments face when negotiating for captives.

It also became part of the historical background to Israel's later confrontation with Sinwar.

Sinwar's Rise to Power in Gaza

Following his release, Sinwar gradually strengthened his position within Hamas.

His relationships with the organization's military leadership became particularly important.

He was widely associated with figures such as Mohammed Deif and other senior members of the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades.

In February 2017, Sinwar was selected as Hamas's leader in the Gaza Strip.

His appointment represented a significant development within the organization.

Unlike political leaders who spent much of their time abroad, Sinwar remained closely connected to Gaza and its military leadership.

His position gave him substantial influence over Hamas's internal political and security decisions.

During his leadership, Hamas continued to develop its military infrastructure, including rockets, armed formations, and underground facilities.

At the same time, Gaza experienced repeated periods of conflict, severe economic difficulties, and continuing restrictions imposed by Israel and Egypt.

Sinwar operated within this complex environment.

He participated in political decisions, security calculations, and negotiations while maintaining a close relationship with Hamas's armed wing.

His combination of political authority and military influence made him an especially important figure for Israeli intelligence.

The Years Before October 7

In the years preceding October 7, Israeli officials increasingly assessed that Hamas was interested in maintaining a degree of stability in Gaza.

This assessment was influenced by several developments.

Hamas participated in indirect arrangements involving economic measures, humanitarian assistance, and periods of reduced confrontation.

Israel permitted increasing numbers of Gaza residents to obtain work permits under controlled arrangements.

Qatari financial assistance also formed part of efforts to address economic conditions and support certain administrative functions.

These developments contributed to an Israeli perception that Hamas had incentives to avoid a major war.

However, the organization continued developing military capabilities.

The contradiction between apparent political restraint and continued military preparation became central to the intelligence failures preceding October 7.

Subsequent investigations revealed that Israeli authorities had possessed information concerning Hamas's plans and training activities but had not adequately assessed the possibility of a large-scale assault.

The precise extent of Sinwar's personal involvement in every stage of operational planning is not fully established in the public record.

Nevertheless, Israeli authorities identified him as a central figure behind the attack.

October 7 and the Transformation of Israel's Priorities

On October 7, 2023, Hamas-led armed groups launched a coordinated assault from Gaza into southern Israel.

The attackers breached border defenses, attacked military positions, entered civilian communities, and targeted people attending the Nova music festival.

Approximately 1,200 people were killed in Israel.

The victims included civilians, soldiers, police officers, and foreign nationals.

The attackers also abducted 251 people into Gaza.

The assault included deliberate attacks on civilians and hostage-taking, acts prohibited under international humanitarian law.

For Israel, October 7 represented a catastrophic security and intelligence failure.

The government subsequently declared the destruction of Hamas's military and governing capabilities among its principal objectives.

Sinwar became one of the most prominent individuals sought by Israeli authorities.

His capture or death was presented as an important element of the campaign.

However, the broader military operation would involve consequences extending far beyond the search for one leader.

The ensuing war caused extensive Palestinian casualties, displacement, and destruction across Gaza.

The campaign against Sinwar became inseparable from the wider humanitarian and political crisis.

Why Sinwar Became Israel's Principal Target

Sinwar's importance to Israeli authorities rested on several factors.

He occupied a senior leadership position within Hamas.

He maintained longstanding relationships with the organization's military wing.

He was associated with the planning of the October 7 attacks.

And he possessed considerable influence over Hamas's political and strategic decisions in Gaza.

His position made him more than a symbolic figure.

Israeli officials believed that removing him could weaken Hamas's leadership and disrupt its ability to coordinate military and political activities.

His death or capture also carried enormous political significance for Israel.

Following October 7, the Israeli public demanded answers about the failure to prevent the attack and the fate of the hostages.

The pursuit of Sinwar became a visible measure of the government's determination to hold Hamas's leadership responsible.

Yet the strategic importance of a target does not guarantee that removing that individual will achieve broader military or political objectives.

Hamas had survived the deaths of senior leaders before.

The question was whether Sinwar's removal would fundamentally alter the organization's capabilities or merely create another leadership transition.

The Search Begins

Following the start of Israel's ground campaign in Gaza, Israeli authorities repeatedly identified Sinwar as a priority.

Public reporting described an extensive effort involving military intelligence, internal security agencies, and operational forces.

The IDF, Shin Bet, and other security institutions possessed different forms of information relevant to the campaign.

However, the precise contribution of individual agencies to the search remains largely classified.

Israeli authorities released information about operations in areas believed to be associated with Hamas's senior leadership.

Khan Younis, Sinwar's hometown and a major Hamas stronghold, became particularly important during the campaign.

Israeli military operations in the area included searches of underground facilities and other suspected military infrastructure.

Nevertheless, the discovery of a tunnel or command facility did not necessarily establish Sinwar's current whereabouts.

The distinction between identifying an area of interest and locating a particular individual remained central throughout the search.

The Tunnel Network and Sinwar's Possible Movements

Gaza's underground tunnel network became closely associated with the search for Sinwar.

Israeli authorities believed that senior Hamas figures had used underground infrastructure for protection, movement, and command functions.

Public reports frequently suggested that Sinwar spent extended periods underground.

However, many accounts concerning his precise movements were based on intelligence assessments or anonymous sources that could not be independently verified.

In February 2024, the IDF released footage that it said showed Sinwar inside a tunnel with family members during the early stages of the war.

The footage demonstrated the importance Israeli authorities placed on underground infrastructure in their investigation.

However, footage recorded at one point in time does not establish an individual's location months later.

This distinction was especially important because reports about Sinwar's whereabouts changed repeatedly.

The public was often presented with suggestions that Israeli forces were approaching his location.

Yet those suggestions did not lead immediately to his capture or death.

The search demonstrated how difficult it can be to establish the location of an individual during an active armed conflict.

The Hostage Question

One of the most sensitive aspects of the search concerned the Israeli and other hostages held in Gaza.

Public reporting repeatedly raised the possibility that Sinwar was staying close to hostages or that captives might be used to deter Israeli attacks.

These claims generated intense concern in Israel.

However, the precise circumstances of Sinwar's movements and any direct relationship between his locations and particular hostages were not fully established in the public record.

It is important to distinguish documented hostage-taking from specific claims about the presence of hostages near an individual leader.

The taking and holding of hostages is prohibited under international humanitarian law.

The use of hostages to shield a military objective would also raise grave legal concerns.

At the same time, allegations concerning specific incidents require evidence.

For Israeli decision-makers, uncertainty about hostage locations created serious operational and political challenges.

Military action intended to target Hamas leadership could endanger captives if their whereabouts were unknown.

This tension became a defining feature of the conflict.

Negotiations, Military Pressure and Political Calculations

Throughout the war, negotiations concerning hostages and a possible ceasefire continued through mediators, particularly Qatar, Egypt, and the United States.

Sinwar's position within Hamas made him relevant to discussions about the organization's negotiating decisions.

However, communication between Hamas's external political representatives and leadership inside Gaza was not always publicly transparent.

Reports frequently described delays and difficulties in obtaining decisions from Hamas's leadership.

The precise reasons for individual delays could not always be independently established.

Israeli leaders argued that military pressure could weaken Hamas and improve the prospects of securing hostage releases.

Critics questioned whether continuing military operations sometimes endangered captives or complicated negotiations.

Families of hostages expressed differing views, although many publicly demanded that the government prioritize an agreement securing their relatives' release.

The debate reflected a fundamental strategic dilemma.

Could military pressure force Hamas to release hostages, or would a negotiated agreement offer the best opportunity to recover them alive?

Sinwar's role in this dilemma contributed to his political significance.

The Death of Ismail Haniyeh and Sinwar's Promotion

On July 31, 2024, Hamas political leader Ismail Haniyeh was killed in Tehran.

Haniyeh had traveled to Iran for the inauguration of the country's president.

Iran and Hamas blamed Israel for the killing, and Israel subsequently acknowledged responsibility.

Haniyeh's death created a leadership vacancy within Hamas.

In August 2024, the organization selected Sinwar as head of its Political Bureau.

The decision elevated him from Hamas's leader in Gaza to its highest political position.

This development was significant.

Sinwar was already a major Israeli intelligence priority.

His appointment further consolidated his symbolic and organizational importance.

However, his ability to exercise the full responsibilities of the position during the war was difficult to assess independently.

The conflict had severely disrupted communications, movement, and organizational structures within Gaza.

His appointment nevertheless demonstrated that Hamas continued to regard him as a central leader despite the extensive Israeli campaign against him.

The Final Encounter in Rafah

On October 16, 2024, Israeli troops operating in the Rafah area encountered several armed individuals.

During the engagement, Israeli forces killed a man who was subsequently identified as Yahya Sinwar.

According to Israeli accounts, the soldiers involved did not initially know that Sinwar was among the individuals they had encountered.

His identity was established afterward through examination and identification procedures.

This distinction is central to understanding the operation.

Sinwar had been one of Israel's highest-priority targets for more than a year.

Yet his death did not result from a publicly documented raid launched against his confirmed location.

Instead, Israeli soldiers encountered him during a military operation and recognized his identity only afterward.

The circumstances challenged the assumption that sophisticated intelligence systems inevitably produce precise information about the whereabouts of senior leaders.

The final encounter demonstrated the unpredictable nature of ground warfare.

The Drone Footage of Sinwar's Final Moments

Following Sinwar's death, the Israeli military released drone footage that it said showed him during the final stages of the encounter.

The footage depicted a wounded man sitting in a damaged building.

As the drone approached, the man threw an object toward it.

Israeli authorities identified the individual as Sinwar.

The images circulated widely and became part of the international discussion surrounding his death.

In Israel, many viewed the footage as evidence that a major figure responsible for October 7 had finally been killed.

Among Hamas supporters and other audiences, the footage was interpreted differently, with some presenting his final actions as a symbol of resistance.

These competing interpretations demonstrate how images from military operations can become political and psychological instruments.

The footage documented part of the encounter, but it did not provide a complete account of every event preceding Sinwar's death.

Visual evidence must therefore be interpreted within its limits.

Confirming Sinwar's Identity

Following the encounter, Israeli authorities conducted identification procedures.

Officials announced that the deceased individual had been confirmed as Yahya Sinwar.

The identification ended months of uncertainty concerning whether he remained alive and where he might be located.

It also confirmed that one of Israel's most prominent military objectives had been achieved.

However, identifying Sinwar after his death is different from establishing that intelligence agencies had known his precise location beforehand.

The distinction matters when evaluating the effectiveness of the intelligence campaign.

Israel's security institutions had accumulated extensive information about Sinwar over decades.

They had identified him as a principal target.

They had searched areas believed to be connected to his activities.

Yet the final encounter occurred without advance confirmation of his presence at that location, according to the public Israeli account.

The case illustrates both the capabilities and limitations of intelligence-led warfare.

Israel's Reaction to Sinwar's Death

Sinwar's death was welcomed by Israel's political and military leadership.

Israeli officials described it as a major achievement in the campaign against Hamas.

For many Israelis, the announcement carried particular emotional significance because of Sinwar's association with the October 7 attacks.

However, his death did not resolve the hostage crisis.

Nor did it automatically end the war.

Israeli leaders continued to emphasize the need to achieve broader security objectives.

The question of Hamas's remaining military capabilities also remained unresolved.

The organization had suffered significant leadership losses, but surviving members and networks continued to exist.

Sinwar's death represented an important military and political event.

Its long-term strategic consequences were less immediately clear.

Hamas's Reaction and the Battle Over His Legacy

Hamas confirmed Sinwar's death and presented him as a leader who had died during the conflict.

The organization sought to frame his death within its broader narrative of armed resistance.

This response reflected the political significance of leadership losses in armed movements.

The death of a senior figure can weaken an organization operationally while also becoming a powerful symbol for supporters.

Images, speeches, and accounts of a leader's final moments may be used to reinforce organizational identity.

This does not establish that the organization remains militarily effective.

It demonstrates that political symbolism and military capability are different dimensions of a conflict.

Sinwar's death therefore became part of an information struggle as well as a military development.

Different audiences interpreted the same event through sharply different political and historical perspectives.

Did Sinwar's Death Weaken Hamas?

The death of a senior leader can have several consequences.

It may disrupt communication between organizational branches.

It may remove a person with extensive institutional knowledge and relationships.

It may create uncertainty over succession and decision-making.

Sinwar occupied an unusually influential position within Hamas.

His removal therefore represented a significant leadership loss.

However, Hamas had survived the deaths of other prominent figures, including its founder Ahmed Yassin and senior leader Abdel Aziz al-Rantisi in 2004.

The organization's continued existence after earlier leadership losses demonstrated its ability to adapt.

Whether Sinwar's death permanently weakened Hamas depended on factors extending beyond the event itself.

These included the survival of military formations, access to weapons, organizational cohesion, recruitment, and future political developments.

The removal of one leader could not, by itself, establish that Hamas had been defeated.

The Intelligence Lessons of the Hunt

The pursuit of Sinwar offers several important lessons about modern intelligence.

First, extensive knowledge of an individual's history does not guarantee an accurate understanding of their future intentions.

Israeli authorities had known Sinwar for decades, including during his long imprisonment.

Yet the October 7 attacks demonstrated a profound failure to anticipate Hamas's actions.

Second, advanced surveillance technology does not guarantee that a particular individual can be located.

Israel possessed sophisticated intelligence capabilities, but Sinwar remained beyond confirmed reach for months.

Third, intelligence priorities and military outcomes do not always coincide.

The final encounter occurred during a ground operation rather than a publicly documented mission directed at his confirmed location.

Finally, the death of a major target does not automatically resolve the strategic conflict.

The effectiveness of leadership targeting must be assessed through its wider consequences.

The Human Cost Behind the Search

The campaign to locate Sinwar took place during a devastating war.

Israeli families continued to confront the consequences of the October 7 attacks and the captivity of their relatives.

Palestinian civilians in Gaza experienced extensive deaths, injuries, displacement, and destruction during the Israeli military campaign.

The search for Hamas's leadership formed one part of this broader conflict.

Military operations intended to weaken Hamas also affected civilian communities.

International humanitarian law requires parties to distinguish between lawful military targets and civilians, assess expected incidental civilian harm, and take feasible precautions.

The importance of a senior commander does not eliminate these obligations.

A comprehensive examination of the hunt for Sinwar must therefore consider both the military objective and the humanitarian consequences of the campaign in which it occurred.

The suffering of Israeli hostages and Palestinian civilians cannot be reduced to the fate of a single leader.

Was the Hunt a Success?

The answer depends on how success is defined.

If the objective was to remove Yahya Sinwar from Hamas's leadership, his death achieved that result.

If the objective was to demonstrate that Israeli intelligence could reliably locate him, the circumstances of the final encounter present a more complicated picture.

If the objective was to eliminate Hamas's military capabilities or secure the release of all hostages, Sinwar's death did not independently accomplish those goals.

This distinction between tactical, operational, and strategic outcomes is essential.

Military campaigns can achieve important individual objectives without resolving the broader conflict.

The removal of a senior leader may weaken an organization while leaving its political influence, surviving armed networks, and underlying conditions intact.

The hunt for Sinwar therefore illustrates both the potential and the limitations of leadership-focused military strategy.

The End of the Hunt, but Not the Conflict

Yahya Sinwar's death in October 2024 marked the end of one of Israel's most prominent intelligence pursuits.

His life had connected several major chapters of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict: the rise of Hamas, the development of its internal security apparatus, the prisoner exchange involving Gilad Shalit, the consolidation of Hamas's rule in Gaza, and the devastating events of October 7.

His death removed a central figure from the organization's leadership.

However, it did not erase the consequences of the attacks, resolve the fate of every hostage, or settle the political future of Gaza.

For Israeli intelligence, the case demonstrated that even a high-priority target can remain difficult to locate despite extensive technological and institutional resources.

For Hamas, it represented the loss of a leader whose influence extended across political and military structures.

For civilians on both sides, the broader conflict continued to carry consequences far beyond the fate of one individual.

Ultimately, the hunt for Yahya Sinwar was more than the pursuit of a Hamas leader.

It became a test of Israel's intelligence capabilities, a symbol of the country's response to October 7, and an illustration of the limits of attempting to resolve a prolonged conflict through the removal of individual commanders.

The next chapter examines another central figure in Hamas's military leadership: Mohammed Deif, the longtime commander of the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades, whose military influence and repeated survival of earlier Israeli assassination attempts made him one of the organization's most significant figures.

Chapter 13 — Mohammed Deif and Hamas's Military Command

The Shadow Commander: Inside the Rise and Fall of Hamas's Most Elusive Military Leader

For more than three decades, Mohammed Deif was one of the most wanted men in Israel.

Unlike Hamas's political leaders, who frequently appeared in public, gave speeches, or represented the organization in international discussions, Deif remained largely invisible.

Few verified photographs of him circulated publicly. His appearances were rare, his movements were concealed, and much of his personal life remained unknown.

Yet behind this secrecy stood one of the most influential figures in Hamas's military history.

As commander of the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades, Deif helped oversee the development of an armed organization that evolved from relatively limited militant networks into a force possessing rockets, organized military formations, underground infrastructure, and the ability to conduct complex attacks.

Israeli authorities accused him of responsibility for attacks that killed Israeli civilians and military personnel over several decades.

He became associated with the development of Hamas's military strategy and was widely regarded as a central figure behind the October 7, 2023, attacks.

His ability to survive repeated Israeli assassination attempts contributed to an almost mythical reputation among supporters.

For Israel's intelligence services, however, Deif represented a persistent security challenge.

Despite extensive intelligence capabilities and years of military operations, Israeli authorities repeatedly failed to kill him.

That changed in July 2024.

An Israeli airstrike in the Khan Younis area of southern Gaza targeted Deif and another senior Hamas commander.

Israel subsequently announced that Deif had been killed.

Hamas confirmed his death in January 2025.

His death marked the end of one of the longest-running pursuits in Israel's counterterrorism history.

But it also raised a larger question: how much of Hamas's military organization depended on one commander, and what happens when a movement loses a leader who helped shape its military capabilities for decades?

From Khan Younis to the Armed Wing of Hamas

Mohammed Deif was born in 1965 in the Khan Younis refugee camp in the Gaza Strip.

His birth name was Mohammed Diab Ibrahim al-Masri.

His family, like many Palestinian families living in refugee camps, had been displaced during the 1948 Arab-Israeli war.

Deif grew up in an environment shaped by the unresolved Israeli-Palestinian conflict, political unrest, and the difficult conditions of life in Gaza.

He studied at the Islamic University of Gaza and became involved in Islamist political activism.

During the First Intifada, which began in 1987, Hamas emerged as a Palestinian Islamist movement with both political and armed ambitions.

Deif became involved in the movement during its early development.

Israeli authorities detained him in 1989, and he was released in 1990.

After his release, he became increasingly active within Hamas's military organization.

The movement's armed wing, the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades, developed during the early 1990s.

Deif's role expanded as Hamas intensified attacks against Israeli targets.

His rise coincided with a period of profound political change, including the Oslo peace process and growing tensions between Palestinian factions over negotiations with Israel.

Hamas opposed the Oslo agreements and continued armed attacks.

Deif became one of the figures associated with the organization's rejection of a negotiated settlement based on the political framework then being developed.

The Development of the Qassam Brigades

The Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades became Hamas's principal military organization.

Its development reflected the movement's transition from a relatively limited underground network into a more structured armed force.

During the 1990s, the brigades conducted attacks against Israeli military personnel and civilians.

Hamas carried out suicide bombings and other attacks that caused substantial casualties and intensified Israeli security concerns.

Deif became associated with the planning and development of military operations during this period.

Israeli authorities accused him of involvement in attacks that killed numerous Israelis.

However, the precise details of his personal role in every attack are not independently established in the public record.

Over time, the Qassam Brigades expanded their capabilities.

The organization developed rocket production and procurement networks, military training structures, and underground infrastructure.

It also established geographical formations and specialized military functions.

Deif's leadership became closely associated with this transformation.

Yet Hamas's military development was not the work of one individual.

It involved other commanders, organizational networks, external relationships, and changing political circumstances.

Understanding Deif's influence therefore requires examining the wider military structure he helped lead.

The Assassination of Yahya Ayyash and the Expansion of Hamas's Armed Campaign

One of the important figures in Hamas's early military history was Yahya Ayyash, an explosives specialist known as the Engineer.

Ayyash was associated with the development of explosive devices used in attacks against Israelis.

He became a major Israeli intelligence target.

In January 1996, Ayyash was killed in Gaza in an operation widely attributed to Shin Bet involving an explosive device concealed in a mobile telephone.

His death became a significant event in the conflict.

Hamas subsequently carried out a series of suicide bombings in Israel, killing civilians and generating widespread fear.

Deif was among the senior military figures associated with Hamas's armed operations during this period.

The cycle of attacks and Israeli counterterrorism operations reinforced the importance of intelligence-led targeting within Israel's security strategy.

It also demonstrated that the killing of a prominent militant figure did not necessarily end an organization's capacity for violence.

Hamas continued operating and developing new military capabilities.

This pattern would remain relevant throughout Deif's career.

Mohammed Deif's Rise to Military Commander

Deif became the commander of the Qassam Brigades following the killing of senior Hamas military leader Salah Shehadeh in July 2002.

Shehadeh was killed in an Israeli airstrike on a residential area of Gaza City.

The attack also killed numerous civilians, including children, and generated international condemnation.

The incident became an important example of the legal and humanitarian controversy surrounding targeted killings.

Deif's succession placed him at the head of Hamas's military organization during the Second Intifada.

The period was marked by intense violence, including Palestinian suicide bombings, Israeli military operations, and large numbers of civilian casualties.

As commander, Deif became responsible for an organization facing sustained Israeli intelligence and military pressure.

His leadership was associated with secrecy, organizational continuity, and the expansion of military capabilities.

However, the exact internal division of responsibilities between Deif and other senior commanders was not fully public.

Hamas's military leadership operated through a network of individuals rather than a single commander personally directing every operation.

This distinction is important when assessing the extent of Deif's authority.

The Man Who Survived Repeated Assassination Attempts

One of the defining features of Deif's public reputation was his survival of repeated Israeli attempts to kill him.

Over the years, Israeli authorities conducted operations against him, but he remained alive.

Reports suggested that he suffered serious injuries during some of these attempts.

Different accounts described injuries affecting his mobility and physical condition.

However, the precise nature and extent of those injuries were often difficult to verify independently.

His continued survival contributed to his reputation as an exceptionally elusive commander.

For supporters of Hamas, the repeated failures to kill him became part of his symbolic importance.

For Israeli intelligence, they represented the difficulty of locating and targeting a senior figure who avoided public exposure.

The limited availability of verified photographs and information concerning his daily activities added to the uncertainty.

Deif's case illustrates the difference between identifying an individual as a major security threat and possessing reliable information about their current whereabouts.

An intelligence agency may understand a commander's organizational importance while remaining unable to locate that person with sufficient certainty for a particular operation.

The 2014 Attempt That Killed His Family

In August 2014, during Operation Protective Edge, an Israeli airstrike targeted a building in Gaza City where Deif was believed to be present.

The strike killed his wife and two of his children.

Deif survived.

The attack became one of the most controversial episodes in the long campaign against him.

Israeli authorities considered Deif a major military target.

However, the deaths of his family members raised serious questions about civilian protection and the consequences of intelligence-led strikes in residential areas.

International humanitarian law does not permit the deliberate targeting of civilians merely because they are related to a military commander.

Even when an individual is lawfully targetable, an attack must comply with the principles of distinction, proportionality, and feasible precautions.

The presence of a senior commander does not automatically justify the expected deaths of family members or other civilians.

The 2014 incident demonstrated the human consequences of the pursuit of Hamas's leadership.

It also reinforced Deif's reputation for surviving attacks that killed people around him.

The Development of Hamas's Rocket Capabilities

During Deif's years as commander, Hamas expanded its rocket capabilities.

Earlier Palestinian rocket attacks had relied heavily on relatively short-range and often inaccurate weapons.

Over time, Hamas developed or acquired systems capable of reaching larger areas of Israel.

These developments were supported by a combination of local production, external assistance, and organizational adaptation.

Iran became an important supporter of Hamas's military capabilities, providing assistance that included funding, training, and weapons-related support.

The precise extent and form of assistance changed over time.

Rocket attacks against civilian population centers are unlawful when they deliberately target civilians or are indiscriminate.

Hamas's use of rockets therefore became a major Israeli security concern.

Israel responded through military operations and the development of defensive systems, including Iron Dome.

The expansion of Hamas's rocket capabilities reflected a broader transformation in the organization.

It was no longer dependent solely on small armed cells.

It had developed military infrastructure capable of sustaining repeated confrontations with Israel.

Deif was widely regarded as an important figure in that transformation.

The Tunnel Network and Underground Warfare

Another major development during Deif's leadership was the expansion of Hamas's underground military infrastructure.

Tunnels became an important element of the organization's strategy.

They provided concealment, protected movement, and locations for military facilities.

Some tunnels were used for attacks or military movement near the Israeli border.

Others formed part of infrastructure within Gaza.

Israeli authorities regarded the tunnel network as a major security threat.

During the 2014 Gaza war, cross-border tunnels became one of Israel's principal military objectives.

In subsequent years, Hamas continued investing in underground capabilities.

The full extent of Deif's personal involvement in particular construction decisions remains unclear.

However, as commander of the Qassam Brigades, he was associated with the broader military strategy that included underground warfare.

The tunnel network became especially important during the war following October 7.

It complicated Israeli operations and contributed to the difficulty of locating Hamas's senior leadership.

Hamas's Military Organization Under Deif

By the years preceding October 7, Hamas's military wing had developed a more structured organization.

Israeli military assessments described geographical formations, local commanders, specialized capabilities, and senior leadership responsible for broader military planning.

Deif occupied the highest position within the Qassam Brigades.

Marwan Issa was widely regarded as one of his principal deputies.

Other commanders held responsibilities within regional formations and specialized military functions.

However, the precise internal structure was not fully transparent.

Public information came from Israeli intelligence assessments, Hamas statements, investigative reporting, and material disclosed during military operations.

The organization also changed during periods of conflict.

Commanders were killed or replaced, communications were disrupted, and responsibilities shifted.

It is therefore important not to treat every publicly reported organizational chart as a complete or permanent representation of Hamas's military structure.

Nevertheless, Deif's long tenure gave him substantial institutional influence.

His leadership connected different generations of Hamas's armed organization.

The Relationship Between Deif and Yahya Sinwar

Mohammed Deif and Yahya Sinwar became two of the most influential figures in Hamas's leadership.

Their responsibilities differed.

Deif commanded the Qassam Brigades.

Sinwar held senior political authority in Gaza while maintaining close relationships with the military wing.

Both were associated with Hamas's long-term military development and its confrontation with Israel.

Their relationship was particularly important in the years preceding October 7.

Israeli authorities regarded both men as central figures behind the attacks.

However, the exact division of responsibilities in planning and authorizing every element of the assault has not been fully established through independently available evidence.

The distinction matters.

Political authority, military command, and responsibility for specific operations are related but not identical.

A responsible historical account should avoid assigning precise actions to individuals when the underlying evidence remains classified or disputed.

What is clear is that both men occupied positions of exceptional influence within Hamas.

Their deaths in 2024 represented major leadership losses for the organization.

October 7 and Deif's Public Declaration

On October 7, 2023, Hamas-led armed groups launched a large-scale assault into southern Israel.

The attack involved breaches of the border defenses, assaults on military positions, attacks on civilian communities, and the taking of hostages.

Approximately 1,200 people were killed in Israel, and 251 people were abducted into Gaza.

Deif issued an audio statement announcing the operation, which Hamas called Al-Aqsa Flood.

In the statement, he presented the attack as a response to Israeli policies and developments affecting Palestinians and religious sites.

His public declaration demonstrated the importance Hamas attached to his position as military commander.

However, political explanations offered by an armed organization do not justify deliberate attacks on civilians or hostage-taking.

Such acts are prohibited under international humanitarian law.

The October 7 attacks included grave violations against civilians.

For Israel, Deif's role as the public military voice of the operation reinforced his position as one of the country's highest-priority targets.

Israel's Intelligence Failure Before October 7

The October 7 attacks exposed serious failures within Israel's intelligence and security institutions.

Israeli authorities had extensive experience monitoring Hamas.

They possessed advanced surveillance systems and had spent years assessing the organization's military capabilities.

Yet the attack was not prevented.

Subsequent reporting and investigations revealed that Israeli intelligence had possessed information concerning Hamas's plans and preparations but failed to interpret the threat adequately.

The failure was not simply a lack of technological information.

It also involved assumptions about Hamas's intentions and the likelihood of a major attack.

Deif's role in the organization made the failure especially significant.

He had been a major Israeli intelligence target for decades.

Despite this, Hamas developed the capability to carry out a large-scale assault that overwhelmed elements of Israel's border defenses.

The events demonstrated that knowledge of an adversary's leadership does not necessarily produce an accurate understanding of the organization's intentions.

Deif Becomes a Central Target of the Gaza Campaign

Following October 7, Israel declared the destruction of Hamas's military and governing capabilities among its principal objectives.

Senior Hamas leaders became major targets.

Deif was among the most prominent.

His position as commander of the Qassam Brigades made him central to Israel's effort to weaken the organization's military leadership.

However, the challenge of locating him remained substantial.

The public record does not establish every intelligence method used during the search.

Reports concerning his whereabouts were frequently based on assessments that could not be independently verified.

The secrecy surrounding his movements continued even as Israeli military operations expanded across Gaza.

The pursuit of Deif therefore reflected a familiar problem.

Israeli intelligence agencies knew the importance of the individual they were seeking.

Determining his location with sufficient confidence was a separate challenge.

The Killing of Marwan Issa

In March 2024, Israeli authorities announced that Marwan Issa had been killed during a military operation in Gaza.

Issa was widely regarded as one of the most senior figures within Hamas's military wing and an important deputy to Deif.

His death represented a significant loss for the organization's command structure.

Issa had been associated with Hamas's military planning and leadership for many years.

His removal reduced the number of experienced senior figures available to the organization.

However, the immediate operational consequences were difficult to measure independently.

Armed organizations may maintain succession arrangements or redistribute responsibilities following leadership losses.

The death of a deputy does not necessarily result in the collapse of an entire military structure.

Nevertheless, Issa's death formed part of a broader Israeli campaign directed against Hamas's senior leadership.

Deif remained one of the principal figures still being sought.

July 13, 2024: The Strike Near Khan Younis

On July 13, 2024, Israel carried out an airstrike in the al-Mawasi area near Khan Younis in southern Gaza.

Israeli authorities stated that the intended targets were Mohammed Deif and Rafa Salama, a senior Hamas commander associated with the Khan Younis Brigade.

The strike took place in an area where large numbers of displaced Palestinians had sought shelter.

It caused substantial casualties.

Gaza health authorities reported at least 90 people killed and hundreds injured in the attack.

Israel disputed aspects of the casualty reporting and stated that it had targeted senior Hamas military figures.

The operation immediately generated international controversy.

The location of the strike, the presence of civilians, and the scale of the casualties raised serious questions concerning the conduct of the attack.

Israeli authorities initially confirmed the death of Salama but did not immediately establish publicly whether Deif had also been killed.

The uncertainty continued for several weeks.

Israel Announces Deif's Death

On August 1, 2024, the IDF announced that Mohammed Deif had been killed in the July 13 strike.

The announcement represented a major development in Israel's campaign against Hamas's senior military leadership.

Deif had survived numerous previous assassination attempts.

His death therefore carried substantial symbolic and military significance.

However, Hamas did not immediately confirm the Israeli announcement.

The difference between Israel's declaration and Hamas's subsequent response created a period in which the public record remained contested.

Israel maintained that Deif had been killed.

Hamas continued to avoid confirming his death for several months.

On January 30, 2025, Hamas formally confirmed that Mohammed Deif was dead.

The confirmation resolved the central question of his fate.

It did not, however, resolve every question concerning the July 2024 attack.

The Civilian Casualties and Legal Questions

The strike that killed Deif became controversial because of the extensive civilian harm reported in the surrounding area.

The al-Mawasi area had been associated with the movement of displaced Palestinians during the war.

This made the presence of civilians a particularly important consideration.

Under international humanitarian law, the presence of a senior military commander does not automatically justify an attack regardless of its expected consequences.

The principle of proportionality prohibits attacks expected to cause incidental civilian harm excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.

Parties must also take feasible precautions to verify military objectives and reduce civilian harm.

The legal assessment depends on information reasonably available before the attack.

A complete independent evaluation would require evidence concerning the intended objective, the expected civilian presence, the anticipated military advantage, and the precautions taken.

Much of that information has not been publicly disclosed.

Deif's military position was highly significant, but that fact alone cannot establish the legality of every aspect of the strike.

The deaths and injuries of civilians remain an essential part of the historical record.

Why Deif's Death Mattered to Israel

For Israeli authorities, Deif's death represented the removal of a commander associated with decades of attacks and military development.

He had occupied a senior position during major periods of violence between Hamas and Israel.

He was linked to the expansion of Hamas's military capabilities.

He was also publicly associated with the October 7 assault.

His death therefore carried military, political, and symbolic importance.

It demonstrated that Israel had eventually succeeded in killing an individual who had survived repeated previous attempts.

However, the outcome did not establish that the broader military organization had ceased to function.

The removal of one commander, even one with Deif's influence, could not independently eliminate Hamas's remaining personnel, weapons, or organizational networks.

The distinction between eliminating a leader and defeating an armed organization remained central.

Hamas After Deif

Hamas's military organization suffered major leadership losses during the Gaza war.

