> ## Content Index > Fetch the complete content index at: https://beyondthelines.news/llms.txt > Use this file to discover other available public pages before exploring further. # Black September 1970: - URL: https://beyondthelines.news/black-september-1970-jordan-plo/ - Published: 2026-10-15T19:35:47.000Z - Updated: 2026-10-15T19:35:47.000Z - Description: How Black September reshaped Jordan, the PLO and the Middle East, leaving a lasting legacy of conflict, sovereignty and political distrust. - Author: Leonie Raffaelli - Tags: Middle-east, Palestinian History, Jordan, PLO, Black September ### **When Palestinian Militants Challenged Jordan — And the Consequences for the Arab World** *How a violent confrontation between Palestinian armed organisations and Jordan's monarchy reshaped regional politics, challenged state sovereignty and left a legacy that continues to influence the Middle East.* ## Introduction — A Conflict the World Rarely Discusses When the history of the Palestinian national movement is discussed, the narrative frequently begins with the establishment of Israel in 1948, the displacement of Palestinians, or the Israeli occupation of territories captured during the Six-Day War in 1967. Yet one of the most consequential chapters in Palestinian political history unfolded not in Israel, Gaza, or the West Bank, but in an Arab country: Jordan. In September 1970, the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan descended into a violent confrontation between its armed forces and Palestinian guerrilla organisations operating within its borders. The conflict became known as **Black September**. It was not simply a dispute between a government and a refugee population. It was a struggle over political authority, armed power, national sovereignty and the ability of a state to control militant organisations operating on its territory. During the years preceding the confrontation, Palestinian guerrilla factions had developed an increasingly powerful presence in Jordan. Some established armed checkpoints, openly carried weapons, conducted military operations against Israel from Jordanian territory and challenged the authority of King Hussein. For the Jordanian monarchy, the question became increasingly urgent: could a sovereign state continue to function while armed organisations operated with considerable independence inside its borders? For Palestinian militants, Jordan represented both a strategic base for their struggle against Israel and a territory with a substantial Palestinian population. For Palestinian civilians, many of whom had already experienced displacement and war, the confrontation brought another devastating period of violence and uncertainty. The crisis reached its breaking point in September 1970, following a series of escalating confrontations and the hijacking of international passenger aircraft by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine. Jordan's army launched a major military offensive against Palestinian armed groups. The fighting caused extensive destruction, killed thousands according to some historical estimates, and contributed to the eventual removal of the Palestine Liberation Organization's armed presence from Jordan in 1971. The consequences extended far beyond Jordan. Palestinian armed factions subsequently consolidated their presence in Lebanon, where tensions involving the Lebanese state, local communities, Israel and competing armed organisations contributed to a deeply unstable political environment. The events also raised questions among Arab governments about the relationship between supporting Palestinian national aspirations and allowing armed Palestinian factions to operate independently within their territories. These questions would reappear in different forms in Lebanon, Kuwait and elsewhere. But Black September also requires an important distinction. The decisions of militant organisations cannot be treated as the collective responsibility of Palestinian civilians, refugees or an entire people. To understand why the events of 1970 mattered, it is necessary to examine the political and military developments that made the confrontation possible. And that history begins decades before Black September itself. --- ## Chapter 1 — Before Black September: How Jordan Became the Centre of the Palestinian Question To understand the violence that erupted in Jordan in September 1970, it is necessary to examine the political geography of the Middle East after the establishment of Israel in 1948. Jordan was not simply a neighbouring Arab country observing the Israeli–Palestinian conflict from a distance. It had become one of the principal destinations for Palestinian refugees, a major political centre for Palestinian nationalism and, eventually, a strategic base for armed organisations seeking to confront Israel. This combination would fundamentally alter Jordan's internal political balance. ### The 1948 War and the Palestinian Refugee Crisis Following the United Nations partition proposal of 1947 and the establishment of Israel in May 1948, war broke out between Israel and neighbouring Arab states. The conflict produced profound demographic changes. Hundreds of thousands of Palestinian Arabs fled or were displaced from their homes. Many crossed into territories controlled by neighbouring Arab countries, including Jordan, Lebanon and Syria. Jordan played a particularly significant role. During the war, Jordanian forces occupied the West Bank, including East Jerusalem. In 1950, Jordan formally annexed these territories, a move that received limited international recognition. Large numbers of Palestinians subsequently became Jordanian citizens, creating a political and demographic situation different from that in several other Arab countries hosting Palestinian refugees. For King Abdullah I, and later King Hussein, the incorporation of the West Bank brought both opportunities and considerable challenges. Jordan now governed a population with strong Palestinian national, social and political identities. The monarchy sought to integrate these communities into the Jordanian state, but tensions persisted over representation, loyalty, political authority and the future of Palestine. ### The Six-Day War Changed Everything In June 1967, Israel fought Egypt, Jordan and Syria in what became known as the Six-Day War. Israel captured the West Bank and East Jerusalem from Jordan, the Gaza Strip and Sinai Peninsula from Egypt, and the Golan Heights from Syria. For Jordan, the loss of the West Bank was a major strategic and political defeat. Another large movement of displaced Palestinians crossed the Jordan River into the East Bank, increasing the already substantial Palestinian population living under the Hashemite monarchy. At the same time, Palestinian armed organisations began expanding their operations from Jordanian territory. The Palestine Liberation Organization, established in 1964, increasingly became an independent political and military actor rather than an organisation operating primarily under the influence of Arab governments. For many Palestinians, these organisations represented an effort to reclaim political agency after repeated military defeats and displacement. For Jordan's leadership, however, their growing military independence presented a serious challenge. ### The Rise of Armed Palestinian Organisations By the late 1960s, several Palestinian guerrilla organisations were operating in Jordan. Among the most influential were Fatah, associated with Yasser Arafat, and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), a revolutionary Marxist organisation. Their objectives and methods were not identical. Fatah focused on Palestinian national liberation through armed struggle, while the PFLP combined Palestinian nationalism with a broader revolutionary ideology and employed international aircraft hijackings as a tactic. The Battle of Karameh in March 1968 significantly increased the prestige of Palestinian guerrilla groups. During the battle, Israeli forces attacked Palestinian militant positions in Jordan. Jordanian soldiers also fought Israeli forces, and the engagement became an important symbol of resistance for both Jordanians and Palestinians. Although the battle's military outcome remains subject to differing interpretations, its political consequences were considerable. Palestinian armed organisations attracted new recruits, funding and regional attention. Their growing popularity strengthened their ability to operate independently of Jordan's government. ### A State Within a State As Palestinian guerrilla organisations expanded, tensions with Jordanian authorities intensified. Armed fighters increasingly appeared in public spaces, maintained checkpoints and operated military structures outside the ordinary command of the Jordanian state. Some factions challenged the monarchy openly, while others sought to avoid a direct confrontation. The distinction was important: the Palestinian national movement was not a single organisation with one unified strategy. Nevertheless, the combined presence of heavily armed factions created an increasingly unstable environment. Military operations launched against Israel from Jordanian territory also exposed Jordan to Israeli retaliation. King Hussein faced a difficult political calculation. Suppressing Palestinian organisations risked alienating large sections of the country's Palestinian population and provoking wider Arab opposition. Allowing those organisations to continue operating independently, however, threatened the monarchy's authority and Jordan's ability to control its own territory. By 1970, repeated confrontations demonstrated that the situation was becoming unsustainable. The dispute was no longer solely about the Palestinian struggle against Israel. It had become a confrontation over who exercised authority inside Jordan itself. ### The Growing Divide Between Arab Solidarity and National Sovereignty The crisis exposed a contradiction that would continue to shape Middle Eastern politics. Arab governments publicly supported Palestinian national aspirations, but that support did not necessarily mean they were willing to surrender control of their territory to Palestinian armed organisations. Jordan's monarchy regarded the survival of the state as its primary responsibility. Palestinian guerrilla factions, meanwhile, considered armed resistance essential to their national struggle. Those competing priorities created a confrontation in which political solidarity could no longer conceal fundamental disagreements over sovereignty, military authority and security. The consequences would become devastating in September 1970. **The central question was no longer whether Jordan supported the Palestinian cause. It was whether the Jordanian government or independent armed organisations would ultimately control the country.** ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/25/d6/25d63f5d-099c-45e8-ad1b-346bc1c986ba/content/images/2026/10/Arafat_in_Jordan.jpg) Yasser Arafat, Nayef Hawatmeh and Kamal Nasser during a press conference in Amman, Jordan, June 1970, as Palestinian armed organisations expanded their political influence in the kingdom. ## Chapter 2 — The Rise of the PLO in Jordan: Armed Power, Political Ambitions and the Challenge to State Authority By the late 1960s, Jordan had become much more than a refuge for Palestinians displaced by successive Arab–Israeli wars. It had also become one of the most important operational centres for Palestinian armed organisations. What began as a movement seeking to confront Israel gradually developed into a complicated struggle involving political influence, military independence and the authority of the Jordanian state. For King Hussein, the growing presence of Palestinian guerrilla organisations presented an increasingly serious dilemma. Jordan publicly supported the Palestinian national cause, but the monarchy was unwilling to accept the emergence of an independent military authority within its borders. For Palestinian leaders, particularly those associated with Fatah and the Palestine Liberation Organization, Jordan provided an essential geographical and political base from which to continue their struggle against Israel. The resulting confrontation would eventually threaten the stability of the entire kingdom. ### The Formation of the Palestine Liberation Organization The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) was established in 1964 following an initiative supported by the Arab League. Its original purpose was to represent Palestinian national aspirations and coordinate efforts toward Palestinian self-determination. During its early years, the organisation operated under considerable influence from Arab governments, particularly Egypt under President Gamal Abdel Nasser. However, the Arab defeat in the Six-Day War of June 1967 fundamentally changed the political environment. The loss of the West Bank, Gaza Strip, East Jerusalem, Sinai Peninsula and Golan Heights weakened confidence in the ability of Arab governments to achieve Palestinian national objectives through conventional military confrontation. Palestinian guerrilla organisations increasingly argued that Palestinians needed to take direct responsibility for their own national struggle. Among the most influential of these movements was Fatah. Founded in the late 1950s by Palestinian activists, including Yasser Arafat, Fatah advocated armed struggle as a central instrument of Palestinian national liberation. Its influence expanded considerably after 1967. In February 1969, Yasser Arafat became chairman of the PLO's Executive Committee, marking a significant shift in the organisation's leadership. The PLO was increasingly dominated by Palestinian guerrilla movements rather than representatives operating primarily under the direction of Arab governments. This transformation strengthened the organisation's independence but also created new tensions with the states in which its armed factions operated. Jordan would become the clearest example of those tensions. ### Jordan as a Military and Political Base Jordan's geographical position made it strategically important to Palestinian guerrilla organisations. Its western border ran alongside the Israeli-controlled West Bank, providing opportunities for infiltration, cross-border attacks and military operations against Israeli targets. Following the 1967 war, Palestinian armed factions established training facilities, operational headquarters and logistical networks in Jordanian territory. Refugee camps and Palestinian communities became important environments for political mobilisation and recruitment, although the civilian population was far from uniformly supportive of the various armed factions. The guerrilla organisations also received financial and political assistance from supporters throughout the Arab world. Some Arab governments regarded Palestinian armed resistance as an essential component of the broader struggle against Israel. Others viewed the increasingly independent organisations with concern, particularly when their operations threatened regional stability or challenged established governments. For Jordan, the consequences were immediate. Attacks launched from Jordanian territory could provoke Israeli military retaliation, exposing Jordanian soldiers and civilians to violence. The monarchy therefore faced the consequences of military activities that it did not always authorise or control. This created an increasingly dangerous imbalance between responsibility and authority. Jordan remained internationally accountable for events within its borders, while armed organisations exercised considerable freedom to conduct operations independently. ### The Battle of Karameh and the Growth of Palestinian Prestige One of the most important developments occurred on 21 March 1968, during the Battle of Karameh. Israeli forces entered Jordanian territory to attack Palestinian guerrilla positions near the town of Karameh, where Fatah maintained an important presence. Jordanian armed forces also engaged the Israeli military. The battle resulted in casualties on all sides and became a major political event throughout the Arab world. Although historians differ in their assessments of its military outcome, Palestinian organisations portrayed the confrontation as evidence that armed resistance could challenge Israel. Fatah's reputation grew significantly. The battle also strengthened the prestige of the Jordanian army, whose soldiers had participated directly in the fighting. Nevertheless, the political benefits for Palestinian guerrilla organisations were substantial. Recruitment increased, financial contributions expanded and the movement attracted greater attention from Arab media and political leaders. For Yasser Arafat, Karameh became an important symbol of Palestinian determination. For King Hussein, however, the growing popularity of the guerrilla movements created a new problem. Armed organisations that had initially operated with a degree of Jordanian tolerance were becoming increasingly confident in their political and military independence. Their growing influence would soon extend beyond operations directed against Israel. ### The Emergence of Parallel Authority By 1969 and early 1970, tensions between the Jordanian government and Palestinian armed organisations had become increasingly visible. In certain areas, guerrilla fighters openly carried weapons, established checkpoints and exercised influence over local security arrangements. Some factions interfered with the movement of civilians and challenged the authority of Jordanian police and military personnel. Armed organisations maintained their own command structures, political leadership and internal disciplinary systems. The result was an increasingly fragmented security environment. Jordanian authorities could not always enforce government decisions without risking confrontation with heavily armed fighters. The expression "a state within a state" became associated with the Palestinian guerrilla presence. Although it did not describe every Palestinian organisation or every area of Jordan equally, it reflected the monarchy's growing concern that its authority was being undermined. The problem was not the existence of Palestinian political identity or the presence of Palestinian refugees. It was the development of armed structures operating outside the authority of the Jordanian government. For any sovereign state, competing military command structures represent a serious security challenge. In Jordan, the issue was particularly sensitive because the country was already dealing with the consequences of war, territorial loss and significant demographic changes. ### Radical Factions and Revolutionary Ambitions The Palestinian national movement was not politically unified. Fatah, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine and other organisations differed in ideology, strategy and their relationships with Arab governments. The PFLP, founded by George Habash in 1967, adopted a revolutionary Marxist orientation and argued that Palestinian liberation was connected to wider political transformation throughout the Arab world. Some radical