Deif and Issa were among the most significant.

Other commanders were also killed during Israeli operations.

These losses affected the organization's senior military leadership.

However, the extent to which they permanently weakened Hamas's capabilities was difficult to establish.

Some local formations continued to operate despite significant losses.

The organization also retained political and social networks that extended beyond its military command.

Leadership replacement remained possible, although the loss of experienced figures could reduce institutional knowledge and coordination.

The long-term consequences depended on factors including surviving personnel, access to resources, organizational cohesion, and future security conditions.

Deif's death was therefore an important event, but not a definitive measure of Hamas's overall survival.

The Limits of Leadership Targeting

Israel's pursuit of Mohammed Deif illustrates both the potential and limitations of targeting senior military commanders.

Removing an experienced leader may disrupt planning, coordination, and institutional continuity.

It can also carry symbolic significance.

However, armed organizations may adapt.

New commanders may assume responsibility.

Military structures may become more decentralized.

Organizational networks may survive even after substantial leadership losses.

Hamas's history demonstrates this pattern.

The organization continued operating after the deaths of earlier leaders, including Ahmed Yassin, Abdel Aziz al-Rantisi, and Salah Shehadeh.

The death of Deif therefore raises a broader strategic question.

Can an armed organization be permanently weakened through leadership targeting alone, or must military operations be accompanied by wider political and security arrangements?

The answer cannot be determined solely by the success of individual strikes.

The Man Behind the Myth

Mohammed Deif's public image was shaped by secrecy.

For years, the limited availability of photographs and information allowed competing narratives to develop.

Israeli authorities portrayed him as a dangerous military commander responsible for attacks against civilians and soldiers.

Hamas presented him as a symbol of armed resistance and organizational endurance.

His repeated survival of assassination attempts reinforced these narratives.

However, the mythology surrounding Deif should not obscure the historical facts.

He led an armed organization that conducted attacks against Israeli civilians.

His military leadership contributed to the development of capabilities that shaped repeated conflicts.

He was associated with the October 7 attacks, during which civilians were deliberately killed and hostages were taken.

At the same time, Israel's attempts to kill him raised serious questions concerning intelligence accuracy, civilian casualties, and the legality of particular operations.

A comprehensive account must examine both dimensions.

What the Hunt for Deif Reveals About Israeli Intelligence

The decades-long pursuit of Mohammed Deif demonstrates that identifying a senior adversary is not equivalent to locating or eliminating that person.

Israeli authorities possessed extensive knowledge of his organizational role.

They regarded him as a major security threat for many years.

Yet he survived repeated attempts to kill him.

His case illustrates the difficulties of intelligence collection against a clandestine military leadership.

It also demonstrates that successful operations may come only after years of uncertainty and previous failures.

However, the eventual death of a target does not automatically establish the accuracy or legality of every decision made during the operation.

The July 2024 strike must be understood in terms of both its military outcome and its civilian consequences.

The intelligence achievement and the humanitarian controversy are parts of the same event.

The End of an Era in Hamas's Military Leadership

Mohammed Deif's death marked the end of a significant chapter in Hamas's military history.

From his early involvement in the movement to his leadership of the Qassam Brigades, he helped shape the organization's armed capabilities over several decades.

His tenure encompassed suicide bombings, rocket development, underground military infrastructure, repeated conflicts with Israel, and the October 7 attacks.

For Israel, his death represented the removal of one of its longest-standing security targets.

For Hamas, it meant losing a commander whose influence had extended across generations of its military organization.

For Palestinian civilians in Gaza, the strike that killed him formed part of a wider war marked by extensive suffering and destruction.

The event therefore cannot be understood solely as the end of a military pursuit.

It also illustrates the difficult relationship between intelligence success, military strategy, and the protection of civilians.

Deif's death demonstrated that even highly secretive commanders are not necessarily beyond the reach of military force.

But it also reinforced a lesson visible throughout the history of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict: removing senior leaders does not automatically resolve the political and security conditions that allow armed organizations to survive.

The next chapter examines other Israeli operations against senior Hamas figures, including the deaths of political and military leaders inside and outside Gaza, and the wider regional consequences of targeting the organization's leadership.

Chapter 14 — Other Operations Against Senior Hamas Leaders

Decades of Targeted Killings, Intelligence Operations and the Struggle to Dismantle Hamas's Leadership

For more than three decades, Israel has pursued senior figures within Hamas through intelligence investigations, arrests, military operations, and targeted killings.

Some of these operations took place in the Gaza Strip.

Others occurred in the occupied West Bank or beyond the Palestinian territories, including Lebanon and Iran.

The individuals targeted held different positions within Hamas.

Some were military commanders directly involved in organizing armed attacks. Others were political leaders whose authority, relationships, and influence extended across the organization's political and military structures.

This distinction is essential.

Hamas has maintained an armed wing responsible for attacks against Israel, but it has also operated political institutions and, for many years, governing structures in Gaza.

The legal status of a particular individual cannot be determined solely from a political title or organizational association.

For Israeli authorities, operations against senior Hamas figures have generally been presented as measures intended to prevent attacks, disrupt military networks, and weaken the organization's leadership.

However, the strategy has also generated serious controversy.

Some operations killed civilians alongside their intended targets.

Others occurred in foreign countries, raising questions about sovereignty and regional escalation.

The deaths of prominent Hamas leaders have sometimes produced significant organizational disruption, but they have not resulted in the movement's permanent disappearance.

The history of these operations therefore raises a fundamental question.

Can the systematic removal of senior leaders dismantle an armed organization, or does leadership targeting address only one dimension of a much larger political and security conflict?

The Historical Development of Israel's Targeted-Killing Strategy

Israel's use of targeted killings predates the establishment of Hamas in 1987.

Israeli security institutions have conducted operations against individuals associated with attacks on Israeli civilians and military personnel across several decades.

The strategy became particularly prominent following the 1972 Munich Olympics massacre, in which members of the Palestinian militant organization Black September killed eleven members of the Israeli Olympic team.

Israel subsequently pursued individuals it considered connected to the attack.

These operations became part of the historical development of Israeli counterterrorism policy.

However, they also demonstrated the risks of intelligence errors and operations conducted abroad.

In July 1973, Israeli operatives mistakenly killed Ahmed Bouchikhi, an innocent Moroccan waiter, in Lillehammer, Norway.

The incident caused an international scandal and resulted in criminal convictions.

The Lillehammer affair remains an important reminder that intelligence assessments can be wrong, even when conducted by experienced security organizations.

By the time Hamas emerged during the First Intifada, Israeli intelligence agencies already possessed substantial experience in investigating and targeting Palestinian armed organizations.

The development of Hamas created a new and increasingly important focus for those operations.

Hamas's Leadership: Political and Military Responsibilities

Hamas developed an organizational structure involving political leadership, military command, regional representatives, and administrative institutions.

Its political bureau became responsible for major organizational decisions, international relationships, and aspects of negotiation.

Its military wing, the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades, developed its own command structure and operational responsibilities.

The relationship between these institutions has changed over time.

Some senior political figures have exercised substantial influence over the movement's military strategy.

Others have been more closely associated with diplomacy, administration, or political representation.

It would therefore be inaccurate to assume that every Hamas political official held the same responsibilities as a military commander.

Hamas is designated as a terrorist organization by Israel, the United States, the European Union, the United Kingdom, and several other governments.

However, terrorist designation and lawful targetability under international humanitarian law are distinct questions.

The legal assessment of an individual depends on the applicable armed-conflict framework, their role and conduct, and the circumstances of a proposed attack.

This distinction becomes particularly important when examining operations against Hamas's political leadership.

Yahya Ayyash: The Killing of the Engineer

One of Israel's most significant early operations against Hamas involved Yahya Ayyash.

Ayyash was an explosives specialist associated with Hamas's military wing.

He became known as the Engineer because of his role in developing explosive devices used in attacks against Israelis.

During the 1990s, Hamas conducted suicide bombings that killed Israeli civilians and intensified fears about the organization's capabilities.

Israeli authorities regarded Ayyash as a major security threat.

On January 5, 1996, he was killed in Gaza in an operation widely attributed to Shin Bet.

The operation involved an explosive device concealed in a mobile telephone.

Ayyash's death became one of the most prominent examples of Israeli intelligence-led targeted killing.

However, it did not end Hamas's armed campaign.

In the weeks that followed, Hamas carried out further suicide bombings in Israel, killing civilians.

The attacks contributed to a period of intense political and security instability.

The sequence demonstrated a central limitation of leadership targeting.

Removing an important individual may disrupt an organization, but it can also be followed by further violence rather than immediate deterrence.

Salah Shehadeh: A Strike That Became a Legal Controversy

Salah Shehadeh was a senior figure in Hamas's military wing and an important predecessor of Mohammed Deif.

Israeli authorities considered him responsible for organizing attacks against Israel.

On July 22, 2002, an Israeli aircraft dropped a large bomb on a residential building in Gaza City, killing Shehadeh.

The strike also killed numerous civilians, including children.

The operation generated widespread international condemnation.

The controversy centered on the use of a powerful explosive weapon in a densely populated residential area.

Israeli authorities maintained that Shehadeh was an important military target.

However, the civilian casualties raised serious questions about proportionality, precautions, and the information available to decision-makers.

The case became the subject of legal scrutiny and public debate.

It remains one of the most frequently discussed examples of the humanitarian consequences of targeted killings.

The central issue was not merely whether Shehadeh held a military command position.

It was whether the attack complied with the legal obligations governing the protection of civilians.

His death also created a leadership transition within Hamas's military wing.

Mohammed Deif subsequently became commander of the Qassam Brigades.

The organization continued to develop its military capabilities.

Ahmed Yassin: The Killing of Hamas's Founder

Ahmed Yassin was one of the founders of Hamas and among its most influential religious and political figures.

Born in 1936 or 1937, according to differing historical records, Yassin became an important figure in Palestinian Islamist activism.

He helped establish Hamas during the First Intifada in 1987.

Despite severe physical disabilities, he exercised considerable influence within the movement.

Israeli authorities accused him of responsibility for Hamas's armed activities and attacks against Israeli civilians.

On March 22, 2004, Yassin was killed in an Israeli helicopter strike in Gaza City after leaving a mosque.

The attack also killed other people.

His death generated intense reactions across the Palestinian territories and the wider Middle East.

Supporters regarded him as the spiritual founder of Hamas.

Israeli authorities presented the operation as an action against a leader they considered responsible for attacks.

The killing raised questions concerning the legal status of political and religious leaders and the circumstances under which they may be targeted.

It also demonstrated the political consequences of removing a highly symbolic figure.

Yassin's death did not bring about the collapse of Hamas.

Instead, the organization appointed new leadership.

Abdel Aziz al-Rantisi: A Leadership Transition Cut Short

Following Yassin's death, Abdel Aziz al-Rantisi became a leading figure within Hamas in Gaza.

Rantisi was a physician and one of the organization's founders.

He was known for his uncompromising public positions and opposition to Israel.

His leadership was brief.

On April 17, 2004, less than a month after Yassin's death, Rantisi was killed in an Israeli helicopter strike in Gaza City.

The attack also killed two other people.

The deaths of Yassin and Rantisi within such a short period represented a major Israeli campaign against Hamas's senior leadership.

However, Hamas continued operating.

Its political and military structures adapted to the loss of prominent figures.

The events illustrated that the removal of leaders does not necessarily destroy an organization with established institutions and replacement mechanisms.

They also raised questions about the distinction between immediate military outcomes and long-term strategic effectiveness.

Israel had removed two important Hamas figures.

Yet the movement survived and continued to develop its capabilities.

Mahmoud al-Mabhouh: A Killing in Dubai

In January 2010, senior Hamas figure Mahmoud al-Mabhouh was found dead in a hotel room in Dubai.

Al-Mabhouh had been associated with Hamas's military activities and was reportedly involved in weapons procurement.

Dubai authorities investigated his death and accused a team of foreign operatives of carrying out the killing.

The operation was widely attributed to Mossad, although Israel did not publicly acknowledge responsibility.

The investigation attracted international attention because of the use of foreign passports and the extensive surveillance footage released by Dubai authorities.

Several governments expressed concern about the alleged misuse of their citizens' identities or travel documents.

The case demonstrated the diplomatic risks associated with suspected intelligence operations abroad.

Even when a government considers an individual a serious security threat, conducting an operation on another state's territory can raise questions of sovereignty and international law.

The Dubai case also illustrated the increasing importance of surveillance technology in investigating covert operations.

The same technologies used by intelligence services to monitor individuals can sometimes contribute to reconstructing the activities of suspected operatives.

Ahmed Jabari: The Beginning of the 2012 Gaza Conflict

Ahmed Jabari was a senior commander within Hamas's military wing.

He was widely regarded as an important figure in the organization's military leadership and was involved in the negotiations that led to the 2011 prisoner exchange involving Gilad Shalit.

On November 14, 2012, Jabari was killed in an Israeli airstrike in Gaza City.

Israel described him as responsible for attacks against Israeli civilians and military personnel.

His killing marked the beginning of Operation Pillar of Defense, an eight-day conflict between Israel and Palestinian armed groups in Gaza.

The fighting involved Israeli airstrikes and Palestinian rocket attacks.

Civilians were killed and injured.

The operation demonstrated how the killing of a senior commander can become part of a wider military confrontation.

Rather than remaining an isolated event, a targeted strike may trigger or accompany a broader escalation.

Jabari's death also illustrated the complicated position of individuals who exercise military responsibilities while participating in negotiations.

His involvement in the Shalit exchange did not remove his military role, but it demonstrated that senior armed-group figures may also influence diplomatic or humanitarian arrangements.

Baha Abu al-Ata and the Distinction Between Armed Organizations

In November 2019, Israel killed Baha Abu al-Ata, a senior commander of Palestinian Islamic Jihad, in Gaza.

Although Abu al-Ata was not a Hamas commander, his death is relevant to understanding Israel's wider counterterrorism strategy.

Palestinian Islamic Jihad is a separate armed organization with its own leadership and military structure.

It has cooperated with Hamas in certain circumstances while maintaining a distinct organizational identity.

Israel accused Abu al-Ata of responsibility for attacks and planning further violence.

His killing was followed by rocket fire and Israeli military operations.

The episode demonstrates why it is important to distinguish between different Palestinian armed groups.

Not every armed operation in Gaza is conducted by Hamas.

Likewise, not every Israeli targeted operation in Gaza has been directed against Hamas personnel.

Accurate identification of organizational responsibility is essential to understanding the conflict.

Saleh al-Arouri: The Killing in Beirut

Saleh al-Arouri was one of Hamas's most prominent senior political figures.

He served as deputy head of the organization's Political Bureau and had longstanding connections to its activities in the West Bank.

Israeli authorities accused him of involvement in organizing and supporting attacks.

On January 2, 2024, al-Arouri was killed in an explosion in the southern suburbs of Beirut, Lebanon.

The strike also killed other Hamas figures.

The operation was widely attributed to Israel, although Israeli officials did not formally acknowledge responsibility at the time.

Al-Arouri's death was significant for several reasons.

He was a senior Hamas official operating outside Gaza.

The strike occurred in Lebanon, a country already experiencing heightened tensions along its border with Israel.

And the location was associated with Hezbollah's political and security presence.

The killing therefore raised concerns about a wider regional escalation.

Lebanese authorities condemned the strike as a violation of sovereignty.

The incident demonstrated how operations against Hamas's external leadership could affect relations involving other states and armed organizations.

Hamas's External Leadership and Regional Networks

Hamas has maintained political representatives and organizational relationships outside the Palestinian territories.

Its external leadership has operated from countries including Qatar, Turkey, Lebanon, and Iran at different times.

These relationships have served different purposes.

Some have involved political representation and diplomatic communication.

Others have involved financial assistance, organizational coordination, or relationships with regional armed groups.

Iran has been an important supporter of Hamas's military capabilities.

Qatar has hosted senior Hamas political representatives and played a major role in mediation concerning hostages and ceasefire arrangements.

These different relationships should not be treated as interchangeable.

A state hosting political representatives for mediation does not necessarily have the same role as a state providing military assistance.

The presence of Hamas officials abroad also creates complicated legal and diplomatic questions.

Operations against individuals on foreign territory may raise issues concerning sovereignty, the use of force, and the territorial scope of armed conflict.

Such operations can have consequences extending far beyond the intended target.

Ismail Haniyeh: A Political Leader Killed in Tehran

Ismail Haniyeh was one of Hamas's most prominent political leaders.

He served as Palestinian prime minister following Hamas's victory in the 2006 legislative elections, although the subsequent Palestinian political split left rival authorities governing Gaza and the West Bank.

In 2017, Haniyeh became head of Hamas's Political Bureau.

He later spent much of his time outside Gaza, including in Qatar.

Haniyeh played a significant role in Hamas's international political relationships and negotiations.

Following October 7, he remained a prominent representative of the organization during discussions concerning hostages and a ceasefire.

On July 31, 2024, Haniyeh was killed in Tehran after attending the inauguration of Iran's president.

Iran and Hamas blamed Israel.

Israel subsequently acknowledged responsibility for the killing.

The operation represented a major development in the campaign against Hamas's leadership.

Unlike Mohammed Deif, whose responsibilities were primarily military, Haniyeh was principally known as a political leader.

His death therefore intensified debate about the targeting of political figures and the legal basis for particular operations.

It also raised serious concerns about regional escalation.

The Regional Consequences of Haniyeh's Death

Haniyeh's killing occurred on Iranian territory.

This made the incident particularly sensitive.

Iran had longstanding relationships with Hamas and other armed organizations opposed to Israel.

The death of a senior Hamas political figure in Tehran raised questions concerning Iranian security, sovereignty, and the possibility of retaliation.

It also occurred during a period of increasing regional tension.

Israel and Iran had already engaged in direct military exchanges in April 2024.

The killing contributed to a wider cycle of confrontation.

In October 2024, Iran launched a major missile attack against Israel.

The attack followed several developments, including the killings of Haniyeh and Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah.

The escalation demonstrated that operations against individual leaders can influence regional security calculations.

A targeted killing may achieve an immediate objective while contributing to broader instability.

Its consequences must therefore be evaluated beyond the death of the intended individual.

The Death of Other Hamas Commanders During the Gaza War

Israel's military campaign following October 7 involved operations against numerous Hamas commanders.

Israeli authorities announced the deaths of figures associated with regional military formations, command functions, and specialized capabilities.

Among the most prominent were Marwan Issa, Mohammed Deif, and Rafa Salama.

Issa was regarded as a senior deputy within the Qassam Brigades.

Deif commanded the organization's military wing.

Salama was associated with the Khan Younis Brigade.

The deaths of these figures represented significant losses for Hamas's military leadership.

However, the precise effect on the organization's operational capabilities was difficult to establish independently.

Some commanders may have been replaced.

Other military functions may have been redistributed.

The death of a senior figure does not necessarily mean that the formation previously under that person's authority has ceased to exist.

A comprehensive assessment requires examining the organization's remaining capabilities rather than relying solely on announcements concerning leadership losses.

The Difference Between Political Leadership and Military Command

The killing of senior Hamas figures raises an important legal distinction.

Military commanders responsible for armed operations may qualify as lawful targets under the applicable rules of armed conflict.

Political leaders do not automatically become lawful targets merely because they hold senior positions within an organization that also maintains an armed wing.

The assessment depends on their actual role and conduct.

A political figure may exercise responsibilities that are relevant to military operations.

However, organizational prominence alone does not settle the legal question.

This distinction is particularly important when examining operations against figures such as Ismail Haniyeh.

The public record does not necessarily disclose all intelligence on which Israeli authorities relied.

Without that information, an independent legal assessment may remain incomplete.

The absence of full information does not establish that an operation was lawful or unlawful.

It means that claims concerning its legality require careful examination.

The same standards apply to operations against other armed organizations.

Targeted Killings and International Law

Targeted killings raise different legal questions depending on the circumstances.

During armed conflict, attacks against lawful military targets may be permissible if they comply with the applicable rules.

Outside an armed-conflict framework, the use of lethal force is generally governed by stricter law-enforcement and human-rights standards.

Operations conducted on foreign territory may also raise questions under the international law governing the use of force and state sovereignty.

These legal frameworks can overlap or be disputed.

For example, a state may argue that an operation abroad forms part of an ongoing armed conflict or constitutes an act of self-defense.

Other states or legal experts may challenge that position.

Regardless of the claimed legal basis, the deliberate targeting of civilians is prohibited.

The protection of civilians and the requirement for legal accountability remain central.

A political or military objective does not automatically justify every method used to achieve it.

Civilian Casualties and the Cost of Leadership Strikes

Some operations against senior Hamas figures have resulted in civilian deaths.

The 2002 strike against Salah Shehadeh is one prominent example.

The 2014 attempt against Mohammed Deif killed members of his family.

The July 2024 strike that killed Deif caused substantial Palestinian casualties in the al-Mawasi area.

These incidents demonstrate the humanitarian consequences that can accompany operations against senior commanders.

The presence of a lawful military target does not eliminate the requirement to assess expected civilian harm.

International humanitarian law prohibits attacks expected to cause incidental civilian harm excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.

It also requires feasible precautions.

The legal assessment depends on the information reasonably available before an attack.

However, the deaths of civilians remain important even when the intended target is a senior commander.

The military significance of an operation and its humanitarian consequences must both be examined.

Can Killing Leaders Prevent Future Attacks?

Supporters of leadership targeting argue that removing experienced commanders can disrupt military planning and reduce an organization's capacity to conduct attacks.

Senior figures may possess institutional knowledge, personal relationships, and authority that are difficult to replace.

Their deaths may interrupt coordination and create uncertainty.

However, the historical record presents a more complicated picture.

Hamas survived the deaths of Ahmed Yassin, Abdel Aziz al-Rantisi, Salah Shehadeh, Yahya Ayyash, and other important figures.

It continued developing military capabilities and remained a significant political and armed organization.

This does not mean that the operations had no effect.

Some may have disrupted particular capabilities or prevented specific attacks.

But the organization's continued existence demonstrates that leadership targeting alone has not permanently eliminated Hamas.

The strategic effectiveness of the approach therefore remains contested.

The Risk of Escalation and Retaliation

Targeted killings can influence the behavior of armed organizations and governments.

Some operations may reduce an organization's immediate capabilities.

Others may provoke retaliatory attacks or contribute to broader military confrontation.

The killing of Yahya Ayyash in 1996 was followed by Hamas suicide bombings.

The killing of Ahmed Jabari in 2012 marked the beginning of a wider Gaza conflict.

The deaths of Saleh al-Arouri in Beirut and Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran contributed to concerns about regional escalation.

However, the relationship between a targeted killing and subsequent violence is not always straightforward.

Conflicts involve multiple actors, decisions, and underlying causes.

It would be inaccurate to attribute every later development to one operation.

Nevertheless, the possibility of escalation is an important factor in evaluating the strategic consequences of targeted killings.

The Psychological and Political Effects

The deaths of senior leaders can have consequences beyond military organization.

For Israel, the killing of individuals accused of responsibility for attacks may be presented as evidence of accountability and security effectiveness.

For Hamas, the deaths of prominent figures may be used to reinforce narratives of sacrifice and resistance.

The same event can therefore carry very different meanings for different audiences.

Leadership targeting can also influence morale.

An organization may experience uncertainty following the loss of experienced commanders.

Alternatively, the death of a prominent figure may strengthen solidarity among supporters.

These effects are difficult to measure.

They depend on the organization's internal structure, political environment, and ability to communicate with its supporters.

The psychological consequences of targeted killings are therefore not necessarily predictable.

The Problem of Replacing Leadership

One reason Hamas has survived repeated leadership losses is that it developed organizational structures extending beyond individual personalities.

Political institutions, military formations, local networks, and external relationships have provided continuity.

When one leader was killed, another could assume responsibility.

However, replacement does not necessarily mean that the organization retains the same level of effectiveness.

New leaders may lack experience.

Internal disagreements may emerge.

Communication and coordination may deteriorate.

The cumulative loss of senior figures may create more serious difficulties than the death of one individual.

The challenge for analysts is determining whether leadership losses have produced lasting organizational damage.

This requires evidence concerning the organization's actual capabilities.

Public announcements of successful strikes are not sufficient on their own.

The Strategic Limits of Targeted Killings

The history of Israeli operations against Hamas leaders reveals a recurring pattern.

Senior figures are identified as important threats.

Intelligence and military operations are conducted against them.

Some are killed.

The organization experiences disruption but may continue operating.

This pattern raises questions about the relationship between tactical success and strategic outcomes.

A targeted killing can achieve its immediate objective without resolving the wider conflict.

Hamas's continued existence after decades of leadership losses demonstrates that military pressure has not independently removed the political and social conditions in which the movement operates.

Long-term security therefore requires consideration of broader issues.

These include governance, regional relationships, political arrangements, civilian protection, and the prevention of future violence.

Military operations may be part of a security strategy, but they cannot substitute for every other element.

Accountability and the Need for Independent Investigation

Operations against senior Hamas figures frequently involve classified intelligence.

Governments may withhold information concerning sources, methods, and operational decisions.

Some secrecy can serve legitimate security purposes.

However, it also complicates independent evaluation.

When an operation results in civilian casualties, questions may arise about the intended target, the information available before the attack, and the precautions taken.

When an operation occurs abroad, questions concerning sovereignty and the legal basis for the use of force may also arise.

Independent investigation is essential to evaluating these issues.

Official claims of success do not establish that every aspect of an operation complied with the law.

Likewise, allegations of wrongdoing require evidence and careful assessment.

The same standards should apply regardless of the identity of the state or armed organization involved.

What Decades of Operations Reveal

Israel's campaign against senior Hamas leaders has achieved significant individual results.

Figures who played important roles in the organization's political and military history have been killed.

Some operations disrupted command structures and removed individuals associated with attacks against Israelis.

Others generated international controversy because of civilian casualties or their location in foreign countries.

The long-term record remains mixed.

Hamas survived numerous leadership losses.

It continued developing military capabilities.

And on October 7, 2023, it carried out the deadliest attack in Israel's history.

This outcome does not prove that every previous counterterrorism operation failed.

It demonstrates that the removal of individual leaders is not equivalent to the elimination of an organization.

The effectiveness of targeted killings must be measured against the specific objectives they were intended to achieve and the consequences they produced.

Beyond the Death of a Commander

The history of Israeli operations against Hamas's senior leadership is a history of intelligence achievements, operational failures, political calculations, and humanitarian controversy.

From Yahya Ayyash and Salah Shehadeh to Ahmed Yassin, Abdel Aziz al-Rantisi, Saleh al-Arouri, and Ismail Haniyeh, the deaths of prominent figures shaped the evolution of the conflict.

Some operations occurred during intense fighting.

Others took place far beyond Gaza.

Together, they demonstrate the geographical and political reach of Israel's campaign against Hamas.

They also reveal the limits of a strategy focused on removing individuals.

Leadership targeting can weaken armed networks, disrupt planning, and eliminate experienced commanders.

But it cannot automatically resolve the political, social, and security conditions that allow organizations to survive.

The consequences for civilians, the risk of regional escalation, and the requirements of international law remain essential to evaluating these operations.

Ultimately, the central question is not simply whether Israel can locate and kill senior Hamas figures.

It is whether those operations contribute to a lasting reduction in violence and greater security for the people affected by the conflict.

The next chapter examines a different and deeply human dimension of Israel's intelligence and military campaign: the efforts to locate and rescue hostages taken during the October 7 attacks, and the cooperation required between intelligence agencies, military forces, and specialized rescue units.

Chapter 15 — Hostage Rescue Missions: Intelligence and Military Cooperation

Inside Israel's Efforts to Locate, Rescue and Bring Home the Hostages of October 7

On October 7, 2023, Hamas-led armed groups crossed from the Gaza Strip into southern Israel, attacking military installations, civilian communities, and the Nova music festival.

Approximately 1,200 people were killed in Israel, and 251 people were taken hostage into Gaza.

The captives included children, women, men, elderly people, Israeli soldiers, and foreign nationals.

Some were wounded. Others were taken from their homes or from places where they had been attending celebrations. Families were separated, and many relatives initially had no reliable information about whether their loved ones were alive.

The attacks created one of the most complex hostage crises in Israel's history.

For Israeli authorities, recovering the captives became a central national objective alongside the military campaign against Hamas.

However, locating hostages held within an active conflict zone presented extraordinary difficulties.

Some captives were believed to be held in underground tunnels. Others were detained in buildings or locations controlled by armed groups. Their whereabouts could change, and information about their condition was often incomplete.

Israeli intelligence agencies, military forces, police counterterrorism units, diplomats, and international mediators became involved in different aspects of the effort to secure their release.

Their responsibilities were not identical.

Intelligence agencies sought information about the captives and their captors. Military and police units participated in rescue operations. Political authorities made decisions concerning negotiations, prisoner exchanges, and the broader conduct of the war.

The hostage crisis therefore became both an intelligence challenge and a political dilemma.

The central question was not simply whether Israel possessed the capabilities to conduct rescue operations.

It was how to bring hostages home alive while navigating the dangers of military action, the demands of negotiations, and the wider humanitarian consequences of the conflict.

October 7: The Beginning of the Hostage Crisis

The scale of the hostage-taking on October 7 was unprecedented in Israel's history.

Armed attackers entered communities near Gaza, including Be'eri, Kfar Aza, Nir Oz, and other locations.

They also attacked the Nova music festival near Re'im.

People were killed, injured, and abducted.

Videos recorded during the attacks showed some captives being taken into Gaza.

The images quickly circulated internationally and became some of the most recognizable evidence of the assault.

For families, the first hours and days were marked by uncertainty.

Some relatives searched hospitals.

Others attempted to contact missing family members or examine photographs and videos for information.

Israeli authorities faced the enormous task of determining who had been killed, who remained missing, and who had been taken hostage.

The process required forensic identification, witness testimony, intelligence assessments, and the examination of available records.

The situation was complicated by the destruction and chaos at attack locations.

It was also complicated by the fact that captives were held by different armed actors.

Although Hamas was the principal organization responsible for the assault, other Palestinian armed groups participated in the attacks and hostage-taking.

This distinction became important when Israeli authorities attempted to establish who controlled particular captives.

Why Hostage Rescue Requires Different Intelligence

Intelligence gathering during a hostage crisis differs from many other military investigations.

Identifying a suspected armed-group commander may involve determining that person's organizational role and military responsibilities.

Locating a hostage requires establishing where a particular individual is being held and whether an intervention could endanger their life.

The consequences of inaccurate information are especially serious.

A mistaken assessment may direct forces toward the wrong location.

An incomplete assessment may fail to account for civilians or other captives nearby.

A military operation may also create dangers that were not fully anticipated.

The search for hostages therefore requires attention to uncertainty.

Information suggesting that a captive was held in a particular area at one time may no longer be reliable later.

Similarly, knowledge of an armed group's infrastructure does not automatically establish the location of the people it is holding.

The challenge is not simply collecting information.

It is determining whether that information is sufficiently reliable to support decisions that may have irreversible consequences.

Shin Bet and the Search for Hostages

Shin Bet, also known as the Israel Security Agency, has played an important role in Israel's response to the hostage crisis.

The agency is responsible for internal security and counterterrorism intelligence.

Its experience investigating Palestinian armed organizations made it an important participant in efforts to understand Hamas's networks and activities.

Following October 7, Shin Bet cooperated with the IDF and other Israeli institutions in hostage-related operations.

Public Israeli statements have identified the agency as a participant in several successful rescues.

However, the precise intelligence methods used in individual missions have not generally been disclosed.

This secrecy creates limitations for independent reporting.

A public announcement that Shin Bet contributed to a rescue does not establish which information came from the agency or how it was obtained.

Nor does it mean that every reported intelligence claim can be independently verified.

The agency's involvement nevertheless demonstrates the importance of cooperation between intelligence institutions and operational forces.

The Role of Military Intelligence

Aman, the IDF's Military Intelligence Directorate, is responsible for supporting military decision-making through intelligence collection and analysis.

During the Gaza campaign, military intelligence contributed to Israel's broader understanding of Hamas's organization, military infrastructure, and activities.

Hostage-related intelligence formed part of this complex environment.

The presence of captives could affect military decisions concerning particular locations or operations.

However, the specific contribution of Aman to individual hostage rescues is not always publicly documented.

It would therefore be inaccurate to assign particular discoveries or operational decisions to a specific intelligence unit without reliable evidence.

The broader point is that military intelligence and internal security intelligence can provide different perspectives on the same crisis.

Coordination between institutions may help decision-makers evaluate information more comprehensively.

Yet cooperation does not guarantee that every assessment will be accurate.

The October 7 attacks themselves demonstrated the consequences of intelligence failures and institutional assumptions.

Yamam: Israel's Specialized Hostage-Rescue Unit

Yamam is Israel's national counterterrorism unit and operates within the Israel Police.

It has extensive experience in high-risk security operations, including hostage rescue.

Unlike Sayeret Matkal, Shayetet 13, and other IDF formations, Yamam is not a military unit.

Nevertheless, it has cooperated closely with the IDF and Shin Bet during major security operations.

Following October 7, Yamam personnel participated in the response to the attacks and in subsequent hostage-rescue missions.

The unit was publicly identified as a participant in the February 2024 rescue of two hostages from Rafah and the June 2024 rescue of four hostages from Nuseirat.

These operations demonstrated the importance of coordination between institutions with different responsibilities.

A hostage-rescue mission may require intelligence analysis, military support, medical assistance, and specialized personnel.

However, the reputation of a particular unit should not obscure the risks associated with such operations.

Successful rescue outcomes must be evaluated alongside the circumstances of the mission and its consequences for civilians.

The IDF's Role in Hostage Recovery

The Israel Defense Forces have played a central role in the effort to recover hostages from Gaza.

Their responsibilities have included military operations, support for intelligence investigations, recovery of remains, and participation in rescue missions.

However, not every hostage-related operation has involved an attempted rescue.

Some military activities have resulted in the discovery of information or locations associated with captives.

Others have involved the recovery of deceased hostages.

The distinction is important.

Recovering the remains of a hostage can provide families with answers and allow burial, but it is not equivalent to bringing a captive home alive.

Similarly, military pressure against Hamas does not automatically lead to the release of hostages.

The relationship between military operations and hostage recovery has remained one of the most contested aspects of Israel's wartime strategy.

The Rescue of Ori Megidish

On October 30, 2023, Israeli authorities announced the rescue of soldier Ori Megidish from Gaza.

Megidish had been abducted during the October 7 attacks.

The operation involved the IDF and Shin Bet.

Her recovery was one of the first successful military rescues of a hostage taken during the assault.

For her family, it ended weeks of uncertainty and captivity.

For Israeli authorities, it demonstrated that rescue operations could succeed under certain circumstances.

However, the operational details released publicly were limited.

The public record does not permit a complete independent reconstruction of the intelligence and decisions involved.

This limitation matters.

The success of a mission does not justify speculation about classified methods or the precise roles of personnel whose involvement has not been confirmed.

The rescue nevertheless became an important event in the early phase of the hostage crisis.

The November 2023 Hostage Agreement

Military rescue was not the only route through which captives returned home.

In November 2023, Israel and Hamas reached a temporary truce and hostage-release agreement through mediation involving Qatar, Egypt, and the United States.

During the pause in fighting, Hamas released Israeli women and children and other hostages, including foreign nationals, while Israel released Palestinian prisoners.

Humanitarian assistance also entered Gaza during the arrangement.

The agreement demonstrated the importance of diplomatic negotiations in securing hostage releases.

For families, the exchanges created moments of relief after weeks of uncertainty.

However, the arrangement did not result in the release of every captive.

The temporary truce ended, and military operations resumed.

The experience became central to the debate over whether further negotiated agreements could secure the return of remaining hostages.

It also demonstrated that intelligence, military pressure, diplomacy, and mediation were interconnected but distinct elements of the crisis.

The February 2024 Rafah Rescue

On February 12, 2024, Israeli forces rescued two hostages from Rafah in southern Gaza.

The rescued men were Fernando Simon Marman and Louis Har.

Both had been abducted from Kibbutz Nir Yitzhak during the October 7 attacks.

The operation involved the IDF, Shin Bet, and Yamam.

Israeli authorities described the mission as the result of intelligence work and cooperation between security institutions.

The two men were recovered alive and returned to Israel.

Their rescue was welcomed by their families and the wider Israeli public.

However, the operation took place amid Israeli military strikes in Rafah that caused Palestinian casualties.

Palestinian authorities reported numerous deaths during the surrounding military action.

The incident demonstrated the difficult relationship between a successful hostage rescue and the consequences of military operations in a populated area.

The recovery of the hostages was an important achievement.

The civilian casualties also required serious examination.

Both aspects are essential to understanding the operation.

Why Rafah Was a Particularly Sensitive Location

Rafah became one of the most sensitive areas of the Gaza conflict.

Located near the Egyptian border, the city and its surroundings received large numbers of displaced Palestinians during the war.

Many families had moved repeatedly in search of relative safety.

Military operations in such an environment created substantial risks.

Buildings could contain civilians, displaced families, or individuals whose presence was not known to military authorities.

The location of a hostage within a populated area did not remove the need to consider the consequences of an operation.

International humanitarian law requires parties to distinguish between lawful military targets and civilians.

It also requires assessment of expected incidental civilian harm and the taking of feasible precautions.

These obligations remain relevant during hostage-rescue missions conducted as part of an armed conflict.

The humanitarian context therefore formed an important part of the debate surrounding the Rafah operation.

The Underground Threat to Hostages

Hamas's underground tunnel network complicated Israel's efforts to locate and recover captives.

Evidence from released hostages and Israeli investigations established that some hostages were held underground.

The tunnels could conceal captives from aerial surveillance and complicate efforts to determine their location.

However, the precise distribution of hostages between underground and above-ground locations changed over time and was not fully known publicly.

The underground environment also created serious risks.

Captives could be held in confined conditions with limited access to medical care, sanitation, or adequate food.

Their ability to communicate with the outside world was severely restricted.

Military operations near suspected detention sites could endanger them.

The discovery of underground facilities therefore did not automatically provide a safe opportunity for rescue.

Knowing that a tunnel existed was different from knowing who was inside it and whether a captive could be recovered alive.

The Killing of Three Israeli Hostages by Israeli Forces

One of the most tragic incidents of the hostage crisis occurred on December 15, 2023.

Israeli soldiers operating in Gaza mistakenly killed three Israeli hostages.

The victims were Yotam Haim, Samer Talalka, and Alon Shamriz.

According to the IDF's investigation, the men had escaped or separated from their captors and were approaching Israeli forces.

The soldiers incorrectly identified them as a threat.

The incident generated profound grief and criticism in Israel.

It also raised serious questions concerning military identification procedures and the rules governing the use of force.

The deaths demonstrated that the danger to hostages did not come only from their captors.

Military operations themselves could create fatal risks when information was incomplete or individuals were wrongly identified.

The incident became an important example of the consequences of battlefield uncertainty.

It also reinforced the need for accountability when military personnel mistakenly kill protected individuals.

The Discovery of Hostages Killed in Captivity

Throughout the war, Israeli authorities recovered the bodies of hostages from Gaza.

Some had been killed during the October 7 attacks and subsequently taken into the territory.

Others died while being held captive.

The precise circumstances of individual deaths were not always immediately established.

In August 2024, Israeli forces recovered the bodies of six hostages from a tunnel in the Rafah area.

They were Hersh Goldberg-Polin, Eden Yerushalmi, Carmel Gat, Alexander Lobanov, Almog Sarusi, and Ori Danino.

Israeli authorities said they had been killed shortly before their bodies were recovered.

The discovery intensified public anger and grief.

Families and demonstrators demanded greater efforts to secure the release of remaining captives through negotiations.

The incident illustrated the dangers of prolonged hostage detention.

It also reinforced the difficulty of determining how military operations, negotiations, and the decisions of captors might affect the survival of hostages.

The Debate Over Military Pressure

Israeli political and military leaders repeatedly argued that military pressure could weaken Hamas and improve the prospects of securing hostage releases.

The argument was that sustained military operations could reduce Hamas's bargaining power and create incentives for an agreement.

However, critics questioned whether military pressure sometimes endangered captives or reduced the likelihood of a negotiated settlement.

Families of hostages expressed differing views, although many publicly called for an agreement that would bring their relatives home.

The debate became increasingly intense as the war continued.

It involved difficult questions.

Could military operations force Hamas to make concessions?

Would a ceasefire and prisoner exchange offer a more reliable route to securing releases?

Could both approaches be pursued simultaneously?

The answers depended on political decisions, intelligence assessments, and negotiations whose full details were not publicly available.

The crisis demonstrated that hostage recovery could not be reduced to a purely military problem.

Qatar, Egypt and the United States as Mediators

International mediation played a major role in the hostage crisis.

Qatar maintained relationships that allowed it to communicate with Hamas's political leadership.

Egypt possessed geographical and political importance because of its border with Gaza and its longstanding involvement in Israeli-Palestinian mediation.

The United States supported negotiations and maintained close relationships with Israeli authorities.

These countries played different but complementary roles in efforts to secure agreements.

Negotiations concerned hostage releases, Palestinian prisoner releases, ceasefire arrangements, humanitarian assistance, and broader security questions.

The process was complicated by disagreements over the duration of ceasefires, the sequencing of releases, and the future conduct of military operations.

Mediation demonstrated that hostage recovery required more than military capabilities.

Political communication and negotiated arrangements could achieve outcomes that military operations alone could not guarantee.

The Role of Families and Public Pressure

The families of hostages became central figures in Israel's public debate.

Relatives organized demonstrations, met political leaders, spoke to international media, and demanded action.

The Hostages and Missing Families Forum became an important organization representing many affected families.

Public campaigns helped keep the fate of the captives at the center of national and international attention.

However, families did not always agree on the best strategy.

Some supported continued military pressure.

Others argued that an agreement should take priority, even if it required significant concessions.

These differences reflected the extraordinary difficulty of making decisions under conditions of uncertainty.

For the families, the issue was not abstract military strategy.

It concerned the lives of their relatives.

The hostage crisis therefore became a defining political and moral issue within Israeli society.

The International Legal Status of Hostages

Hostage-taking is prohibited under international humanitarian law.

The prohibition applies to parties involved in armed conflict, including non-state armed groups.

Hostages must not be used to compel governments or other parties to take particular actions.

Individuals held captive must be treated humanely.

Torture, cruel treatment, and other forms of abuse are prohibited.

The detention of civilians as hostages is a grave violation of international humanitarian law and may constitute a war crime.

The legal prohibition does not depend on the political objectives claimed by the captors.

Likewise, the existence of a hostage crisis does not remove the obligations of a state conducting military operations.

Rescue efforts must comply with the applicable legal rules.

The protection of hostages and civilians remains central regardless of the conduct of the opposing party.

Intelligence Cooperation and Institutional Responsibility

The publicly documented hostage rescues demonstrate the importance of cooperation between Israeli security institutions.

Shin Bet contributed intelligence and counterterrorism expertise.

The IDF provided military capabilities and operational support.

Yamam participated in specialized rescue operations.

Other institutions supported the broader effort through medical assistance, investigation, and coordination.

However, the exact division of responsibilities differed between missions.

Not every rescue involved the same units.

Nor did every operation rely on the same intelligence sources.

It is therefore important to avoid presenting one universal operational model.

The available evidence supports a broader conclusion: successful hostage recovery has often required cooperation across institutions with different responsibilities.

Such cooperation can improve the ability to respond to complex situations, but it does not eliminate uncertainty or risk.

The June 2024 Nuseirat Rescue

On June 8, 2024, Israeli forces rescued four hostages from the Nuseirat area of central Gaza.

The rescued individuals were Noa Argamani, Almog Meir Jan, Andrey Kozlov, and Shlomi Ziv.

All four had been abducted from the Nova music festival during the October 7 attacks.

The operation involved the IDF, Shin Bet, and Yamam.

Israeli authorities described it as the result of extensive intelligence work and cooperation between security institutions.

The four hostages were recovered alive and returned to Israel.

For their families, the rescue ended eight months of captivity.

However, the operation and associated Israeli military action caused substantial Palestinian casualties.

Gaza health authorities reported more than 270 people killed, while Israeli authorities disputed aspects of the figures.

The precise circumstances of individual deaths remain difficult to establish from the publicly available record.

The operation became one of the most significant and controversial hostage rescues of the war.

It demonstrated the ability of Israeli security institutions to recover captives through coordinated action.

It also raised serious questions about the humanitarian consequences of military operations in densely populated areas.

The next chapter examines the Nuseirat operation in detail.

Why Successful Rescues Remained Rare

Despite Israel's extensive military and intelligence capabilities, relatively few hostages were recovered alive through military rescue operations during the first year of the war.

This was not necessarily evidence of a lack of effort.

Hostage rescue is exceptionally difficult when captives are dispersed across an active conflict zone and their locations are uncertain.

The danger to captives may increase if their captors believe a rescue is imminent.

Military operations may also place surrounding civilians at risk.

The circumstances differ significantly from hostage incidents in which authorities can isolate a single location and establish more reliable information about the people inside.

In Gaza, the hostage crisis unfolded during a large-scale war involving underground infrastructure, extensive displacement, and continuing military operations.

These conditions made successful rescues difficult to achieve consistently.

The rarity of such operations also reinforced the importance of negotiations.

The Human Consequences of Captivity

Behind the intelligence assessments and military decisions were individuals whose lives had been transformed by captivity.

Released hostages described experiences involving fear, isolation, uncertainty, and difficult living conditions.

Some reported abuse, threats, and inadequate access to food or medical care.

Their experiences varied, and the circumstances of every captive were not identical.

The psychological consequences extended to families who waited for news.

Parents, children, spouses, and siblings faced prolonged uncertainty.

Some families learned that their relatives had been killed.

Others experienced the relief of reunification.

The hostage crisis also affected Palestinian civilians in Gaza, whose lives were devastated by the wider war.

A complete examination must recognize these different human experiences without treating them as interchangeable.

The deliberate taking of hostages was a serious violation.

The protection of Palestinian civilians during military operations remained a separate and continuing legal obligation.

What the Hostage Crisis Revealed About Israeli Intelligence

The hostage crisis exposed both the capabilities and limitations of Israel's intelligence establishment.

Some operations demonstrated effective cooperation between security agencies and specialized forces.

The rescues of Ori Megidish, Fernando Simon Marman, Louis Har, and the four hostages from Nuseirat were important achievements.

However, the prolonged captivity of many others demonstrated the difficulty of obtaining reliable information and translating it into safe recovery.

The mistaken killing of three hostages by Israeli soldiers revealed the potentially fatal consequences of identification failures.

The recovery of murdered hostages from underground facilities highlighted the dangers of prolonged captivity.

These events showed that advanced technology and experienced security institutions cannot guarantee successful outcomes.

Human judgment, institutional coordination, and the reliability of information remain essential.

Military Success, Negotiations and the Meaning of Responsibility

Hostage recovery presents a difficult challenge for governments.

Military operations may sometimes succeed in bringing captives home.

Negotiated agreements may secure the release of larger groups.

Both approaches involve risks, compromises, and political consequences.

The Israeli experience after October 7 demonstrated that no single method guaranteed success.

The responsibility of decision-makers extended beyond achieving individual operational objectives.

It also involved evaluating the likelihood of bringing captives home alive, the consequences of military action, and the wider obligations imposed by international law.

The debate over military pressure and negotiations therefore reflected more than disagreements about tactics.

It concerned the state's responsibility toward its citizens and the human consequences of the decisions taken in their name.

Beyond the Rescue Operation

Israel's efforts to recover the hostages of October 7 became one of the defining dimensions of the war against Hamas.

The crisis required intelligence investigations, military operations, specialized rescue capabilities, diplomatic negotiations, and sustained public attention.

It revealed the importance of cooperation between Shin Bet, the IDF, Yamam, and other institutions.

It also exposed the limits of military force in situations where captives are hidden within an active conflict zone.

Successful rescues brought extraordinary relief to families.

Failed operations, mistaken identification, and the deaths of hostages demonstrated the devastating consequences of uncertainty.

The wider war also imposed severe costs on Palestinian civilians, whose protection remained an obligation throughout the conflict.

Ultimately, the hostage crisis illustrated a fundamental reality of modern counterterrorism.

Locating an adversary and defeating an armed organization are not the same as bringing captives home safely.

The protection of human life requires accurate intelligence, responsible decision-making, legal compliance, and a willingness to pursue diplomatic solutions when they offer a viable path to release.

The next chapter examines one of the most consequential hostage-rescue missions of the Gaza war: the June 8, 2024, operation in Nuseirat.

It will explore the publicly documented preparations, the cooperation between Israeli security institutions, the rescue of four hostages, the Palestinian casualties, and the continuing questions surrounding the operation.

Chapter 16 — The Nuseirat Rescue Operation: A Detailed Case Study

Four Hostages Rescued, a Commander Killed and a Palestinian Community Devastated

On June 8, 2024, Israeli security forces carried out one of the most significant hostage-rescue operations of the war in Gaza.

The mission took place in the Nuseirat area of central Gaza, where four Israeli hostages had been held for approximately eight months following their abduction during the Hamas-led attacks of October 7, 2023.

The rescued hostages were Noa Argamani, Almog Meir Jan, Andrey Kozlov, and Shlomi Ziv.

All four had been abducted from the Nova music festival near Re'im in southern Israel.

The operation involved cooperation between the Israel Defense Forces, Shin Bet, and Yamam, Israel's national police counterterrorism unit.

Israeli authorities described the mission as a major intelligence and operational achievement.

The four hostages were recovered alive and returned to Israel.

For their families, the operation ended months of uncertainty, fear, and captivity.

However, the rescue also became one of the most controversial military operations of the Gaza war.

The fighting and Israeli military strikes associated with the operation caused extensive Palestinian casualties in the densely populated Nuseirat area.

Gaza health authorities reported more than 270 people killed and hundreds injured.

Israeli authorities disputed aspects of the reported figures and said their forces had encountered armed resistance during the mission.

An Israeli counterterrorism commander, Arnon Zamora, was also killed.

The operation therefore produced sharply different experiences.

For the rescued hostages and their families, it was a moment of extraordinary relief.

For Palestinian families in Nuseirat, it was a day of death, injury, and destruction.

Understanding the operation requires examining both realities.

The military achievement cannot be separated from the humanitarian consequences, and the civilian casualties do not erase the significance of recovering four people who had been unlawfully held captive.

October 7 and the Abduction of the Four Hostages

The story of the Nuseirat operation began eight months earlier.

On October 7, 2023, Hamas-led armed groups launched a coordinated assault into southern Israel.

The attackers breached border defenses, attacked military installations and civilian communities, and entered the Nova music festival near Re'im.

The festival had attracted thousands of people.

As the assault unfolded, attendees attempted to escape through surrounding roads and fields.

Hundreds were killed at the festival and in the surrounding area.

Others were abducted into Gaza.

Among them were Noa Argamani, Almog Meir Jan, Andrey Kozlov, and Shlomi Ziv.

Their individual circumstances differed, but all four became part of the hostage crisis that dominated Israeli public life following October 7.

Videos of some abductions circulated internationally.

Footage showing Noa Argamani being taken away became particularly widely known.

The images brought international attention to the experiences of people abducted from the festival.

For their families, the following months were marked by uncertainty.

They did not know when their relatives would return or whether they would survive captivity.

Who Were the Four Rescued Hostages?

The four individuals rescued in Nuseirat came from different backgrounds.

Noa Argamani, aged 26 at the time of her rescue, became one of the most widely recognized hostages after video footage of her abduction circulated online.

Her mother, Liora Argamani, was seriously ill with cancer during Noa's captivity.

The family's situation attracted considerable attention in Israel and internationally.

Almog Meir Jan, aged 21, had attended the Nova festival before being abducted.

His family spent months campaigning for his return.

His father, Yossi, died shortly before the rescue, without knowing that his son was about to be brought home.

Andrey Kozlov, aged 27, was a Russian-born Israeli who had been working as a security guard at the festival.

He was taken captive during the attack.

Shlomi Ziv, aged 40, was also working in a security role at the festival.

He was abducted while the assault was taking place.

Their rescue represented the end of a prolonged period of captivity.

However, their return did not resolve the broader hostage crisis.

Many other captives remained in Gaza after June 8.

Why Nuseirat Became Important

Nuseirat is located in the central Gaza Strip.

The area includes a densely populated refugee camp and surrounding residential neighborhoods.

During the war, central Gaza experienced extensive displacement, military operations, and pressure on civilian infrastructure.

Large numbers of Palestinians were living in crowded conditions.

Some had been displaced from other parts of the territory.

This environment made military operations particularly dangerous.

Israeli authorities stated that the four hostages were being held in two separate locations within the Nuseirat area.

The captives were not all held together.

According to the Israeli account, Noa Argamani was held at one location, while Almog Meir Jan, Andrey Kozlov, and Shlomi Ziv were held at another.

The locations were within a populated urban environment.

That fact was central to the operation's risks.

The presence of hostages created an urgent rescue objective.

The surrounding civilian population created serious humanitarian and legal considerations.

Both factors shaped the controversy that followed.

The Intelligence Challenge

Locating hostages in Gaza required information that was both specific and sufficiently reliable to support decisions involving their lives.

Israeli intelligence agencies had been searching for captives since October 7.

The challenge was complicated by the possibility that hostages could be moved, concealed underground, or held in buildings within populated areas.

Information concerning a location could become outdated.

The identity of the people present might be uncertain.

The presence of civilians or armed individuals could also be difficult to establish.

Israeli authorities stated that the Nuseirat operation followed extensive intelligence work.

Shin Bet and the IDF were publicly identified as important participants in the preparation and execution of the mission.

However, the precise intelligence sources and methods used to locate the hostages have not been fully disclosed.

This limits independent reconstruction.

It is possible to establish that Israeli authorities identified two locations and conducted a successful rescue.

It is not possible from the public record to verify every intelligence assessment, the precise source of each piece of information, or the complete sequence of classified decisions.

That distinction is essential when examining a covert operation.

Cooperation Between Shin Bet, Yamam and the IDF

The Nuseirat rescue involved several Israeli security institutions.

Each had different responsibilities.

Shin Bet contributed its counterterrorism and intelligence capabilities.

Yamam provided specialized personnel experienced in high-risk security and hostage-rescue operations.

The IDF contributed military forces and support.

The operation demonstrated the importance of cooperation between intelligence agencies, police counterterrorism units, and the military.

Such cooperation can be essential when a mission involves both the recovery of captives and military activity within an active conflict zone.

However, the full operational division of responsibilities remains partly classified.

Public statements identify the institutions involved, but they do not provide a complete account of every decision or action.

It would therefore be inaccurate to reconstruct undisclosed tactical details as established facts.

The documented outcome is that the participating Israeli institutions succeeded in recovering four hostages alive.

The Decision to Conduct a Rescue

Military rescue operations carry exceptional risks.

A failed attempt may endanger the hostages.

It may also endanger military personnel and civilians in the surrounding area.

Israeli authorities had to consider whether the available intelligence supported an attempt to recover the captives.

The public record does not disclose the complete internal decision-making process.

However, the operation demonstrates that Israeli authorities concluded a rescue attempt was possible.

The decision occurred within the broader context of the war.

Israel's government was facing intense pressure to bring hostages home.

Families had repeatedly called for action.

Negotiations concerning a possible ceasefire and hostage-release agreement were continuing through international mediators.

The Nuseirat mission therefore occurred at the intersection of intelligence, military strategy, domestic politics, and diplomacy.

It was not simply a battlefield event.

It was also part of the wider struggle over how Israel should prioritize the recovery of its captives.

June 8, 2024: The Rescue Operation

On June 8, Israeli forces entered the Nuseirat area to recover the four hostages.

According to Israeli authorities, the captives were held in two separate locations.

The operation resulted in the recovery of all four alive.

Israeli forces subsequently transported the hostages out of Gaza.

The mission involved intense fighting and military support.

Israeli authorities stated that armed individuals resisted the operation.

The rescue unfolded in a densely populated environment, and the associated military action caused extensive destruction and casualties.

The full sequence of events has not been independently reconstructed in every detail.

Different accounts have emphasized different aspects of the mission.

Israeli official statements focused on the recovery of the hostages and the fighting encountered by rescue forces.

Palestinian witnesses and medical personnel described severe casualties and destruction in the surrounding area.

A complete historical account must consider both sets of evidence while recognizing that some operational details remain disputed or unavailable.

The Rescue of Noa Argamani

Noa Argamani was recovered from one of the locations identified by Israeli authorities.

Her rescue became one of the most widely reported moments of the operation.

The images of her return to Israel received international attention.

After eight months in captivity, she was reunited with family members.

Her mother's serious illness made the reunion especially significant.

Noa was able to see her mother before Liora Argamani died later that month.

The reunion became a powerful human story within the wider conflict.

However, the emotional significance of the rescue should not obscure the broader circumstances of the operation.

Noa's return was one part of a mission that also involved other hostages, military personnel, and civilians in Nuseirat.

The event carried different consequences for different families.

The Rescue of Almog Meir Jan, Andrey Kozlov and Shlomi Ziv

The other three hostages were recovered from a separate location.

Almog Meir Jan, Andrey Kozlov, and Shlomi Ziv had been held together.

Their rescue brought an end to approximately eight months of captivity.

For their families, the announcement produced enormous relief.

However, Almog Meir Jan's return was accompanied by tragedy.

His father had died shortly before the rescue.

The circumstances meant that a long-awaited reunion could never take place.

The experience illustrated the profound human consequences of prolonged hostage detention.

Even when a captive survives and returns home, the period of captivity may have permanently changed the lives of their family members.

The return of the three men was a major achievement for the Israeli forces involved.

It was also a reminder that successful rescue does not erase the suffering experienced during captivity.

The Death of Arnon Zamora

The operation also resulted in the death of an Israeli counterterrorism commander.

Chief Inspector Arnon Zamora, a member of Yamam, was critically wounded during the mission and subsequently died.

His death became a significant part of the Israeli account of the rescue.

Zamora had participated in security operations during the October 7 attacks and the subsequent conflict.

Israeli authorities honored his service and named the Nuseirat mission Operation Arnon in his memory.

His death demonstrated that hostage-rescue missions can involve serious risks for the personnel conducting them.

Even when the hostages are recovered alive, the operation may result in fatalities among participating forces.

For Zamora's family, the successful rescue was accompanied by personal loss.

His death became part of the operation's lasting significance in Israel.

The Palestinian Casualties

The Nuseirat rescue caused substantial Palestinian casualties.

Gaza health authorities reported that more than 270 people were killed during the operation and associated military action.

Hundreds more were reported injured.

Israeli authorities disputed aspects of the figures and stated that armed militants were among those killed.

The precise number of civilians and combatants killed has not been independently established.

However, the existence of extensive Palestinian casualties is not seriously in doubt.

Medical facilities received large numbers of wounded people.

Witnesses described intense explosions, gunfire, and destruction.

The scale of the casualties generated widespread international concern.

The incident illustrates the importance of distinguishing between reported total deaths and independently verified classifications of the people killed.

A reported casualty figure does not, by itself, establish how many victims were civilians or combatants.

At the same time, uncertainty about the precise classification of casualties does not justify dismissing the deaths or injuries that occurred.

The humanitarian consequences remain central to the operation's history.

Inside the Hospitals After the Operation

Medical facilities in central Gaza faced severe pressure following the Nuseirat operation.

Al-Aqsa Martyrs Hospital in Deir al-Balah received large numbers of casualties.

Medical personnel and humanitarian organizations described scenes of overcrowding and limited capacity.

The wider health system in Gaza had already been severely damaged by months of war.

Hospitals faced shortages of medical supplies, equipment, and personnel.

The arrival of large numbers of wounded people created additional difficulties.

Some patients required urgent surgery.

Others suffered serious injuries requiring specialized treatment.

The pressure on medical facilities demonstrated how a military operation can produce consequences extending beyond the immediate area of fighting.

The condition of Gaza's health system was therefore an important part of the humanitarian impact.

Conflicting Accounts of the Fighting

Israeli authorities stated that their forces encountered armed resistance during the rescue.

They also described military support intended to protect the operation and facilitate the withdrawal of the hostages and participating forces.

Palestinian witnesses described extensive attacks in populated areas.

Different accounts emerged concerning the scale and timing of the military action.

Some details remain disputed.

This is common in complex military incidents where the available evidence includes official statements, witness testimony, photographs, videos, and reports produced under difficult conditions.

Independent verification requires comparing these sources and identifying what each can establish.

An official military statement may provide information about the intended objective.

A witness may describe events experienced at a particular location.

Medical records may establish injuries and deaths.

None of these sources necessarily provides a complete account of the entire operation.

The task of investigative journalism is to examine the evidence without assuming that one perspective alone explains every aspect.

Allegations Concerning Civilian Disguises and Humanitarian Vehicles

Following the operation, allegations circulated concerning the appearance of Israeli personnel and the possible use of civilian or humanitarian cover.

Israeli authorities denied certain claims concerning the use of humanitarian vehicles.

Some accounts of the operation remain disputed or insufficiently verified.

These allegations are important because international humanitarian law places restrictions on particular forms of deception.

Military deception is not automatically unlawful.

However, perfidy, including certain forms of feigning protected status to kill, injure, or capture an adversary, is prohibited.

The misuse of protected humanitarian emblems or status can also raise serious legal concerns.

A legal conclusion requires reliable evidence concerning what occurred and the circumstances of the conduct.

The public record does not establish every allegation made about the Nuseirat mission.

Such claims should therefore be reported with clear attribution rather than presented as confirmed facts.

The Legal Status of the Hostage Rescue

The four people rescued in Nuseirat had been taken hostage during the October 7 attacks.

Hostage-taking is prohibited under international humanitarian law.

The continued detention of civilians as hostages is a serious violation.

Israel had a legitimate objective in seeking the release of its captives.

However, the existence of that objective did not remove the legal obligations governing military operations.

The applicable rules required distinction between civilians and lawful military targets.

They also required the assessment of expected incidental civilian harm and the taking of feasible precautions.

The principle of proportionality prohibits attacks expected to cause incidental civilian harm excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.

The legality of particular attacks associated with the rescue cannot be determined solely from the successful recovery of the hostages.

Nor can it be determined solely from the final casualty count.

A full assessment would require examining the information available to decision-makers before the attacks, the military objectives involved, the expected civilian harm, and the precautions taken.

Much of that information remains unavailable to independent investigators.

The Question of Proportionality

The Nuseirat operation became a major subject of debate concerning proportionality under international humanitarian law.

The rescue of four hostages was an important objective.

However, the military action also resulted in extensive casualties among Palestinians.

The legal question is not whether four Israeli lives can be compared numerically with the number of Palestinians killed.

International humanitarian law does not apply proportionality through a simple comparison of the number of people rescued and the number killed.

Instead, the assessment concerns whether the incidental civilian harm expected from particular attacks would have been excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.

This assessment must be made on the basis of information reasonably available before an attack.

The final outcome may be relevant to investigation, but it does not automatically establish what commanders knew or expected beforehand.

The absence of complete operational information limits independent legal conclusions.

Nevertheless, the scale of the Palestinian casualties makes careful examination essential.

The Responsibility of Hamas and Other Armed Actors

The hostage crisis began with the abduction of people during the October 7 attacks.

Hamas and other participating armed groups were responsible for taking and holding captives.

The deliberate detention of civilians as hostages is prohibited.

Armed groups also have obligations concerning the protection of civilians.

The use of civilian locations for military purposes may create serious risks for surrounding populations.

However, the presence of hostages or armed personnel in a civilian area does not automatically establish that every resident was participating in hostilities.

Nor does an alleged violation by one party remove the legal obligations of another.

The responsibility for hostage-taking and the responsibility for conducting military operations lawfully are separate questions.

Both must be examined.

This distinction is essential to avoiding the assumption that the conduct of one party legally excuses the actions of the other.

International Reactions

The Nuseirat operation produced sharply contrasting international responses.

Israeli leaders welcomed the return of the four hostages and praised the participating security forces.

The United States welcomed the rescue while also expressing concern about civilian casualties and the need to protect civilians.

United Nations officials and humanitarian organizations raised serious concerns about the number of Palestinians killed and injured.

The operation became part of a wider international debate concerning Israel's conduct of the war and the obligations of Hamas.

Some observers emphasized the right of hostages to be freed.

Others focused on the scale of the civilian casualties.

Both issues were central to the event.

A comprehensive assessment must recognize the illegality of hostage-taking while also examining whether the military action complied with international humanitarian law.

The Political Impact Inside Israel

The rescue generated widespread relief and celebration in Israel.

Images of the four hostages returning home became prominent in the media.

The operation was presented by Israeli leaders as evidence that military and intelligence cooperation could achieve important results.

However, it also intensified the debate concerning the best way to secure the release of remaining captives.

Families continued demanding action.

Some argued that military pressure and rescue operations were necessary.

Others maintained that a negotiated agreement offered the best prospect of bringing larger numbers of hostages home alive.

The rescue demonstrated that military operations could succeed under particular circumstances.

It did not establish that similar operations would be possible for every remaining hostage.

The circumstances of captivity differed from person to person.

The political debate therefore continued.

The Impact on Palestinian Families in Nuseirat

For Palestinian families in Nuseirat, June 8 was marked by death, injury, and destruction.

Residents described losing relatives and witnessing severe damage to their surroundings.

Medical facilities struggled to treat the wounded.

The operation occurred after months of war that had already displaced large numbers of people and damaged essential infrastructure.

The civilian consequences were therefore compounded by existing humanitarian conditions.

For families who lost relatives, the recovery of Israeli hostages did not diminish their grief.

The event became another traumatic episode in the wider Gaza conflict.

A responsible historical account must recognize these experiences.

The suffering of Palestinian civilians is not incidental to understanding the operation.

It is part of the event itself.

The Intelligence Achievement

From an intelligence perspective, the Nuseirat rescue demonstrated that Israeli security institutions had succeeded in locating four hostages and supporting an operation that recovered them alive.

The mission required cooperation between organizations with different responsibilities.

It also demonstrated the importance of sufficiently reliable information concerning the captives' locations.

However, the public record does not establish every intelligence method used.

It is therefore not possible to independently assess the full technical or human intelligence contribution of each institution.

The successful recovery of the hostages is documented.

The precise intelligence process remains only partly public.

This distinction is important because intelligence achievements should be evaluated on the basis of evidence rather than speculation about classified capabilities.

The Operational and Strategic Limits

The rescue of four hostages was an important operational achievement.

However, its wider strategic significance was more complicated.

The mission did not end the hostage crisis.

Many captives remained in Gaza.

The war continued.

The operation also caused extensive Palestinian casualties and generated international criticism.

These consequences demonstrate the difference between achieving a specific operational objective and resolving a broader conflict.

A successful rescue may bring individuals home without changing the fundamental political and military conditions responsible for the crisis.

It may also influence negotiations, public opinion, and the calculations of the parties involved.

The long-term effects cannot be measured solely by the immediate success of the mission.