factions regarded conservative Arab monarchies as obstacles to revolutionary change. This placed them in direct ideological opposition to Jordan's Hashemite monarchy. While Arafat and Fatah often attempted to balance armed resistance with political considerations, more radical organisations were willing to pursue confrontational tactics that could destabilise neighbouring states. The PFLP became particularly associated with international aircraft hijackings, which it used to draw global attention to the Palestinian cause and pressure governments. These operations endangered civilians and challenged international aviation security. The growing use of such tactics intensified the Jordanian government's concerns. King Hussein was no longer confronting only the question of cross-border attacks against Israel. He was also facing armed political movements whose ambitions and methods could directly threaten the survival of his government. ### King Hussein's Increasingly Difficult Position King Hussein had ruled Jordan since 1952, becoming one of the central political figures in the region. His government depended on the loyalty of the armed forces, the continuity of the Hashemite monarchy and the maintenance of relationships with influential regional and international partners. The Palestinian guerrilla presence complicated each of these priorities. The king faced pressure from different directions. Within Jordan, supporters of the monarchy demanded that the government restore control over armed groups operating independently. Palestinian organisations argued that restrictions on their activities would undermine resistance against Israel. Across the Arab world, leaders publicly supported the Palestinian cause, making a direct Jordanian military confrontation with Palestinian factions politically sensitive. Israel, meanwhile, regarded attacks launched from Jordanian territory as a security threat and responded with military operations. The monarchy therefore faced a dangerous combination of domestic instability, external military pressure and regional political expectations. Attempts to negotiate arrangements governing guerrilla activities produced temporary agreements but failed to resolve the underlying conflict. The central disagreement remained unchanged. Could Palestinian armed organisations continue operating as independent military forces inside Jordan, or would they be required to submit to Jordanian state authority? Neither side was prepared to abandon its fundamental position. ### The Escalation of Violence in 1970 During the first half of 1970, clashes between Jordanian security forces and Palestinian guerrilla organisations became increasingly frequent. The government attempted to impose restrictions on armed activity, while factions resisted measures they regarded as threats to their operations. Armed confrontations occurred in Amman and other areas. The security situation became increasingly unpredictable for civilians. Political negotiations repeatedly failed to produce a lasting settlement. The crisis became especially serious in June 1970, when major fighting broke out between Jordanian forces and Palestinian guerrillas. The violence demonstrated that the conflict had moved beyond political disagreement. Both sides possessed organised armed forces capable of inflicting significant casualties. The situation deteriorated further when King Hussein survived assassination attempts during the escalating crisis, including an attack on his motorcade in September. These events strengthened the monarchy's perception that its survival was at risk. For Jordanian authorities, restoring state control was becoming an urgent priority. For Palestinian armed factions, accepting government restrictions threatened the military independence they had developed since 1967. The possibility of a full-scale confrontation was growing. ### The Question of Palestinian Representation The political crisis also exposed an important distinction between Palestinian civilians and the organisations claiming to represent their national aspirations. Many Palestinians living in Jordan were citizens, workers, business owners, students and families seeking stability after years of displacement. Their political views varied considerably. Some supported the guerrilla organisations, while others were concerned about the violence and instability associated with armed activity. Palestinians also served in Jordanian institutions, including the country's security forces and government structures. The conflict therefore cannot accurately be described as a simple confrontation between Jordanians and Palestinians. It was primarily a struggle between the Jordanian state and Palestinian armed organisations, although its consequences affected communities across the country. This distinction is essential when examining the longer-term legacy of Black September. The actions of militant factions influenced how regional governments assessed security risks, but they did not represent the political choices of every Palestinian. ### A Confrontation Moving Toward Civil War By the summer of 1970, Jordan was approaching a decisive moment. The monarchy had repeatedly attempted to limit the independence of Palestinian guerrilla organisations. The armed factions continued to maintain substantial military capabilities and resisted efforts to place them under Jordanian authority. Public confrontations, military clashes and competing political ambitions made compromise increasingly difficult. At the same time, the PFLP was preparing an operation that would transform Jordan's internal crisis into an international emergency. In September 1970, the organisation carried out a series of aircraft hijackings that brought global attention to the confrontation and placed enormous pressure on King Hussein. The hijackings became one of the immediate catalysts for the Jordanian government's decision to launch a major military offensive. What followed would become one of the bloodiest episodes in modern Jordanian history. **Black September was approaching, and the struggle over military authority inside Jordan was about to erupt into open warfare.** ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/25/d6/25d63f5d-099c-45e8-ad1b-346bc1c986ba/content/images/2026/10/Dawson_field_aircrafts-_Jordan-_6_September_1970.png) Hijacked aircraft at Dawson's Field in Jordan during the September 1970 crisis. The hijackings by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine intensified the confrontation between Palestinian armed organisations and King Hussein's government. ## Chapter 3 — The Challenge to King Hussein: Assassination Attempts, Aircraft Hijackings and the Collapse of State Authority By the summer of 1970, the confrontation between Jordan's Hashemite monarchy and Palestinian armed organisations had reached a dangerous turning point. What had begun as a dispute over the presence of guerrilla fighters on Jordanian territory was developing into a direct challenge to the authority of King Hussein. Armed clashes were becoming increasingly frequent. Political agreements were repeatedly violated or interpreted differently by the opposing sides. Palestinian factions maintained independent military structures, while Jordanian security forces struggled to enforce government authority in areas where guerrilla organisations exercised considerable influence. For the Jordanian monarchy, the situation was becoming increasingly difficult to control. The central question was no longer whether Palestinian armed organisations should be permitted to operate against Israel from Jordanian territory. It was whether the Jordanian state could continue to function while armed groups openly challenged its authority. In September 1970, a series of dramatic events would bring the crisis to its breaking point. ### A Monarchy Under Increasing Pressure King Hussein had spent much of his reign attempting to balance Jordan's national interests with the broader political expectations of the Arab world. The Palestinian question occupied a central position in this delicate balancing act. Jordan had absorbed large numbers of Palestinians following the wars of 1948 and 1967, and the monarchy maintained close political, economic and social ties with Palestinian communities. At the same time, Jordan's leadership sought to prevent the kingdom from becoming a permanent battlefield between Palestinian guerrilla organisations and Israel. The increasing independence of armed factions made this objective difficult. Some Palestinian organisations openly criticised the monarchy, portraying conservative Arab governments as obstacles to the Palestinian national struggle. More radical groups promoted revolutionary political ideas that challenged the legitimacy of existing Arab political systems. For King Hussein, these developments raised concerns that extended beyond the immediate military threat. The monarchy faced the possibility that armed organisations operating within Jordan could eventually attempt to determine the country's political future. The Jordanian army remained loyal to the king, but repeated confrontations with guerrilla fighters placed increasing pressure on the government to act decisively. Every attempt to impose restrictions risked provoking further violence. Every compromise risked being interpreted as evidence that the monarchy was losing control. ### The Erosion of Government Authority By 1970, Palestinian guerrilla organisations had established a visible armed presence in parts of Jordan, particularly around Amman and areas with significant Palestinian populations. Fighters carried weapons openly, maintained checkpoints and operated within military command structures that were independent of Jordanian authorities. Some factions interfered with civilian movement and challenged the ability of police and government officials to enforce national laws. The situation created competing centres of authority. For ordinary Jordanians and Palestinians, the consequences could be immediate. Residents faced armed confrontations, disruptions to daily life and growing uncertainty about which institutions controlled local security. Businesses and public services were vulnerable to instability. Jordanian soldiers and police officers increasingly encountered armed groups unwilling to recognise their authority. The government also faced international consequences. Military operations launched against Israel from Jordanian territory exposed the kingdom to Israeli retaliation, even when the Jordanian government had not authorised those attacks. This created a serious problem of national sovereignty. Jordan was expected to exercise responsibility for events within its borders, yet it could not consistently control the armed organisations operating there. The monarchy regarded this situation as increasingly unacceptable. ### The June 1970 Clashes in Amman In June 1970, tensions erupted into major fighting between Jordanian security forces and Palestinian guerrilla organisations. Armed confrontations spread through parts of Amman, demonstrating how rapidly political disagreements could escalate into urban warfare. The clashes involved competing military positions, armed patrols and attacks that placed civilians in danger. The fighting caused casualties and significant disruption. Attempts to negotiate a ceasefire eventually reduced the immediate violence, but they did not resolve the underlying dispute. The Palestinian factions continued to resist restrictions on their military independence. Jordanian authorities remained determined to restore effective control over the country's security. The June clashes revealed that both sides were prepared to use force. They also demonstrated the limitations of political agreements that were not supported by a mutually accepted system of military authority. The country was moving toward a confrontation that temporary negotiations could no longer prevent. ### The Threat to King Hussein's Life The crisis became even more serious as King Hussein himself faced direct threats. During the escalating confrontations of 1970, the king survived attempts on his life. One particularly serious incident occurred on 1 September, when his motorcade came under fire near Amman. The attack reinforced the monarchy's perception that the conflict had become an immediate threat to the survival of the Hashemite state. The precise responsibility for particular attacks and the degree of coordination among Palestinian factions have been subjects of historical debate. It would therefore be misleading to attribute every attempt against the king to the PLO as a unified organisation. Nevertheless, the attacks took place within a broader environment in which armed factions were increasingly challenging Jordanian state authority. For the king and his military commanders, the distinction between political opposition and an armed threat to the monarchy was becoming increasingly difficult to maintain. The Jordanian army's leadership pressed for stronger action. The confrontation was approaching a decisive stage. ### The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine Among the Palestinian organisations operating during this period, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine played a particularly important role in escalating the crisis. Founded in 1967 and led by George Habash, the PFLP combined Palestinian nationalism with revolutionary Marxist politics. The organisation viewed the struggle against Israel as part of a broader confrontation with Western influence and conservative political systems in the Middle East. Its leadership believed that spectacular international operations could attract global attention to the Palestinian cause and pressure governments to respond to Palestinian demands. Aircraft hijackings became one of its most notorious tactics. Unlike conventional guerrilla operations directed against military targets, these attacks involved civilian aircraft, passengers and international aviation networks. The strategy deliberately transformed regional political grievances into international security crises. For Jordan, the consequences would be profound. The PFLP's activities increasingly demonstrated that a Palestinian faction operating from Jordanian territory could make decisions with enormous international consequences without the approval of the Jordanian government. The monarchy would soon face an unprecedented challenge. ### September 1970: The Dawson's Field Hijackings On 6 September 1970, PFLP operatives launched a coordinated series of international aircraft hijackings. The operation became known as the Dawson's Field hijackings. Several passenger aircraft were targeted in operations involving international routes. A Trans World Airlines Boeing 707 and a Swissair Douglas DC-8 were hijacked and diverted to an abandoned airfield near Zarqa, Jordan. The airfield became known internationally as Dawson's Field. A separate attempt to hijack an El Al aircraft failed after a confrontation aboard the plane. One hijacker was killed, while Leila Khaled, a prominent PFLP operative, was arrested after the aircraft landed in Britain. Another aircraft, operated by Pan American World Airways, was hijacked and eventually flown to Cairo, where the passengers were evacuated before the plane was destroyed. On 9 September, a British Overseas Airways Corporation aircraft was also hijacked and taken to Dawson's Field. The hijackings created an international emergency involving multiple governments, airlines and hundreds of passengers. The PFLP demanded the release of Palestinian prisoners and other militants held in different countries. The operation attracted enormous international attention. It also placed Jordan at the centre of a crisis that its government had neither authorised nor controlled. ### Hostages in the Jordanian Desert At Dawson's Field, passengers and crew members were held under the control of armed hijackers. The situation attracted worldwide media coverage. Images of passenger aircraft standing in the desert became powerful symbols of the crisis. The hijackers released many passengers during the negotiations, while others remained in captivity. The treatment and selection of hostages raised serious concerns about discrimination and the deliberate targeting of people according to nationality and perceived political significance. For the governments involved, the immediate priority was securing the release of the hostages. For Jordan, however, the crisis carried an additional political meaning. An armed organisation operating within its territory had effectively taken control of an airfield and was conducting international negotiations through the detention of civilian passengers. The Jordanian government had been pushed aside in a matter involving foreign nationals, international aviation security and the country's sovereign territory. This was not merely a diplomatic embarrassment. It was a direct demonstration of the government's inability to exercise complete authority within its own borders. ### The Destruction of the Aircraft On 12 September 1970, after most passengers had been removed from the aircraft at Dawson's Field, PFLP militants destroyed three hijacked passenger planes with explosives. The destruction was widely photographed and broadcast internationally. The images shocked audiences around the world. The operation demonstrated the PFLP's willingness to use civilian aviation as an instrument of political pressure. It also intensified the Jordanian government's determination to confront armed organisations operating independently within the kingdom. The hijackings did not create the conflict between the monarchy and Palestinian guerrilla factions. That conflict had been developing for years. But the events at Dawson's Field became an immediate catalyst for the military confrontation that followed. They exposed the depth of the crisis and weakened the possibility of another temporary political compromise. ### Arafat, Fatah and the Problem of Fragmented Leadership The hijackings also revealed important divisions within the Palestinian national movement. Yasser Arafat, who chaired the PLO and led Fatah, did not exercise complete operational control over every organisation associated with the Palestinian national movement. The PFLP maintained its own leadership, ideology and military decision-making structures. Although the organisations shared broad Palestinian national objectives, they frequently disagreed over strategy and tactics. The PFLP's hijackings created a crisis that affected the entire Palestinian guerrilla presence in Jordan, including factions that had not organised the operation. For Arafat, the situation was politically dangerous. He needed to maintain his position within the Palestinian movement while avoiding a confrontation that could destroy its principal operational base. For King Hussein, however, the fragmentation of Palestinian leadership made negotiations increasingly difficult. Agreements reached with one faction could not necessarily guarantee compliance by others. The absence of unified control over armed groups contributed to the collapse of trust between the Jordanian government and Palestinian guerrilla