What the Operation Revealed About Modern Hostage Rescue

The Nuseirat mission illustrated several characteristics of hostage recovery during an active armed conflict.

Accurate intelligence was essential to identifying the captives' locations.

Cooperation between different security institutions contributed to the operation.

The presence of civilians in the surrounding area created serious risks.

Military action produced consequences extending beyond the immediate rescue.

And the successful return of hostages did not eliminate the need for legal and humanitarian scrutiny.

The operation also demonstrated the limitations of treating hostage rescue as a purely military problem.

Negotiations remained important for other captives.

The broader conflict continued to shape the options available to decision-makers.

The mission therefore became both an example of Israeli operational capability and a case study in the difficult legal and humanitarian questions surrounding military action in populated areas.

Four Lives Recovered, Many Questions Remaining

On June 8, 2024, Noa Argamani, Almog Meir Jan, Andrey Kozlov, and Shlomi Ziv returned to Israel after eight months of captivity.

Their rescue was a profound moment for their families and for a country still confronting the consequences of October 7.

The operation demonstrated the ability of Israeli intelligence, military, and police counterterrorism institutions to cooperate in a complex mission.

It also resulted in the death of Arnon Zamora, whose name became permanently associated with the rescue.

For Palestinians in Nuseirat, the same day brought extensive casualties, injuries, and destruction.

These realities cannot be reduced to a single narrative of military success or humanitarian tragedy.

Both occurred.

The central challenge for investigative journalism is to examine the operation in its entirety.

That means recognizing the unlawful hostage-taking that created the crisis, documenting the successful recovery of the four captives, and investigating the civilian harm caused during the military action.

It also means acknowledging the limits of publicly available evidence.

The complete operational record has not been disclosed, and some important questions remain unresolved.

Ultimately, the Nuseirat operation illustrates the extraordinary complexity of modern hostage rescue.

A mission can succeed in recovering captives while simultaneously producing consequences that demand serious legal, humanitarian, and political examination.

The next chapter returns to the beginning of the war and examines the intelligence and security failures that allowed the October 7 attacks to occur despite Israel's extensive surveillance capabilities and longstanding knowledge of Hamas.

Chapter 17 — October 7 and Israel's Intelligence Failures

How Hamas Breached One of the World's Most Advanced Security Systems

On the morning of October 7, 2023, Israel experienced the most devastating security failure in its history.

Hamas-led armed groups crossed from the Gaza Strip into southern Israel, overwhelming border defenses, attacking military installations, entering civilian communities, and carrying out mass killings and hostage-taking.

Approximately 1,200 people were killed in Israel, and 251 were taken hostage into Gaza.

The attacks exposed a profound contradiction.

Israel possessed sophisticated intelligence agencies, advanced surveillance systems, military intelligence units, aerial reconnaissance capabilities, and extensive experience monitoring Hamas.

Yet these institutions failed to prevent a large-scale assault that Hamas had prepared over an extended period.

The central question became unavoidable.

How could a country with such extensive intelligence and military capabilities fail to recognize, interpret, and respond to the threat?

Subsequent investigations and reporting revealed that the failure was not simply a lack of information.

Israeli security institutions had received warnings, observed concerning activities, and possessed documents describing elements of a possible Hamas attack.

The deeper problem involved how that information was assessed.

Warnings were discounted, assumptions about Hamas's intentions remained influential, and military preparations proved inadequate for the scale of the assault.

October 7 therefore became more than an intelligence failure.

It was a breakdown involving intelligence analysis, operational readiness, military command, political oversight, and the assumptions underlying Israel's Gaza security strategy.

Israel's Intelligence System Before October 7

Israel's national security establishment includes several intelligence institutions with different responsibilities.

Shin Bet, also known as the Israel Security Agency, is responsible for internal security and counterterrorism intelligence.

Aman, the IDF's Military Intelligence Directorate, provides intelligence assessments to military and political decision-makers.

Within Aman, Unit 8200 is associated with signals intelligence and other technological intelligence capabilities.

Mossad is primarily responsible for foreign intelligence and certain overseas operations.

These agencies operate within a broader security system that includes military commands, border surveillance units, air defense systems, and political authorities.

For decades, Israel had invested heavily in intelligence collection concerning Palestinian armed organizations.

Hamas was among its principal security priorities.

Israeli institutions monitored the organization's leadership, military capabilities, communications, and activities.

However, extensive intelligence collection does not automatically produce accurate threat assessments.

Information must be interpreted.

Different institutions must communicate effectively.

Decision-makers must remain willing to reconsider assumptions.

The events of October 7 demonstrated what can happen when these elements fail.

The Assumption That Hamas Wanted Stability

One of the most important factors preceding October 7 was an Israeli assessment that Hamas had strong incentives to avoid a major war.

In the years before the attack, Israeli policy toward Gaza combined military deterrence, border restrictions, economic measures, and indirect arrangements involving Hamas.

Israel allowed increasing numbers of Palestinians from Gaza to enter Israel for work under controlled conditions.

Qatari financial assistance also formed part of arrangements intended to support aspects of Gaza's economy and administration.

Periods of relative calm reinforced the perception that Hamas was primarily interested in preserving its control over Gaza.

Israeli officials understood that Hamas continued developing military capabilities.

However, many assessments treated a large-scale invasion of Israel as unlikely.

This distinction became crucial.

An organization may have the capability to conduct an attack without being assessed as intending to carry it out.

Israeli intelligence and security institutions underestimated the possibility that Hamas was preparing an operation fundamentally different from earlier rounds of fighting.

The assumption that Hamas was deterred became one of the central failures identified after October 7.

The Jericho Wall Document

One of the most significant revelations concerned an Israeli intelligence document known as Jericho Wall.

The document, reported publicly after October 7, described a Hamas attack plan involving a coordinated assault on Israeli border defenses and military positions.

The plan included elements resembling the operation eventually carried out.

These involved breaching the border, attacking military installations, and moving armed personnel into Israeli territory.

The document demonstrated that Israeli intelligence possessed information about a possible large-scale assault before October 7.

However, possessing a plan does not necessarily establish that an adversary intends to execute it at a particular time.

That distinction became central to the intelligence debate.

Israeli officials reportedly considered aspects of the plan beyond Hamas's practical capabilities.

The possibility that Hamas could successfully coordinate such an operation was underestimated.

After October 7, the similarities between the document and the actual attack generated intense scrutiny.

The issue was not merely why the document had been collected.

It was why the warning it contained had not led to adequate changes in military readiness.

Training Exercises That Resembled the Attack

In the period preceding October 7, Hamas conducted military training exercises in Gaza.

Some activities were visible and publicly documented.

Training included simulations of attacks on military positions and other scenarios involving Israeli targets.

After October 7, analysts examined the similarities between these exercises and the eventual assault.

The exercises raised questions about whether Hamas had been signaling elements of its operational plans.

However, armed organizations frequently conduct training exercises, and not every exercise indicates an imminent attack.

The challenge for intelligence agencies is distinguishing routine preparation from activity suggesting an actual decision to launch an operation.

In this case, Israeli assessments failed to recognize the significance of the combined indicators.

The training activities, the Jericho Wall document, and other warning information did not produce an adequate defensive response.

The failure illustrates the danger of evaluating each piece of intelligence in isolation rather than considering the cumulative picture.

The Warnings of Female Border Observers

Among the most disturbing revelations following October 7 were reports concerning warnings from female Israeli soldiers assigned to border observation duties.

These soldiers, often referred to as tatzpitaniyot, monitored activity near the Gaza border.

Their responsibilities included identifying unusual movements and reporting potential threats.

Before October 7, some observers reported concerning Hamas activity.

Public investigations and testimony described observations involving unusual training, activity near the border, and behavior that appeared inconsistent with established patterns.

Some soldiers and their families later said the warnings had not received sufficient attention.

The reports became an important part of the public debate concerning military hierarchy and institutional culture.

Why were observations from personnel directly monitoring the border not given greater weight?

Were warnings discounted because they contradicted higher-level assessments?

Did organizational culture discourage challenges to established assumptions?

These questions extended beyond the technical capabilities of surveillance systems.

They concerned whether institutions were willing to listen to the people collecting information.

Intelligence Collection Versus Intelligence Interpretation

The October 7 failure demonstrated an important distinction between collecting intelligence and understanding it.

Israel possessed extensive technological capabilities.

Surveillance systems monitored the Gaza border.

Military intelligence gathered information concerning Hamas's activities.

Documents and observations indicated possible threats.

However, the available information was not translated into an adequate understanding of Hamas's intentions.

Intelligence analysis involves interpreting incomplete evidence.

Analysts must assess what an adversary is capable of doing and what it is likely to do.

These judgments are vulnerable to cognitive bias.

When an institution becomes confident in a particular assessment, contradictory information may be discounted.

This phenomenon is sometimes described as confirmation bias.

In the Israeli case, the belief that Hamas was deterred influenced the interpretation of warning information.

The problem was not necessarily that analysts lacked intelligence.

It was that significant evidence failed to overturn the prevailing assessment.

The Failure of the Border Defense Concept

Israel's border with Gaza had been equipped with extensive security infrastructure.

This included barriers, surveillance equipment, observation systems, and remotely operated defensive capabilities.

The infrastructure was intended to detect and prevent unauthorized crossings and armed infiltration.

Israeli authorities invested heavily in these systems.

However, the October 7 assault demonstrated that technological defenses could be overwhelmed when attacked as part of a coordinated operation.

Hamas-led attackers breached the border at multiple locations.

Military positions and surveillance capabilities were attacked.

Israeli forces faced difficulties responding to the scale and speed of the assault.

The events exposed the danger of relying too heavily on technological barriers without sufficient preparation for a large-scale breach.

Physical defenses can contribute to security.

They cannot replace intelligence assessment, military readiness, and effective command arrangements.

The Early Hours of October 7

The assault began early on the morning of October 7, during the Jewish holiday of Simchat Torah.

Hamas launched a large rocket barrage toward Israel.

At the same time, armed attackers crossed the Gaza border.

They used multiple methods of entry and attacked Israeli military positions and civilian areas.

The speed and scale of the operation created widespread confusion.

Some military units were unable to respond effectively.

Communication between different locations and command structures was disrupted.

Civilians in communities near Gaza were left waiting for assistance while armed attackers moved through their neighborhoods.

Local security teams, police officers, soldiers, and civilians attempted to defend communities under extremely difficult circumstances.

The delayed response became one of the most painful aspects of the disaster.

For many survivors, the question was not only why the attack had not been prevented.

It was why military assistance took so long to arrive.

The Attacks on Military Installations

Hamas-led attackers targeted Israeli military installations near Gaza.

These attacks affected facilities and personnel responsible for border security.

The targeting of military positions contributed to the breakdown of the initial defensive response.

Some bases were overrun.

Soldiers were killed or captured.

Communication and command capabilities were disrupted.

The attacks demonstrated that Hamas had planned to challenge not only the physical border but also the military system responsible for defending it.

This was a significant departure from smaller infiltration attempts.

The operation was designed to create simultaneous crises across numerous locations.

Israeli forces struggled to establish a coherent picture of events during the early hours.

The result was a severe breakdown in defensive coordination.

The Attacks on Civilian Communities

The most devastating consequences of October 7 occurred in civilian communities.

Armed attackers entered kibbutzim, towns, and other locations near the Gaza border.

Residents were killed in their homes, on roads, and in public areas.

Others were taken hostage.

Communities including Be'eri, Kfar Aza, Nir Oz, and others suffered severe losses.

The attacks involved deliberate violence against civilians.

Such acts are prohibited under international humanitarian law.

The events also exposed the limitations of Israel's emergency response.

Some communities remained under attack for many hours before Israeli forces regained control.

Local security personnel and residents attempted to resist while waiting for reinforcements.

The delayed arrival of military assistance became a central subject of subsequent investigations.

For survivors and families, the failures were not abstract institutional problems.

They had immediate and devastating consequences.

The Nova Music Festival

The attack on the Nova music festival became one of the most internationally recognized atrocities of October 7.

Thousands of people had gathered near Re'im for an outdoor music event.

When the assault began, attendees attempted to escape.

Many were killed while fleeing or hiding.

Others were abducted into Gaza.

The attack generated extensive photographic and video evidence.

Survivor testimony documented the fear and confusion experienced during the assault.

The festival became a symbol of the civilian suffering caused by October 7.

It also raised questions about emergency communication and the speed of the security response.

The broader intelligence failure meant that civilian events near the Gaza border were not adequately protected against the scale of attack that occurred.

The Collapse of Situational Awareness

During the first hours of October 7, Israeli commanders struggled to establish an accurate understanding of the situation.

Reports of attacks emerged from numerous locations.

The scale of the assault exceeded expectations.

Communication difficulties complicated coordination.

Some military personnel did not initially understand how many attackers had crossed the border or how many communities were under attack.

This lack of situational awareness delayed an effective response.

Military command depends on reliable information.

When communication systems are disrupted and reports are incomplete, decision-making becomes more difficult.

However, the scale of the confusion also reflected inadequate preparation for the possibility of a coordinated multi-location attack.

The failure was therefore both operational and conceptual.

Israeli forces had not been sufficiently prepared for the type of assault Hamas conducted.

The Role of Shin Bet

Shin Bet had longstanding responsibility for counterterrorism intelligence concerning Hamas.

The agency possessed extensive experience investigating Palestinian armed organizations.

However, it failed to provide warning sufficient to prevent the October 7 assault.

In the aftermath, Shin Bet's leadership acknowledged serious failures.

Subsequent institutional investigations examined intelligence assessments, warning information, and decisions made before the attack.

The agency's responsibilities included understanding threats posed by Hamas.

Its failure to recognize the danger became one of the central issues in Israel's national security debate.

However, the available evidence does not support attributing the entire disaster to one intelligence institution.

The failure involved multiple agencies and levels of decision-making.

Aman and Military Intelligence

Aman, the IDF's Military Intelligence Directorate, also faced intense scrutiny.

Its responsibilities included assessing Hamas's military capabilities and intentions.

The Jericho Wall document and other warning information became central to questions about military intelligence performance.

The key issue was how information concerning a possible attack had been interpreted.

Israeli military intelligence had assessed that Hamas was unlikely to conduct an operation of the scale eventually seen on October 7.

That assessment proved catastrophically wrong.

The failure demonstrated the importance of distinguishing between an adversary's capabilities and its intentions.

It also raised questions about how intelligence assessments were communicated to senior military and political authorities.

Unit 8200 and the Limits of Technological Intelligence

Unit 8200 is one of Israel's most prominent intelligence units.

It is associated with signals intelligence and advanced technological capabilities.

The unit's reputation contributed to the wider perception that Israel possessed exceptional insight into the activities of its adversaries.

However, October 7 demonstrated that technological sophistication does not guarantee accurate strategic warning.

Information may be collected without being interpreted correctly.

Communications may be unavailable or incomplete.

An adversary may deliberately conceal intentions or exploit assumptions held by intelligence analysts.

The failure therefore cannot be understood solely through the performance of individual surveillance technologies.

It also involved the institutional processes through which information was analyzed and acted upon.

The Responsibility of Military Command

Military commanders were responsible for preparing forces to respond to threats.

The October 7 attacks exposed severe weaknesses in readiness and deployment.

Some units were unable to respond quickly.

Military installations were attacked.

Communities remained vulnerable for extended periods.

The defensive arrangements were not sufficient for the scale of the assault.

These failures raised questions about force deployment, command decisions, contingency planning, and the assumptions underlying border security.

Subsequent IDF investigations examined different aspects of the response.

However, individual investigations varied in scope, and their findings should not be treated as a complete account of every event.

The broader issue was whether military command had adequately prepared for a scenario that intelligence assessments considered unlikely.

Political Responsibility and National Security Policy

The intelligence failure also raised questions about Israel's political leadership.

Governments establish national security priorities and approve major strategic policies.

Before October 7, Israeli policy toward Gaza involved deterrence, containment, economic arrangements, and periodic military operations.

The approach was based partly on the belief that Hamas could be managed without a full-scale war.

The October 7 attacks demonstrated the failure of that assumption.

However, political responsibility and direct operational responsibility are not identical.

The precise information available to particular political leaders before the attack is an important subject for investigation.

It is also necessary to distinguish long-term policy decisions from specific intelligence warnings and immediate military command decisions.

A comprehensive assessment requires examining how these levels of responsibility interacted.

The Question of a State Commission of Inquiry

Following October 7, demands grew for an independent national investigation into the failures.

Families of victims, survivors, public figures, and other groups called for accountability.

Israel's institutions conducted internal investigations into aspects of the intelligence and military response.

However, internal reviews do not necessarily replace an independent examination of political and institutional responsibility.

A state commission of inquiry has been a central demand in the public debate.

Such an investigation could examine intelligence assessments, military readiness, government policy, and decision-making across institutions.

The question of who should investigate and how independently the inquiry should operate became politically contentious.

Accountability requires more than identifying mistakes.

It requires understanding why institutions failed and what changes are necessary to reduce the likelihood of recurrence.

The Failure to Challenge Established Assumptions

One of the most important lessons from October 7 concerns the danger of institutional certainty.

Israeli security agencies possessed extensive experience confronting Hamas.

That experience may have contributed to confidence in their understanding of the organization.

However, familiarity can create blind spots.

Analysts may become accustomed to established patterns.

Commanders may assume that an adversary will behave as it has in the past.

Political leaders may rely on assessments that reinforce existing policy.

When contradictory evidence emerges, institutions must be willing to reconsider their conclusions.

The October 7 attacks demonstrated the consequences of failing to do so.

The problem was not simply that Hamas concealed its plans.

It was that significant warning information did not produce the necessary reassessment.

Did Hamas Deliberately Exploit Israeli Assumptions?

Hamas's preparations suggested an awareness of Israel's military and intelligence capabilities.

The organization conducted training, developed military infrastructure, and prepared for a coordinated assault.

Its actions before October 7 also occurred during periods when Israeli authorities believed that Hamas had incentives to avoid a major conflict.

It is reasonable to examine whether Hamas deliberately exploited these assumptions.

However, the precise internal calculations of its leadership are not fully established through independently available evidence.

Some aspects of planning became clearer through captured documents, statements, and investigations.

Other details remain uncertain.

A responsible account should therefore distinguish between documented preparation and conclusions about the private intentions of individual leaders.

What is clear is that Hamas succeeded in achieving strategic surprise.

The consequences were devastating.

Intelligence Failure and the Wider War

The October 7 attacks triggered a major Israeli military campaign in Gaza.

Israel declared the destruction of Hamas's military and governing capabilities among its principal objectives.

The war resulted in extensive Palestinian casualties, displacement, and destruction.

The consequences of the intelligence failure therefore extended far beyond the initial attack.

Israeli civilians suffered mass killings, hostage-taking, and profound trauma.

Palestinian civilians subsequently experienced a devastating military campaign and humanitarian crisis.

The failure to prevent October 7 became one of the events that shaped the wider regional conflict.

Understanding the intelligence breakdown is therefore essential to understanding the war that followed.

What Could Have Been Different?

Retrospective analysis often creates the impression that warning signs were obvious.

After an attack, information that previously appeared ambiguous may seem unmistakable.

This is known as hindsight bias.

It is important not to assume that every warning necessarily established the exact timing or certainty of an attack.

However, the October 7 case involved more than isolated ambiguous information.

Israeli institutions possessed a detailed attack plan, received concerning observations, and monitored activities resembling elements of the eventual assault.

The failure to integrate these indicators into defensive planning requires serious examination.

Even if the precise timing had remained uncertain, greater preparedness might have reduced the scale of the disaster.

The central issue is not whether intelligence agencies could have predicted every detail.

It is whether the available evidence should have prompted a more cautious and prepared security posture.

The Human Cost of Institutional Failure

Intelligence failures are often discussed through organizational structures, assessments, and technical systems.

However, their consequences are human.

On October 7, families were killed in their homes.

Young people attending a music festival were murdered or abducted.

Soldiers and police officers died attempting to defend communities.

Hostages were taken into Gaza, where many experienced prolonged captivity and abuse.

Survivors were left with physical and psychological trauma.

The consequences extended to Palestinian civilians during the subsequent war.

The scale of suffering demonstrates why accountability matters.

Failures in intelligence and national security policy can produce consequences that extend across entire societies.

Rebuilding Trust in Israel's Security Institutions

October 7 severely damaged public confidence in Israel's security establishment.

For decades, many Israelis had regarded their intelligence agencies and military as highly capable institutions.

The attacks challenged that confidence.

Rebuilding trust requires more than technological improvements.

It requires institutional transparency, independent investigation, accountability, and changes in decision-making culture.

Intelligence agencies must be willing to challenge assumptions.

Military commanders must prepare for scenarios considered unlikely but potentially catastrophic.

Political leaders must understand the limitations of intelligence assessments.

The experiences of personnel at lower levels of the hierarchy must also receive appropriate attention.

The warnings reported by female border observers became an especially important example of this need.

The Lessons for Modern Intelligence Agencies

The October 7 failure carries lessons extending beyond Israel.

Advanced surveillance technology cannot replace critical analysis.

Large quantities of intelligence do not guarantee accurate assessments.

Organizational hierarchy can prevent important warnings from reaching decision-makers.

Political assumptions can influence security judgments.

And an adversary may exploit the expectations of a technologically superior opponent.

These lessons apply to intelligence institutions around the world.

The central challenge is not simply gathering more information.

It is building organizations capable of recognizing when their assumptions may be wrong.

A Failure That Changed Israel

October 7, 2023, marked a turning point in Israeli history.

The Hamas-led attacks caused mass casualties, hostage-taking, and profound national trauma.

They also exposed a breakdown in one of the country's most important security systems.

The failure involved intelligence collection and interpretation, military readiness, command coordination, and the strategic assumptions underlying Israeli policy toward Gaza.

No single institution can fully explain what happened.

The available evidence points to failures across multiple levels of responsibility.

The most important lesson is that technological superiority does not guarantee security.

A state may possess sophisticated intelligence systems and still fail to understand an adversary's intentions.

A military may maintain advanced defensive infrastructure and still be unprepared for a coordinated assault.

And institutions may possess warning information without recognizing its significance.

The challenge for Israel is therefore not merely to rebuild damaged defenses.

It is to confront the institutional assumptions and decisions that allowed the disaster to occur.

Only through credible investigation, accountability, and meaningful reform can the failures of October 7 be properly understood.

The next chapter examines one of the most contested dimensions of the subsequent war: civilian casualties, the use of human shields, and the legal obligations governing military operations against Hamas.

Chapter 18 — Civilian Casualties, Human Shields and International Law

Between Military Necessity, Civilian Protection and the Laws of War

Few aspects of the war between Israel and Hamas have generated as much international controversy as the deaths of civilians in Gaza.

Following the Hamas-led attacks of October 7, 2023, Israel launched a major military campaign aimed at dismantling Hamas's military and governing capabilities and securing the return of hostages.

The campaign involved airstrikes, ground operations, artillery, and extensive fighting in densely populated areas.

Palestinian civilians experienced devastating consequences.

Large numbers of people were killed or injured. Residential neighborhoods were destroyed, families were repeatedly displaced, and essential infrastructure suffered severe damage.

Israeli authorities maintained that Hamas's military infrastructure was embedded within Gaza's civilian environment and accused the organization of using civilians as human shields.

Hamas and other Palestinian armed groups were also accused of operating from civilian locations, constructing military tunnels beneath populated areas, and exposing civilians to danger.

These allegations became central to Israel's explanations of its military operations.

However, the presence of an armed organization within a densely populated territory does not remove the legal obligations governing attacks.

International humanitarian law requires all parties to distinguish between civilians and military objectives, take feasible precautions, and avoid disproportionate attacks.

The conduct of Hamas and the conduct of Israeli forces must therefore be examined separately.

The central question is not whether Hamas committed atrocities on October 7. The deliberate killing of civilians and hostage-taking were grave violations.

Nor is the question whether Israel faced a genuine security threat following those attacks.

The essential legal and humanitarian question is how military operations were conducted, what information was available to those making decisions, and whether the parties complied with their obligations under international law.

Understanding these issues requires moving beyond political slogans and examining the evidence, legal standards, and human consequences.

October 7: The Legal Starting Point

On October 7, 2023, Hamas-led armed groups crossed from Gaza into southern Israel.

The attackers assaulted military positions, civilian communities, and the Nova music festival.

Approximately 1,200 people were killed in Israel, and 251 were taken hostage.

The attacks included deliberate killings of civilians, hostage-taking, and other serious abuses.

These acts are prohibited under international humanitarian law.

The prohibition against deliberately targeting civilians applies to all parties involved in armed conflict.

Hostage-taking is also expressly prohibited.

The political objectives of an armed organization do not provide a legal justification for such conduct.

Hamas described the assault as part of its struggle against Israel.

However, historical grievances, territorial disputes, occupation, or claims of resistance do not authorize attacks on civilians.

The events of October 7 therefore constitute an essential part of the legal and historical background to the war.

At the same time, violations committed by Hamas do not release Israel from its own obligations under international humanitarian law.

The law does not operate through reciprocal permission to commit unlawful acts.

Each party remains responsible for its conduct.

Israel's Military Objectives After October 7

Following the attacks, Israel declared several major objectives.

These included dismantling Hamas's military capabilities, ending its ability to govern Gaza as an armed organization, and recovering the hostages.

Israeli authorities argued that Hamas's continued military presence represented an unacceptable threat to Israeli civilians.

The government maintained that military operations were necessary to prevent another attack resembling October 7.

These objectives formed the strategic foundation of the campaign.

However, a legitimate military or security objective does not automatically make every action taken in pursuit of it lawful.

International humanitarian law regulates how military force may be used.

It distinguishes between the purpose of a campaign and the legality of individual operations.

Even when a state is responding to an armed attack, its forces must comply with the rules governing civilian protection.

This distinction is essential.

The right to defend a population from armed attacks cannot be treated as unlimited permission to use force without regard to civilian consequences.

Gaza's Civilian Population and the Reality of Urban Warfare

The Gaza Strip is a small and densely populated territory.

Before the war, approximately 2.2 million Palestinians lived there.

Its population included large numbers of children, and many families lived in urban neighborhoods or refugee camps that had developed into densely populated residential areas.

Military operations in such an environment create serious risks.

Residential buildings may stand close to roads, schools, hospitals, and other civilian facilities.

Explosive weapons can cause harm beyond their intended point of impact.

Damage to water systems, electricity infrastructure, sanitation, and medical facilities can produce consequences extending far beyond the immediate fighting.

The destruction of housing also contributes to displacement.

During the war, many Palestinian families were forced to move repeatedly.

Some fled areas where fighting was occurring, only to face danger in other locations.

The humanitarian consequences cannot be understood solely through the number of people killed in individual attacks.

They also include injuries, disability, psychological trauma, loss of shelter, disruption of medical care, and the collapse of essential services.

These effects are central to assessing the wider conduct and consequences of the war.

Understanding the Civilian Casualty Figures

Casualty figures from Gaza became a major subject of international debate.

The Gaza Ministry of Health, operating within the territory's Hamas-led administrative system during the war, published figures concerning people killed and injured.

These figures were widely used by international organizations, humanitarian agencies, and news outlets, often with qualifications concerning verification.

Israeli authorities challenged aspects of the reporting, particularly the distinction between civilians and combatants.

An important limitation is that a total death toll does not, by itself, establish how many of those killed were civilians or members of armed organizations.

Likewise, a person's age or sex cannot automatically establish combatant status.

A child is generally protected as a civilian, and adults are not combatants merely because they are male.

Independent assessments require reliable information about individual circumstances.

The figures have also been affected by the destruction of medical facilities, difficulties identifying bodies, people reported missing beneath rubble, and interruptions to administrative systems.

These problems can create uncertainty in both directions.

Some deaths may not be immediately recorded, while incomplete or duplicated records may require correction.

Responsible reporting should therefore identify the source of casualty figures, the date to which they apply, and the limitations of available verification.

Disputes over precise totals should not obscure the extensively documented scale of civilian suffering.

Who Is Considered a Civilian?

International humanitarian law distinguishes between civilians and combatants or other persons who may lawfully be targeted under the applicable armed-conflict framework.

Civilians are protected against direct attack unless and for such time as they directly participate in hostilities.

In conflicts involving organized non-state armed groups, members with a continuous combat function may also be targetable under a widely used interpretation of the law, although aspects of the legal framework remain debated.

The distinction depends on a person's actual role and conduct.

Political opinions do not determine civilian status.

A Palestinian civilian does not become a lawful military target merely by supporting Hamas politically, expressing hostility toward Israel, or living in an area where Hamas operates.

Likewise, an Israeli civilian does not lose protection because of the policies of the Israeli government.

The same principle applies to relatives of fighters.

Family members are not lawful targets merely because they are related to a commander or member of an armed group.

These distinctions are essential to preventing the collective treatment of entire populations as military enemies.

What Is a Human Shield?

The term human shield has a specific meaning under international humanitarian law.

It refers to the use of civilians or other protected persons to shield military objectives, forces, or operations from attack.

The prohibition concerns conduct intended to exploit the protected status of those individuals.

For example, deliberately placing civilians near a military objective to deter an opposing force from attacking may constitute unlawful human shielding.

However, the mere presence of civilians near a military target does not automatically prove that they are being used as human shields.

Intent and circumstances matter.

In a densely populated territory, civilians and military personnel may be located near one another for several reasons.

An armed group's presence in a residential area may create serious legal concerns without every instance necessarily satisfying the specific definition of human shielding.

The distinction is important because the term is frequently used in political arguments without sufficient explanation.

A legal allegation requires evidence concerning what occurred and why.

Israel's Allegations Against Hamas

Israeli authorities have repeatedly accused Hamas of exploiting Gaza's civilian environment for military purposes.

The allegations include the use of underground tunnels beneath populated areas, the presence of military infrastructure near civilian buildings, and the operation of armed networks within residential neighborhoods.

Israeli authorities have also accused Hamas of using hospitals, schools, and other civilian facilities for military activities.

Some investigations and military disclosures have documented particular instances of military infrastructure in or near civilian areas.

However, the strength of publicly available evidence varies substantially between locations and incidents.

The existence of a tunnel in one area does not prove that every nearby building was used for military purposes.

Similarly, evidence concerning one hospital does not establish that all hospitals were used as military command centers.

Each allegation requires examination on its own merits.

The broader concern is nevertheless serious.

Armed groups have obligations to take feasible precautions to protect civilians under their control from the effects of attacks.

They must not use civilians to shield military objectives.

Violations of these obligations can increase the dangers faced by the population.

Hamas's Tunnel Network and Civilian Areas

Hamas developed an extensive underground military infrastructure in Gaza.

The network included tunnels used for movement, concealment, storage, and other military purposes.

Israeli authorities regarded the infrastructure as a major security threat.

Some tunnels were located beneath or near populated areas.

This created difficult military and humanitarian questions.

The presence of underground military infrastructure may make a location relevant to military operations.

However, it does not automatically transform every civilian structure above it into a lawful target.

The legal assessment depends on the particular military objective, the circumstances of the attack, and the expected harm to civilians.

Underground facilities can also complicate efforts to determine whether hostages or civilians are present.

Military action directed against tunnels may affect buildings and infrastructure above ground.

The tunnel network therefore became an important factor in the humanitarian consequences of the Gaza campaign.

Hospitals and Allegations of Military Use

Hospitals became among the most controversial locations in the war.

Israeli authorities accused Hamas of using certain medical facilities or nearby underground infrastructure for military purposes.

Al-Shifa Hospital in Gaza City became a prominent example.

Israeli forces conducted operations at the hospital and released material that they said demonstrated Hamas's military use of the site.

Publicly available evidence established the existence of underground structures and raised questions about activities at or near the facility.

However, some of Israel's more extensive initial claims concerning the scale and function of a Hamas command center beneath the hospital were not independently established to the degree asserted.

This distinction matters.

Hospitals enjoy special protection under international humanitarian law.

They may lose particular protections if they are used to commit acts harmful to the enemy outside their humanitarian function, subject to the applicable legal conditions.

Even in such circumstances, the protection of patients, medical personnel, and civilians remains relevant.

Warnings, precautions, and proportionality requirements cannot simply be disregarded.

The legal status of a hospital cannot be determined through political accusation alone.

It requires careful examination of the evidence and applicable law.

Schools, Shelters and Civilian Infrastructure

Schools and other civilian buildings were also affected by the war.

Some facilities had been converted into shelters for displaced families.

Israeli authorities stated that Hamas or other armed groups operated from certain buildings or nearby locations.

Palestinian witnesses and humanitarian organizations reported attacks affecting civilians sheltering in these facilities.

The legal assessment depends on the circumstances of each incident.

A school used solely for civilian purposes is protected against direct attack.

If a building is used in a manner that makes it an effective contribution to military action, it may become a military objective under the applicable rules.

However, the presence of civilians remains legally significant.

The expected incidental harm must be assessed, and feasible precautions must be taken.

A military claim that armed individuals were present does not automatically establish that an attack complied with all legal requirements.

Nor does the presence of civilian casualties alone establish every element of a legal violation.

Independent investigation is necessary.

The Principle of Distinction

The principle of distinction is one of the foundations of international humanitarian law.

Parties to an armed conflict must distinguish between civilians and combatants, and between civilian objects and military objectives.

Attacks may be directed only against lawful military objectives.

Deliberately attacking civilians is prohibited.

Indiscriminate attacks are also prohibited.

These rules apply regardless of the military capabilities or political objectives of the parties.

Hamas's deliberate attacks against Israeli civilians on October 7 violated these fundamental protections.