organisations. The monarchy increasingly concluded that negotiations alone could not restore state authority. ### Jordan's Sovereignty Versus Revolutionary Armed Struggle The crisis exposed a fundamental contradiction in the relationship between the Palestinian guerrilla movement and the Jordanian state. Palestinian armed organisations argued that their struggle against Israel required military independence and freedom of operation. Jordan's government maintained that no armed organisation could legitimately exercise authority outside the state's command structure. Both positions reflected different political priorities. For Palestinian guerrilla leaders, the struggle for national liberation was central to their identity and legitimacy. For King Hussein, the survival of Jordan as a functioning sovereign state was non-negotiable. The situation became especially dangerous when some militant factions treated Jordanian government restrictions as obstacles to their revolutionary objectives. The monarchy interpreted such actions as challenges to its political authority. Jordanian soldiers increasingly viewed the guerrilla organisations as an internal military threat. The confrontation was no longer limited to disputes over border operations or political rhetoric. It had become a struggle over the state's monopoly on armed force. ### The Decision to Restore Control Following the Dawson's Field hijackings and the continuing deterioration of security, King Hussein moved toward a decisive military response. On 16 September 1970, the king appointed a military government under Brigadier Mohammad Daoud. The decision signalled that the monarchy was preparing to confront Palestinian armed organisations through the Jordanian armed forces. The following day, major fighting began. Jordanian troops, supported by tanks and artillery, moved against Palestinian guerrilla positions in Amman and other areas. The offensive marked the beginning of the most intense phase of Black September. The fighting would involve urban combat, artillery bombardment and severe consequences for civilians. Regional governments would become involved, and the conflict would threaten to develop into a wider international crisis. The Jordanian monarchy was determined to reassert its authority. Palestinian armed organisations were equally determined to resist military defeat. The confrontation that had developed over several years had finally become open warfare. ### The Wider Consequences of the Crisis The events leading to Black September illustrated how an armed movement operating within another country's borders could create profound challenges for national sovereignty. The PFLP's aircraft hijackings were particularly significant because they demonstrated the ability of a non-state organisation to provoke an international crisis while operating from territory controlled by a government that had not authorised its actions. For Jordan, the problem was not simply political disagreement with Palestinian leaders. It was the existence of armed organisations capable of conducting military operations, challenging domestic security forces and pursuing international objectives outside government control. These developments would influence how other Arab governments approached the presence of Palestinian armed factions in subsequent decades. However, the crisis also demonstrated the dangers of treating an entire civilian population as responsible for the actions of militant organisations. Palestinian civilians living in Jordan did not share a single political position, and many would suffer directly from the violence that followed. The events of September 1970 therefore require an examination of both the armed organisations that challenged Jordanian authority and the military response of the Jordanian state. By the middle of September 1970, diplomacy had largely failed, the monarchy's authority had been openly challenged, and Jordan stood on the edge of a devastating internal war. The next phase would determine not only the survival of King Hussein's government, but also the future of Palestinian armed organisations in Jordan and their relationship with the wider Arab world. ## Chapter 4 — Black September 1970: The Jordanian Civil War and the Battle for State Sovereignty On 17 September 1970, the political confrontation that had been building inside Jordan for several years erupted into full-scale military conflict. Jordanian armed forces launched a major offensive against Palestinian guerrilla organisations operating within the kingdom. Tanks entered urban areas, artillery struck militant positions, and fierce fighting spread through parts of Amman and other locations. The confrontation became known as Black September, one of the most violent and consequential episodes in modern Jordanian history. For King Hussein, the military operation represented an attempt to restore the authority of the Jordanian state after years of escalating tensions with Palestinian armed factions. For the Palestine Liberation Organization and its affiliated guerrilla groups, the offensive threatened the survival of their principal military and political base. For civilians, including Palestinian refugees and Jordanian residents, the fighting brought destruction, displacement and considerable loss of life. The conflict would ultimately transform the relationship between the Palestinian national movement and the Arab governments that had previously provided it with political and territorial support. ### September 17: The Jordanian Army Moves Against the Guerrillas Following the international aircraft hijackings at Dawson's Field and repeated armed confrontations, King Hussein concluded that the government could no longer tolerate the existence of independent military structures challenging its authority. On 16 September, he appointed a military government headed by Brigadier Mohammad Daoud. The following day, Jordanian forces launched coordinated operations against Palestinian guerrilla positions. The offensive focused heavily on Amman, where Palestinian armed organisations had established a substantial presence. Jordanian tanks and infantry units moved into areas containing guerrilla strongholds. Artillery was used against positions believed to be occupied by Palestinian fighters. The military sought to dismantle armed checkpoints, regain control of important roads and restore government authority over territory where guerrilla factions had operated with considerable independence. Palestinian fighters responded with armed resistance. Fatah and other guerrilla organisations attempted to defend their positions, using small arms and other available weapons against the better-equipped Jordanian military. The confrontation rapidly developed into intense urban warfare. For the Jordanian government, the operation was presented as necessary to defend the state. For Palestinian armed organisations, it represented a military assault on their movement and their ability to continue operations against Israel. The opposing interpretations reflected the political divisions that had made the conflict increasingly difficult to resolve. ### The Battle for Amman Amman became one of the principal centres of the fighting. The Jordanian capital contained government institutions, military facilities, residential neighbourhoods and areas with a substantial Palestinian population. The presence of guerrilla fighters within populated districts made the military confrontation particularly dangerous for civilians. Jordanian forces employed tanks and artillery in operations against armed positions. Palestinian fighters established defensive positions and resisted the army's advance. Fighting occurred in and around residential areas, exposing civilians to gunfire, shelling and the destruction of buildings. The use of heavy weapons in urban environments created significant humanitarian consequences. Homes were damaged, essential services were disrupted, and many residents found themselves trapped between opposing forces. Access to food, water and medical assistance became increasingly difficult in affected neighbourhoods. Hospitals and humanitarian organisations struggled to respond to the growing number of wounded. The conflict demonstrated the devastating consequences of military operations conducted in densely populated areas. Although the Jordanian army possessed a substantial advantage in conventional military equipment, guerrilla resistance complicated efforts to restore control quickly. The fighting continued as both sides attempted to strengthen their positions. ### Palestinian Refugee Camps Caught in the Fighting Palestinian refugee communities were among those most severely affected by the conflict. Many families living in Jordan had already experienced displacement during the wars of 1948 and 1967. For these civilians, Black September brought another period of insecurity and violence. Some refugee camps and Palestinian neighbourhoods had become areas of political mobilisation and guerrilla activity. During the military offensive, the presence of armed fighters in or near civilian communities exposed residents to considerable danger. Jordanian military operations struck areas containing both combatants and civilians. The consequences included deaths, injuries, damage to homes and further displacement. The distinction between Palestinian armed organisations and Palestinian civilians was particularly important during this period. Not every Palestinian resident supported the guerrilla organisations, and many had no direct involvement in the fighting. Nevertheless, civilians living in areas associated with militant activity frequently suffered from the military confrontation. The humanitarian impact became one of the most controversial aspects of the Jordanian offensive. While the monarchy argued that military action was necessary to restore national security, the scale of civilian suffering raised serious questions about the conduct and proportionality of the operations. ### The Military Balance: Jordan's Army Versus Palestinian Guerrilla Forces The opposing forces entered the conflict with very different military capabilities. Jordan possessed an organised national army with established command structures, armoured vehicles, artillery and professional military training. Its forces were accustomed to conventional military operations and remained largely loyal to the monarchy. The Palestinian guerrilla organisations, by contrast, consisted of several factions with different leadership structures, political objectives and operational capabilities. Although they possessed significant quantities of small arms and some heavier weapons, they lacked the conventional military resources available to the Jordanian state. The absence of unified command further complicated their position. Fatah, the PFLP and other organisations did not always agree on strategy or political priorities. This fragmentation weakened their ability to coordinate a sustained military response. Nevertheless, Palestinian fighters were familiar with certain urban areas and possessed experience in guerrilla operations. Their resistance prolonged the confrontation and increased the costs of the Jordanian military campaign. The imbalance in conventional military power would eventually become decisive. ### Syria's Intervention and the Risk of Regional War The conflict quickly developed an international dimension. On 20 September 1970, Syrian armoured forces entered northern Jordan in support of Palestinian forces. The intervention dramatically increased the danger that Jordan's internal conflict could expand into a wider regional war. Syrian tanks advanced into Jordanian territory and engaged Jordanian military units. The intervention was connected to divisions within Syria's leadership and support among certain Syrian political and military figures for Palestinian guerrilla organisations. However, Syria's actions did not represent a unified or uncontested policy among all elements of its leadership. The Syrian air force did not provide the level of support that might have been expected during a major armoured intervention. Jordanian forces responded militarily, and fierce fighting took place in the north. King Hussein now faced a serious threat from both Palestinian guerrilla organisations inside Jordan and Syrian forces crossing the country's border. The confrontation attracted immediate attention from the United States, Israel and other regional governments. ### Israel and the United States Watch the Crisis The possibility that Jordan's monarchy could collapse created significant concern in Washington and Jerusalem. The United States regarded King Hussein as an important regional partner and feared that the conflict could destabilise Jordan and alter the balance of power in the Middle East. Israel also had strong strategic reasons to oppose a Syrian military victory in Jordan. A hostile government or a large Syrian military presence east of the Jordan River could create additional security threats along Israel's eastern frontier. During the crisis, the United States considered military options and coordinated diplomatically with regional partners. Israel undertook military preparations and demonstrated its readiness to respond to developments involving Syrian forces. Israeli aircraft conducted flights intended to signal opposition to the Syrian intervention. The precise influence of these actions on Syria's decision to withdraw remains a subject of historical interpretation. Nevertheless, the crisis demonstrated that Jordan's internal conflict had implications far beyond its borders. The survival of the Hashemite monarchy had become an issue of international strategic importance. ### The Syrian Withdrawal The Syrian intervention ultimately failed to reverse the military balance in Jordan. Jordanian forces resisted the Syrian advance, while the absence of sustained Syrian air support limited the effectiveness of the operation. By 23 September, Syrian forces had withdrawn from Jordanian territory. The withdrawal allowed King Hussein to concentrate more fully on the confrontation with Palestinian guerrilla organisations. It also represented a major political and military success for the Jordanian monarchy. The kingdom had survived a direct challenge involving an external military intervention. However, the internal conflict was far from resolved. Fighting continued in urban areas, and the humanitarian situation remained severe. ### The Human Cost of Black September The number of people killed during Black September remains disputed. Historical accounts provide widely varying estimates, reflecting the difficulty of obtaining reliable casualty records during the fighting and the political controversies surrounding the conflict. Some estimates place the death toll in the thousands, while others suggest substantially higher figures. The uncertainty is important. There is no universally accepted figure that reliably separates Palestinian guerrilla casualties, Jordanian military deaths and civilian fatalities. What is clear is that the fighting caused extensive human suffering. Civilians were killed and wounded. Residential neighbourhoods sustained serious damage. Families were displaced, and many people struggled to obtain food, medical assistance and safe shelter. The use of artillery and armoured forces in populated areas increased the danger to non-combatants. For Palestinian communities, the conflict deepened the trauma of earlier displacement. For Jordanian society, it exposed the destructive consequences of an armed struggle over political authority within the kingdom. The human cost cannot be understood solely through military or political outcomes. Black September was also a humanitarian crisis whose consequences affected thousands of families. ### Arab Governments Attempt to End the Fighting As the violence intensified, Arab leaders attempted to negotiate an end to the confrontation. Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser played an important diplomatic role. An emergency Arab summit was convened in Cairo to address the crisis. King Hussein and Yasser Arafat participated in negotiations intended to halt the fighting and establish arrangements for resolving the conflict. On 27 September 1970, a ceasefire agreement was reached. The agreement sought to end the immediate hostilities and reduce tensions between the Jordanian government and Palestinian organisations. However, the underlying disagreement over armed authority remained unresolved. The monarchy continued to insist that Jordanian sovereignty had to be respected. Palestinian guerrilla organisations sought to preserve their military and political independence. The agreement therefore represented a temporary reduction in violence rather than a permanent political settlement. ### The Death of Gamal Abdel Nasser On 28 September 1970, Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser died suddenly, one day after the Cairo ceasefire agreement. His death marked a major turning point in Arab politics. Nasser had been one of the most influential political figures in the modern Middle East and a prominent advocate of Arab nationalism. He had also played an important role in supporting the Palestinian cause while attempting to manage relations among competing Arab governments. His death removed a significant regional mediator at a moment of exceptional political instability. For Jordan and the Palestinian national movement, the absence of Nasser further complicated efforts to reach a lasting settlement. The political environment of the Middle East was changing rapidly. ### Why the Ceasefire Did Not Resolve the Conflict Despite the September ceasefire, the fundamental political and military disagreements remained. Jordanian authorities were unwilling to permit Palestinian armed organisations to continue exercising independent authority within the kingdom. Palestinian guerrilla leaders, meanwhile, feared that surrendering their military independence would weaken their ability to pursue their national objectives. The result was a fragile and unstable arrangement. Armed confrontations continued intermittently during the following months. The Jordanian government gradually strengthened its military position. Palestinian guerrilla organisations found themselves under increasing pressure. By 1971, the monarchy would launch further operations that ultimately ended the principal Palestinian guerrilla presence in Jordan. The September 1970 fighting had therefore not been the final stage of the conflict. It had established the military and political conditions for the eventual defeat and expulsion of the guerrilla organisations. ### The Question of Responsibility Black September remains a deeply contested historical event because it involved competing claims of political legitimacy, national security and military necessity. The Jordanian monarchy maintained that it had a responsibility to defend the country's sovereignty and protect its institutions from armed organisations operating outside state control. Palestinian guerrilla organisations argued that their armed presence was necessary to continue the struggle against Israel and defend Palestinian national aspirations. However, these political arguments do not eliminate the need to examine the conduct of both sides. The use of aircraft hijackings, hostage-taking and attacks that endangered civilians by Palestinian militant factions requires clear historical scrutiny. So does the Jordanian army's use of heavy weapons in populated areas and the resulting civilian casualties. The responsibility of armed organisations must be assessed separately from the rights and experiences of the civilian populations among whom they operated. Black September was not a war between all Jordanians and all Palestinians. It was primarily a confrontation between the Jordanian state and Palestinian armed factions, with devastating consequences for civilians on both sides. This distinction is essential to understanding the conflict without reducing an entire population to the actions of political or military organisations. ### A Turning Point for the Arab World The events of September 1970 fundamentally changed the relationship between Jordan and Palestinian armed organisations. The monarchy demonstrated its willingness to use overwhelming military force to defend its authority. Palestinian guerrilla factions discovered the limits of operating independently within the territory of an Arab state. Other Arab governments observed the consequences of allowing heavily armed political movements to develop military structures beyond government control. The crisis exposed a central contradiction in regional politics. Supporting Palestinian national aspirations did not necessarily mean accepting the presence of autonomous Palestinian armed forces within another country's borders. This distinction would become increasingly important in the years that followed. The movement of Palestinian armed organisations from Jordan to Lebanon would create new political and security tensions. The emergence of the Black September Organisation would introduce another chapter of international terrorism. And the memory of the Jordanian conflict would continue to influence regional debates about Palestinian political movements, national sovereignty and state security. Black September demonstrated that the conflict surrounding Palestinian armed organisations was not limited to Israel. It could also produce violent confrontations with Arab governments that supported Palestinian national aspirations but rejected challenges to their own sovereignty. The Jordanian monarchy had survived the most dangerous phase of the crisis. But the struggle was not yet over. The final confrontation would come in 1971, when Jordan moved to dismantle the remaining Palestinian guerrilla strongholds and force the PLO's armed leadership out of the kingdom. ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/25/d6/25d63f5d-099c-45e8-ad1b-346bc1c986ba/content/images/2026/10/Palestinian_fedayeen_surrendering_to_Israel_after_being_expelled_from_Jordan-_21_July_1971.png) Palestinian fedayeen surrender to Israeli forces after being expelled from Jordan, 21 July 1971, marking the final phase of the Jordanian military campaign against Palestinian guerrilla organisations. ## Chapter 5 — The Expulsion of the PLO: How Jordan Ended Palestinian Armed Control in 1971 The ceasefire of September 1970 did not bring a permanent end to the conflict between Jordan's Hashemite monarchy and Palestinian armed organisations. Although the most intense phase of Black September had ended, the underlying struggle over political authority, military independence and national sovereignty remained unresolved. King Hussein had survived the immediate threat to his government. The Jordanian army had demonstrated its military superiority, and the Syrian intervention had failed to overturn the balance of power. Yet Palestinian guerrilla organisations continued to maintain armed positions inside Jordan. For the monarchy, this represented an unacceptable continuation of the crisis. For the Palestine Liberation Organization, Jordan remained an important political and military base from which to pursue the struggle against Israel. The months that followed would determine whether the two sides could coexist under a negotiated arrangement or whether one would ultimately force the other to withdraw. By the summer of 1971, the answer had become clear. The Jordanian government had succeeded in dismantling the principal Palestinian guerrilla presence within the kingdom. The consequences would extend far beyond Jordan's borders. ### The Failure of the September Ceasefire The ceasefire negotiated in Cairo on 27 September 1970 was intended to halt the violence and establish a framework for restoring stability. However, it did not resolve the fundamental disagreement between the Jordanian government and Palestinian armed organisations. The monarchy insisted that all armed activity within Jordan had to remain subject to national authority. Palestinian guerrilla factions sought to preserve their operational independence and maintain their ability to conduct attacks against Israel. These positions were difficult to reconcile. Although the September fighting had weakened Palestinian armed groups, it had not eliminated their military capabilities. Guerrilla fighters continued to operate in parts of Jordan, including areas outside the capital. The Jordanian army maintained pressure on these positions, while the government gradually strengthened its control over major cities and transportation routes. Political negotiations continued, but confidence between the opposing sides had been severely damaged. Each side viewed the other as a potential threat. For King Hussein, the events of September had demonstrated the danger of permitting autonomous armed organisations to develop within Jordan. For Palestinian leaders, the military offensive had demonstrated that the Jordanian monarchy was prepared to use substantial force against organisations claiming to represent Palestinian national aspirations. The ceasefire therefore became a temporary arrangement rather than the foundation of a lasting settlement. ### The Monarchy Reasserts Its Authority Following the September crisis, King Hussein moved to restore the authority of the Jordanian state. The government sought to dismantle independent armed checkpoints, regain control over public security and restrict the activities of Palestinian guerrilla organisations. Jordanian military forces gradually consolidated their positions. The monarchy also worked to reinforce the loyalty of the army and strengthen the institutions responsible for internal security. The objective was clear: no organisation outside the Jordanian government would be permitted to maintain an independent military authority within the kingdom. This policy represented a decisive shift from the relative tolerance that had characterised parts of the late 1960s. The government was no longer prepared to accept agreements that allowed Palestinian guerrilla organisations substantial freedom of military operation. Instead, the monarchy increasingly treated the remaining armed structures as a direct challenge to state sovereignty. For Palestinian factions, this created a rapidly deteriorating strategic environment. Their military positions were increasingly isolated. Their freedom of movement was restricted. Their ability to operate openly in major urban areas was reduced. The balance of power had shifted decisively toward the Jordanian state. ### Arafat and the Limits of Palestinian Military Independence Yasser Arafat faced one of the most serious crises of his political career. As chairman of the PLO and leader of Fatah, he had helped transform the Palestinian national movement into a more independent political and military force. Jordan had played a central role in that transformation. The country's geographical position, Palestinian population and proximity to the Israeli-controlled West Bank had made it a valuable operational base. However, the confrontation with King Hussein revealed the vulnerability of a national movement dependent on territory controlled by another government. The PLO possessed armed fighters, political networks and international support, but it did not control a sovereign state. Its military presence depended on the willingness or inability of host governments to restrict its activities. In Jordan, that situation had changed. Arafat and other Palestinian leaders faced the prospect of losing one of their most important operational centres. They also faced internal disagreements. Different Palestinian factions continued to pursue different political strategies, and the PLO leadership did not exercise complete control over every armed organisation. These divisions complicated efforts to negotiate a unified settlement with the Jordanian government. The movement's fragmented military structure, which had previously allowed different factions considerable independence, now became a strategic weakness. ### Renewed Fighting in Early 1971 During the first months of 1971, armed confrontations continued between Jordanian forces and Palestinian guerrilla organisations. The Jordanian military gradually reduced the remaining guerrilla presence in populated areas. Government forces regained control over positions previously used by Palestinian armed groups. The fighting was not always continuous, but the overall direction was increasingly clear. The monarchy was determined to prevent the re-emergence of independent military authority. Palestinian organisations attempted to preserve their remaining positions, but they faced growing pressure from the better-equipped Jordanian army. The Jordanian government also benefited from greater control over roads, supply routes and major population centres. These advantages made it increasingly difficult for guerrilla organisations to maintain their military networks. As the months passed, Palestinian fighters withdrew from several positions and concentrated in more remote areas. The conflict was moving toward its final military phase. ### The Battle for Northern Jordan By mid-1971, some of the remaining Palestinian guerrilla forces had established positions in northern Jordan, particularly around the Ajloun and Jerash regions. The terrain offered forests, hills and areas that were more suitable for guerrilla operations than the major urban centres. For Palestinian fighters, these locations represented some of their last significant strongholds inside Jordan. For the Jordanian government, their continued presence meant that the struggle over state authority had not yet been fully resolved. In July 1971, Jordanian armed forces launched a major offensive against the remaining guerrilla positions. The army used its superior organisation, firepower and control of surrounding territory to isolate Palestinian units. Fighting took place in difficult terrain as guerrilla forces attempted to resist the advancing military. However, the Palestinian organisations lacked the resources necessary to withstand a sustained conventional offensive. Their supply lines were vulnerable, their positions were increasingly isolated, and their military coordination remained limited. Jordanian forces gradually overwhelmed the remaining strongholds. By the middle of July, the principal Palestinian guerrilla presence in Jordan had been defeated. The offensive marked the effective end of the PLO's ability to operate as an independent armed force within the kingdom. ### The Fate of Palestinian Fighters The final stages of the conflict left Palestinian guerrilla fighters with limited options. Some surrendered to Jordanian forces. Others were captured during military operations. Groups of fighters attempted to escape across Jordan's borders, including toward Syria and the Israeli-controlled West Bank. Some Palestinian fighters who crossed into Israeli-controlled territory were detained by Israeli forces. The movement of fighters across borders reflected the extent of the military defeat. Organisations that had previously operated openly within Jordan were now struggling to preserve their personnel and leadership. The defeat also had consequences for Palestinian political networks. Offices, military installations and organisational structures that had developed over several years were dismantled or abandoned. The PLO lost much of the infrastructure that had supported its operations from Jordan. The outcome represented more than a battlefield defeat. It was the collapse of a political and military strategy built around maintaining substantial autonomous armed power inside a neighbouring Arab state. ### The Humanitarian Consequences The final military operations of 1971 added to the suffering already caused by the September 1970 fighting. Civilians living near guerrilla positions faced renewed insecurity. Military operations disrupted communities and contributed to further displacement. Palestinian families who had already experienced the wars of 1948 and 1967 now faced the consequences of another armed confrontation. The conflict also deepened political divisions within Jordanian society. Some Jordanians regarded the monarchy's military victory as essential to preserving national stability. Others, particularly among communities sympathetic to Palestinian armed resistance, viewed the operations as a painful confrontation between an Arab government and the Palestinian national movement. These differing interpretations would influence political memory for decades. It is important, however, to distinguish between the removal of Palestinian guerrilla organisations and the status of Jordan's Palestinian population. The defeat of the PLO's armed presence did not mean that Palestinians as a whole were expelled from Jordan. Large Palestinian communities remained in the kingdom, including many people who held Jordanian citizenship. Palestinians continued to participate in Jordanian economic, social and political life. The military campaign was directed against armed organisations, although civilians were also affected by the fighting and its consequences. This distinction is essential to understanding both the historical events and their longer-term significance. ### The PLO's Departure from Jordan The defeat of the remaining guerrilla forces ended Jordan's role as the PLO's principal military base. The organisation's leadership and armed networks increasingly shifted their activities toward Lebanon. Lebanon had already hosted Palestinian refugees and armed organisations, but the arrival and consolidation of additional Palestinian fighters would significantly increase the political and military importance of the PLO's presence there. For Arafat, the move represented both a strategic necessity and an opportunity to rebuild. The organisation had suffered a serious defeat, but it had not ceased to exist. Its leadership remained committed to Palestinian national objectives. Its international political networks continued to develop. Its armed factions sought new operational bases. However, the experience in Jordan had demonstrated the risks associated with maintaining military independence inside another sovereign state. The question was whether the PLO and its affiliated organisations would adapt their strategies to avoid a similar confrontation elsewhere. The events that followed in Lebanon would show how difficult that challenge remained. ### Jordan's Political Victory For King Hussein, the removal of the Palestinian guerrilla organisations represented a decisive victory. The monarchy had survived a major internal crisis, resisted an external military intervention and restored government authority over territory previously influenced by independent armed factions. The Jordanian army emerged as a central institution in the preservation of the Hashemite state. The government was now better positioned to control its borders, regulate armed activity and prevent competing military organisations from challenging its authority. The victory also sent a message to regional governments. Jordan had demonstrated that a state could confront Palestinian armed organisations despite the political sensitivity surrounding the Palestinian national cause. However, the monarchy's success came at a considerable human and political cost. The fighting had caused extensive casualties and destruction. Relations between the Jordanian government and the PLO remained deeply damaged. The events also created painful memories among Palestinian communities and contributed to lasting divisions over how the conflict should be interpreted. The restoration of state authority did not erase the suffering caused by the military campaign. ### The Reaction of the Arab World The confrontation created significant divisions among Arab governments. Many Arab leaders publicly supported Palestinian national aspirations, but they differed over the appropriate relationship between Palestinian armed organisations and the governments hosting them. Some criticised Jordan's military actions and expressed solidarity with the PLO. Others were concerned about the implications of independent armed movements operating within sovereign states. The crisis exposed the limits of Arab political unity. Support for the Palestinian cause did not automatically translate into support for every tactic or political objective pursued by Palestinian guerrilla factions. For governments concerned about internal stability, the Jordanian experience raised difficult questions. Could armed organisations be allowed to establish independent security structures? What would happen if those organisations challenged government authority? Could a state support Palestinian national aspirations while refusing to permit military operations from its territory? These questions would become increasingly relevant in Lebanon. They would also influence later regional debates about the political activities of Palestinian organisations in other Arab countries. However, the responses of Arab governments varied over time and cannot be reduced to a single regional position toward Palestinians. ### A Defeat That Changed Palestinian Strategy The loss of Jordan forced the PLO to reconsider important aspects of its political and military strategy. The organisation had demonstrated that it could mobilise supporters, attract international attention and maintain armed operations. But it had also discovered the limitations of confronting a sovereign state with a professional army. The defeat highlighted the vulnerability of guerrilla organisations that depended on the territory and political tolerance of host countries. At the same time, the PLO continued developing its international diplomatic presence. During the 1970s, it increasingly sought recognition as the representative of the Palestinian people. This diplomatic development existed alongside the continued activities of armed factions, some of which carried out attacks against civilian targets. The Palestinian national movement was therefore entering a period in which political diplomacy, guerrilla warfare and international militancy would coexist, sometimes uneasily, within a fragmented organisational environment. The consequences would be felt throughout the Middle East and beyond. ### The Legacy of Jordan's Decision The events of 1970 and 1971 became a defining episode in