Israeli military operations in Gaza must be assessed according to the same principle of civilian protection.

The legal obligations do not depend on whether the opposing party respects them.

Distinction remains a requirement even when armed groups operate within populated areas.

The Principle of Proportionality

Proportionality is frequently misunderstood in public discussion.

Under international humanitarian law, proportionality does not mean that two opposing sides must suffer equal numbers of casualties.

It also does not mean that a military operation becomes unlawful merely because one side possesses greater military power.

The legal rule concerns particular attacks.

An attack is prohibited if the incidental civilian harm expected would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.

This is a forward-looking assessment based on information reasonably available to the decision-maker at the time.

The importance of a military objective is relevant, but it does not eliminate the requirement to consider civilian harm.

A senior commander may represent a significant military objective.

Nevertheless, an attack against that individual can still be unlawful if the expected incidental civilian harm would be excessive.

The final number of casualties may be important evidence during an investigation, but it does not automatically establish what was reasonably foreseeable beforehand.

This distinction is essential when examining controversial strikes in Gaza.

Feasible Precautions Before an Attack

International humanitarian law also requires feasible precautions in attack.

These include taking steps to verify that intended targets are military objectives and choosing methods or means of attack with a view to avoiding or minimizing civilian harm.

Effective advance warnings must be given when circumstances permit and when attacks may affect civilians.

However, warnings do not automatically make an attack lawful.

A civilian who remains in a warned area does not lose protection merely by failing or being unable to leave.

The ability of civilians to evacuate must also be considered realistically.

People may be elderly, injured, disabled, or responsible for children.

Routes may be unsafe.

Shelter may be unavailable.

Repeated displacement may leave families without meaningful alternatives.

The effectiveness of precautions therefore depends on actual circumstances rather than the existence of a warning alone.

Evacuation Orders and Displacement

Israeli authorities issued evacuation instructions during different stages of the Gaza campaign.

The stated purpose was to move civilians away from areas where military operations were expected.

However, the instructions affected large numbers of people.

Many families were displaced repeatedly.

Humanitarian organizations reported overcrowded shelters, inadequate sanitation, limited medical care, and shortages of essential supplies.

The legality of displacement depends on the circumstances.

International humanitarian law contains restrictions on the forcible transfer and evacuation of civilians, particularly in occupied territory.

Temporary evacuation may be permissible under specific conditions involving civilian safety or imperative military reasons, but relevant safeguards apply.

The broader legal status of Gaza and Israel's obligations have also been subjects of international legal analysis.

The fact that civilians were instructed to leave an area does not remove their protection if they remain.

Nor does it eliminate the need to ensure that displacement does not expose them to further foreseeable harm.

Human Shields Do Not Eliminate Civilian Protection

One of the most important legal principles in this debate is that the unlawful use of human shields does not release an attacking party from its obligations.

If an armed group deliberately uses civilians to protect a military objective, that conduct may violate international humanitarian law.

However, the civilians do not automatically become lawful targets.

The attacking force must still comply with the applicable rules of distinction, proportionality, and precautions.

The presence of human shields may complicate the assessment, but it does not create unrestricted permission to attack.

This is a central point often missing from public arguments.

A violation by Hamas does not legally excuse an unlawful attack by Israeli forces.

Likewise, unlawful conduct by Israeli forces would not justify Hamas's deliberate attacks against civilians.

International humanitarian law imposes obligations on each party independently.

The Question of Collective Punishment

Collective punishment is prohibited under international humanitarian law.

The prohibition concerns penalties imposed on people for acts they did not personally commit.

During the Gaza war, restrictions on essential supplies, destruction of infrastructure, and the consequences of military operations generated allegations of collective punishment.

Israeli authorities argued that restrictions and military measures were connected to security objectives and the campaign against Hamas.

Humanitarian organizations and legal experts questioned whether particular policies unlawfully punished Gaza's civilian population.

The legal assessment requires examining the measures involved, their purpose, their effects, and the applicable obligations.

It is important to distinguish between lawful security restrictions and measures that violate international humanitarian law.

The presence of Hamas in Gaza does not make the entire Palestinian population responsible for the organization's actions.

Civilian protection cannot depend on collective political affiliation.

Humanitarian Assistance and the Protection of Civilians

The war severely affected access to food, water, medicine, fuel, and other essential supplies.

Humanitarian organizations warned repeatedly about the deterioration of living conditions.

Israeli authorities maintained that they permitted or facilitated assistance through different mechanisms, while also imposing restrictions and inspections based on security concerns.

Aid organizations reported obstacles involving access, distribution, insecurity, damaged infrastructure, and administrative restrictions.

The legal framework governing humanitarian relief includes obligations concerning civilian survival and the facilitation of humanitarian assistance, subject to applicable conditions.

Starvation of civilians as a method of warfare is prohibited.

The use of deprivation to punish a civilian population is also prohibited.

The practical question is whether measures taken during the conflict complied with these obligations.

A complete assessment requires examining both official policies and their actual consequences.

Egypt, Rafah and the Border Question

Egypt's role in the humanitarian crisis became an important subject of debate.

The Rafah crossing connects Gaza with Egypt.

During the war, the crossing became central to discussions about humanitarian assistance, evacuations, and the movement of foreign nationals and injured Palestinians.

Egypt maintained restrictions on movement and expressed concerns about security and the possibility of permanent Palestinian displacement into its territory.

Israel also exercised significant control over other access routes and, during parts of the war, over the Palestinian side of the Rafah crossing.

The responsibilities of the different actors must be distinguished.

Egypt's border policies affected the movement of people and assistance.

However, those policies do not remove Israel's obligations under applicable international law.

Nor does the existence of restrictions at Rafah establish that Egypt alone caused the humanitarian crisis.

The situation involved decisions by multiple governments and authorities, ongoing hostilities, and the destruction of infrastructure.

A serious examination must consider these factors separately.

The Use of Civilian Casualty Figures in Political Narratives

Civilian casualty figures became central to competing political narratives.

Israeli officials emphasized Hamas's military activities within populated areas and questioned some casualty classifications.

Palestinian authorities and humanitarian organizations emphasized the scale of deaths, injuries, and destruction.

Political activists frequently used the figures to support broader claims about the war.

However, responsible journalism must distinguish between documented deaths, disputed classifications, and legal conclusions.

The number of people killed does not, by itself, establish whether genocide occurred.

Genocide is a specific international crime requiring proof of prohibited acts and the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a protected national, ethnical, racial, or religious group as such.

Likewise, an increase in Gaza's population over a particular historical period does not disprove genocide allegations.

Population trends alone cannot establish or negate the specific intent required by the Genocide Convention.

The relevant legal analysis concerns conduct, evidence, and intent.

The same care is necessary when examining allegations of war crimes or crimes against humanity.

Legal conclusions require more than slogans or selective statistics.

The International Criminal Court

The International Criminal Court became an important part of the international response to the war.

The ICC investigates and prosecutes individuals for crimes within its jurisdiction, subject to the requirements of the Rome Statute.

In November 2024, the Court issued arrest warrants for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and former Defense Minister Yoav Gallant.

The warrants concerned allegations of war crimes and crimes against humanity.

The Court also pursued allegations involving Hamas leaders, including responsibility for the October 7 attacks and hostage-related crimes.

The legal proceedings generated strong political reactions.

Israel rejected the Court's allegations and challenged its jurisdiction.

Supporters of the proceedings argued that international criminal accountability must apply regardless of the identity of the accused.

An arrest warrant is not a criminal conviction.

It reflects a judicial determination at a particular procedural stage, not a final finding of guilt.

The presumption of innocence and the right to contest allegations remain essential.

The International Court of Justice and Genocide Allegations

The International Court of Justice also became involved in proceedings concerning the Gaza war.

South Africa brought a case against Israel under the Genocide Convention.

The proceedings concerned allegations that Israel had violated obligations under the Convention.

Israel rejected the allegations and argued that its military campaign was directed against Hamas rather than the Palestinian population as such.

The Court issued provisional-measures orders requiring Israel to comply with specified obligations under the Convention and to address humanitarian concerns.

These orders were legally significant.

However, provisional measures do not constitute a final judgment that genocide has occurred.

The distinction between interim judicial orders and final findings is essential.

The proceedings also demonstrated the importance of legal definitions.

Genocide is not simply a synonym for large-scale civilian casualties or an especially destructive war.

It is a specific crime requiring proof of prohibited acts and the requisite intent.

The legal assessment must be based on evidence rather than political preference.

War Crimes, Crimes Against Humanity and Genocide

The terms war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide are sometimes used interchangeably in public debate.

Legally, they refer to different categories of international crimes.

War crimes involve serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in connection with an armed conflict.

Examples may include deliberately attacking civilians, hostage-taking, torture, and certain unlawful attacks.

Crimes against humanity involve specified acts committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against a civilian population, with the required knowledge.

Genocide involves specified prohibited acts committed with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a protected group as such.

These crimes have different legal elements.

An incident may raise questions under more than one category, but the elements of each must be established separately.

The seriousness of civilian suffering does not remove the need for precise legal analysis.

Accuracy is especially important when accusations concern crimes of exceptional gravity.

The Responsibility of Commanders and Political Leaders

International criminal law recognizes that responsibility may extend beyond the individuals who physically carry out unlawful acts.

Military commanders and other superiors may incur responsibility under applicable legal standards when they fail to prevent or repress crimes committed by subordinates or fail to take necessary measures within their authority.

Political leaders may also bear individual criminal responsibility when the relevant legal elements are established.

However, responsibility is not automatic.

Holding a senior position does not, by itself, prove guilt for every act committed by an organization or military force.

Investigations must examine authority, knowledge, conduct, and the applicable legal requirements.

This principle applies to Hamas leaders and Israeli officials alike.

Accountability must be based on evidence concerning individual responsibility.

The Importance of Independent Investigations

Many incidents during the Gaza war remain disputed.

Israeli authorities have provided explanations for particular strikes.

Palestinian witnesses, medical personnel, and humanitarian organizations have reported different experiences and consequences.

International investigators have examined some incidents, while others remain difficult to reconstruct.

Independent investigations are essential because official accounts may be incomplete.

Military institutions may possess classified information unavailable to outside observers.

Witnesses may have direct knowledge of particular events but not of the wider military decision-making process.

Photographs and videos may establish important facts without revealing the full circumstances.

Reliable investigations require the comparison of different forms of evidence.

They also require transparency concerning uncertainty.

Where facts cannot be established, responsible reporting should say so.

The Danger of Dehumanization

The debate over civilian casualties has frequently been shaped by emotionally charged language.

Israeli victims of October 7 have sometimes been minimized or treated as symbols rather than individuals.

Palestinian civilians in Gaza have likewise been portrayed in ways that obscure their individual lives and suffering.

Such narratives can contribute to dehumanization.

The legal protections afforded to civilians do not depend on nationality, religion, political opinion, or public sympathy.

An Israeli child killed on October 7 was a civilian entitled to protection.

A Palestinian child killed during military operations in Gaza was also a civilian entitled to protection.

Recognizing one does not diminish the other.

The purpose of international humanitarian law is not to establish which population deserves greater sympathy.

It is to limit suffering during armed conflict.

Military Necessity and Its Limits

Military necessity is an important concept in the law of armed conflict.

It recognizes that parties may undertake measures necessary to achieve legitimate military objectives, subject to the applicable legal restrictions.

However, military necessity is not an unlimited justification.

It does not permit deliberate attacks against civilians.

It does not authorize torture or hostage-taking.

It does not remove proportionality and precaution requirements.

The existence of a genuine military threat therefore cannot settle the legality of every response.

Likewise, civilian suffering does not automatically establish that a particular military objective was illegitimate.

The analysis must consider both the objective and the means used.

This distinction is essential to understanding the legal controversies surrounding Israel's campaign against Hamas.

The Long-Term Consequences for Civilians

The consequences of the Gaza war extend beyond immediate casualty figures.

Families lost relatives, homes, livelihoods, and access to essential services.

Children experienced displacement, interruption of education, and psychological trauma.

Medical facilities struggled to provide treatment.

The destruction of housing and infrastructure created long-term reconstruction challenges.

Israeli communities affected by October 7 also faced enduring consequences.

Survivors experienced trauma, families mourned those killed, and former hostages confronted the effects of captivity.

These experiences are different, but they demonstrate the human consequences of prolonged violence.

The protection of civilians must therefore be understood as more than the prevention of immediate deaths.

It also concerns the conditions necessary for human survival, dignity, and recovery.

Can Civilian Protection and Military Objectives Coexist?

The central challenge of international humanitarian law is that it regulates warfare rather than assuming warfare can always be avoided.

It recognizes that military operations may occur while imposing limits intended to protect people who are not participating in hostilities.

This framework requires difficult decisions.

Military commanders may confront genuine threats in populated areas.

Armed groups may operate within civilian environments.

Intelligence may be incomplete.

However, these difficulties do not eliminate legal obligations.

The law requires parties to take civilian protection seriously even when doing so complicates military operations.

The presence of Hamas within Gaza's civilian environment is relevant to understanding the challenges faced by Israeli forces.

It does not automatically establish that every Israeli attack was lawful.

Similarly, the scale of civilian suffering does not remove the need to examine the facts of particular incidents before reaching legal conclusions.

Beyond Political Narratives

The debate over civilian casualties, human shields, and international law has often been reduced to opposing political narratives.

One narrative emphasizes Hamas's use of civilian areas and Israel's security needs.

Another emphasizes the devastation in Gaza and allegations of unlawful Israeli conduct.

Both address important aspects of the conflict.

Neither should replace a careful examination of evidence.

Hamas's deliberate attacks on civilians and hostage-taking require accountability.

Allegations concerning its use of civilian infrastructure and human shielding require investigation.

Israeli military operations must be examined for compliance with the rules of distinction, proportionality, and precautions.

The deaths and injuries of Palestinian civilians require documentation and scrutiny.

International legal proceedings must be described accurately, including the difference between allegations, provisional measures, arrest warrants, and final judgments.

These principles are not expressions of political neutrality toward atrocities.

They are requirements of credible journalism.

The Law Must Apply to Everyone

The war between Israel and Hamas has exposed profound disagreements about military necessity, civilian protection, and international accountability.

The attacks of October 7 demonstrated the devastating consequences of deliberate violence against civilians.

The subsequent war in Gaza demonstrated the enormous humanitarian consequences of sustained military operations in a densely populated territory.

The allegations concerning human shields, the use of civilian infrastructure, disproportionate attacks, and restrictions on humanitarian assistance require careful investigation.

International humanitarian law provides the framework for examining these issues.

Its central principle is that civilians remain protected regardless of the identity or conduct of the opposing party.

Hamas cannot justify deliberate attacks against Israeli civilians through political grievances or claims of resistance.

Israel cannot disregard civilian protection obligations because Hamas has committed serious violations.

The responsibility of each party must be assessed independently.

Ultimately, the purpose of international humanitarian law is not to determine which side has suffered more or which political narrative is more persuasive.

It is to establish limits on the conduct of war and protect people who are not participating in hostilities.

For investigative journalism, this requires consistency.

The same legal standards must be applied to all parties.

The same care must be taken with evidence.

And the same recognition of human dignity must extend to Israeli and Palestinian civilians.

Only through that approach can the discussion move beyond accusation and counteraccusation toward a serious understanding of responsibility, accountability, and the human cost of the conflict.

The next chapter examines another dimension of the war: the struggle over information, public perception, propaganda, and psychological pressure.

It will explore how Hamas, Israel, political actors, and digital media platforms have shaped competing narratives, and how journalists can distinguish verified information from manipulation.

Chapter 19 — The Psychological and Information War

How Hamas, Israel and the Global Media Battle to Control the Narrative

Modern warfare is fought not only with weapons, soldiers, and intelligence operations.

It is also fought through information.

Images, videos, political statements, social media posts, eyewitness accounts, and carefully constructed narratives can influence how a conflict is understood far beyond the battlefield.

The war between Israel and Hamas following October 7, 2023, demonstrated the extraordinary power of information in modern conflict.

Within hours of the Hamas-led attacks on southern Israel, photographs and videos began circulating internationally.

Some documented the killings of civilians, the destruction of communities, and the abduction of hostages.

Others were published by the attackers themselves.

As Israel launched its military campaign in Gaza, images of destroyed neighborhoods, injured civilians, overwhelmed hospitals, and displaced families became central to international coverage.

The result was an intense struggle over public perception.

Hamas sought to present its actions within a narrative of Palestinian resistance while using hostage-related communications and other material to influence Israeli society and international audiences.

Israel sought to demonstrate the threat posed by Hamas, justify its military campaign, and defend its actions against growing international criticism.

Governments, political movements, activists, journalists, and social media users became participants in the wider information environment.

Not every misleading claim was part of an organized propaganda campaign.

Some emerged from confusion, incomplete evidence, emotional reactions, or the speed of online reporting.

Others involved deliberate manipulation.

The challenge for journalism is to distinguish between these different phenomena.

The central question is not simply which side communicates more effectively.

It is how information can be verified when almost every significant event becomes part of a political and psychological struggle.

What Is Psychological Warfare?

Psychological warfare involves attempts to influence the perceptions, emotions, attitudes, or behavior of an adversary or a wider audience.

Its objectives may include undermining morale, creating uncertainty, increasing political pressure, or encouraging particular decisions.

Psychological operations are not new.

Throughout history, governments and armed organizations have used messages, rumors, symbolic actions, and public displays to influence opponents.

Modern technology has expanded the scale and speed of these efforts.

A video recorded in a conflict zone can reach millions of viewers within minutes.

A political statement can be translated, shared, and interpreted across different countries almost immediately.

A false claim may spread widely before journalists have time to verify it.

Psychological warfare is therefore closely connected to information warfare, although the two concepts are not identical.

Information warfare concerns the use, protection, disruption, or manipulation of information to achieve strategic objectives.

Psychological warfare focuses more specifically on influencing human perceptions and behavior.

Both have played important roles in the Israel-Hamas conflict.

October 7: Violence and Its Digital Representation

The Hamas-led attacks of October 7 were accompanied by extensive visual documentation.

Some attackers recorded their activities using body cameras, mobile telephones, and other devices.

Videos showed armed infiltrations, attacks, and the taking of hostages.

Other recordings were produced by victims, witnesses, surveillance cameras, and emergency responders.

The material became an important source of evidence.

It also became part of the information war.

Some footage published by attackers appeared intended to demonstrate military success, intimidate Israeli audiences, or promote the assault among supporters.

The publication of violent imagery can serve psychological objectives beyond documenting events.

It can create fear.

It can humiliate an adversary.

It can encourage supporters.

It can also provoke reactions that the perpetrators hope will serve their broader political objectives.

However, the existence of such footage does not mean that every recording from October 7 was propaganda.

Much of the material has also been essential to documenting atrocities, identifying victims, and reconstructing the events.

Journalists must distinguish between the original purpose of a recording and its evidentiary value.

The Psychological Impact of the Hostage Crisis

The abduction of 251 people into Gaza created an enduring psychological crisis for Israeli society.

The captives included civilians, soldiers, children, elderly people, and foreign nationals.

Families faced prolonged uncertainty about their relatives' conditions and whereabouts.

Hamas and other armed groups released selected photographs, recordings, and videos of captives during the war.

Some showed hostages speaking directly to the camera.

Others included appeals concerning ceasefires, prisoner exchanges, or the actions of Israeli authorities.

Such material must be approached with particular caution.

A person speaking while held hostage is not in a position to communicate freely.

Statements may be influenced by coercion, fear, instructions from captors, or concern for personal survival.

Journalists should therefore avoid treating hostage videos as ordinary voluntary interviews.

Their publication may serve the captors' political or psychological objectives.

At the same time, families may regard such recordings as evidence that their relatives were alive at the time.

This creates a painful dilemma.

The same video may provide desperately needed information while also functioning as an instrument of coercion.

Hostages as Instruments of Political Pressure

Hostage-taking is prohibited under international humanitarian law.

The use of captives to pressure governments or other parties is central to the legal concept of hostage-taking.

During the Gaza war, the fate of the hostages became an important factor in negotiations involving Israel, Hamas, Qatar, Egypt, and the United States.

Public statements concerning possible releases, ceasefire arrangements, and prisoner exchanges influenced political debate.

Families of hostages organized demonstrations and demanded action.

Israeli leaders faced pressure to balance military objectives with efforts to secure the captives' return.

Hamas's control over the hostages gave it leverage in negotiations.

The organization also used public messaging to influence perceptions of responsibility for their continued captivity.

However, the legal responsibility for unlawfully taking and holding hostages remains with the captors.

Disagreements over military strategy or negotiations do not remove that responsibility.

The psychological effects extended far beyond the individuals held captive.

Entire families and communities lived with uncertainty, fear, and repeated disappointment.

Israel's Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication

Israel also developed extensive communication efforts during the war.

Government ministries, military spokespersons, diplomatic representatives, and official social media accounts published material intended to explain the October 7 attacks and Israel's military response.

These communications included footage of the attacks, statements about Hamas's military infrastructure, information concerning hostages, and explanations of Israeli operations.

Israel sought to maintain international support and counter accusations concerning its conduct in Gaza.

Official military communications also emphasized alleged Hamas activity within civilian environments.

Some statements were supported by independently verifiable evidence.

Others relied on intelligence that was not publicly disclosed.

This created difficulties for journalists.

A government may possess legitimate security reasons for withholding intelligence sources.

However, undisclosed information cannot automatically be treated as independently established fact.

Official statements are important sources of information, but they remain claims that require evaluation.

The same standard should apply to statements from all parties involved in the conflict.

Hamas's Political Messaging

Hamas has maintained political and media structures that communicate its positions to Palestinian, regional, and international audiences.

Its statements have emphasized themes including Palestinian national aspirations, opposition to Israeli policies, armed resistance, and the consequences of Israeli military operations.

Following October 7, Hamas sought to frame the conflict within these broader political narratives.

The organization also used communications concerning hostages, military operations, and ceasefire negotiations.

Its military wing, the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades, published selected material concerning armed activities.

These communications served several audiences.

Palestinian supporters were one audience.

Israeli society and political leaders were another.

Regional governments, international media, and foreign publics were also important.

The content and framing of messages could vary depending on the intended audience.

However, public messaging by an armed organization should not be confused with independent evidence.

Statements concerning battlefield events, casualties, or military outcomes require verification.

The same applies to claims made by opposing military authorities.

The Battle Over Civilian Casualties

Civilian casualties in Gaza became one of the most influential subjects in the information war.

Images of injured children, destroyed homes, and overwhelmed medical facilities circulated widely.

These images documented genuine humanitarian suffering.

They also became central to political arguments concerning the legality and morality of Israel's military campaign.

Israeli authorities emphasized Hamas's military infrastructure within civilian areas and questioned some casualty classifications.

Palestinian authorities and humanitarian organizations emphasized the scale of deaths, injuries, and destruction.

The resulting debate frequently blurred several different questions.

How many people had been killed?

How many were civilians?

Who was responsible for a particular incident?

Was a specific attack lawful?

Did a broader pattern of conduct amount to an international crime?

These questions require different forms of evidence.

A casualty figure does not automatically establish the legality of a military operation.

Likewise, a military explanation does not eliminate the need to investigate civilian deaths.

The information war often encouraged audiences to treat complex legal and factual questions as simple political choices.

Independent journalism must resist that pressure.

The Hospital Explosion of October 17, 2023

One of the most prominent examples of conflicting information occurred following an explosion at Al-Ahli Arab Hospital in Gaza City on October 17, 2023.

Initial reports attributed the explosion to an Israeli airstrike.

Palestinian authorities reported a large number of deaths.

Israel denied responsibility and stated that the explosion resulted from a failed rocket launch by Palestinian militants.

Subsequent investigations by several independent organizations and intelligence assessments questioned the initial attribution to an Israeli airstrike.

However, not all investigations reached identical conclusions about the precise cause, and some findings remained limited by the available evidence.

The incident demonstrated how rapidly unverified information can influence international opinion.

Political leaders and media organizations reacted while essential facts remained uncertain.

The consequences extended beyond the immediate event.

The explosion became a major subject of diplomatic controversy and public demonstrations.

It also illustrated why early casualty estimates and claims concerning responsibility must be reported with explicit attribution and appropriate caution.

The Speed of Social Media

Social media platforms transformed the way information about the conflict reached the public.

Unlike traditional journalism, online content does not necessarily pass through editorial verification before publication.

Videos, photographs, and statements can circulate globally within seconds.

Users may share material because it confirms existing beliefs, produces strong emotional reactions, or appears to offer immediate evidence.

The speed of distribution creates particular difficulties during armed conflict.

A video may be genuine but presented with an incorrect location.

A photograph may come from an earlier conflict.

A statement may be quoted without context.

A translated caption may distort the original meaning.

Even after a false claim is corrected, the original version may continue circulating.

The information environment therefore rewards speed and emotional impact, while accurate verification often requires time.

Old Images Presented as New Evidence

One recurring form of misinformation involves authentic images used in misleading contexts.

A photograph from an earlier conflict may be presented as evidence of a recent attack.

Footage from another country may be attributed to Gaza or Israel.

Images of military activity may be shared without reliable information concerning when or where they were recorded.

This form of misinformation can be particularly effective because the image itself may not be digitally altered.

The deception lies in its description.

Journalists therefore need to examine the provenance of visual material.

Relevant questions include when the image first appeared, whether its location can be established, and whether independent sources support the accompanying claim.

A visually convincing post is not necessarily an accurate account of an event.

Artificial Intelligence and Synthetic Media

Artificial intelligence has created additional challenges for conflict reporting.

Generative systems can produce realistic images, audio, and video that depict events that never occurred.

Such material can be used to create emotional narratives or support false claims.

AI-generated images associated with the Israel-Hamas conflict have circulated online.

Some were presented as illustrations or symbolic material.

Others were shared in ways that could mislead viewers into believing they depicted real events.

The distinction matters.

An illustration may be legitimate when clearly identified as such.

Presenting a synthetic image as documentary evidence is misleading.

Journalists must also avoid assuming that unusual visual details automatically prove that an image is AI-generated.

Authentic photographs can contain distortions caused by compression, motion, lighting, or camera limitations.

Verification requires more than visual suspicion.

It requires examining provenance, context, and corroborating evidence.

Algorithms and Emotional Engagement

Social media platforms use recommendation systems that influence which content users encounter.

The details vary between platforms, but engagement is an important factor in the distribution of many forms of content.

Posts generating strong emotional reactions may receive extensive attention.

During the Israel-Hamas war, highly disturbing images and strongly worded political claims often circulated widely.

This does not necessarily mean that platforms deliberately favored one political position.

However, systems designed to maximize engagement can contribute to the spread of polarizing content.

Users may encounter repeated material reinforcing their existing beliefs.

Contradictory evidence may receive less attention.

Over time, this can create distorted perceptions of what is happening.

The problem is not limited to false information.

Authentic events can also be presented selectively, producing misleading impressions through omission.

Selective Reporting and the Problem of Context

Not all misleading coverage involves fabricated facts.

A report may contain accurate information while omitting context necessary for understanding it.

For example, an account of an Israeli military strike may describe civilian casualties without explaining the stated military objective or the available evidence concerning it.

Conversely, an account emphasizing the killing of a Hamas commander may fail to describe civilian casualties or unresolved legal questions.

Both approaches can leave audiences with an incomplete understanding.

Context does not mean excusing unlawful conduct.

Explaining the circumstances of an attack is not the same as justifying it.

Likewise, documenting civilian suffering does not require accepting every political allegation concerning responsibility.

The purpose of context is to allow readers to understand the evidence more fully.

Independent journalism must therefore examine not only what is reported, but also what is omitted.

The Role of International News Organizations

Major international news organizations played an important role in documenting the war.

Their reporting included investigations into October 7, hostage-taking, military operations, civilian casualties, humanitarian conditions, and international legal proceedings.

However, reporting from Gaza involved substantial difficulties.

Access was restricted.

Communications were frequently disrupted.

Journalists faced serious security risks.

Foreign reporters generally could not enter Gaza independently during much of the war, while Palestinian journalists working inside the territory faced extreme danger.

These conditions complicated verification.

News organizations often relied on local journalists, medical personnel, witnesses, humanitarian organizations, and official statements.

Each source had strengths and limitations.

Responsible reporting required clear attribution and careful evaluation.

Errors and corrections were inevitable in such a difficult environment, but transparency about them remained essential.

Journalists as Targets of Pressure and Intimidation

Journalists covering the conflict faced political pressure, harassment, threats, and accusations of bias.

Some were criticized for questioning Israeli military claims.

Others were criticized for investigating Hamas's conduct or documenting the October 7 atrocities.

Palestinian journalists in Gaza faced exceptional physical danger amid the fighting.

The deaths of journalists and media workers raised serious concerns about the protection of the press.

International humanitarian law protects civilian journalists unless and for such time as they directly participate in hostilities.

Their professional activities do not make them lawful targets.

Independent journalism depends on the ability to investigate events without intimidation.

When reporters face threats or are unable to access evidence, the public's ability to understand a conflict is weakened.

The Information War in Europe

The effects of the conflict extended into European societies.

Demonstrations, political debates, university protests, and online campaigns reflected strong disagreements about Israel, Hamas, Palestinian rights, and the war in Gaza.

Many demonstrations were peaceful expressions of political opinion.

Others involved confrontations, intimidation, or incidents that raised public-order concerns.

The distinction is important.

Criticism of the Israeli government or support for Palestinian self-determination is not inherently antisemitic.

Likewise, concern for Israeli civilians or condemnation of Hamas does not automatically imply hostility toward Palestinians.

However, antisemitic incidents increased in several European countries following October 7.

Jewish communities reported harassment, threats, and fear.

Anti-Muslim hatred and discrimination also became serious concerns.

The information war contributed to an atmosphere in which political anger could be redirected toward people who had no responsibility for the actions of governments or armed organizations.

This was one of the most damaging consequences of the conflict's international polarization.

Antisemitism and the Distortion of Political Debate

Antisemitism has a long history in Europe.

The Holocaust demonstrated the catastrophic consequences of systematic hatred against Jews.

Following October 7, Jewish communities in several countries reported increased insecurity.

Some incidents involved threats against synagogues, Jewish schools, or individuals identified as Jewish.

Others involved conspiracy theories or the collective blaming of Jews for Israeli government policies.

Such conduct must be distinguished from legitimate political criticism.

A person may criticize Israeli military operations, government decisions, or settlement policies without expressing antisemitism.

However, holding Jewish people collectively responsible for Israel's actions crosses an important line.

The same principle applies to other communities.

Palestinians and Muslims must not be treated as collectively responsible for Hamas's actions.

The information war becomes especially dangerous when political identities are transformed into collective accusations against entire populations.

The Influence of Activism on Public Narratives

Activist movements have played a significant role in shaping public discussion of the conflict.

Pro-Israel groups have emphasized the October 7 attacks, the hostage crisis, antisemitism, and Israel's security concerns.

Pro-Palestinian groups have emphasized civilian casualties, displacement, Palestinian rights, and allegations concerning Israeli military conduct.

Both movements have influenced public debate.

Activism is not inherently incompatible with factual accuracy.

However, advocacy and journalism have different responsibilities.

An activist may seek to persuade an audience toward a particular political outcome.

A journalist must establish what the evidence supports, including facts that complicate a preferred interpretation.

The distinction becomes particularly important when emotionally powerful claims circulate without sufficient verification.

Propaganda and the Problem of Dehumanization

One of the most dangerous effects of propaganda is the dehumanization of an opposing population.

Language that treats entire communities as collectively guilty can reduce public concern for civilian suffering.

During the conflict, some narratives portrayed all Palestinians as supporters of Hamas.

Others portrayed all Israelis as responsible for the actions of their government or military.

Both approaches are misleading and dangerous.

Palestinian civilians are not automatically members of Hamas.

Israeli civilians are not automatically responsible for government policy.

Children cannot be assigned collective guilt based on nationality, religion, or place of birth.

Dehumanization makes it easier to dismiss suffering and justify violence.

Responsible journalism must challenge such narratives regardless of their source.

Psychological Pressure on Israeli Society

The war created sustained psychological pressure within Israel.

The October 7 attacks damaged public confidence in national security institutions.

The hostage crisis generated prolonged uncertainty.

Rocket attacks, military mobilization, displacement from border communities, and continuing security threats affected daily life.

Public disagreements concerning the government's military strategy and hostage negotiations intensified.

Hamas's communications concerning captives formed part of this environment.

However, Israeli political debate also reflected genuine differences among citizens and families.

It would be inaccurate to describe every protest or criticism of government policy as the result of enemy psychological warfare.

Democratic societies naturally contain disagreement.

The challenge is distinguishing legitimate public debate from deliberate manipulation.

Psychological Pressure on Palestinian Society

Palestinian civilians in Gaza also experienced extraordinary psychological pressure.

The war involved repeated displacement, destruction of homes, loss of relatives, and uncertainty concerning personal safety.

Many families lived under conditions of severe humanitarian deprivation.

The continuous circulation of images and reports of violence contributed to fear and distress.

Palestinian society was also affected by Hamas's political and military decisions, the actions of Israeli forces, and the broader collapse of normal civilian life.

The psychological consequences extended to children and families who had experienced repeated trauma.

These experiences should not be reduced to political messaging.

They represent genuine human suffering.

The existence of propaganda does not make every image of suffering false.

Nor does the reality of suffering establish the accuracy of every claim attached to it.

The Role of Foreign Governments

The information environment surrounding the war extended beyond Israel and Hamas.

Foreign governments issued statements, conducted diplomatic campaigns, and sought to influence international responses.

The United States supported Israel's security while expressing concerns about aspects of the Gaza campaign.

Iran publicly supported Hamas and other armed organizations opposed to Israel.

European governments adopted different positions concerning ceasefires, hostage negotiations, humanitarian assistance, and international legal proceedings.

Regional governments also sought to influence the diplomatic environment.

These communications were part of international politics.

However, government statements must be evaluated as political positions rather than automatically accepted as independent evidence.

The interests of states can shape how they describe events.

This makes independent verification particularly important.

How Misinformation Can Affect Military and Political Decisions

False or misleading information can have consequences beyond public opinion.

It may influence diplomatic discussions.

It can increase tensions between communities.

It may create pressure for rapid political decisions.

In some circumstances, inaccurate reports can contribute to escalation.

The speed of online communication makes these risks more serious.

Governments may feel compelled to respond before evidence has been fully examined.

News organizations may face pressure to publish immediately.

Audiences may interpret caution as political bias.

However, uncertainty is not evidence of dishonesty.

Acknowledging what is not yet known is often the most responsible form of reporting.

Verification as a Journalistic Responsibility

Investigative journalism requires a disciplined approach to evidence.

When examining a claim, journalists should identify its original source.

They should determine whether the material is authentic and whether it has been presented in the correct context.

They should seek independent corroboration where possible.

Official statements should be distinguished from verified findings.

Witness testimony should be treated seriously while recognizing that individual witnesses may not possess a complete understanding of events.

Casualty figures should be attributed to their sources and accompanied by relevant limitations.

Legal allegations should be distinguished from judicial findings.

These practices are especially important in conflicts where misinformation can spread rapidly.

Accuracy does not require false equivalence between claims supported by strong evidence and claims lacking credible support.

It requires evaluating each claim according to the quality of the evidence.

The Difference Between Balance and False Equivalence

Journalists are often encouraged to present different perspectives.

However, presenting perspectives does not mean treating every assertion as equally credible.

A verified video of an attack does not have the same evidentiary status as an unsupported denial.

A documented civilian death does not become uncertain merely because a political actor disputes the wider narrative.

Likewise, an allegation concerning military conduct should not automatically be presented as an established legal violation without sufficient evidence.

The responsibility of journalism is to assess the strength of claims.

When evidence clearly supports a conclusion, reporting should say so.

When evidence remains incomplete, uncertainty should be acknowledged.

Fairness requires consistency in standards, not artificial symmetry.

The Future of Information Warfare

The Israel-Hamas conflict demonstrated how rapidly the information environment is changing.

Artificial intelligence, social media algorithms, encrypted communications, and increasingly sophisticated digital manipulation will continue shaping future conflicts.

Military organizations and governments are likely to invest further in strategic communication and information operations.

Armed groups may also continue using online platforms to influence supporters and adversaries.

For journalists, these developments create new responsibilities.

Verification methods must evolve.

Audiences need clearer explanations of how evidence is assessed.

News organizations must remain transparent about uncertainty and corrections.

The ability to distinguish authentic evidence from manipulation will become increasingly important.

Beyond the Narrative

The war between Israel and Hamas has been accompanied by an intense struggle over information.

Hamas has used political messaging, military communications, and hostage-related material to influence audiences.

Israel has used official statements, military briefings, and public diplomacy to explain its actions and defend its security objectives.

International media, activists, foreign governments, and social media platforms have shaped how the conflict is understood around the world.

Some information has been accurate and essential.

Other material has been misleading, incomplete, or deliberately manipulated.

The consequences extend beyond political debate.

Misinformation can increase fear, deepen polarization, encourage hatred, and undermine confidence in credible reporting.

The greatest danger arises when audiences stop distinguishing between verified facts and emotionally persuasive narratives.

For independent journalism, the responsibility is clear.

The killings and hostage-taking of October 7 must be documented accurately.

The suffering of Palestinian civilians in Gaza must also be documented accurately.

Claims made by Hamas, Israeli authorities, foreign governments, and political movements must be examined according to the same evidentiary standards.

Journalists must distinguish criticism of governments from hatred directed toward entire populations.

They must resist pressure to adopt conclusions before the evidence supports them.

And they must recognize that understanding a conflict requires more than choosing which narrative to believe.

The purpose of investigative journalism is not to win the information war for one side.

It is to establish what can be known, explain what remains uncertain, and give readers the evidence necessary to form informed judgments.

In an age when images can travel around the world in seconds and falsehoods can spread faster than corrections, that responsibility has become more important than ever.

The next chapter examines whether Israel's targeted operations against Hamas have achieved their strategic objectives.

It will consider the deaths of senior commanders, the disruption of military networks, the limits of leadership targeting, and the question of whether tactical success can produce lasting security.

Chapter 20 — How Effective Are Targeted Operations?

Military Success, Intelligence Achievements and the Limits of Eliminating Hamas's Leadership

For decades, Israel has pursued senior Hamas commanders and operational figures through intelligence investigations, arrests, targeted military strikes, and covert operations.

Some of these missions have removed individuals responsible for planning attacks, organizing military networks, developing weapons, or directing armed operations.

Others have targeted senior figures whose influence extended across Hamas's political and military structures.

The campaign intensified dramatically following the Hamas-led attacks of October 7, 2023.

Israel declared the destruction of Hamas's military and governing capabilities among its central objectives.

The deaths of senior figures, including Yahya Sinwar, Mohammed Deif, Marwan Issa, and other commanders, represented significant developments in the military campaign.

Israeli authorities presented these operations as evidence that Hamas's leadership and operational capabilities were being systematically dismantled.

However, the effectiveness of targeted operations cannot be measured solely by the number of commanders killed.

A successful strike may eliminate an individual without destroying the organization that individual helped lead.

A disrupted military network may recover.

An experienced commander may be replaced.

And a movement with political, ideological, and social dimensions may survive even after suffering severe military losses.

The central question is therefore not simply whether Israel has successfully targeted Hamas leaders.

It is whether those operations have reduced the organization's capacity to conduct attacks, weakened its command structure, and contributed to lasting security.

To answer that question, tactical achievements must be distinguished from strategic outcomes.

What Does a Successful Targeted Operation Mean?

The word success can describe several different outcomes.

At the tactical level, an operation may be considered successful when an identified target is located and the intended military objective is achieved.

At the operational level, success may involve disrupting a command structure, interrupting communications, preventing a planned attack, or reducing an armed organization's ability to coordinate its forces.

At the strategic level, success concerns longer-term consequences.

Has the organization lost the ability to carry out major attacks?

Has its military infrastructure been significantly degraded?

Can it recruit and train replacements?

Does the operation contribute to a sustainable reduction in violence?

These questions are related, but they are not identical.

A military operation can succeed tactically while producing limited strategic change.

It can also create unexpected consequences, including retaliatory attacks, political instability, or increased support for the organization being targeted.

Evaluating targeted operations therefore requires examining both immediate results and developments over time.

Israel's Historical Experience with Leadership Targeting

Israel's campaign against Hamas leaders began long before October 7.

In 1996, Yahya Ayyash, an explosives specialist associated with Hamas's military wing, was killed in an operation widely attributed to Shin Bet.

In 2002, Israel killed Salah Shehadeh, a senior military commander.

In 2004, Israeli strikes killed Hamas founder Ahmed Yassin and senior leader Abdel Aziz al-Rantisi.

In 2012, Ahmed Jabari, a leading figure in the Qassam Brigades, was killed in an Israeli strike.

Each operation removed an important individual.

However, Hamas continued to exist.

It developed new leaders, maintained political institutions, and expanded aspects of its military infrastructure.

This history does not prove that the operations were ineffective.

Some may have prevented attacks or disrupted particular capabilities.

However, the organization's survival demonstrates that leadership losses did not produce its permanent elimination.

The distinction between disrupting an organization and destroying it is central to understanding the limits of targeted killing.

The Importance of Experienced Commanders

Senior military commanders possess forms of knowledge that are not always easily replaced.

They may understand an organization's operational networks, logistical arrangements, personnel, and internal decision-making.

They may also maintain relationships built over many years.

Within Hamas, experienced commanders played important roles in developing armed capabilities and coordinating military activities.

Mohammed Deif, for example, was associated with the development of the Qassam Brigades into a more structured military organization.

Marwan Issa was regarded as an influential senior commander.

Yahya Sinwar exercised substantial authority over Hamas's strategy and decision-making.

The removal of such figures can create organizational difficulties.

Replacement leaders may lack experience.

Existing relationships may be disrupted.

Coordination between different parts of the organization may become more difficult.

However, the extent of these effects depends on the structure of the organization and the capabilities of those who remain.

The death of a commander is therefore evidence of a leadership loss, not automatic proof of organizational collapse.

Mohammed Deif and the Loss of Military Experience

Mohammed Deif became one of Hamas's most important military figures.

Over several decades, he helped shape the organization's armed capabilities.

His leadership was associated with the development of military structures, rocket capabilities, and underground infrastructure.

Israel considered him a central figure in Hamas's military organization and planning.

Deif was killed in an Israeli strike in July 2024.

His death represented the removal of a commander with extensive institutional experience.

However, the precise effect on Hamas's remaining capabilities was difficult to determine independently.

The organization had already developed a network of commanders and military formations.

Some functions could potentially be redistributed.

Other capabilities depended on infrastructure and personnel extending beyond one individual.

Deif's death therefore represented a significant military and symbolic achievement for Israel.

Whether it produced lasting organizational damage requires a broader assessment of Hamas's subsequent capabilities.

Yahya Sinwar and the Limits of Leadership Removal

Yahya Sinwar was one of Hamas's most influential leaders.

He played a major role in the organization's leadership in Gaza and was closely associated with the strategy that preceded the October 7 attacks.

Following the death of Ismail Haniyeh, Sinwar became head of Hamas's Political Bureau in August 2024.

He was killed during an encounter with Israeli forces in Rafah on October 16, 2024.

His death was one of the most significant leadership losses Hamas suffered during the war.

However, the circumstances also illustrated the limitations of intelligence-led targeting.

Israeli forces encountered Sinwar during a military operation without initially knowing that he was present.

His identity was established afterward.

The event demonstrated that the removal of a senior leader does not always result from a precisely planned operation directed against that individual.

It also raised questions concerning the strategic consequences of his death.

Sinwar's removal did not automatically resolve the hostage crisis or determine the future of Hamas.

The organization continued to face questions concerning leadership succession and its remaining political and military structures.

Can Leadership Losses Disrupt Military Coordination?

Military organizations depend on communication and coordination.

Senior commanders may be responsible for connecting regional formations, assigning responsibilities, and maintaining strategic direction.

The removal of key figures can complicate these processes.

An organization may experience delays in decision-making.

Regional commanders may operate with greater independence.

Communication between political and military leadership may become more difficult.

However, the extent of disruption depends on the organization's structure.

A highly centralized organization may be particularly vulnerable to the loss of senior leadership.

A decentralized organization may retain substantial capabilities even after important commanders are removed.

Hamas has maintained both centralized leadership structures and regional military formations.

This has allowed different parts of the organization to exercise varying degrees of operational responsibility.

The death of senior leaders may therefore weaken coordination without eliminating all military activity.

The Difference Between Commanders and Military Infrastructure

Leadership targeting addresses one component of an armed organization's capabilities.

Military infrastructure is another.

Hamas developed tunnels, weapons-storage facilities, rocket capabilities, and other military resources over many years.

These capabilities did not depend entirely on the physical presence of individual leaders.

A commander may be killed while weapons and infrastructure remain available.

Likewise, the destruction of infrastructure may reduce military capabilities even when senior commanders survive.

The relationship between leadership and infrastructure is therefore important.

A comprehensive assessment of Hamas's military strength must consider both.

It must also examine personnel, training, logistics, and the ability to sustain operations.

The number of commanders killed is an incomplete measure of military effectiveness.

The Role of Intelligence in Measuring Success

Israel's intelligence agencies have played important roles in identifying Hamas figures and supporting military operations.

Shin Bet, Aman, and other institutions contributed to the broader campaign against Hamas.

However, intelligence assessments are also necessary after an operation.

Authorities must determine whether a target was killed, whether associated military capabilities were disrupted, and whether the organization has adapted.

These assessments can be difficult.

An armed organization may conceal leadership changes.

Communication networks may be disrupted without being permanently destroyed.

Public statements may exaggerate or understate actual capabilities.

Independent observers often lack access to the intelligence needed to evaluate these developments fully.

For this reason, claims concerning the effectiveness of targeted operations should be treated carefully.

An official announcement may establish that a particular operation occurred.

It does not necessarily establish its long-term strategic impact.

The Problem of Leadership Replacement

One of the most important limitations of targeted killing is the possibility of leadership replacement.

Organizations with established institutions may develop succession mechanisms.

Experienced deputies may assume responsibility.

Regional commanders may be promoted.

Political leaders may reorganize authority.

Hamas has demonstrated this ability repeatedly.

After the deaths of earlier leaders, the organization continued operating.

Following the deaths of senior commanders during the Gaza war, questions emerged concerning who would assume their responsibilities.

However, replacement does not necessarily mean that the organization retains its previous effectiveness.

A successor may lack experience or influence.

Internal disagreements may emerge.

The cumulative loss of several leaders may create difficulties that cannot be resolved quickly.

The important question is therefore not simply whether replacements exist.

It is whether those replacements can maintain the organization's previous capabilities.

Can Targeted Operations Prevent Attacks?

One of the principal arguments in favor of targeted operations is that removing individuals involved in planning violence may prevent future attacks.

A commander may possess knowledge, authority, or relationships necessary for particular operations.

Their removal may interrupt planning.

It may also force an organization to divert resources toward security and reorganization.

However, demonstrating that an attack was prevented can be difficult.

An operation that never occurred cannot always be directly observed or independently verified.

Governments may rely on classified intelligence to assess the threat posed by an individual.

That information may not be publicly available.

The absence of an attack after a targeted killing does not automatically prove that the killing prevented it.

Similarly, the occurrence of later attacks does not establish that the operation had no preventive effect.

The effectiveness of targeted operations must therefore be evaluated through multiple indicators rather than simple assumptions.

Deterrence: Does the Threat of Targeting Change Behavior?

Targeted operations may also be intended to deter armed organizations.

The argument is that commanders who face a credible risk of being located and killed may alter their behavior.

They may reduce communications, avoid certain activities, or limit operational exposure.

Such changes can create difficulties for an organization.

However, deterrence is difficult to measure.

Some individuals may become more cautious.

Others may regard the risk of death as an accepted part of their role.

Organizations may also adapt their structures to reduce dependence on visible leadership.

The history of Hamas demonstrates that repeated leadership losses did not eliminate its willingness or ability to conduct attacks.

October 7 was particularly significant in this regard.

The assault occurred after decades of Israeli operations against senior Hamas figures.

This does not prove that deterrence never worked.

It demonstrates that previous measures did not prevent Hamas from preparing and carrying out a major attack.

The Risk of Retaliation

Targeted killings may produce consequences beyond their immediate military objectives.

Some operations have been followed by retaliatory violence.

After the killing of Yahya Ayyash in January 1996, Hamas carried out suicide bombings that killed Israeli civilians.

The killing of Ahmed Jabari in November 2012 marked the beginning of a wider confrontation between Israel and Palestinian armed groups in Gaza.

The deaths of senior Hamas figures outside Gaza also raised concerns about regional escalation.

However, the relationship between an operation and subsequent violence is not always straightforward.

Armed conflicts involve multiple actors, strategic calculations, and underlying causes.

It would be inaccurate to assume that every later attack was caused by a particular targeted killing.

Nevertheless, the possibility of retaliation must form part of any serious assessment of strategic effectiveness.

An operation that removes a dangerous individual may also contribute to a wider cycle of violence.

Political Leadership and Military Leadership Are Not Identical

The effectiveness of targeting political leaders may differ from targeting operational commanders.

Military commanders may possess direct responsibility for planning or coordinating armed attacks.

Political leaders may exercise broader authority involving negotiations, diplomacy, organizational policy, or relationships with foreign governments.

Some individuals may perform both types of functions.

However, the distinction is important.

Removing a political figure may influence an organization's decision-making or international relationships without necessarily reducing its immediate military capabilities.

It may also affect negotiations.

For example, the killing of Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran in July 2024 raised questions concerning Hamas's political leadership and diplomatic communication.

The strategic consequences of such an operation cannot be assessed solely through military indicators.

They may include effects on negotiations, regional relations, and political succession.

The legal basis for targeting a political figure must also be assessed independently rather than assumed from organizational affiliation.

The Humanitarian Consequences of Targeted Operations

Some operations against senior Hamas figures have caused substantial civilian casualties.

The 2002 strike against Salah Shehadeh killed numerous civilians.

The July 2024 strike against Mohammed Deif in the al-Mawasi area caused extensive Palestinian casualties.

These incidents demonstrate that leadership targeting can involve serious humanitarian consequences.

The presence of a lawful military target does not eliminate the obligation to protect civilians.

International humanitarian law requires distinction, proportionality, and feasible precautions.

The expected incidental civilian harm must be assessed in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.

A successful operation against a commander does not automatically establish that the attack was lawful.

Likewise, civilian casualties do not by themselves establish every element of a legal violation.

A proper assessment requires examining the information available before the attack and the circumstances in which it was conducted.

Humanitarian consequences must therefore be included when evaluating operational effectiveness.

Tactical Success Versus Strategic Victory

The distinction between tactical success and strategic victory is central to understanding the campaign against Hamas.

A tactical success may involve the removal of a commander.

An operational success may involve disruption of a military formation.

A strategic victory would require achieving broader political and security objectives.

Israel's declared objectives included dismantling Hamas's military and governing capabilities and preventing future attacks.

These objectives are considerably more demanding than killing individual leaders.

They require examining whether Hamas can continue recruiting, organizing, governing, and conducting military operations.

They also raise questions concerning the future administration and security of Gaza.

A military campaign may substantially weaken an organization without eliminating the conditions that allow it to recover.

The strategic outcome therefore depends on more than battlefield results.

What Does the Evidence From Gaza Show?

The Gaza war caused severe damage to Hamas's military infrastructure and leadership.

Israeli forces killed senior commanders and numerous other members of armed groups.

Military operations damaged tunnel networks, weapons facilities, and other infrastructure.

However, the precise extent of Hamas's remaining capabilities has been difficult to establish independently.

Israeli authorities have published assessments concerning the organization's losses.

Hamas has also issued statements concerning its continuing activities and resistance.

Both parties have strategic reasons to influence public perceptions of military effectiveness.

Independent assessments must therefore consider multiple sources.

The available record demonstrates that Hamas suffered major losses.

It does not justify assuming that every remaining military capability was eliminated.

Nor does the organization's continued existence prove that Israeli operations achieved no significant results.

Both conclusions would oversimplify the evidence.

The Problem of Measuring Organizational Survival

An armed organization can survive in different forms.

It may retain a formal leadership structure.

It may continue conducting attacks.

It may maintain political influence.

It may operate through smaller decentralized groups.

It may also lose substantial military capabilities while retaining ideological support.

These forms of survival should not be treated as identical.

An organization that remains politically influential but cannot conduct major military operations is in a different position from one that retains extensive armed capabilities.

Similarly, an organization capable of occasional attacks may not possess the same capabilities it held before a major military campaign.

Evaluating Hamas's future therefore requires distinguishing between political survival, organizational continuity, and military effectiveness.

Recruitment and the Next Generation

The long-term effectiveness of targeted operations also depends on an organization's ability to recruit replacements.

Armed organizations may draw recruits from existing supporters, ideological networks, or communities affected by conflict.

However, recruitment patterns are complex.

They cannot be explained solely through military operations or civilian suffering.

Political conditions, social networks, leadership decisions, and individual motivations all play roles.

The Gaza war created extensive destruction and trauma.

Some analysts have warned that such conditions may contribute to future radicalization.

Others argue that sustained military pressure can reduce an armed organization's capacity to recruit, train, and equip new members.

Both possibilities require empirical examination.

The central issue is whether the organization can transform recruitment into effective military capabilities.

The existence of potential recruits does not automatically mean that a military network can be rebuilt.

The Importance of Governance

Military effectiveness is closely connected to political and administrative conditions.

Hamas governed Gaza after taking control of the territory in 2007.

Its governing structures became intertwined with its political authority and, in some areas, its security institutions.

Israel's campaign therefore sought to weaken both military and governing capabilities.

However, removing an existing authority raises the question of what replaces it.

A prolonged absence of effective governance may create insecurity and opportunities for armed groups.

Conversely, credible civilian administration and functioning institutions may reduce the space in which armed organizations operate.

The future of Gaza's governance is therefore relevant to assessing the long-term results of Israel's military campaign.

Leadership targeting alone cannot establish a sustainable political order.

The Role of International Support Networks

Hamas has maintained relationships with regional actors, including Iran.

These relationships have contributed to the organization's political and military development.

External support can influence an armed organization's ability to recover from losses.

Financial assistance, political relationships, and access to military resources may affect rebuilding.

However, the nature and extent of such support can change over time.

It is also important to distinguish between political contacts, humanitarian assistance, and military support.

Not every relationship involving Hamas serves the same purpose.

A comprehensive assessment of the organization's resilience must examine both internal capabilities and external relationships.

Targeting commanders within Gaza may weaken local military structures without necessarily ending support networks operating elsewhere.

Intelligence Superiority and Its Limits

Israel possesses advanced intelligence capabilities.

Its agencies have demonstrated the ability to identify and locate important Hamas figures.

However, intelligence superiority is not absolute.

October 7 demonstrated that even highly sophisticated institutions can fail to understand an adversary's intentions.

The subsequent campaign demonstrated that intelligence capabilities can support significant operations without guaranteeing complete control over the conflict.

Armed organizations can adapt.

They may change leadership structures, reduce communications, or reorganize responsibilities.

Intelligence agencies must continually reassess their understanding of such changes.

The effectiveness of targeted operations therefore depends partly on the quality of intelligence over time.

A successful operation today does not guarantee accurate assessments tomorrow.

The Question of Cost

Targeted operations also involve costs.

These may include military resources, intelligence capabilities, diplomatic consequences, and humanitarian harm.

Some operations require extensive preparation and coordination.

Others may lead to broader military escalation.

Operations conducted abroad may affect relations with foreign governments.

Civilian casualties may generate legal scrutiny and international criticism.

The strategic value of an operation must therefore be considered in relation to its wider consequences.

A target's importance may justify substantial operational effort.

However, the fact that an individual has been identified as dangerous does not mean that every possible method of targeting that person is lawful or strategically wise.

The question is not merely whether an operation can be conducted.

It is whether the expected benefits outweigh the risks and whether the chosen methods comply with applicable law.

Lessons From Other Counterterrorism Campaigns

The challenges associated with leadership targeting are not unique to Israel.

Other governments have conducted operations against senior figures in armed organizations.

The United States, for example, killed al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden in 2011.

His death removed a central figure from the organization.

However, al-Qaeda and affiliated movements did not disappear entirely.

Other counterterrorism campaigns have demonstrated similar complexities.

The removal of leaders can disrupt networks and weaken operational capabilities.

Yet organizations may survive through decentralization, succession, or the emergence of new branches.

These comparisons do not mean that all armed organizations are identical.

Their structures, objectives, and political environments differ.

However, the broader lesson is relevant.

Leadership targeting can be an important component of counterterrorism without necessarily providing a complete solution.

What Would Lasting Success Look Like?

A meaningful assessment of Israel's campaign against Hamas requires clear criteria.

Lasting success would involve more than the deaths of prominent commanders.

It would require a sustained reduction in the organization's ability to organize and conduct attacks against civilians.

It would also require effective prevention of renewed military threats.

The recovery of hostages, protection of Israeli communities, and reduction of regional escalation would be important indicators.

The future of Gaza's civilian population and governing institutions would also matter.

A security arrangement that produces only temporary military disruption may not prevent renewed violence.

Likewise, an arrangement that leaves civilians without functioning institutions may create further instability.

The challenge is therefore both military and political.

Lasting security depends on the relationship between military outcomes, governance, diplomacy, and civilian protection.

Can Targeted Operations Defeat Hamas?

The historical evidence supports a qualified conclusion.

Targeted operations have removed important Hamas leaders and commanders.

They have disrupted particular military capabilities and contributed to the organization's losses.

These achievements should not be dismissed.

However, decades of leadership targeting did not prevent Hamas from surviving or carrying out the October 7 attacks.

The organization demonstrated an ability to replace leaders and maintain different forms of political and military activity.

This history indicates that leadership targeting alone has not been sufficient to eliminate the threat.

At the same time, it would be inaccurate to conclude that the operations were irrelevant.

The cumulative loss of experienced commanders, military infrastructure, and organizational resources can substantially weaken an armed group.

The question is whether those losses can be translated into durable security.

That outcome depends on developments extending beyond individual military operations.

The Difference Between Weakening and Eliminating

A military campaign may weaken an organization without eliminating it.

This distinction is particularly important in the case of Hamas.

The organization has political, military, ideological, and social dimensions.

The destruction of a military formation does not necessarily eliminate political influence.

The death of a political leader does not automatically destroy military infrastructure.

The loss of weapons does not necessarily remove an organization's ability to recruit.

These dimensions interact, but they are not identical.

A realistic assessment must therefore avoid treating Hamas as a single structure that can be dismantled through one type of operation.

The effectiveness of Israeli counterterrorism measures depends on which capabilities are targeted and whether those capabilities can be restored.

The Strategic Challenge for Israel

Israel faces a difficult security problem.

Hamas demonstrated on October 7 that it was capable of organizing an attack causing mass civilian casualties and widespread destruction.

Preventing another such assault became a central national objective.

Targeted operations offer one means of reducing the threat posed by experienced commanders and military networks.

However, the historical record demonstrates the limits of relying on leadership removal alone.

Military achievements must be accompanied by accurate intelligence, effective defensive preparations, and a broader strategy addressing the conditions under which armed organizations operate.

The October 7 intelligence failure showed that assumptions about deterrence can be dangerously misleading.

The subsequent campaign showed that military superiority does not automatically produce a clear political outcome.

Israel's challenge is therefore to transform operational achievements into a sustainable security framework.

Beyond the Killing of a Commander

The effectiveness of targeted operations cannot be reduced to a list of names.

The deaths of Yahya Sinwar, Mohammed Deif, Marwan Issa, and other senior figures represented significant losses for Hamas.

They also demonstrated the capabilities of Israeli intelligence and military institutions.

However, the broader history of the conflict reveals the limitations of leadership targeting.

Hamas survived earlier campaigns against its senior figures.

It developed replacement leaders and maintained organizational structures.

The October 7 attacks demonstrated that previous measures had not eliminated its capacity for large-scale violence.

The war that followed caused severe damage to Hamas's military infrastructure and leadership, but also produced devastating humanitarian consequences in Gaza.

The central strategic question is whether these losses have created lasting changes in the organization's capabilities.

A tactical achievement becomes a strategic success only when it contributes to a durable reduction in the threat.

That requires more than eliminating individuals.

It requires understanding organizational resilience, preventing reconstruction of military capabilities, maintaining effective intelligence, and establishing political and security arrangements capable of reducing future violence.

Targeted operations may remain an important instrument of Israeli counterterrorism.

But the evidence does not support treating them as a complete strategy in themselves.

Ultimately, the effectiveness of such operations must be judged not only by who was killed, but by what threats were prevented, what capabilities were reduced, what civilian harm occurred, and whether the result contributed to greater long-term security.

The next chapter examines the question that follows naturally from this assessment: whether Hamas can rebuild its military networks after losing senior leaders, infrastructure, and personnel.

It will explore recruitment, underground networks, external support, organizational adaptation, and the conditions that may determine the movement's future.

Chapter 21 — Can Hamas Rebuild Its Military Networks?

Recruitment, Underground Infrastructure, Iranian Support and the Struggle for Hamas's Future

The Israeli military campaign following October 7, 2023, inflicted major losses on Hamas's leadership, armed personnel, infrastructure, and governing institutions.

Senior figures, including Yahya Sinwar, Mohammed Deif, and Marwan Issa, were killed.

Israeli forces attacked military facilities, tunnel networks, weapons-storage sites, and locations associated with Hamas's command structure.

Large areas of the Gaza Strip suffered extensive destruction during the fighting.

For Israel, weakening Hamas's military capabilities became a central objective of the war.

However, destroying existing military infrastructure is not necessarily the same as preventing its reconstruction.

Armed organizations can sometimes survive severe losses by reorganizing their leadership, recruiting new members, adapting their methods, and rebuilding networks over time.

Hamas has demonstrated organizational resilience during earlier periods of conflict.

It survived the deaths of founding figures, senior political leaders, and experienced military commanders.

Yet the scale of the destruction following October 7 created challenges different from those encountered in previous confrontations.

The central question is whether Hamas can rebuild a functioning military organization after suffering extensive losses, or whether the cumulative effects of Israeli operations have fundamentally changed its capabilities.

The answer depends on more than the number of surviving fighters.

It involves leadership, recruitment, financial resources, weapons, underground infrastructure, external relationships, territorial control, and the future political administration of Gaza.

It also depends on whether a new security and governing framework can prevent the return of organized armed activity.

What Does Rebuilding a Military Network Actually Mean?

The term rebuilding can describe several different processes.

An armed organization may replace personnel without restoring its previous military capabilities.

It may retain weapons while losing the ability to coordinate large operations.

It may preserve political influence while its military infrastructure remains severely damaged.

These distinctions are important when assessing Hamas.

Before October 7, the organization possessed an established military wing, regional formations, weapons capabilities, underground infrastructure, and command structures.

Rebuilding those capabilities would involve more than recruiting individuals willing to fight.

It would require restoring organizational coordination, leadership, resources, and the ability to sustain military activity.

An organization may remain capable of occasional attacks while lacking the resources to conduct a large-scale operation comparable to October 7.

Similarly, the survival of individual armed cells does not automatically establish that a centralized military structure has been restored.

A realistic assessment must distinguish between organizational survival and the recovery of substantial military capabilities.

The Scale of Hamas's Military Losses

Israel's campaign against Hamas involved extensive military operations across Gaza.

Israeli authorities reported killing numerous Hamas fighters and commanders.

They also announced the destruction of weapons facilities, military positions, and sections of the tunnel network.

The organization lost several of its most experienced leaders.

However, the precise scale of its losses has been difficult to verify independently.

Israeli military assessments concerning the number of Hamas personnel killed have not always been accompanied by publicly available evidence sufficient to establish individual combatant status.

Hamas has also had incentives to conceal or selectively disclose information about its remaining strength.

Independent observers have faced serious limitations in accessing the territory and evaluating military infrastructure.

The destruction of particular facilities may be documented without establishing whether equivalent capabilities exist elsewhere.

Likewise, a military formation may be described as dismantled while some of its personnel continue operating in smaller groups.

These limitations mean that claims about Hamas's remaining military strength require caution.

The available evidence supports the conclusion that the organization suffered major losses.

It does not permit a simple assumption that every military network was permanently eliminated.

The Loss of Senior Leadership

Leadership losses represent one of the most significant challenges for any armed organization.

Experienced commanders possess institutional knowledge, authority, and relationships developed over many years.

Within Hamas, senior military figures helped oversee organizational development and strategic decision-making.

Mohammed Deif played a central role in the evolution of the Qassam Brigades.

Marwan Issa was an influential figure within the military leadership.

Yahya Sinwar exercised considerable authority over Hamas's political and strategic direction.

Their deaths removed individuals with substantial experience.

However, Hamas had previously survived the loss of senior leaders.

The organization developed mechanisms for succession and distributed responsibilities among different figures.

The critical question is whether surviving leaders possess the experience and authority necessary to maintain organizational cohesion.

Replacing a title is not the same as replacing the capabilities of the person who previously held it.

The cumulative loss of senior figures may therefore have effects extending beyond individual deaths.

Leadership Succession and Organizational Continuity

Armed organizations often attempt to preserve continuity through replacement leadership.

Deputies may assume responsibility.

Regional commanders may gain greater authority.

Political institutions may reorganize decision-making.

Hamas has maintained different leadership structures inside and outside Gaza.

These structures have not always exercised identical responsibilities.

The relationship between political leadership, military command, and external representatives has changed over time.

Following the deaths of senior figures, succession became an important issue.

However, public announcements concerning leadership appointments do not necessarily reveal how authority functions internally.

An individual may hold a formal position without exercising the same influence as a predecessor.

Likewise, decentralized networks may continue operating even when central leadership is disrupted.

Organizational continuity must therefore be assessed through actual capabilities rather than titles alone.

Recruitment After a Devastating War

Recruitment is one of the most important factors determining whether an armed organization can recover.

Hamas has historically recruited through political, ideological, social, and organizational networks.

The motivations of individuals who join armed groups can vary.

Some may be influenced by ideology.

Others may be affected by personal experiences, political grievances, family relationships, or local social environments.

The Gaza war created extraordinary levels of destruction and suffering.

Large numbers of Palestinian families lost relatives, homes, livelihoods, and access to essential services.

Such experiences may influence political attitudes and individual decisions.

Some analysts have warned that prolonged suffering and the absence of a credible political future may contribute to further radicalization.

However, civilian suffering does not automatically produce support for Hamas.

Palestinians hold diverse political views.

Many oppose Hamas or criticize its decisions.

Others may reject armed violence while remaining deeply opposed to Israeli policies.

Recruitment therefore cannot be explained through a simple assumption that every affected civilian becomes a potential fighter.

The relationship between conflict, political identity, and armed mobilization is complex.

Recruiting Fighters Is Not the Same as Rebuilding an Army

An organization may attract new recruits without restoring its previous military effectiveness.

Experienced personnel require time to replace.

Leadership relationships must be rebuilt.