the history of relations between Palestinian armed organisations and Arab states. Jordan's experience demonstrated the potential consequences of allowing autonomous armed movements to establish extensive military and political structures within national territory. It also revealed the limits of political solidarity when the security and survival of a government were perceived to be at risk. For Jordan, the restoration of sovereignty became a central part of the monarchy's account of the conflict. For the PLO, the expulsion represented a major defeat and a painful chapter in the Palestinian national movement's history. For civilians, the events left memories of violence, displacement and political division. The broader lesson was not that Palestinians as a people were inherently incompatible with neighbouring Arab societies. Rather, the conflict illustrated how the activities of armed organisations could produce serious confrontations with host governments, even when those governments publicly supported Palestinian national aspirations. The distinction between a civilian population and the political or military organisations claiming to represent it remains essential. ### From Jordan to Lebanon: The Next Crisis By July 1971, the Jordanian monarchy had effectively ended the PLO's independent military presence within the kingdom. King Hussein had restored the authority of the state, but the defeat of the guerrilla organisations did not end the broader regional conflict. Instead, the centre of Palestinian armed activity increasingly shifted toward Lebanon. There, a fragile political system, complex sectarian relationships, existing Palestinian refugee communities and the presence of multiple armed factions created a different but equally sensitive environment. The PLO's growing military role would become one factor in Lebanon's escalating instability. The consequences would eventually contribute to a much larger conflict involving Lebanese factions, Palestinian organisations, Syria, Israel and other regional actors. Jordan had ended the challenge posed by Palestinian guerrilla organisations within its borders, but the political and military tensions surrounding those organisations had not disappeared. They had moved into a new regional setting. The next chapter of this history would unfold in Lebanon, where the arrival and expansion of Palestinian armed factions would intersect with an already fragile political order and help shape one of the most destructive conflicts in the modern Middle East. ## Chapter 6 — From Jordan to Lebanon: How the PLO's Relocation Reshaped a Fragile Nation The expulsion of Palestinian guerrilla organisations from Jordan in 1971 marked the end of one chapter in the history of the Palestinian national movement. But it also marked the beginning of another, one that would have profound consequences for Lebanon. After losing their principal military base in Jordan, the Palestine Liberation Organization and its affiliated armed factions increasingly concentrated their activities in Lebanon. For the PLO, Lebanon offered geographical access to Israel's northern border, established Palestinian refugee communities and a political environment in which armed organisations already maintained a significant presence. For Lebanon, however, the expansion of Palestinian military activity introduced additional pressure into an already fragile political system. The country was divided by competing political movements, religious communities, economic inequalities and disagreements over Lebanon's relationship with the wider Arab world. The presence of independent Palestinian armed organisations would become one of several major factors contributing to the collapse of political stability. Within a few years, Lebanon would descend into a devastating civil war. The connection between Black September and the Lebanese Civil War is therefore significant, although the latter cannot be explained by Palestinian armed activity alone. Lebanon's crisis had deep domestic roots, and the involvement of Palestinian factions interacted with conflicts that had been developing long before the PLO's departure from Jordan. ### Lebanon Before the Arrival of the PLO Leadership Lebanon had long occupied a distinctive position in the Middle East. Its political system was built around a delicate arrangement among religious communities, including Maronite Christians, Sunni Muslims, Shia Muslims and Druze. Under the National Pact of 1943, political power was distributed according to a confessional formula. The presidency was reserved for a Maronite Christian, the prime ministership for a Sunni Muslim and the parliamentary speakership for a Shia Muslim. This arrangement was intended to maintain cooperation among Lebanon's principal religious communities. However, the system also institutionalised political divisions. As Lebanon's population, economy and regional environment changed, disagreements emerged over whether the existing distribution of political power remained representative. Some political movements demanded reforms and greater participation. Others feared that major constitutional changes could undermine the balance on which the Lebanese state had been established. These tensions existed independently of the Palestinian national movement. By the late 1960s, Lebanon was already experiencing increasing political polarisation, social inequality and disputes over national identity. The expansion of Palestinian armed activity would intensify these existing divisions. ### Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon After 1948 The Palestinian presence in Lebanon began long before Black September. Following the 1948 Arab–Israeli war, large numbers of Palestinian refugees entered Lebanon. Many settled in refugee camps established or supported by international humanitarian organisations. Unlike many Palestinians in Jordan, most Palestinian refugees in Lebanon did not receive Lebanese citizenship. Their legal status remained restricted, and access to certain professions, property rights and political participation was limited. Over time, refugee camps developed into established communities with schools, markets, social institutions and political organisations. These communities were not simply military environments. They were home to families who had experienced displacement and were attempting to rebuild their lives. Nevertheless, the camps also became important centres of Palestinian political mobilisation. Following the 1967 war, armed organisations increased their recruitment and political influence among sections of the refugee population. The distinction between civilian communities and armed factions would become increasingly important as Lebanon's security situation deteriorated. ### The Cairo Agreement of 1969 An important turning point occurred before the PLO's expulsion from Jordan. In November 1969, representatives of the Lebanese government and the PLO reached an agreement in Cairo under Egyptian mediation. The agreement sought to regulate the activities of Palestinian armed organisations in Lebanon and address tensions surrounding the refugee camps. It recognised a role for Palestinian committees in administering certain internal affairs within the camps and established arrangements concerning Palestinian armed activity. The agreement also provided a framework for guerrilla operations against Israel from Lebanese territory, subject to conditions. Supporters regarded the arrangement as a compromise intended to reduce confrontation between Lebanese authorities and Palestinian organisations. Critics argued that it weakened the Lebanese state's control over security and contributed to the development of autonomous armed structures. The agreement became deeply controversial within Lebanon. Some political movements supported Palestinian armed resistance as part of a broader Arab struggle. Others regarded the presence of independent military organisations as a direct threat to Lebanese sovereignty. The Cairo Agreement therefore exposed divisions that would become increasingly serious during the following years. It is important to recognise that the PLO did not establish its first presence in Lebanon after Black September. Palestinian armed organisations were already active there. The defeat in Jordan accelerated the consolidation of Lebanon as the movement's principal operational centre. ### The PLO Rebuilds Its Military Presence Following the Jordanian military victory in 1971, the PLO shifted much of its leadership, military infrastructure and organisational activity toward Lebanon. Yasser Arafat and other Palestinian leaders sought to rebuild the movement after the loss of its Jordanian base. Lebanon offered several strategic advantages. Its southern territory bordered northern Israel, providing opportunities for cross-border military operations. Palestinian refugee communities offered established social and political networks. The Lebanese state's limited ability to impose unified security control in certain areas created space for armed organisations to expand. The PLO developed military facilities, training camps and operational structures. Its political influence also increased in parts of Beirut and southern Lebanon. However, the movement remained divided among several factions. Fatah was the largest and most influential organisation, but the PFLP, Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine and other groups maintained their own political positions and military structures. These differences sometimes complicated efforts to coordinate strategy and control armed activity. The PLO's growing presence created a new challenge for the Lebanese government. As in Jordan, a sovereign state faced armed organisations pursuing military objectives that were not always aligned with national government policy. But Lebanon's political environment was more fragmented, making a unified state response far more difficult. ### Southern Lebanon Becomes a Conflict Zone During the early 1970s, southern Lebanon increasingly became an operational area for Palestinian guerrilla organisations. Armed factions conducted attacks against Israeli targets, including cross-border raids and rocket attacks. Israel responded with military operations against Palestinian positions in Lebanon. These exchanges placed Lebanese border communities in a dangerous position. Civilians living in southern villages faced the consequences of armed activity conducted by organisations over which the Lebanese government exercised limited control. Israeli retaliatory operations caused casualties, destruction and displacement. The cycle of attacks and military responses contributed to growing insecurity. For Palestinian armed factions, southern Lebanon represented an important front in their struggle against Israel. For Israel, the presence of armed organisations near its northern border created serious security concerns. For the Lebanese government, the situation demonstrated the difficulty of maintaining national sovereignty while competing military forces operated on its territory. The consequences were particularly severe for civilians. Lebanese and Palestinian communities increasingly found themselves exposed to a conflict that extended beyond Lebanon's internal political disputes. ### The Emergence of "Fatahland" As Palestinian armed organisations expanded their presence in southern Lebanon, the term "Fatahland" emerged in political and media discussions. The expression referred to areas where Palestinian guerrilla groups, particularly Fatah, exercised substantial military influence. It was not an officially recognised state or a clearly defined political territory. Rather, it described the limited reach of Lebanese government authority in certain areas where Palestinian armed organisations maintained operational bases. The development reflected the growing fragmentation of security control. Lebanese authorities struggled to prevent attacks launched from their territory. Palestinian factions continued to pursue military operations against Israel. Israeli forces conducted retaliatory attacks and, at times, larger military interventions. Local communities faced insecurity as the presence of competing armed forces complicated everyday life. The situation also created tensions among Lebanese political and religious groups. Some supported Palestinian resistance and regarded the armed presence as part of a legitimate national liberation struggle. Others believed that Lebanon was being drawn into a conflict that threatened the country's independence and internal stability. These competing interpretations deepened political divisions. ### The 1973 Israeli Raid in Beirut On 9–10 April 1973, Israeli commandos carried out a military operation in Beirut targeting senior Palestinian figures. The operation, known as Operation Spring of Youth, was conducted as part of Israel's campaign against Palestinian militant networks following a series of international attacks, including the 1972 Munich Olympics massacre. Israeli forces killed several senior Palestinian leaders during the raid. The operation demonstrated that the conflict involving Palestinian armed organisations could reach directly into Lebanon's capital. It also exposed the Lebanese state's vulnerability. Foreign military forces had conducted an operation in Beirut, while Palestinian armed organisations continued to maintain significant military structures within Lebanese territory. The raid intensified political controversy. Critics of the Palestinian armed presence argued that the activities of guerrilla organisations exposed Lebanon to Israeli military retaliation. Supporters of the Palestinian movement condemned the Israeli operation and argued that Palestinian organisations had a right to resist Israel. The incident further increased tensions between Lebanese security institutions, political factions and Palestinian armed groups. ### The Lebanese Army and Palestinian Armed Organisations In May 1973, major clashes erupted between the Lebanese army and Palestinian guerrilla organisations. The fighting reflected the growing inability of the Lebanese government and the PLO to agree on the limits of Palestinian military activity. Lebanese authorities sought to assert control over national security. Palestinian factions resisted restrictions that threatened their operational independence. The confrontation resembled certain aspects of the earlier crisis in Jordan, although Lebanon's political circumstances were significantly different. The Lebanese army was affected by the country's sectarian and political divisions. Unlike Jordan, where the monarchy retained a largely cohesive military institution, Lebanon's armed forces operated within a deeply fragmented political environment. A sustained military campaign against Palestinian organisations risked provoking internal divisions and wider civil conflict. Political negotiations eventually reduced the immediate fighting. However, the fundamental disagreements remained unresolved. Lebanon continued to face the presence of powerful armed organisations operating alongside competing domestic political movements. The conditions for a larger confrontation were developing. ### Palestinian Armed Groups and Lebanese Political Alliances The PLO's position in Lebanon was shaped not only by its military activities but also by its relationships with Lebanese political organisations. Some left-wing, Arab nationalist and Muslim political movements supported Palestinian armed resistance. They also advocated reforms to Lebanon's political system, which they regarded as unequal or insufficiently representative. Other political movements, including influential Christian parties, opposed the growing military independence of Palestinian factions. They feared that the PLO's presence could alter Lebanon's political balance and weaken state authority. These disagreements increasingly connected the Palestinian question to Lebanon's domestic political conflicts. The PLO was no longer simply an external armed movement operating from Lebanese territory. It had become an important actor within the country's political landscape. This development complicated efforts to separate the Palestinian–Israeli conflict from Lebanon's internal disputes. Political alliances increasingly developed along competing visions of Lebanese national identity, regional orientation and the distribution of power. Armed groups on different sides began preparing for the possibility of a wider confrontation. ### The Road to the Lebanese Civil War By 1975, Lebanon's political environment had become dangerously unstable. Longstanding sectarian divisions, economic inequalities, political reform disputes and the growing presence of armed militias had weakened the country's institutions. The activities of Palestinian armed organisations formed an important part of this environment, but they were not the sole cause of the crisis. On 13 April 1975, a series of violent incidents in Beirut helped trigger the outbreak of the Lebanese Civil War. Following an attack near a church in Ain el-Remmaneh, gunmen associated with the Christian Kataeb movement attacked a bus carrying Palestinians. The killings intensified an already explosive political situation. Violence spread as Lebanese militias and Palestinian armed organisations became increasingly involved in the fighting. The conflict developed into a complex civil war involving multiple political, religious and military factions. It would eventually draw in Syria, Israel and other regional and international actors. The war lasted until 1990 and caused enormous human suffering. The PLO's military presence contributed to the escalation, but Lebanon's collapse cannot be attributed to a single organisation or community. The civil war resulted from the interaction of domestic political failures, sectarian tensions, armed mobilisation and regional intervention. ### The 1978 Israeli Invasion of Southern Lebanon The conflict between Palestinian armed organisations and Israel continued during the Lebanese Civil War. In March 1978, Palestinian militants carried out the Coastal Road attack in Israel, killing dozens of civilians. The attack was conducted by Fatah militants who had infiltrated Israel from Lebanon. Israel responded by launching Operation Litani, a major military intervention in southern Lebanon. Israeli forces advanced into Lebanese territory with the stated objective of pushing Palestinian armed organisations away from Israel's northern border. The operation caused further displacement and civilian suffering. The United Nations Security Council subsequently adopted Resolutions 425 and 426, calling for Israeli withdrawal and establishing the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon. The intervention demonstrated how the presence and activities of Palestinian armed factions had become intertwined with Lebanon's territorial security. It also highlighted the limitations of military operations in resolving the underlying political and security disputes. Despite the intervention, Palestinian armed organisations continued to operate in Lebanon. The conflict remained unresolved. ### The 1982 Lebanon War and the PLO's Departure In June 