Organizational structures may need to be reorganized.

Resources may be limited.

Military operations may also continue disrupting the organization's activities.

The ability to recruit individuals is therefore only one component of rebuilding.

Hamas's future military capabilities depend on whether recruitment can be translated into functioning organizational structures.

The distinction matters because public assessments sometimes treat the existence of new recruits as proof that an armed organization has recovered.

That conclusion is not necessarily justified.

A weakened organization may retain a capacity for violence without regaining the ability to conduct large, coordinated attacks.

The Survival of Smaller Armed Cells

One possible consequence of sustained military pressure is organizational fragmentation.

Large military formations may become difficult to maintain.

Smaller groups may continue operating with greater independence.

This can change the character of an armed organization.

Instead of conducting coordinated operations through established command structures, surviving personnel may engage in more localized activity.

Such a development can complicate assessments of military effectiveness.

The organization may appear severely weakened at the strategic level while remaining capable of attacks in particular areas.

However, the presence of small armed groups does not necessarily mean that a unified military network has survived.

Some groups may operate with limited coordination.

Others may have different priorities or loyalties.

The distinction between a centralized military organization and fragmented armed activity is therefore essential.

Hamas's Underground Infrastructure

The tunnel network developed by Hamas became one of the most important military features of Gaza.

Over many years, the organization constructed underground facilities used for different purposes.

These included movement, concealment, storage, and other military functions.

Some tunnels were associated with command infrastructure.

Others were connected to the broader underground environment in which hostages were held.

Israel regarded the network as a major military threat.

During the war, Israeli forces sought to locate and destroy substantial parts of it.

However, independently determining the percentage of the network destroyed has been difficult.

Public estimates of tunnel length and damage have varied.

Some underground structures may have been damaged without being permanently unusable.

Others may have remained inaccessible to independent observers.

The survival or destruction of particular tunnels is therefore only part of the assessment.

The wider question is whether Hamas can restore underground military capabilities over time.

Can the Tunnel Network Be Rebuilt?

The possibility of rebuilding underground infrastructure depends on several factors.

These include access to resources, territorial control, security conditions, and the ability to organize construction activity.

The destruction of existing tunnels may impose substantial costs.

Reconstruction may also be constrained by ongoing military surveillance and restrictions on materials.

However, the historical development of Hamas's underground infrastructure demonstrates that the organization invested heavily in such capabilities over an extended period.

A future assessment must therefore consider whether the conditions that previously allowed the network to expand continue to exist.

It is also important to distinguish between military tunnels and legitimate civilian infrastructure.

Gaza requires extensive reconstruction of housing, water systems, hospitals, and other essential facilities.

Civilian reconstruction should not be treated as inherently suspicious merely because materials can have more than one possible use.

The challenge for future security arrangements will be preventing military reconstruction without unnecessarily obstructing the recovery of civilian life.

Weapons and Military Resources

Hamas's military capabilities have historically included rockets, small arms, explosives, and other weapons.

Some weapons were obtained through external channels.

Others were produced or assembled within Gaza.

Israeli military operations targeted weapons facilities and storage locations.

Restrictions on the movement of goods and materials also affected the broader environment in which Hamas operated.

However, the complete status of the organization's remaining weapons has not been independently established.

A stockpile may survive even when a production facility is destroyed.

Conversely, possession of weapons does not automatically establish the ability to conduct complex military operations.

The future of Hamas's military capabilities depends on both available resources and the organizational capacity to use them.

Smuggling Networks and Border Security

Hamas has historically relied in part on clandestine supply networks.

The movement of weapons and materials into Gaza has been a longstanding Israeli security concern.

Egypt's border with Gaza, including the Rafah area, has played an important role in regional discussions about smuggling and border control.

Egypt has conducted operations against tunnel networks and other illicit activities in the Sinai border region.

Israel has also pursued measures intended to restrict weapons transfers.

The effectiveness of future border arrangements will influence the possibilities for Hamas's military reconstruction.

However, allegations concerning particular smuggling routes or foreign involvement require reliable evidence.

Not every commercial movement or humanitarian shipment is connected to military activity.

The challenge is distinguishing legitimate civilian needs from prohibited weapons transfers.

Effective border security must therefore be considered alongside the humanitarian requirements of Gaza's population.

Iran's Historical Support for Hamas

Iran has been an important external supporter of Hamas.

The relationship has included political backing and military assistance.

Iranian officials have publicly supported Palestinian armed groups opposed to Israel.

Israeli authorities have accused Iran of helping Hamas develop military capabilities.

The relationship has not always been politically uncomplicated.

Hamas and Iran have differed over regional issues, including the Syrian civil war.

Nevertheless, their cooperation has remained strategically important.

Iran's support has been relevant to Hamas's ability to develop and sustain military capabilities.

The future extent of that support is therefore an important factor in assessing whether the organization can rebuild.

However, the precise level of assistance at any particular time may be difficult to verify independently.

Official claims should be distinguished from publicly established evidence.

Regional Relationships Beyond Iran

Hamas has maintained political relationships with several regional governments and organizations.

These relationships have served different purposes.

Some have involved diplomacy and mediation.

Others have involved political support or financial arrangements.

Qatar, for example, has hosted Hamas political representatives and played an important role in negotiations concerning hostages and ceasefires.

Turkey has also maintained political contacts with Hamas.

These relationships should not automatically be equated with military assistance.

A government hosting political representatives for diplomatic purposes does not necessarily have the same role as an actor supplying weapons or military resources.

The distinction is essential to understanding Hamas's external networks.

A credible assessment must identify the nature of each relationship rather than treating all foreign contacts as evidence of military support.

The Role of Financial Resources

Military organizations require financial resources to maintain personnel, institutions, and activities.

Hamas has historically obtained funding through different channels, including external support, revenue associated with governance, and other financial networks.

Israel and several other governments have imposed sanctions and financial restrictions intended to disrupt Hamas's access to resources.

Such measures may complicate organizational recovery.

However, their effectiveness depends on enforcement, the adaptability of financial networks, and the availability of alternative sources.

The financial dimension also creates humanitarian concerns.

Measures targeting an armed organization must be distinguished from restrictions that unnecessarily harm civilians.

Palestinian families, businesses, and humanitarian institutions require access to legitimate financial services.

The challenge is preventing the financing of armed activity while protecting lawful civilian economic activity.

The Political Future of Gaza

The question of Hamas's military reconstruction cannot be separated from Gaza's political future.

Before October 7, Hamas exercised governing authority in Gaza.

Its political and administrative structures were intertwined with the territory's institutions.

Israel's military campaign sought to end the organization's ability to govern and conduct military operations.

However, removing an existing authority creates the question of what replaces it.

A functioning civilian administration is necessary for public services, reconstruction, policing, education, and economic activity.

If effective institutions are absent, armed groups may find opportunities to exercise influence.

Conversely, credible governance may reduce the space in which armed organizations operate.

The future political administration of Gaza is therefore a central factor in determining whether Hamas can regain influence.

The Palestinian Authority and Alternative Governance

The Palestinian Authority exercises limited self-government in parts of the West Bank under arrangements established during the Oslo peace process.

Hamas and Fatah have been political rivals for many years.

Their division deepened after Hamas took control of Gaza in 2007.

Since then, the Palestinian political system has remained fragmented.

Proposals concerning Gaza's future governance have included different roles for the Palestinian Authority, technocratic administrations, international support mechanisms, and locally based institutions.

Each proposal raises difficult questions.

Would the proposed authority possess sufficient legitimacy?

Could it provide essential services?

Would it have the resources and security arrangements necessary to function?

Would Palestinian communities accept its leadership?

And could it operate without becoming dependent on armed factions?

The answers will influence the long-term security environment.

A viable governing structure may be essential to preventing the re-emergence of armed control.

Public Support and Political Legitimacy

Hamas's future also depends on its relationship with Palestinian society.

Public opinion in Gaza and the West Bank has varied over time.

Support for Hamas cannot be assumed to be uniform.

Some Palestinians have supported the organization for ideological or political reasons.

Others have opposed its governance, military decisions, or treatment of political rivals.

The devastation of the Gaza war may influence these attitudes in different ways.

Some people may blame Israel for the destruction.

Others may blame Hamas for decisions that contributed to the conflict.

Many may hold both views or prioritize immediate survival over political affiliation.

Reliable public opinion research is difficult during war.

Displacement, insecurity, communication disruptions, and fear may affect the ability to conduct representative surveys.

Claims concerning what all Palestinians believe should therefore be treated with caution.

The Risk of Radicalization

Prolonged conflict can influence political attitudes and individual behavior.

Experiences of violence, displacement, and loss may contribute to anger and distrust.

However, radicalization is not an automatic or uniform response to suffering.

Many people who experience war reject armed violence.

Others may become more politically active through nonviolent means.

Some may withdraw from political participation entirely.

The relationship between trauma and recruitment into armed organizations depends on social, political, and organizational factors.

A future security strategy must therefore avoid treating Palestinian civilians as an undifferentiated source of potential militancy.

Such an approach would be both inaccurate and counterproductive.

Preventing recruitment into armed organizations requires understanding the conditions under which those organizations gain influence.

The Importance of Reconstruction

Gaza's physical and economic reconstruction will be a major factor in its future.

The war damaged housing, roads, hospitals, schools, water systems, and other essential infrastructure.

Large numbers of people experienced displacement and loss of income.

Reconstruction requires resources, administrative capacity, and a functioning security environment.

Without these conditions, prolonged instability may continue.

The relationship between reconstruction and security is important.

A population with access to housing, education, healthcare, and economic opportunities may have greater possibilities for stable civilian life.

However, reconstruction alone does not guarantee that armed organizations will disappear.

Political institutions, security arrangements, and regional relationships also matter.

The challenge is creating conditions that support civilian recovery while reducing the opportunities for military reconstruction.

Israel's Long-Term Security Requirements

For Israel, preventing another October 7 attack became a central national security objective.

The assault demonstrated that Hamas possessed the capacity to conduct a large-scale operation causing mass civilian casualties.

Israeli authorities therefore sought to prevent the organization from restoring comparable capabilities.

This objective involves more than targeting individual commanders.

It requires reliable intelligence, effective border defenses, and the ability to identify emerging threats.

However, October 7 also demonstrated the dangers of excessive confidence in technological surveillance and assumptions about deterrence.

A sustainable security strategy must address both the capabilities of armed organizations and the institutional weaknesses that can allow threats to be underestimated.

The effectiveness of such a strategy will depend on whether it produces lasting security rather than temporary military disruption.

Can Military Pressure Prevent Reconstruction?

Sustained military pressure can make it difficult for an armed organization to rebuild.

Operations may disrupt leadership, destroy infrastructure, and restrict access to resources.

However, military pressure also has limitations.

An organization may adapt its structure.

Surviving personnel may operate in smaller groups.

Political and social conditions may continue to support organizational survival.

The challenge is determining whether military measures reduce the threat over time or merely change its form.

Continued operations may prevent the restoration of particular capabilities.

They may also create humanitarian and political consequences that affect the wider security environment.

The effectiveness of military pressure must therefore be evaluated through long-term outcomes.

The Difference Between Hamas's Political Survival and Military Recovery

Hamas may survive politically without restoring its previous military capabilities.

It may retain supporters, representatives, or organizational relationships.

However, political survival does not automatically mean that it can conduct large-scale military operations.

Conversely, armed networks may remain active even when political institutions are weakened.

These distinctions are essential.

The question of whether Hamas can rebuild should not be answered through a single measure.

Its political influence, organizational cohesion, military resources, and operational capabilities must be examined separately.

A movement may remain relevant while being substantially weaker than before.

It may also regain influence under conditions of prolonged instability.

The future will depend on developments across several interconnected areas.

What Would Prevent Hamas From Rebuilding?

Preventing the restoration of major military capabilities would require a combination of measures.

These could include effective security arrangements, intelligence cooperation, restrictions on weapons transfers, and credible civilian governance.

However, such measures must comply with international law and protect the civilian population.

A sustainable approach would also need to address the conditions under which armed organizations gain support and influence.

This does not mean that political or economic measures can substitute entirely for security.

Nor does it mean that military operations alone can create a stable future.

The challenge is combining security measures with functioning institutions and a credible political framework.

Without such a framework, the risk of renewed armed activity may remain.

The Lessons of Previous Conflicts

Hamas has survived several earlier rounds of conflict with Israel.

Its military capabilities were damaged during different periods, but the organization continued to operate.

The scale of the post-October 7 war was substantially greater.

Nevertheless, the historical record demonstrates the importance of avoiding premature conclusions.

An organization may appear severely weakened at one point and recover some capabilities later.

Alternatively, cumulative losses may produce lasting damage that becomes clearer only over time.

The future of Hamas therefore cannot be determined solely from immediate battlefield outcomes.

Long-term assessments require evidence concerning leadership, recruitment, infrastructure, financing, and military activity.

A Future Without Hamas's Military Threat?

The question of whether Hamas can rebuild is ultimately connected to a broader question.

Can Israel achieve lasting security while Gaza develops a functioning civilian and political future?

The answer depends on developments that extend beyond the battlefield.

The prevention of renewed attacks is essential to Israeli security.

The protection of Palestinian civilians and the reconstruction of Gaza are essential to the territory's future.

These objectives should not be treated as inherently incompatible.

A stable security environment can support civilian recovery.

Credible civilian institutions may also reduce opportunities for armed organizations to regain control.

However, achieving such conditions requires difficult political decisions, regional cooperation, and sustained international engagement.

Military operations may create opportunities for change.

They cannot guarantee the political outcome.

The Future of Hamas's Military Networks

Hamas suffered major losses during the Israeli military campaign following October 7.

Senior leaders were killed.

Military infrastructure was damaged or destroyed.

Organizational networks faced sustained pressure.

These developments significantly affected the organization's capabilities.

However, the precise extent of its remaining military strength has been difficult to establish independently.

The possibility of rebuilding depends on multiple factors.

Leadership succession, recruitment, financial resources, weapons, underground infrastructure, external support, and territorial control will all influence its future.

The political administration of Gaza may prove equally important.

An environment characterized by weak governance and continuing instability could create opportunities for armed networks to survive.

A credible civilian administration supported by effective security arrangements could make reconstruction of military capabilities more difficult.

The central lesson is that the destruction of an armed organization's existing infrastructure does not automatically prevent its return.

Lasting security requires more than battlefield success.

It requires the prevention of renewed military threats, the development of functioning institutions, and a political environment capable of reducing the conditions that sustain prolonged conflict.

For Israel, the ultimate measure of success will not be the number of Hamas leaders killed or tunnels destroyed.

It will be whether the organization remains capable of threatening Israeli civilians on the scale witnessed on October 7.

For Palestinians in Gaza, the future will also depend on whether the territory can recover from war and establish conditions for stable civilian life.

These outcomes are interconnected.

The next chapter examines how Israel's counterterrorism strategy may evolve in response to the lessons of October 7 and the subsequent war.

It will consider intelligence reform, technological developments, regional cooperation, military doctrine, and the challenge of preventing future attacks without creating an endless cycle of conflict.

Chapter 22 — The Future of Israel's Counterterrorism Strategy

Intelligence Reform, Military Innovation, Regional Cooperation and the Search for Lasting Security

The Hamas-led attacks of October 7, 2023, fundamentally challenged Israel's national security doctrine.

For decades, Israel had developed one of the world's most sophisticated counterterrorism systems.

Its intelligence agencies possessed extensive technological capabilities, experience in human intelligence operations, and established networks for identifying and disrupting security threats.

The Israel Defense Forces maintained advanced surveillance systems, specialized military units, and substantial technological superiority over Hamas.

Yet these capabilities did not prevent the most devastating attack on Israeli civilians in the country's history.

The events exposed weaknesses that could not be explained solely by insufficient technology or inadequate intelligence collection.

Israel had received warning information.

Its military monitored Hamas's activities.

Its security institutions possessed knowledge of the organization's military development.

Nevertheless, the prevailing assessment underestimated Hamas's intentions and the possibility of a coordinated large-scale assault.

The war that followed demonstrated Israel's capacity to conduct extensive military operations, locate senior Hamas leaders, damage underground infrastructure, and rescue some hostages.

However, it also revealed the limitations of relying primarily on military force.

The destruction of infrastructure does not necessarily eliminate an organization's ability to recover.

The death of a commander does not automatically prevent leadership succession.

And military operations conducted in densely populated areas can produce humanitarian consequences that affect regional stability, international relations, and future security.

Israel's counterterrorism strategy must therefore confront two separate challenges.

The first is preventing another attack comparable to October 7.

The second is establishing security arrangements that remain effective without requiring perpetual large-scale military operations.

Achieving both objectives will require changes extending far beyond the battlefield.

October 7 as a Turning Point in Israeli Security Thinking

October 7 exposed a fundamental weakness in Israel's approach to Gaza.

Before the attack, Israeli policy relied partly on the assumption that Hamas was deterred from launching a major war.

The organization was believed to have incentives to preserve its governing authority and avoid a confrontation that could threaten its position.

This assessment influenced the interpretation of intelligence information and the deployment of military resources.

The attacks demonstrated that these assumptions were dangerously unreliable.

Hamas had developed the capability to conduct a coordinated assault involving multiple locations, the breaching of border defenses, and attacks against military installations and civilian communities.

The failure was therefore not limited to the inability to predict an exact date.

It involved a broader misunderstanding of the threat.

Future Israeli security policy must account for the possibility that adversaries may act in ways that contradict established intelligence assessments.

The central lesson is that deterrence should not be treated as a permanent condition.

It must be continuously reassessed.

From Deterrence to Prevention

Deterrence attempts to discourage an adversary from acting by creating the expectation of unacceptable consequences.

Prevention seeks to stop a threat before it can be carried out.

Israel has historically relied on both approaches.

However, the October 7 attacks demonstrated the limitations of assuming that Hamas would avoid actions likely to trigger a major Israeli response.

Future strategy may therefore place greater emphasis on identifying and disrupting emerging threats.

This could include more frequent reassessment of intelligence, improved military readiness, and stronger coordination between security institutions.

However, prevention also presents risks.

An excessively broad interpretation of preventive action may encourage military operations based on uncertain assessments.

Such actions can generate civilian casualties, diplomatic consequences, and further instability.

The challenge is therefore to develop a prevention strategy grounded in reliable intelligence, clear legal standards, and effective political oversight.

Prevention cannot become a justification for unlimited military action.

Reforming Israel's Intelligence Institutions

Israel's intelligence system includes several institutions with distinct responsibilities.

Shin Bet focuses on internal security and counterterrorism.

Aman provides military intelligence and strategic assessments.

Mossad is primarily responsible for foreign intelligence and overseas activities.

The October 7 failure demonstrated that sophisticated institutions can collect substantial information without producing an accurate understanding of an adversary's intentions.

Future reform must therefore address intelligence analysis as well as intelligence collection.

Agencies need mechanisms for challenging prevailing assessments.

Contradictory evidence must receive serious consideration.

Warnings from personnel at lower levels of the organization must be evaluated according to their substance rather than their position in the hierarchy.

Cooperation between institutions must also be effective.

The existence of several intelligence agencies does not automatically guarantee that their assessments will be integrated successfully.

A future security system must be capable of recognizing when its collective assumptions are wrong.

The Importance of Independent Intelligence Analysis

One of the most important lessons from October 7 concerns institutional confidence.

When analysts become convinced that an adversary is unlikely to act, new information may be interpreted through that assumption.

This can produce confirmation bias.

Information supporting the existing assessment receives greater weight.

Contradictory evidence may be dismissed as unlikely or insignificant.

A future intelligence system must create space for alternative assessments.

Independent analytical teams can challenge dominant conclusions.

Competing hypotheses can be evaluated.

Decision-makers can be presented with uncertainty rather than a single confident prediction.

However, alternative analysis should not become a process in which every possibility is treated as equally likely.

The objective is disciplined evaluation.

A credible intelligence system must distinguish between plausible threats, speculative scenarios, and evidence-supported assessments.

The ability to reconsider conclusions may be as important as the ability to collect information.

Listening to the People Closest to the Threat

The experiences of Israeli border observers became an important part of the debate following October 7.

Female soldiers assigned to surveillance duties had reported concerning activities near Gaza.

Subsequent reporting raised serious questions about whether their observations had received sufficient attention.

Their experiences demonstrated a broader organizational problem.

Personnel directly monitoring events may identify changes before senior decision-makers recognize their significance.

However, hierarchical institutions can sometimes discourage challenges to established assessments.

Future reforms must ensure that warnings are evaluated consistently.

The credibility of information should depend on evidence, not rank.

This principle applies beyond border observation units.

Field intelligence personnel, analysts, military officers, and other specialists must be able to communicate concerns without fear that contradictory assessments will automatically be dismissed.

Rebuilding Border Security

Israel invested heavily in border infrastructure before October 7.

The Gaza border included barriers, surveillance equipment, observation systems, and other defensive technologies.

These measures were intended to detect and prevent infiltration.

However, Hamas's coordinated assault overwhelmed important parts of the system.

The attacks demonstrated that technological barriers can be vulnerable when several defensive components are challenged simultaneously.

Future border security must therefore involve more than constructing stronger physical barriers.

It requires effective surveillance, military readiness, communication systems, and contingency planning.

Defensive arrangements must account for scenarios in which technology fails or information becomes incomplete.

The protection of civilian communities must also remain central.

A security system cannot be considered successful if it detects threats but cannot respond quickly enough to protect people.

The Role of Artificial Intelligence

Artificial intelligence is likely to play an increasingly important role in intelligence analysis and military decision-making.

AI systems can assist analysts in examining large quantities of information.

They may help identify patterns, prioritize material for review, or detect anomalies requiring further investigation.

However, the Gaza war also generated serious controversy concerning Israel's reported use of AI-assisted targeting systems.

Investigations raised questions about how algorithmic assessments were used, the reliability of the information involved, and the extent of human review.

Israeli authorities disputed aspects of some published accounts and emphasized the role of human decision-making.

These controversies illustrate an important problem.

AI can process information rapidly, but speed does not guarantee accuracy.

An automated system may reproduce errors or biases present in its data.

A model may generate a confident assessment without sufficient evidence.

And a mistaken classification can have severe consequences when military force is involved.

Future use of AI must therefore be accompanied by meaningful human oversight, testing, accountability, and compliance with international humanitarian law.

Human Judgment Must Remain Central

The October 7 failure was not caused by an absence of technology.

Israel possessed advanced surveillance and intelligence capabilities.

The problem involved the interpretation of information and the decisions that followed.

This lesson is especially relevant to artificial intelligence.

Technology can assist human judgment.

It cannot replace the responsibility of commanders and political authorities.

Decisions involving military force require an assessment of available evidence, uncertainty, civilian risk, and legal obligations.

Human involvement must be meaningful rather than merely formal.

A person approving an automated recommendation without sufficient understanding or opportunity to challenge it does not necessarily provide effective oversight.

Future security systems must therefore prioritize the quality of decision-making rather than the speed of technological processing alone.

Human Intelligence in an Increasingly Digital Environment

Technological intelligence has become central to modern counterterrorism.

However, human intelligence remains important.

Information obtained from people may provide insight into intentions, relationships, and organizational developments that cannot always be understood through technical surveillance.

The October 7 attacks demonstrated the difficulty of assessing an adversary's intentions.

A military organization may possess visible capabilities while concealing its decision to use them.

Human intelligence can sometimes help address such uncertainty.

However, human sources also have limitations.

Information may be incomplete, inaccurate, manipulated, or influenced by personal motivations.

Human intelligence must therefore be evaluated alongside other evidence.

The future of Israeli counterterrorism is likely to depend on combining technological capabilities with careful human analysis.

Neither approach provides certainty on its own.

The Future of Mossad's Overseas Operations

Mossad has historically played an important role in Israel's efforts to identify and counter threats beyond its borders.

Its activities have included foreign intelligence collection and operations associated with individuals and organizations considered threats to Israeli security.

The international dimensions of Hamas's political and financial networks make foreign intelligence relevant to Israel's future strategy.

However, overseas operations create diplomatic and legal challenges.

Actions conducted in another state's territory may raise questions concerning sovereignty, the use of force, and international law.

They may also affect relations with governments whose cooperation is important for regional security.

The future role of Mossad must therefore be considered within a broader strategic framework.

Operational capability does not automatically establish that a particular action is legally justified or politically beneficial.

The long-term value of overseas intelligence activities depends partly on whether they contribute to preventing attacks without producing wider instability.

Shin Bet and the Changing Nature of Counterterrorism

Shin Bet's responsibilities include counterterrorism intelligence and internal security.

Its future role will be shaped by the lessons of October 7 and the continuing challenge posed by armed organizations.

The agency's ability to identify threats depends on intelligence collection, analysis, and cooperation with other institutions.

However, the October 7 failure demonstrated that operational experience does not eliminate the risk of mistaken assumptions.

Institutional reform must therefore address analytical culture and accountability.

It must also ensure that counterterrorism measures comply with applicable legal standards.

Effective security institutions require public confidence.

That confidence depends not only on operational achievements but also on lawful conduct and credible oversight.

Aman and the Reform of Military Intelligence

Aman plays a central role in assessing military threats.

The October 7 attacks exposed serious weaknesses in its understanding of Hamas's intentions and capabilities.

Future reform must examine how military intelligence assessments are produced, communicated, and challenged.

The Jericho Wall document became an important example of the problem.

Israeli intelligence possessed information describing elements of a possible large-scale Hamas attack.

Yet the threat was not translated into sufficient defensive preparation.

The lesson is not that every intelligence warning must be treated as proof of an imminent attack.

Rather, potentially catastrophic scenarios require careful assessment even when their probability appears limited.

Military intelligence must distinguish between confidence in an assessment and certainty about the future.

Special Forces and Targeted Operations

Israel's specialized military and counterterrorism units will likely remain important elements of its security system.

These include units associated with intelligence-supported operations, hostage rescue, and other specialized military missions.

The rescue of four hostages from Nuseirat in June 2024 demonstrated the potential effectiveness of cooperation between intelligence agencies and specialized forces.

However, that operation also caused extensive Palestinian casualties and generated serious legal and humanitarian concerns.

Future strategy must therefore assess both operational capability and the consequences of military action.

Targeted operations may disrupt armed networks.

They may remove individuals involved in planning attacks.

They may also create risks for civilians, hostages, military personnel, and regional stability.

The question is not simply whether Israel can conduct such operations.

It is whether they contribute to long-term security while complying with applicable law.

The Limits of Leadership Targeting

Israel's campaign against Hamas resulted in the deaths of several senior leaders.

These losses affected the organization's leadership and military structures.

However, Hamas had survived earlier campaigns against its commanders.

The organization demonstrated an ability to replace leaders and adapt its structures.

This history suggests that targeted operations may weaken an armed organization without necessarily eliminating it.

The future effectiveness of leadership targeting must therefore be assessed through broader indicators.

Has the organization's ability to plan attacks been reduced?

Can it maintain effective command structures?

Does it retain access to weapons and resources?

Can it recruit and train replacements?

And can it recover under future political and security conditions?

The death of a senior leader is an operational result.

Lasting security requires evidence of sustained reductions in the threat.

Preventing the Reconstruction of Hamas's Military Capabilities

A central Israeli security objective is preventing Hamas from restoring the capabilities that enabled October 7.

This involves questions concerning weapons, infrastructure, financing, recruitment, and external support.

However, preventing military reconstruction is different from preventing civilian reconstruction.

Gaza requires extensive rebuilding of homes, hospitals, schools, water systems, and other essential infrastructure.

Measures intended to prevent weapons transfers must therefore be distinguished from restrictions that unnecessarily obstruct humanitarian recovery.

The challenge is creating effective security arrangements without treating the entire civilian population as a military threat.

Such arrangements require reliable verification, lawful controls, and cooperation among relevant authorities.

A sustainable strategy must address military risks while allowing ordinary civilian life to recover.

The Future Governance of Gaza

The political future of Gaza is inseparable from Israel's long-term security.

Before October 7, Hamas exercised governing authority in the territory.

Israel's military campaign sought to dismantle the organization's governing and military capabilities.

However, removing an existing authority creates the question of what replaces it.

A functioning civilian administration is necessary for public services, reconstruction, law enforcement, and economic recovery.

Without effective governance, armed groups may find opportunities to regain influence.

Proposals for Gaza's future have included roles for Palestinian institutions, technocratic administrations, regional governments, and international support mechanisms.

Each option raises questions concerning legitimacy, security, and political feasibility.

A durable arrangement must be capable of serving Gaza's civilian population while preventing armed organizations from rebuilding military control.

Military force alone cannot establish such an administration.

The Palestinian Authority and Political Legitimacy

The Palestinian Authority has been proposed as a possible participant in future governance arrangements for Gaza.

However, its authority and legitimacy have been contested.

The division between Hamas and Fatah has shaped Palestinian politics since 2007.

National elections have not produced a renewed unified political mandate for many years.

A future governing arrangement must therefore confront the issue of political representation.

Institutions require public confidence to function effectively.

A government viewed as externally imposed or lacking legitimacy may struggle to maintain authority.

At the same time, legitimate political participation must be accompanied by commitments to civilian protection, lawful governance, and the rejection of attacks against civilians.

The future of Gaza cannot be resolved solely through decisions made by Israeli authorities or foreign governments.

Palestinian political agency is an essential part of any sustainable arrangement.

Regional Cooperation as a Security Strategy

Israel's security challenges extend beyond Gaza.

Iran, Hezbollah, and other armed organizations have shaped the regional security environment.

Hamas has maintained relationships with regional actors, including Iran.

These relationships have influenced its political and military development.

Regional cooperation may therefore be important in preventing renewed threats.

Intelligence sharing, diplomatic engagement, border security, and efforts to disrupt illicit weapons transfers can contribute to security.

However, regional relationships are complex.

Governments have different political interests and domestic constraints.

Cooperation on one issue does not necessarily imply agreement on every aspect of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Future security arrangements will depend partly on whether regional actors can identify areas of practical cooperation.

Egypt's Strategic Role

Egypt has a particularly important position because it shares a border with Gaza.

The Rafah crossing has been central to humanitarian access, evacuations, and security discussions.

Egypt has also played an important role in mediation between Israel and Hamas.

Its involvement reflects both geographic proximity and longstanding diplomatic relationships.

Future arrangements concerning Gaza will likely require cooperation with Egypt.

However, border security must be considered alongside humanitarian obligations and the rights of civilians.

Egypt has expressed concerns about security and the possibility of permanent Palestinian displacement.

These concerns have influenced its policies.

A sustainable regional arrangement must address legitimate security interests without making civilian populations bear the consequences of unresolved political disputes.

The United States and Israeli Security

The United States remains one of Israel's most important security partners.

The relationship includes military assistance, intelligence cooperation, diplomatic engagement, and defense technology.

Following October 7, the United States supported Israel's security while also expressing concerns about civilian casualties and humanitarian conditions in Gaza.

American officials participated in diplomatic efforts concerning hostages and ceasefire negotiations.

Future cooperation may involve intelligence reform, defensive capabilities, and regional security arrangements.

However, American support does not eliminate the need for independent Israeli decision-making and accountability.

Nor does strategic cooperation remove international legal obligations.

The relationship will continue to be influenced by developments in Gaza, regional diplomacy, and domestic political debates in both countries.

Iran and the Broader Regional Threat

Iran's relationships with Hamas, Hezbollah, and other armed organizations have long been central to Israeli security concerns.

Israeli authorities view Iran as a major strategic adversary.

Iranian support for armed groups has contributed to tensions across the region.

The confrontation has involved military, intelligence, diplomatic, and political dimensions.

Future Israeli counterterrorism strategy must therefore consider the regional environment.

However, policies directed toward Iran also carry risks of escalation.

Military operations may produce consequences extending beyond the immediate target.

Regional stability requires careful assessment of these risks.

A strategy focused exclusively on military confrontation may overlook opportunities for diplomacy, deterrence, and conflict prevention.

The challenge is preventing genuine security threats without producing wider instability.

The Importance of International Law

Future Israeli counterterrorism strategy must operate within the framework of international law.

The October 7 attacks involved grave violations, including deliberate killings of civilians and hostage-taking.

Israel has a responsibility to protect its population.

However, counterterrorism operations remain subject to legal restrictions.

International humanitarian law requires distinction, proportionality, and feasible precautions during armed conflict.

International human rights law may also impose relevant obligations depending on the circumstances.

Operations conducted abroad raise additional questions concerning sovereignty and the lawful use of force.

The existence of a serious security threat does not eliminate these requirements.

A credible security strategy must therefore integrate legal assessment into operational planning and oversight.

Compliance with international law is not separate from strategic effectiveness.

Unlawful conduct can undermine legitimacy, damage diplomatic relationships, and contribute to further instability.

Accountability After October 7

The future of Israel's security system depends partly on how it confronts the failures of October 7.

Internal military and intelligence investigations can identify operational weaknesses.

However, broader questions concerning political decisions and national security policy require credible examination.

Families of victims and survivors have demanded accountability.

The debate over an independent state commission of inquiry has reflected wider concerns about institutional responsibility.

A meaningful investigation must examine intelligence assessments, military readiness, political oversight, and the decisions made before and during the attacks.

It must also distinguish between individual mistakes and systemic failures.

The objective should not be limited to assigning blame.

It should include identifying changes necessary to prevent similar failures.

Public confidence cannot be rebuilt through declarations of reform alone.

It requires demonstrable institutional change.

Democratic Oversight and Security Institutions

Intelligence agencies and military organizations often operate with substantial secrecy.

Secrecy may be necessary to protect sources, personnel, and operations.