1982, Israel launched a major invasion of Lebanon. The invasion followed years of cross-border violence and was immediately preceded by the attempted assassination of Israel's ambassador to the United Kingdom, Shlomo Argov, by the Abu Nidal Organization. The Abu Nidal Organization was hostile to Arafat's PLO and was not operating under its command. Nevertheless, Israel attacked PLO positions and launched a broader military campaign in Lebanon. Israeli forces advanced toward Beirut, where the PLO maintained important political and military headquarters. The campaign developed into a prolonged siege of West Beirut. The fighting caused extensive destruction and civilian casualties. International negotiations eventually produced an arrangement for the evacuation of PLO fighters and leadership from Beirut. Under multinational supervision, thousands of Palestinian fighters departed Lebanon. Yasser Arafat and the PLO leadership relocated to Tunisia. The departure marked another major transformation in the Palestinian national movement. Just over a decade after being expelled from Jordan, the PLO had lost another principal military and political base in an Arab country. However, the organisation's departure from Beirut did not end Palestinian armed activity throughout Lebanon, nor did it resolve the country's civil war. ### The Human Cost for Lebanon The years of conflict involving Palestinian armed organisations, Lebanese militias, Israeli forces and other regional actors had devastating consequences. Lebanese civilians experienced repeated displacement, destruction of infrastructure and widespread insecurity. Palestinian refugees also suffered enormously. Refugee camps became battlegrounds, and civilian communities were exposed to attacks by multiple armed actors. One of the most notorious atrocities occurred in September 1982, when Lebanese Christian militiamen killed Palestinian and Lebanese civilians in the Sabra and Shatila camps. Israeli forces controlled the surrounding area and had allowed the militia to enter the camps. Israel's subsequent Kahan Commission found that Israeli officials bore indirect responsibility for failing to anticipate and prevent the massacre. The atrocity demonstrated the extreme vulnerability of civilians caught between armed organisations and competing military powers. It also underscored why the history of Palestinian armed activity in Lebanon must be distinguished from the experiences of Palestinian refugees. The actions of political and military organisations did not make civilian communities legitimate targets. ### Why Lebanon Could Not Repeat Jordan's Response Jordan and Lebanon faced some similar challenges involving Palestinian armed organisations, but their political and institutional circumstances differed significantly. Jordan possessed a monarchy supported by a comparatively cohesive national army. King Hussein was able to mobilise the armed forces against Palestinian guerrilla organisations and eventually restore state control. Lebanon lacked an equivalent concentration of political and military authority. Its confessional political system depended on cooperation among competing communities. Its military institutions were vulnerable to political divisions. Domestic armed movements had developed their own military capabilities. The presence of Palestinian factions interacted with these existing weaknesses. As a result, Lebanon could not easily reproduce Jordan's military response without risking a wider internal conflict. The country ultimately experienced precisely such a conflict. This difference illustrates the importance of domestic political institutions in determining how states respond to powerful non-state armed organisations. ### A Pattern of Conflict With Host Governments? The experiences of Jordan and Lebanon raise an important historical question. Why did Palestinian armed organisations become involved in serious confrontations within more than one Arab country? One explanation concerns the tension between revolutionary movements and sovereign governments. Palestinian guerrilla organisations pursued national objectives that extended beyond the political priorities of their host states. Their military operations could expose neighbouring countries to retaliation, diplomatic pressure and internal instability. Governments, meanwhile, sought to preserve their authority and prevent independent armed groups from determining national security policy. These competing priorities created conditions for confrontation. However, the circumstances in Jordan and Lebanon were not identical. Jordan's conflict involved a direct struggle between the monarchy and Palestinian guerrilla organisations over state authority. Lebanon's crisis involved a much broader combination of domestic political divisions, sectarian militias, foreign interventions and Palestinian armed activity. It would therefore be historically inaccurate to present both conflicts as evidence of an inherent problem with Palestinians as a people. The more relevant issue is the relationship between armed non-state organisations, political movements and the sovereignty of the countries in which they operate. ### The Regional Consequences The PLO's relocation from Jordan to Lebanon transformed the geography of the Palestinian armed struggle. It also contributed to a new period of regional instability. Jordan had restored government control by removing the principal guerrilla organisations from its territory. Lebanon became the centre of a much more complicated confrontation involving Palestinian factions, Lebanese political movements, Israel, Syria and other external powers. The consequences extended across decades. The conflict contributed to repeated military interventions, political fragmentation and large-scale civilian suffering. It also influenced the calculations of other Arab governments. Supporting Palestinian national aspirations did not necessarily mean accepting autonomous Palestinian military organisations within national territory. The distinction between political solidarity and military sovereignty became increasingly important. At the same time, Arab governments continued to maintain different relationships with Palestinian political organisations and civilian communities. Those relationships were shaped by domestic politics, regional alliances, security concerns and changing diplomatic priorities. There was no single Arab response to the Palestinian national movement. ### From Black September to a Wider Regional Legacy The movement of Palestinian armed organisations from Jordan to Lebanon demonstrates how the consequences of Black September extended beyond the original battlefield. The defeat of the PLO in Jordan did not eliminate its military capabilities or political ambitions. Instead, it shifted the movement's operational centre to a country already struggling with internal divisions. The resulting tensions contributed to a much larger regional crisis. For Jordan, Black September became associated with the restoration of state sovereignty. For the PLO, it represented a major defeat that forced the movement to rebuild elsewhere. For Lebanon, the expansion of Palestinian armed activity became one element in a destructive combination of domestic instability and regional conflict. For civilians across the region, the consequences included repeated cycles of violence, displacement and insecurity. The history of Jordan and Lebanon demonstrates that armed movements operating independently of host governments can create profound challenges for national sovereignty and regional stability. But it also shows that these challenges must be examined within the specific political circumstances of each country, rather than attributed collectively to an entire population. The consequences of Black September were not limited to the movement of guerrilla fighters from one country to another. The conflict also gave its name to a clandestine militant organisation associated with some of the most notorious international terrorist attacks of the 1970s. Its actions would bring the name Black September to worldwide attention, particularly during the 1972 Olympic Games in Munich. That development would form the next chapter in this history. ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/25/d6/25d63f5d-099c-45e8-ad1b-346bc1c986ba/content/images/2026/10/Munich_1972_Massacre_Memorial.jpg) The memorial to the victims of the 1972 Munich Olympics massacre, where eleven members of the Israeli Olympic delegation were murdered by the Black September Organisation. ## Chapter 7 — The Black September Organisation: From Jordan's Civil War to the Munich Olympics Massacre The violent confrontation between the Jordanian monarchy and Palestinian armed organisations in 1970 and 1971 did not end with the expulsion of the Palestine Liberation Organization from Jordan. For some Palestinian militants, the defeat represented more than the loss of an important military base. It became a symbol of betrayal, humiliation and a desire for revenge. While the PLO leadership attempted to rebuild its political and military structures in Lebanon, a clandestine organisation emerged that would carry the name of the conflict into international history. It became known as the Black September Organisation. The group was associated with assassinations, hostage-taking and international terrorist operations. Its most notorious attack occurred during the 1972 Summer Olympic Games in Munich, when Israeli athletes and coaches were taken hostage and murdered. The attack shocked the international community and transformed the name Black September from a reference to Jordan's internal conflict into a symbol of international terrorism. The organisation's emergence also raised difficult questions about the relationship between Palestinian political leadership, armed factions and covert militant operations. ### The Origins of the Black September Organisation The Black September Organisation emerged in 1971, following the defeat of Palestinian guerrilla forces in Jordan. Its name referred directly to the events of September 1970, when King Hussein's army launched a major offensive against Palestinian armed organisations. The subsequent defeat of the remaining guerrilla strongholds in July 1971 deepened resentment among militants who regarded Jordan's actions as a betrayal of the Palestinian cause. The organisation developed as a clandestine network associated with militants from Fatah and the wider Palestinian guerrilla movement. Its precise organisational structure, leadership arrangements and degree of independence from Fatah have remained subjects of historical investigation and debate. Some historical accounts describe Black September as a covert operational structure closely connected to elements of Fatah. Others emphasise the role of militants seeking revenge for the events in Jordan. These interpretations are not necessarily mutually exclusive. The organisation operated in an environment where formal political leadership, underground networks and armed factions frequently overlapped. Unlike the publicly recognised PLO, Black September did not function as an ordinary political organisation with an openly accountable leadership structure. Its clandestine nature made it difficult to determine who authorised individual operations and how decisions were made. Nevertheless, the organisation became associated with a series of attacks that extended far beyond the Middle East. ### Revenge Against Jordan The earliest operations associated with Black September reflected anger over the Jordanian military campaign. One of the most significant incidents occurred on 28 November 1971. Jordanian Prime Minister Wasfi al-Tal was assassinated outside the Sheraton Hotel in Cairo while attending an Arab League meeting. The assassination was carried out by Palestinian militants associated with the Black September Organisation. Al-Tal had been a prominent figure in Jordan's confrontation with Palestinian guerrilla organisations and was regarded by militants as one of the officials responsible for their defeat. His assassination demonstrated that the conflict had not ended with the PLO's departure from Jordan. Instead, violence had moved into the international arena. A senior government official had been killed outside his own country in an operation linked to the unresolved political and military struggle. The assassination also created serious diplomatic consequences. For Jordan, it reinforced concerns about the ability of Palestinian militant networks to target officials beyond the kingdom's borders. For the Black September Organisation, the attack demonstrated a willingness to pursue political revenge through assassination. It marked the beginning of a broader campaign of international violence. ### From Regional Militancy to International Terrorism During the early 1970s, several Palestinian militant organisations increasingly used international operations to attract attention to their political objectives. Aircraft hijackings, hostage-taking and attacks on diplomatic or civilian targets were intended to place the Palestinian question at the centre of global political discussions. The Black September Organisation adopted methods that extended the conflict beyond conventional military confrontations. Its operations targeted individuals and institutions associated with governments it regarded as hostile to Palestinian objectives. These tactics created serious threats to international security. Unlike attacks against military forces in an active conflict zone, operations involving civilian hostages and diplomatic targets deliberately exposed non-combatants to violence. The organisation's methods also complicated the international position of the broader Palestinian national movement. The PLO was seeking political recognition and diplomatic influence, while clandestine militant operations associated with Palestinian factions generated international condemnation. This contradiction would become particularly visible in 1972. ### The Munich Olympic Games: A Global Stage The 1972 Summer Olympic Games were held in Munich, West Germany. For West Germany, the Games represented an opportunity to present a modern, democratic image to the international community. The organisers sought to distinguish the event from the heavily militarised atmosphere associated with the 1936 Berlin Olympics under Nazi rule. Security arrangements were therefore designed to appear relatively relaxed. Athletes from around the world gathered in the Olympic Village, including a delegation representing Israel. The presence of Israeli athletes carried particular historical significance. The Games were taking place in Germany less than three decades after the Holocaust, during which Nazi Germany systematically murdered approximately six million Jews. The Israeli delegation consisted of athletes, coaches and officials who had travelled to participate in an international sporting event. They were not military combatants engaged in a battlefield confrontation. Nevertheless, members of the Black September Organisation selected the Israeli team as the target of a hostage operation. The decision would turn an international celebration of sport into one of the most notorious terrorist attacks of the twentieth century. ### September 5, 1972: The Attack Begins In the early morning hours of 5 September 1972, eight armed members of the Black September Organisation entered the Olympic Village. The attackers climbed over a perimeter fence and made their way toward the apartments occupied by members of the Israeli delegation. They entered the accommodation at 31 Connollystrasse. During the initial assault, Israeli wrestling coach Moshe Weinberg resisted the attackers and was shot and killed. Weightlifter Yossef Romano was also killed. Nine other Israeli athletes and coaches were taken hostage. The attackers demanded the release of more than 200 Palestinian and other prisoners held in Israeli prisons. They also demanded the release of two imprisoned members of the German Red Army Faction. The hostage-taking immediately became an international crisis. German authorities began negotiations while attempting to develop a plan to rescue the captives. The Israeli government refused to release prisoners in response to the demands. The crisis unfolded under the attention of international television networks covering the Olympic Games. Images of masked militants on the balconies of the Israeli accommodation became among the most recognisable photographs associated with modern terrorism. ### The Hostages and Their Families Behind the international political crisis were individuals whose lives had been violently interrupted. The Israeli delegation included athletes and coaches who had spent years preparing for the Olympic Games. They represented different sporting disciplines and personal backgrounds. Some had survived earlier wars and persecution. Others were young athletes pursuing international competition. The nine hostages were held under armed guard while negotiations continued. Their families, colleagues and teammates waited for information about their safety. The attack transformed people who had travelled to Germany for a sporting competition into bargaining instruments in a political operation. The murder of Weinberg and Romano during the initial assault had already demonstrated the attackers' willingness to use lethal violence. As the hours passed, the danger to the remaining hostages increased. The German authorities faced a crisis for which their security arrangements were poorly prepared. ### The Failed Rescue at Fürstenfeldbruck After prolonged negotiations, German authorities arranged for the attackers and hostages to be transported by helicopter to Fürstenfeldbruck airbase near Munich. The militants believed they would be transferred to an aircraft that would take them out of West Germany. German authorities planned to carry out a rescue operation at the airbase. However, the operation suffered from serious planning and coordination failures. The police marksmen lacked adequate equipment and preparation for the circumstances. Communications were poor, and the authorities had underestimated the number of attackers. The planned intervention failed to achieve its objective. A gun battle erupted between German security forces and the militants. During the confrontation, the remaining Israeli hostages were killed. Some were shot, while others died when a grenade exploded inside one of the helicopters. Five of the eight attackers were killed. Three survived and were taken into custody. A German police officer was also killed. By the end of the operation, eleven members of the Israeli Olympic delegation had been murdered. The failure of the rescue operation intensified international outrage and led to extensive criticism of West Germany's security preparations. ### The Eleven Israeli Victims The eleven members of the Israeli delegation murdered during the Munich attack were: - Moshe Weinberg — Wrestling coach - Yossef Romano — Weightlifter - Ze'ev Friedman — Weightlifter - David Berger — Weightlifter - Yossef Gutfreund — Wrestling referee - Eliezer Halfin — Wrestler - Mark Slavin — Wrestler - Andre Spitzer — Fencing coach - Kehat Shorr — Shooting coach - Amitzur Shapira — Athletics coach - Yaakov Springer — Weightlifting referee Their deaths remain central to the historical memory of the 1972 Olympic Games. The victims were athletes, coaches and officials participating in an international sporting event. They were targeted because they belonged to the Israeli delegation. The attack therefore represented not only an act of international terrorism but also the deliberate targeting of civilians on the basis of their national identity. The Munich massacre remains one of the most significant examples of how political violence can transform a civilian international event into a scene of mass murder. ### The International Reaction The Munich attack provoked widespread condemnation. Governments around the world denounced the hostage-taking and killings. The Olympic Games were temporarily suspended, and a memorial ceremony was held. International attention focused on the victims, the failures of the German rescue operation and the growing threat posed by transnational militant networks. The attack also intensified debates about aviation security, diplomatic protection and the safety of international sporting events. For Israel, the massacre was particularly traumatic. Eleven members of its Olympic delegation had been murdered on German soil less than thirty years after the Holocaust. The location and circumstances gave the tragedy additional historical significance. For the Palestinian national movement, the attack created serious political consequences. Although Black September operated as a clandestine organisation, its connections to militants associated with Fatah raised questions about responsibility within the broader movement. The attack was widely condemned internationally, while reactions within Palestinian political circles varied. The distinction between the organisation responsible for the massacre and the wider Palestinian civilian population remained essential. The perpetrators were members of an armed network, not representatives of every Palestinian. ### The Release of the Surviving Attackers Three Black September militants survived the failed rescue operation and were detained by West German authorities. However, their imprisonment did not last long. On 29 October 1972, a Lufthansa aircraft was hijacked by Palestinian militants who demanded the release of the surviving Munich attackers. West German authorities agreed to the demand, and the three prisoners were released. The circumstances surrounding the hijacking and the German government's handling of the crisis later became subjects of controversy. The release caused anger in Israel and among the families of the murdered athletes. It also raised broader concerns about whether hostage-taking could be used successfully to force governments to release individuals accused of serious terrorist crimes. The episode further demonstrated how international terrorism could exploit political pressure and the vulnerability of civilian aviation. ### Israel's Response: Operation Wrath of God Following the Munich massacre, Israel initiated a covert campaign against individuals believed to have been involved in planning or supporting attacks associated with Black September. The campaign became widely known as Operation Wrath of God. Israeli intelligence services, particularly Mossad, were involved in operations targeting suspected members of Palestinian militant networks. The objective was to disrupt organisations responsible for attacks against Israeli citizens and deter future operations. Several suspected militants were killed in operations conducted across different countries. However, the campaign also generated controversy. Questions arose about the reliability of intelligence, the legality of extraterritorial killings and the possibility of mistaken identity. One of the most serious failures occurred in Lillehammer, Norway, in July 1973. Israeli operatives mistakenly identified Ahmed Bouchiki, a Moroccan-born waiter, as a Palestinian militant associated with the Munich attack. Bouchiki was shot and killed. He was not the intended target and had no established involvement in the Munich massacre. Norwegian authorities arrested several Israeli operatives, and the incident became a major diplomatic scandal. The Lillehammer affair demonstrated the risks of covert operations based on incorrect intelligence. It also illustrated the wider consequences of the Munich massacre, as the cycle of violence and retaliation extended into European countries. ### The Relationship Between Black September and Fatah One of the most important historical questions concerns the relationship between the Black September Organisation and Fatah. The organisation was closely associated with militants from Fatah, but the precise nature of its command structure has remained disputed. Some researchers have argued that Black September functioned as a covert operational arm of Fatah, allowing militant activities to be conducted without openly attributing responsibility to the movement's political leadership. Other accounts emphasise the relative autonomy of particular militant networks. The clandestine nature of the organisation complicates efforts to establish direct responsibility for every operation. Yasser Arafat's knowledge of, influence over or authorisation of specific attacks has been debated. It is therefore important to distinguish between documented organisational connections and claims about individual decisions that remain contested. Nevertheless, the Black September Organisation emerged from the wider Palestinian militant environment that developed after the confrontation with Jordan. Its activities demonstrated the dangers created when clandestine armed networks operated without transparent political accountability. ### The Decline of the Black September Organisation By the mid-1970s, the Black September Organisation had largely ceased to operate as a distinct international militant network. Its decline occurred as the PLO increasingly sought diplomatic recognition and a more prominent position in international politics. The organisation's clandestine structure makes it difficult to identify a single moment at which its activities formally ended. Some militants associated with Black September remained active within other Palestinian organisations. The broader Palestinian national movement continued to include factions with differing approaches to diplomacy and armed struggle. The PLO's international political position changed significantly during this period. In 1974, the Arab League recognised the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. That same year, Yasser Arafat addressed the United Nations General Assembly. These developments reflected the movement's growing diplomatic influence. However, they did not erase the legacy of attacks carried out by organisations associated with the Palestinian militant movement. The Munich massacre remained a defining event in international perceptions of Palestinian terrorism. ### The Lasting Impact on International Security The attacks associated with Black September contributed to major changes in international security practices. Governments increasingly recognised the need for specialised counterterrorism capabilities. The failure of the German rescue operation at Munich influenced the development of more professional tactical response units. West Germany established the GSG 9 counterterrorism unit in 1972. Other countries also reviewed security arrangements for airports, diplomatic facilities and major international events. The Munich massacre became an important case study in hostage rescue, crisis negotiation and the dangers of inadequate operational planning. Its consequences extended well beyond the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. The attack demonstrated how a relatively small group of armed militants could exploit an international event to generate worldwide attention and create a major political crisis. ### Black September and the Question of Political Responsibility The Black September Organisation illustrates the difficulties that arise when political movements maintain connections with clandestine armed networks. The Palestinian national movement included organisations pursuing diplomatic recognition, armed resistance and revolutionary political objectives. These approaches sometimes overlapped, creating uncertainty about command structures and accountability. The Munich massacre demonstrated the consequences of allowing political violence to target civilians deliberately. Whatever political grievances motivated the attackers, the murder of athletes and coaches could not be justified as a conventional military operation. The victims were participating in an international sporting event. They were not combatants engaged in hostilities. The attack violated fundamental principles protecting civilians from deliberate violence. At the same time, historical responsibility must remain specific. The actions of the Black September Organisation should be attributed to the individuals and networks responsible for planning, authorising and carrying out its operations. They should not be treated as evidence that Palestinian civilians collectively supported or participated in terrorism. This distinction is essential for an accurate understanding of the period. ### From Jordan's Civil War to International Terrorism The transformation of Black September from the name of a Jordanian conflict into the identity of an international terrorist organisation reveals how regional political violence can develop consequences far beyond its original setting. The Jordanian military campaign of 1970 and 1971 produced a major defeat for Palestinian guerrilla organisations. Some militants responded by pursuing revenge against Jordanian officials. Others became involved in international operations targeting Israel and foreign governments. The Munich massacre became the most notorious example of this escalation. The attack killed eleven Israeli athletes and coaches, exposed serious failures in international security and triggered a prolonged campaign of retaliation. It also influenced the political development of the Palestinian national movement and international perceptions of its armed factions. For Jordan, the events reinforced the significance of the earlier struggle over national sovereignty. For Israel, Munich became a defining tragedy in the history of terrorism directed against its citizens. For the international community, the massacre demonstrated the vulnerability of civilians to politically motivated violence beyond conventional battlefields. The legacy of the Black September Organisation shows how the defeat of an armed movement in one country can contribute to the emergence of clandestine networks capable of carrying violence across international borders. The final question is how these events influenced the attitudes of Arab governments toward Palestinian armed organisations in the decades that followed. Jordan, Lebanon and the international attacks of the 1970s created a complicated historical legacy. Understanding that legacy requires examining the difference between legitimate Palestinian national aspirations, the actions of militant organisations and the security concerns of the states in which those organisations operated. That distinction is essential to the final chapter of Black September's history. ## Chapter 8 — A Legacy of Distrust: Why Black September Changed Relations Between Palestinian Armed Organisations and the Arab World More than five decades after the events of Black September, the confrontation between Jordan's monarchy and Palestinian armed organisations remains one of the most revealing episodes in modern Middle Eastern history. The conflict exposed a fundamental contradiction that continues to influence regional politics: Arab governments have often supported Palestinian national aspirations while simultaneously seeking to prevent independent Palestinian armed organisations from threatening their own security, sovereignty and political stability. In 1970, King Hussein faced a challenge that extended beyond the Palestinian struggle against Israel. Armed organisations operating within Jordan had developed their own military structures, challenged government authority and conducted operations with international consequences. The Jordanian monarchy ultimately responded with overwhelming military force. The defeat of Palestinian guerrilla organisations in 1971 ended their principal military presence in Jordan, but it did not eliminate the political and security questions surrounding their activities. Instead, those questions emerged in different forms in Lebanon and other parts of the Middle East. The resulting history has sometimes been used to explain why certain Arab governments developed reservations about Palestinian militant organisations. However, it is essential to distinguish between distrust of particular armed factions, disagreements with Palestinian political leaders and attitudes toward Palestinian civilians. These are not interchangeable. Understanding that distinction is necessary to examine Black September's legacy without reducing a complex historical experience to a judgment about an entire people. ### The Difference Between Supporting Palestine and Supporting Armed Organisations For decades, support for Palestinian national aspirations has been an important element of Arab regional politics. Arab governments have repeatedly expressed support for Palestinian self-determination, criticised Israeli policies and participated in diplomatic initiatives addressing the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. Yet this political support has not always translated into acceptance of Palestinian armed organisations operating independently within Arab countries. Jordan demonstrated why. During the late 1960s, Palestinian guerrilla organisations developed substantial military capabilities on Jordanian territory. Their activities included attacks against Israel, armed checkpoints, independent command structures and confrontations with Jordanian security forces. The PFLP's international aircraft hijackings in September 1970 further exposed the limits of the Jordanian government's authority. For King Hussein, these developments created a direct challenge to the state's ability to control its territory. The monarchy's response was not a rejection of Palestinian identity or national aspirations as such. It was a military campaign against armed organisations that the government considered a threat to its sovereignty. The distinction became an important consideration for other Arab governments. A state could support Palestinian political rights while refusing to permit autonomous armed factions to determine its military and security policies. ### Why Jordan's Experience Had Regional Consequences Black September demonstrated that an armed national liberation movement could enter into violent conflict with a government that publicly supported its broader political cause. This was a significant development. The conflict challenged the assumption that Arab solidarity would necessarily prevent confrontation between Palestinian guerrilla organisations and Arab governments. Jordan's monarchy had supported Palestinian political interests and maintained close ties with Palestinian communities. Nevertheless, the government ultimately concluded that the military independence of guerrilla organisations posed an unacceptable threat. The confrontation revealed the limits of political cooperation when competing actors claimed authority over armed force. For governments elsewhere in the region, the Jordanian experience illustrated the risks of permitting armed organisations to develop parallel military and political structures. These concerns were particularly relevant in states already facing internal political divisions or weak security institutions. However, Jordan's experience did not produce a uniform Arab policy toward Palestinian organisations. Different governments continued to maintain different relationships with the PLO and its affiliated factions. Some provided political recognition, financial assistance or military support. Others imposed restrictions or entered into direct confrontation with particular groups. The responses reflected national interests, regional rivalries and changing political circumstances rather than a single collective judgment about Palestinians. ### Lebanon: When the Conflict Moved Across the Border The consequences of Black September became particularly visible in Lebanon. Following their defeat in Jordan, Palestinian armed organisations consolidated their military and political presence in Lebanese territory. The PLO had already maintained activities in Lebanon before 1971, but the loss of Jordan accelerated the country's importance as a centre of Palestinian operations. The expansion of armed activity intensified existing tensions within Lebanon. The country was already divided by disagreements over political representation, sectarian power-sharing, economic inequality and its relationship with neighbouring states. Palestinian guerrilla organisations became involved in these divisions through military operations and political alliances. Some Lebanese movements supported the Palestinian armed struggle. Others regarded the presence of independent armed factions as a threat to Lebanese sovereignty. The resulting tensions contributed to the environment in which the Lebanese Civil War erupted in 1975. The war cannot be attributed solely to Palestinian organisations. Lebanon's internal political problems, the activities of Lebanese militias and interventions by foreign powers were all major factors. Nevertheless, the PLO's military presence became an important component of the conflict. For regional governments, the experiences of Jordan and Lebanon demonstrated how armed organisations pursuing objectives beyond the host state's control could become involved in domestic political crises. ### The Question of Sovereignty At the centre of both conflicts was the issue of national sovereignty. A sovereign government is expected to exercise authority over the use of armed force within its territory. When independent military organisations establish checkpoints, maintain weapons, conduct cross-border operations or challenge security institutions, that authority becomes contested. Jordan's monarchy confronted this problem directly. Lebanon experienced a more fragmented version of the same challenge. The issue was not unique to Palestinian organisations. Similar tensions can arise wherever armed non-state groups operate independently of national governments. However, the Palestinian national movement occupied a distinctive position because it pursued national objectives without controlling a sovereign state. Its armed factions frequently depended on territory controlled by neighbouring governments. This created a structural conflict between the organisations' desire for operational independence and the host governments' responsibility for national security. Black September demonstrated how violently that conflict could unfold when political