However, it also creates challenges for democratic accountability.

Citizens cannot independently evaluate information that remains classified.

Political leaders may depend heavily on assessments produced by security institutions.

Parliamentary and judicial oversight therefore play important roles.

Effective oversight must be capable of examining institutional performance without unnecessarily exposing sensitive information.

The October 7 failure demonstrated the importance of questioning established security assumptions.

A democratic security system must allow serious scrutiny even of institutions with strong operational reputations.

Accountability should strengthen national security rather than be treated as a threat to it.

The Psychological Dimension of Future Security

October 7 caused profound trauma in Israeli society.

Families lost relatives.

Communities were attacked.

Hostages were taken into Gaza.

Public confidence in security institutions was severely damaged.

The subsequent war also caused devastating suffering among Palestinian civilians.

These experiences will influence political attitudes and perceptions of security for years.

A future strategy must recognize the psychological consequences of prolonged conflict.

Fear can influence political decisions.

Trauma can deepen distrust.

Repeated violence can make compromise appear increasingly difficult.

However, security policy must be based on evidence and long-term objectives rather than fear alone.

Protecting civilians requires effective institutions and realistic assessments.

It also requires avoiding policies that perpetuate insecurity.

Can Military Superiority Produce Lasting Security?

Israel possesses substantial military and technological advantages over Hamas.

These advantages allow it to conduct operations that Hamas cannot match in scale or sophistication.

However, October 7 demonstrated that military superiority does not guarantee protection against every threat.

The subsequent war demonstrated that extensive military operations do not automatically produce a stable political outcome.

The distinction between military dominance and lasting security is essential.

A state may defeat particular armed formations while continuing to face threats from smaller networks.

It may destroy infrastructure while failing to establish a durable political arrangement.

It may eliminate senior commanders while an organization retains ideological or political influence.

Military capabilities are therefore necessary components of security, but they are not sufficient on their own.

The Risk of an Endless Counterterrorism Campaign

One of the central challenges facing Israel is the possibility of a prolonged cycle of military operations.

If armed organizations repeatedly rebuild after suffering losses, security policy may become dependent on continuing interventions.

Such a strategy can impose substantial costs.

Military personnel face recurring risks.

Civilian populations experience repeated disruption.

Regional tensions may remain unresolved.

International relationships may be affected.

The effectiveness of counterterrorism must therefore be judged partly by whether it reduces the need for future military operations.

A strategy that requires indefinite large-scale intervention may achieve important short-term objectives without resolving the underlying security problem.

The question is whether military pressure can create conditions for a more durable arrangement.

A Strategy Combining Security and Political Solutions

A sustainable approach is likely to require several interconnected elements.

Effective intelligence and military readiness are necessary to identify and prevent attacks.

Border security must be capable of responding to unexpected threats.

Measures to prevent weapons transfers and military reconstruction may remain important.

However, these measures must be accompanied by functioning civilian institutions and credible governance.

Diplomatic engagement may help establish arrangements that reduce the risk of renewed conflict.

Economic recovery and reconstruction can support civilian stability.

International cooperation may contribute resources, monitoring, and political support.

None of these elements guarantees success.

However, reliance on only one element is unlikely to resolve a conflict involving military, political, historical, and social dimensions.

The Future of Counterterrorism in an Uncertain Region

Israel's future security environment will remain influenced by regional developments.

The relationships between Iran, Hezbollah, Hamas, and other armed organizations may change.

Regional governments may adjust their diplomatic priorities.

Technological developments will continue to influence intelligence and military operations.

Political changes within Israel and Palestinian society may also affect future security arrangements.

These uncertainties make rigid strategic assumptions particularly dangerous.

The October 7 failure demonstrated the consequences of treating an assessment of an adversary's intentions as a settled fact.

Future counterterrorism policy must remain adaptable.

It must distinguish between threats that are documented and scenarios that remain speculative.

It must also recognize that military capabilities and political conditions can change.

What Would a Successful Future Strategy Look Like?

The ultimate measure of Israeli counterterrorism should be the protection of civilians and the prevention of future attacks.

A successful strategy would reduce the ability of armed organizations to conduct mass-casualty assaults.

It would maintain reliable intelligence and effective defensive capabilities.

It would ensure that warnings receive serious attention.

It would preserve lawful oversight of military and intelligence institutions.

It would also contribute to regional arrangements that reduce the likelihood of renewed conflict.

For Gaza, a sustainable outcome would require functioning civilian institutions, reconstruction, and security arrangements capable of preventing the restoration of major armed networks.

These objectives are difficult.

They involve political decisions that military institutions cannot make alone.

However, they provide a more meaningful measure of success than the number of commanders killed or military facilities destroyed.

The Central Lesson of October 7

The most important lesson of October 7 is that sophisticated intelligence and military power cannot substitute for accurate judgment.

Israel possessed advanced technology.

It had experienced intelligence agencies.

It maintained extensive border defenses.

Yet Hamas succeeded in carrying out a devastating assault.

The failure emerged from a combination of mistaken assumptions, inadequate preparedness, and institutional weaknesses.

The subsequent campaign demonstrated Israel's capacity to inflict major damage on Hamas's military organization.

However, it also revealed the limits of military force as a complete solution.

The future of Israeli counterterrorism must therefore be built on two principles.

The first is that genuine threats require serious, evidence-based security responses.

The second is that lasting security cannot be measured solely through military operations.

It must also be measured through prevention, accountability, lawful conduct, effective governance, and the reduction of future violence.

Beyond Counterterrorism: The Search for Lasting Security

Israel's counterterrorism strategy is entering a period shaped by the lessons of October 7 and the consequences of the Gaza war.

The attacks demonstrated the catastrophic risks of underestimating an adversary.

The subsequent military campaign demonstrated the power of intelligence-supported operations and the difficulties of eliminating an entrenched armed organization.

The deaths of senior Hamas leaders weakened important parts of the organization's leadership.

Military operations damaged infrastructure and disrupted armed networks.

Yet the broader challenge remains.

How can Israel prevent Hamas or another armed organization from rebuilding the capacity to carry out attacks against civilians?

The answer cannot depend solely on identifying and eliminating individual commanders.

It requires intelligence institutions capable of challenging their own assumptions.

It requires military defenses prepared for unexpected scenarios.

It requires effective cooperation with regional and international partners.

It requires adherence to international law and meaningful accountability.

And it requires confronting the political conditions that influence the future of Gaza and the wider Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

The protection of Israeli civilians and the protection of Palestinian civilians are not mutually exclusive objectives.

Both are essential to any sustainable future.

The ultimate purpose of counterterrorism should be to reduce the threat of violence, not to create a permanent condition in which military force becomes the only available response.

For Israel, the challenge is to transform the lessons of October 7 into a security system that is more realistic, accountable, and resilient.

For the region, the challenge is even broader: creating political and security conditions in which another catastrophe becomes less likely.

The history of Israel's campaign against Hamas demonstrates that intelligence, technology, and military force can achieve significant operational results.

But whether those achievements can produce lasting security remains the most important question.

That question leads to the conclusion of this investigation.

Next: Conclusion — Can Hamas Be Defeated Through Military Force Alone?

Conclusion — Can Hamas Be Defeated Through Military Force Alone?

The Limits of Military Power and the Search for Lasting Security

The campaign against Hamas has become one of the most consequential security operations in Israel's history.

It has involved intelligence agencies, special forces, advanced surveillance technologies, artificial intelligence, underground warfare, hostage rescue missions, and operations against senior political and military leaders.

It has also exposed profound weaknesses in Israel's security system, generated international legal controversy, and caused immense suffering among civilians.

At the center of this investigation lies a question that cannot be answered simply by examining the outcome of individual military operations.

Can Hamas be defeated through military force alone?

The evidence presented throughout this investigation suggests that military force can severely damage Hamas's capabilities, disrupt its command structures, and reduce its ability to organize attacks.

However, the history of the organization also demonstrates that leadership losses and military defeats do not necessarily result in its permanent disappearance.

The distinction between weakening Hamas, dismantling its military infrastructure, removing its governing authority, and eliminating its political or ideological influence is essential.

These are different objectives.

They require different measures of success.

And they cannot all be achieved through the same methods.

The future of Israeli security will depend on whether military achievements can be translated into lasting changes in the conditions that allowed Hamas to develop and operate.

October 7 Changed Everything

The Hamas-led attacks of October 7, 2023, represented a catastrophic failure of Israeli security.

Approximately 1,200 people were killed in Israel, and 251 were taken hostage.

Civilian communities, military installations, and a music festival were attacked.

The assault involved deliberate violence against civilians and hostage-taking, acts prohibited under international humanitarian law.

The consequences extended far beyond the immediate casualties.

Families lost relatives.

Survivors experienced severe trauma.

Communities near Gaza were devastated.

The hostage crisis became a continuing national emergency.

The attacks also destroyed confidence in assumptions that had shaped Israeli security policy.

For years, Israeli authorities had regarded Hamas as a dangerous adversary but had increasingly operated on the assumption that the organization could be deterred from initiating a major confrontation.

That assumption proved disastrously wrong.

Hamas had prepared an operation that Israeli institutions failed to prevent despite possessing substantial intelligence and surveillance capabilities.

October 7 therefore demonstrated that military and technological superiority cannot guarantee security when an adversary's intentions are misunderstood.

The Failure Was Not Simply Technological

Israel possessed advanced surveillance systems, border defenses, intelligence capabilities, and military resources before October 7.

Its security institutions monitored Hamas's activities and collected information concerning the organization's capabilities.

Yet important warnings were not translated into adequate defensive preparation.

The failure involved intelligence interpretation, institutional assumptions, communication, military readiness, and political oversight.

This distinction matters.

A country can collect extensive information and still fail to understand what it means.

An intelligence agency can possess advanced technology and still underestimate an adversary.

A defensive system can appear sophisticated while remaining vulnerable to an unexpected combination of threats.

The most important lesson is therefore not that Israel simply needed more technology.

It needed institutions capable of challenging their own conclusions, recognizing uncertainty, and preparing for scenarios that contradicted prevailing expectations.

That lesson will remain relevant long after the immediate military campaign.

The Power of Israel's Intelligence Network

Following October 7, Israel demonstrated substantial intelligence and military capabilities.

Mossad, Shin Bet, Aman, and specialized military units contributed to a campaign involving the identification of Hamas leaders, analysis of military networks, and support for complex operations.

Advanced surveillance technologies provided important intelligence capabilities.

Human intelligence remained essential.

Specialized forces conducted operations in difficult environments.

Israeli forces located and killed several senior Hamas figures, including Yahya Sinwar, Mohammed Deif, and Marwan Issa.

These losses were significant.

Experienced leaders possess knowledge, authority, relationships, and organizational influence that cannot always be replaced easily.

Their removal can disrupt communication, coordination, and planning.

However, operational success should not be confused with strategic completion.

The death of a commander does not automatically destroy the organization that commander helped lead.

A military network may lose experienced personnel while retaining weapons, infrastructure, and the ability to recruit.

The effectiveness of intelligence operations must therefore be judged by their lasting consequences, not simply by the importance of the individuals targeted.

The Limits of Targeted Killing

Israel has pursued Hamas leaders for decades.

Senior figures were killed long before the Gaza war that followed October 7.

Among them were Yahya Ayyash, Ahmed Yassin, Abdel Aziz al-Rantisi, and Ahmed Jabari.

Yet Hamas survived.

It replaced leaders, adapted its structures, and continued developing military capabilities.

This history does not mean that targeted operations achieved nothing.

Individual operations may have disrupted attacks, weakened networks, or removed experienced planners.

However, the organization's continued existence demonstrates that targeted killing alone did not eliminate the threat.

The same distinction applies to the post-October 7 campaign.

The removal of senior Hamas figures represents important military achievements.

Whether those achievements produce lasting security depends on the organization's remaining capabilities and the conditions under which it might recover.

A list of eliminated commanders cannot substitute for a comprehensive assessment of military effectiveness.

The Underground War

Hamas's tunnel infrastructure became one of the defining features of the conflict.

The network provided underground spaces used for military movement, concealment, storage, and other activities.

Some tunnels were associated with the detention of hostages.

The network complicated Israeli military operations and created serious risks in densely populated areas.

Israel sought to locate and destroy substantial portions of this infrastructure.

However, underground warfare also demonstrated the difficulties of translating military superiority into complete control.

The destruction of a tunnel does not necessarily eliminate every associated military network.

The discovery of underground infrastructure does not automatically establish the military status of every civilian building above it.

And operations against tunnels can produce serious consequences for civilians and infrastructure at ground level.

The underground campaign therefore illustrates both the military challenges posed by Hamas and the legal and humanitarian constraints governing Israel's response.

The Hostage Crisis Revealed the Limits of Force

The hostage crisis became one of the most painful dimensions of the war.

Israeli intelligence and specialized forces conducted several successful rescue operations.

The recovery of individual hostages demonstrated the value of intelligence cooperation, preparation, and specialized military capabilities.

The Nuseirat rescue in June 2024, in which four hostages were recovered, became a prominent example.

However, the operation also resulted in extensive Palestinian casualties and generated serious humanitarian and legal questions.

Other hostages were released through negotiated arrangements.

The crisis demonstrated that military force and diplomacy were not interchangeable.

Military operations could sometimes recover captives.

Negotiations could also secure releases that military operations might not achieve.

The continuing danger to hostages further complicated military decision-making.

A strategy intended to protect civilians must account for the safety of those held captive as well as the broader consequences of military action.

The hostage crisis showed that even exceptional operational capabilities have limits.

Civilian Casualties Cannot Be Treated as a Secondary Question

The Israeli campaign against Hamas caused devastating humanitarian consequences in Gaza.

Large numbers of Palestinians were killed or injured.

Residential neighborhoods suffered extensive destruction.

Families were repeatedly displaced.

Hospitals, schools, water systems, and other essential infrastructure were severely affected.

These consequences are not peripheral to evaluating the war.

They are central to understanding its conduct and long-term effects.

Israeli authorities argued that Hamas operated within civilian environments and used underground infrastructure beneath populated areas.

Allegations concerning the use of human shields and civilian facilities for military purposes require serious examination.

However, the presence of military activity within populated areas does not eliminate the legal protection of civilians.

International humanitarian law requires distinction, proportionality, and feasible precautions.

Hamas's violations do not excuse unlawful conduct by Israeli forces.

Likewise, allegations concerning Israeli military conduct do not excuse Hamas's deliberate attacks against civilians.

The same legal standards must be applied consistently.

The protection of civilians cannot depend on nationality, religion, political affiliation, or public sympathy.

Human Shields and the Responsibility of Armed Organizations

Hamas's military presence within Gaza's densely populated environment raised serious concerns about civilian protection.

Israeli authorities accused the organization of using civilian infrastructure and civilians to shield military activity.

Some publicly documented incidents support concerns about military activity in or near civilian areas.

However, allegations must be assessed individually.

The presence of armed personnel near civilians does not automatically prove deliberate human shielding.

Where civilians are deliberately used to shield military objectives, that conduct is prohibited.

Nevertheless, the use of human shields does not remove the attacking party's obligations to protect civilians.

This distinction is fundamental.

International humanitarian law does not allow one party's violations to become unrestricted permission for the other party to use force.

The responsibility of Hamas and the responsibility of Israeli forces must be examined independently.

Military Superiority Is Not the Same as Strategic Victory

Israel possesses substantial advantages in intelligence, technology, airpower, and conventional military capabilities.

These advantages enabled it to inflict severe losses on Hamas.

However, military superiority does not automatically resolve the political and organizational conditions that sustain an armed movement.

Hamas has historically combined political institutions, governing structures, ideological commitments, and military capabilities.

Weakening one dimension does not necessarily eliminate the others.

An organization may lose its senior commanders while retaining supporters.

It may lose established military formations while smaller armed groups continue operating.

It may lose governing authority while preserving political influence.

These distinctions make the concept of defeating Hamas more complicated than a conventional battlefield victory.

A realistic assessment must identify which capabilities have been destroyed, which remain, and which could be restored.

Can Hamas Rebuild?

The possibility of Hamas rebuilding its military networks remains a central strategic question.

The organization suffered substantial leadership and infrastructure losses.

However, its future capabilities depend on several factors.

These include recruitment, financial resources, external relationships, weapons availability, organizational cohesion, and the security environment in Gaza.

Iran's historical support for Hamas is relevant to this assessment.

So are border arrangements and efforts to prevent illicit weapons transfers.

However, military reconstruction must be distinguished from civilian reconstruction.

Gaza requires functioning hospitals, schools, housing, water systems, and economic institutions.

Preventing military threats cannot justify treating all civilian recovery as suspicious.

A sustainable approach must combine effective security measures with the protection of legitimate civilian needs.

The future of Hamas cannot be predicted solely from the destruction of its existing infrastructure.

It will depend on whether the conditions necessary for organizational recovery remain available.

Governance May Prove as Important as Military Operations

One of the most difficult questions following the war concerns the future administration of Gaza.

Hamas exercised governing authority in the territory before October 7.

Israel sought to dismantle both its military and governing capabilities.

However, removing an existing authority creates a political and administrative vacuum unless an alternative can function effectively.

Civilian institutions are necessary for public services, policing, education, healthcare, reconstruction, and economic activity.

Without effective governance, armed organizations may find opportunities to regain influence.

A credible administration requires resources, legitimacy, security, and public confidence.

These cannot be created solely through military operations.

The future of Gaza must also involve meaningful Palestinian political participation.

A governing arrangement lacking local legitimacy may struggle to establish durable authority.

The question of governance is therefore not separate from Israeli security.

It is one of the conditions that may determine whether renewed armed conflict can be prevented.

The Role of Regional Powers

The conflict cannot be understood solely through events inside Israel and Gaza.

Iran has played an important role in supporting Hamas and other armed organizations opposed to Israel.

Egypt has been central to border security and mediation.

Qatar has played a significant diplomatic role in hostage and ceasefire negotiations.

The United States has remained a major Israeli security partner.

Other regional governments have influenced diplomatic initiatives and political discussions concerning the future of Gaza.

These relationships demonstrate that lasting security requires more than bilateral military confrontation.

Regional actors may contribute to arrangements concerning humanitarian assistance, reconstruction, security, and political administration.

However, their interests differ.

Diplomatic cooperation cannot be assumed.

It must be developed through arrangements that recognize the security concerns and political responsibilities of the parties involved.

International Law and Accountability

The war generated major legal controversies.

International investigations and proceedings examined allegations concerning attacks on civilians, hostage-taking, humanitarian restrictions, and the conduct of military operations.

The International Criminal Court pursued individual criminal responsibility.

The International Court of Justice addressed proceedings brought under the Genocide Convention.

These institutions perform different legal functions.

Arrest warrants are not convictions.

Provisional measures are not final determinations that genocide occurred.

Allegations must be distinguished from established judicial findings.

At the same time, the absence of a final judgment does not mean that serious allegations should be ignored.

Credible investigations are essential.

The rule of law requires that responsibility be assessed through evidence and applicable legal standards.

This principle applies to Hamas leaders, Israeli officials, and all other individuals whose conduct falls within the relevant legal frameworks.

The Information War and the Responsibility of Journalism

The conflict has also demonstrated how information can become a weapon.

Hamas used political messaging, military communications, and hostage-related material to influence audiences.

Israeli authorities used official briefings, public diplomacy, and military disclosures to explain and defend their operations.

International media, activists, foreign governments, and social media platforms contributed to the wider information environment.

Some material provided essential evidence.

Other claims were misleading, incomplete, or deliberately manipulated.

The rapid circulation of photographs, videos, and emotionally charged narratives made independent verification increasingly difficult.

For journalism, the central responsibility is to distinguish between evidence and assertion.

Official claims should be attributed.

Disputed incidents should be investigated.

Legal allegations should be described accurately.

Uncertainty should be acknowledged where facts cannot be established.

The purpose of investigative reporting is not to reproduce the preferred narrative of any government or armed organization.

It is to examine what happened, explain the evidence, and identify what remains unknown.

Israel's Security Requires Institutional Accountability

October 7 demonstrated that Israel's security failures were not limited to the capabilities of Hamas.

They also involved Israeli decision-making.

The interpretation of intelligence, military preparedness, assumptions about deterrence, and communication between institutions require serious examination.

Institutional accountability is therefore essential.

A future security system must be capable of challenging established assessments.

Warnings must be evaluated on their merits.

Political leaders and security institutions must understand the limitations of intelligence.

Technology must support rather than replace human judgment.

These reforms are necessary because future threats may not resemble previous attacks.

The lesson of October 7 is not simply that Hamas was underestimated.

It is that a security system can become vulnerable when its assumptions are treated as certainty.

The Danger of Permanent War

A strategy based primarily on repeated military operations risks becoming an indefinite campaign.

An armed organization may suffer losses and then adapt.

New leaders may emerge.

Smaller networks may replace larger formations.

Political instability may create opportunities for renewed violence.

Military pressure may therefore need to be repeated without producing a stable outcome.

This creates significant costs.

Israeli civilians may continue facing security threats.

Palestinian civilians may experience recurring destruction and displacement.

Regional tensions may remain unresolved.

International relationships may deteriorate.

A strategy that repeatedly disrupts an armed organization without preventing its recovery may achieve tactical results while failing to establish lasting security.

The objective must therefore be to reduce the need for future military operations, not simply to demonstrate the capacity to conduct them.

Security and Political Solutions Are Not Opposites

Military and political measures are sometimes presented as competing approaches.

In reality, lasting security may require both.

Israel must be able to protect its population against armed attacks.

Intelligence, defensive capabilities, and lawful counterterrorism operations remain important.

However, political arrangements can influence whether armed organizations are able to recruit, govern, and rebuild.

Effective civilian institutions may reduce instability.

Regional cooperation may help prevent weapons transfers and support reconstruction.

Diplomatic agreements may create mechanisms for addressing disputes before they escalate into violence.

None of these measures guarantees peace.

However, the historical record does not support the conclusion that military force alone can resolve every dimension of the conflict.

Security arrangements must address immediate threats while creating conditions that make renewed violence less likely.

The Human Cost Must Remain Central

The strategic debate often focuses on military capabilities, political objectives, and territorial control.

Yet the consequences are experienced by individuals.

Israeli families continue to live with the trauma of October 7 and the hostage crisis.

Palestinian families have experienced extensive loss, displacement, and destruction during the war.

These experiences are different, but neither can be dismissed.

A serious examination of the conflict must recognize the humanity of civilians on both sides.

The deliberate killing of Israeli civilians cannot be justified through political grievances.

The suffering of Palestinian civilians cannot be dismissed because Hamas operates within Gaza.

Civilian protection is not a concession to an adversary.

It is a fundamental obligation.

Any strategy claiming to produce lasting security must ultimately be judged by whether it reduces the danger faced by civilians.

What Would Defeating Hamas Actually Mean?

The question of defeating Hamas requires a clear definition.

If defeat means removing particular senior commanders, Israel has achieved significant results.

If it means damaging military infrastructure, the campaign has also produced substantial effects.

If it means ending Hamas's ability to conduct coordinated large-scale attacks, the answer requires continued assessment of the organization's actual capabilities.

If it means eliminating Hamas as a political or ideological movement, military operations alone are unlikely to be sufficient.

These different objectives should not be confused.

A government may declare victory based on battlefield achievements while the wider political conflict remains unresolved.

Conversely, the continued existence of an organization does not prove that military operations have failed to weaken it.

A credible assessment must be specific.

It must identify the intended objective and examine whether the evidence demonstrates that it has been achieved.

The Future Will Be Determined Beyond the Battlefield

The future of Israeli security depends on several interconnected developments.

Israel's intelligence institutions must learn from the failures of October 7.

Its military defenses must be capable of responding to unexpected threats.

The remaining capabilities of Hamas and other armed organizations must be assessed accurately.

Effective arrangements are needed to prevent renewed attacks and the rebuilding of major military networks.

Gaza requires functioning civilian governance and extensive reconstruction.

Regional actors must determine whether they can support credible security and political arrangements.

International legal obligations must remain central to military and governmental conduct.

These challenges cannot be resolved through a single operation or the removal of one leader.

They require sustained institutional, political, and diplomatic efforts.

Final Assessment — Can Hamas Be Defeated Through Military Force Alone?

The findings of this investigation support a clear but qualified conclusion.

Military force can severely weaken Hamas. It can disrupt command structures, destroy military infrastructure, remove experienced leaders, and prevent particular attacks. But military force alone has not demonstrated an ability to permanently eliminate the organization or resolve the wider conditions that allow armed conflict to continue.

Israel's intelligence and military operations have produced significant results.

The removal of senior Hamas figures represents substantial losses for the organization.

The destruction of military infrastructure has affected its capabilities.

However, the history of Hamas demonstrates organizational resilience.

Previous leadership losses did not prevent the organization from rebuilding.

The October 7 attacks exposed the consequences of underestimating that resilience.

The subsequent war demonstrated both the power and the limitations of Israel's military response.

The long-term outcome will depend on whether the organization's military capabilities remain degraded and whether credible security and political arrangements prevent their restoration.

For Israel, lasting success must mean more than the death of Hamas commanders.

It must mean that Israeli civilians can live without the threat of another mass-casualty assault.

For Palestinians in Gaza, a sustainable future must include civilian protection, functioning institutions, reconstruction, and a political environment that does not condemn successive generations to repeated warfare.

These objectives are difficult, but they are not inherently incompatible.

A future in which Israeli civilians are secure and Palestinian civilians can live with safety and dignity is a more meaningful measure of strategic success than the outcome of any single military operation.

The central lesson of this investigation is that intelligence, technology, and military power are indispensable instruments of national security, but they are not substitutes for sound judgment, accountability, lawful conduct, and political strategy.

October 7 demonstrated what happens when a security system misunderstands an adversary.

The war that followed demonstrated the immense human and political consequences of confronting that adversary through sustained military force.

The challenge now is to ensure that the lessons of both are not lost.

The ultimate measure of Israel's campaign against Hamas will not be how many leaders were eliminated, how many tunnels were destroyed, or how many operations were completed. It will be whether another October 7 can be prevented—and whether that security can endure without an endless cycle of war.

That remains the most consequential question for Israel, Gaza, and the wider Middle East.

Beyond the Lines — Independent Journalism, Context Beyond the Headlines.

Sources and References

Inside Israel's Hunt for Hamas: Intelligence, Secret Operations, Advanced Technology and the Military Campaign Against Hamas

1. Israeli Intelligence, Military Operations and October 7

Israel Defense Forces (IDF)
Official military statements, operational updates, and investigations into the events of October 7, 2023.

https://www.idf.il/en/

IDF — The October 7 Inquiries
Official investigations examining military preparedness, operational failures, and the attacks on Israeli communities.

https://www.idf.il/en/mini-sites/710-the-inquiries/

Israel Security Agency (Shin Bet)
Official information concerning Israel's domestic security and counterterrorism agency.

https://www.shabak.gov.il/en/

Mossad — Israeli Intelligence and Special Operations Institute
Official institutional information about Israel's foreign intelligence service.

https://www.mossad.gov.il/en

Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Government statements, diplomatic positions, and material concerning the October 7 attacks and the Gaza war.

https://www.gov.il/en/departments/ministry_of_foreign_affairs/govil-landing-page

2. October 7, Hamas and the Hostage Crisis

Human Rights Watch — “I Can't Erase All the Blood from My Mind”: Palestinian Armed Groups' October 7 Assault on Israel (2024)

An extensive investigation documenting killings, hostage-taking, and other crimes committed during the Hamas-led attacks.

https://www.hrw.org/news/2024/07/17/october-7-crimes-against-humanity-war-crimes-hamas-led-groups

United Nations Human Rights Office (OHCHR)

Reports and investigations concerning attacks against civilians, hostage-taking, the conduct of hostilities, and alleged violations of international law.

https://www.ohchr.org/en

International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)

Information on the legal protection of civilians, hostages, detainees, medical personnel, and humanitarian operations.

https://www.icrc.org/en

3. Hamas Leadership and Targeted Operations

Reuters — Middle East Reporting

Independent reporting on the deaths of senior Hamas leaders, Israeli military operations, hostage negotiations, and regional developments.

https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/

Associated Press — Middle East Coverage

Reporting on Hamas's political and military leadership, Israeli operations, and the wider consequences of the war.

https://apnews.com/hub/middle-east

International Crisis Group — Israel/Palestine

Analysis of Hamas, Palestinian politics, regional security, and the strategic consequences of armed conflict.

https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/east-mediterranean-mena/israelpalestine

4. Military Technology, Intelligence and Artificial Intelligence

Royal United Services Institute (RUSI)

Research on modern warfare, intelligence, military technology, drones, and the strategic challenges of armed conflict.

https://www.rusi.org/

Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)

Research and analysis concerning Middle Eastern security, military strategy, intelligence, and emerging technologies.

https://www.csis.org/

International Committee of the Red Cross — International Humanitarian Law

Legal analysis relevant to military targeting, emerging technologies, and the protection of civilians.

https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en

5. Civilian Casualties and Humanitarian Conditions in Gaza

United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs — Occupied Palestinian Territory (OCHA)

Humanitarian situation reports concerning casualties, displacement, infrastructure damage, and access to essential services.

https://www.ochaopt.org/

World Health Organization (WHO)

Reports concerning Gaza's healthcare system, hospitals, medical personnel, and humanitarian health needs.

https://www.who.int/

UNICEF — State of Palestine

Reporting on children, displacement, education, health, and humanitarian conditions.

https://www.unicef.org/sop/

United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA)

Information on humanitarian assistance, shelters, education, and the effects of the war on Palestinian refugees.

https://www.unrwa.org/

6. International Humanitarian Law and Civilian Protection

International Committee of the Red Cross — Customary International Humanitarian Law

Rules concerning distinction, proportionality, precautions, civilian protection, human shields, and the conduct of hostilities.

https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/customary-ihl/v1

ICRC — Conduct of Hostilities and Protection of Civilians

An explanation of the legal principles governing attacks and the protection of civilians during armed conflict.

https://www.icrc.org/en/law-and-policy/conduct-hostilities-and-protection-civilians

ICRC — Targeting Under International Humanitarian Law

Legal analysis of military objectives, proportionality, and precautions.

https://casebook.icrc.org/highlight/targeting-under-international-humanitarian-law

7. International Criminal Court and International Court of Justice

International Criminal Court (ICC) — Situation in the State of Palestine

Official proceedings concerning alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity.

https://www.icc-cpi.int/palestine

ICC — Arrest Warrants for Benjamin Netanyahu and Yoav Gallant, November 21, 2024

Official judicial information concerning the warrants and the allegations underlying them.

https://www.icc-cpi.int/news/situation-state-palestine-icc-pre-trial-chamber-i-rejects-state-israels-challenges

ICC — Arrest Warrant for Mohammed Diab Ibrahim al-Masri (Mohammed Deif), November 21, 2024

Official information concerning allegations of crimes committed during the October 7 attacks and related events. Proceedings against Deif were subsequently terminated following confirmation of his death.

https://www.icc-cpi.int/news/situation-state-palestine-icc-pre-trial-chamber-i-issues-warrant-arrest-mohammed-diab-ibrahim

International Court of Justice (ICJ) — South Africa v. Israel

Official case materials concerning proceedings under the Genocide Convention, including provisional-measures orders.

https://www.icj-cij.org/case/192

8. Independent Human Rights Investigations

Human Rights Watch — Israel and Palestine

Investigations concerning attacks on civilians, military operations, hostage-taking, humanitarian conditions, and alleged violations of international law.

https://www.hrw.org/middle-east/north-africa/israel/palestine

Amnesty International — Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territory

Human rights investigations, including allegations concerning military operations, civilian protection, and international crimes.

https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/middle-east-and-north-africa/middle-east/israel-and-the-occupied-palestinian-territory/

United Nations Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and Israel

Reports investigating violations and abuses involving different parties to the conflict.

https://www.ohchr.org/en/hr-bodies/hrc/co-israel/index

9. Regional Security, Iran and Hamas's External Relationships

International Crisis Group

Research concerning Iran, Israel, Hamas, regional armed groups, diplomacy, and conflict prevention.

https://www.crisisgroup.org/

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace — Middle East

Analysis of regional politics, security relationships, governance, and diplomatic developments.

https://carnegieendowment.org/

Council on Foreign Relations — Middle East and North Africa

Background research concerning Hamas, Iran, Israeli security, and regional politics.

https://www.cfr.org/middle-east-and-north-africa

10. Information Warfare and Independent Verification

Reuters — Investigations and International Reporting

Reporting and verification of major developments, military claims, and contested incidents.

https://www.reuters.com/

Associated Press

Independent reporting and fact-checking concerning the conflict.

https://apnews.com/

BBC Verify

Investigations using open-source evidence, imagery, and other verification methods.

https://www.bbc.com/news

Bellingcat

Open-source investigations and verification methods relevant to conflict reporting.

https://www.bellingcat.com/

Editorial and Methodological Note

This investigation draws on official Israeli military and government material, international legal documents, United Nations reporting, humanitarian organizations, human rights investigations, and independent news coverage.

Official statements from governments, military organizations, and armed groups are treated as attributed claims unless independently corroborated.

Casualty figures and assessments of military effectiveness may change as new evidence becomes available.

Legal allegations are distinguished from judicial findings. Arrest warrants do not constitute convictions, and provisional measures issued by the International Court of Justice do not constitute a final determination on the merits.

The inclusion of a source does not imply endorsement of every conclusion reached by that organization.

The objective of this investigation is to examine Israel's campaign against Hamas through documented evidence, historical context, military analysis, and the applicable principles of international law.

Beyond the Lines — Independent Journalism, Context Beyond the Headlines.