agreements failed. ### The PLO and the Limits of Arab Political Solidarity The PLO's history also reveals that relations between Palestinian political organisations and Arab governments were never defined exclusively by confrontation. Despite its defeat in Jordan, the PLO continued to receive political support from numerous Arab states. In 1974, the Arab League recognised the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. This decision demonstrated that the events of Black September had not produced a general Arab rejection of Palestinian national representation. Instead, governments distinguished, to varying degrees, between recognising Palestinian political claims and accepting the military activities of particular factions. Some states supported the PLO diplomatically while restricting armed operations on their territory. Others developed closer relationships with competing Palestinian organisations. Regional rivalries also influenced these relationships. Governments sometimes supported Palestinian factions that aligned with their strategic interests while opposing others. The result was a complicated political landscape in which solidarity, competition and security concerns frequently existed simultaneously. ### Kuwait and the Gulf War: Another Crisis of Political Trust Two decades after Black September, another major confrontation affected relations between Palestinian political leadership and an Arab government. In August 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait. The invasion triggered an international crisis and eventually led to the United States-led military campaign that expelled Iraqi forces from Kuwait in 1991. During the crisis, Yasser Arafat and the PLO leadership adopted positions widely perceived as sympathetic to Saddam Hussein's Iraq. The PLO did not simply become an Iraqi military organisation, and its diplomatic position contained complexities. Nevertheless, its refusal to clearly align with the coalition opposing Iraq created a serious rupture with Kuwait and several Gulf governments. For Kuwaitis who had experienced occupation, the PLO leadership's position was widely regarded as a betrayal. Following Kuwait's liberation, large numbers of Palestinians left the country amid expulsions, pressure, insecurity and the collapse of employment opportunities. The Palestinian population in Kuwait declined dramatically. This episode differed fundamentally from Black September. Jordan's conflict involved armed organisations challenging state authority from within its territory. The Kuwait crisis centred on the diplomatic choices of Palestinian leadership during a foreign invasion and the treatment of Palestinian residents afterward. Nevertheless, both events illustrate how the decisions of political organisations can affect relations between governments and civilian communities. They also demonstrate the dangers of collective punishment. Palestinian residents of Kuwait held different political views, and many had no responsibility for the PLO leadership's decisions. The experiences of those civilians cannot be reduced to the diplomatic position adopted by Arafat. ### Why Egypt Has Taken a Different Approach to Gaza Egypt provides another example of the distinction between supporting Palestinian national aspirations and managing security concerns. Egypt governed the Gaza Strip from 1948 until Israel captured it during the Six-Day War in 1967, although the territory was not formally annexed by Egypt. In subsequent decades, Egypt became a central participant in Arab–Israeli diplomacy. The 1979 peace treaty between Egypt and Israel transformed regional political relationships. Egypt continued to support Palestinian statehood while maintaining security cooperation with Israel and managing its own border with Gaza. Following Hamas's takeover of Gaza in 2007, Egypt imposed restrictions on movement through the Rafah crossing at various times. Egyptian authorities have cited border security, militant activity in the Sinai Peninsula and concerns about regional instability among their reasons for maintaining controls. Egypt has also participated in ceasefire negotiations and humanitarian diplomacy involving Gaza. Its policies have been criticised by those who argue that border restrictions have worsened humanitarian conditions. Egyptian officials, meanwhile, have defended security measures and opposed arrangements they believe could result in permanent Palestinian displacement into Egyptian territory. These policies cannot be explained solely by Black September or by a general distrust of Palestinians. They reflect Egypt's specific security concerns, its relationship with Israel, its position toward Hamas and its broader regional interests. ### Hamas and the Question of Independent Armed Authority The emergence of Hamas introduced another dimension to the relationship between Palestinian political movements and regional governments. Hamas was founded in 1987 during the First Intifada. Unlike the secular nationalist orientation of Fatah, Hamas developed from a Palestinian Islamist political and social movement. The organisation combined political activity, social institutions and an armed wing. Following its victory in the 2006 Palestinian legislative elections and the violent split with Fatah in 2007, Hamas established de facto control over Gaza. The Palestinian Authority, dominated by Fatah, continued to exercise limited self-government in parts of the West Bank. This division created two competing Palestinian centres of political authority. Regional governments developed different relationships with Hamas. Some maintained political contacts or provided support. Others viewed the organisation as a security threat or restricted its activities. Hamas's attacks against Israeli civilians, including the atrocities committed during the 7 October 2023 attacks, have intensified international debates over armed non-state organisations and political accountability. The historical circumstances differ significantly from Jordan in 1970. Nevertheless, the broader question of how armed movements exercise power, claim political legitimacy and affect neighbouring states remains relevant. Comparisons should therefore focus on specific political structures and documented actions rather than treating different Palestinian organisations as interchangeable. ### Do Arab Governments Distrust Palestinians? The question is often raised in political discussions, particularly when examining Jordan, Lebanon, Kuwait and Egypt. But the wording itself requires careful examination. There is no single Arab government position toward Palestinians, and there is no historical basis for treating Palestinians as a population that is universally distrusted. Millions of Palestinians have lived, worked, studied and established families across the Arab world. Many have contributed significantly to the economies, institutions and cultural life of their host countries. Jordan provides a particularly important example. Despite the events of Black September, large numbers of Jordanians are of Palestinian origin, and Palestinian communities remain deeply integrated into Jordanian society. The monarchy's conflict with the PLO did not amount to a permanent rejection of Palestinians as citizens or members of society. In other countries, Palestinian refugees have faced substantial legal restrictions and political uncertainty. Those restrictions have reflected a mixture of domestic politics, demographic concerns, citizenship policies, security considerations and the unresolved Palestinian refugee question. The actions of armed organisations have sometimes contributed to government security concerns. But they do not explain every restriction imposed on Palestinian communities. Nor do they justify treating civilians as collectively responsible for the decisions of political or military leaders. A historically accurate analysis must distinguish between distrust of particular organisations, concerns about armed activity and prejudice directed toward an entire population. ### The Role of Palestinian Leadership Black September also raises questions about the responsibilities of political leadership. Yasser Arafat and other Palestinian leaders faced difficult strategic choices during the late 1960s and early 1970s. They sought to build an independent Palestinian national movement after repeated military defeats and displacement. However, the growth of armed organisations operating within neighbouring states created tensions that were not adequately resolved through political negotiation. The PLO's fragmented structure made unified command difficult. Different factions pursued different tactics, including operations that endangered civilians and challenged host governments. These divisions complicated the leadership's ability to maintain political credibility and negotiate stable arrangements. The events in Jordan demonstrated that armed independence could carry substantial costs when it conflicted with the authority of a sovereign state. The later crisis in Lebanon reinforced the importance of that problem, although the circumstances were different. The PLO's position during the Gulf War further demonstrated how political decisions could affect Palestinian communities living outside the Palestinian territories. These episodes justify critical examination of leadership decisions and organisational accountability. They do not establish collective responsibility among Palestinian civilians. ### The Responsibility of Host Governments The historical record also requires scrutiny of the governments involved. Jordan had a legitimate interest in maintaining public security and controlling armed activity within its territory. However, the use of heavy weapons in populated areas during Black September caused substantial civilian suffering. The government's security objectives did not remove its responsibility to protect non-combatants. In Lebanon, political institutions failed to prevent the escalation of armed conflict involving domestic militias, Palestinian organisations and foreign powers. During and after the Gulf War, Palestinians in Kuwait faced serious abuses and displacement despite the fact that individual residents could not automatically be held responsible for the PLO's political position. In Gaza, border restrictions and military operations have created major humanitarian consequences that require examination alongside the security concerns cited by governments. The conduct of states must therefore be evaluated independently of the actions of armed organisations. National security and civilian protection are not mutually exclusive obligations. A government can face genuine security threats while still being accountable for the methods it uses in response. ### The Danger of Collective Blame One of the most important lessons from Black September concerns the consequences of confusing political organisations with entire populations. Palestinian guerrilla factions were responsible for their own military and political decisions. The Jordanian government was responsible for its military response. Neither side represented every individual living in the areas affected by the conflict. The same distinction applies to later events. The decisions of the PLO leadership during the Gulf War did not represent the views of every Palestinian resident of Kuwait. The actions of Hamas do not establish the political beliefs or personal responsibility of every civilian living in Gaza. Likewise, the actions of governments should not automatically be attributed to every citizen of the states they govern. Collective blame obscures individual responsibility and weakens historical analysis. It also makes it more difficult to understand the specific political and military decisions that produced violence. For journalism, the challenge is to examine responsibility without turning complex history into generalisations about nationality, ethnicity or identity. ### What Black September Reveals About the Middle East The events of 1970 and 1971 reveal several enduring features of Middle Eastern politics. First, the Palestinian national movement developed within a regional environment shaped by competing state interests. Second, armed organisations without sovereign territory often depended on neighbouring countries for operational space. Third, that dependence created potential conflicts when military activities threatened host governments' authority or security. Fourth, Arab political solidarity did not eliminate disagreements over sovereignty, national interests and the use of force. Finally, the consequences of political and military decisions frequently extended beyond the organisations responsible for making them. Civilians in Jordan, Lebanon, Kuwait and the Palestinian territories experienced the effects of conflicts in which they often had limited influence over the decisions of armed leaders and governments. Black September is therefore not simply a historical episode involving Jordan and the PLO. It is a case study in the relationship between revolutionary movements, national sovereignty, regional alliances and civilian vulnerability. ### A History That Continues to Matter More than fifty years after Black September, the relationship between Palestinian political movements and Arab governments remains complex. Jordan continues to play an important role in regional diplomacy and maintains extensive social and historical connections with Palestinians. Lebanon continues to host Palestinian refugee communities whose legal and economic circumstances remain difficult. Egypt remains an important diplomatic actor in negotiations involving Gaza. Gulf governments have developed varying relationships with Palestinian political leadership, shaped by regional alliances and national interests. These relationships cannot be explained by one event. But the history of Black September helps illuminate why governments may distinguish between supporting Palestinian political rights and permitting armed organisations to operate independently within their borders. It also explains why the actions of particular Palestinian factions have, at different moments, generated serious political and security concerns among neighbouring states. The legacy is therefore not one of universal distrust. It is a history of competing political objectives, damaged relationships, changing alliances and repeated disputes over sovereignty. ### Conclusion — The Lessons of Black September Black September remains one of the most significant and often overlooked chapters in the history of the Palestinian national movement and the modern Middle East. The conflict began with escalating tensions between the Jordanian monarchy and Palestinian guerrilla organisations operating within the kingdom. It developed into a major military confrontation in September 1970 and culminated in the defeat of the remaining Palestinian guerrilla forces in 1971. The PLO subsequently consolidated its presence in Lebanon, where its military activities became entangled with existing political divisions and regional conflicts. The emergence of the Black September Organisation and the 1972 Munich Olympics massacre demonstrated how the consequences of the Jordanian confrontation could extend into international terrorism. Later crises, including the PLO's position during Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, further complicated relations between Palestinian political leadership and certain Arab governments. Together, these events reveal the challenges that arise when armed organisations pursue political objectives while operating within the territory of sovereign states. They also demonstrate the importance of holding political and military leaders accountable for their decisions. But the history does not support the conclusion that Palestinians as a people are inherently untrustworthy or collectively responsible for the actions of armed factions. Such a conclusion would ignore the diversity of Palestinian political opinion, the experiences of civilians and the substantial differences between the historical events examined. The more important lesson is that political solidarity cannot replace the need for accountable leadership, respect for sovereignty and the protection of civilians. Jordan's experience demonstrated the consequences of a breakdown in relations between a government and armed organisations operating within its borders. Lebanon revealed how similar tensions could interact with deeper domestic divisions. Kuwait demonstrated how political decisions by national leaders could have serious consequences for civilian communities living abroad. These histories deserve critical examination precisely because they challenge simplified narratives about the Middle East. Black September was not merely a conflict between Jordan and Palestinian militants. It was a turning point that exposed the limits of Arab political solidarity, the dangers of competing armed authority and the lasting consequences of decisions made by political and military leaders. Understanding those events is essential to understanding the wider history of Palestinian organisations, Arab governments and regional security. And perhaps the most important question is not why an entire people should be distrusted, but how the actions of armed organisations and political leaders have repeatedly shaped the lives of civilians who had little control over the conflicts carried out in their name. That is the history Black September leaves behind. --- ## Sources and Further Reading The following historical documents, institutional archives and research publications provide background on Black September, the Jordanian–Palestinian conflict, the Palestine Liberation Organization and the wider regional consequences. ### Black September and the Jordanian Crisis (1970–1971) **1\. U.S. Department of State — Office of the Historian** *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXIV: Middle East Region and Arabian Peninsula, 1969–1972; Jordan, September 1970.* Official declassified diplomatic records covering the confrontation between King Hussein and Palestinian guerrilla organisations, Syrian intervention and American diplomatic and strategic responses. [https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v24](https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v24?ref=beyondthelines.news) **2\. U.S. Department of State — Office of the Historian** *Foreign Relations of the United States, Volume XXIII: Arab–Israeli Dispute, 1969–1972, Document 161.* Historical documentation of the September 1970 escalation, the Dawson's Field hijackings and the confrontation between Jordanian forces and Palestinian armed factions. [https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v23/d161](https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v23/d161?ref=beyondthelines.news) ### The PLO, Lebanon and Regional Instability **3\. United Nations Security Council** *Resolution 425 (1978): The Situation in Lebanon.* Official UN resolution addressing Israeli military operations in Lebanon, Lebanese territorial sovereignty and the establishment of an international peacekeeping force. [https://www.un.org/unispal/document/auto-insert-189331/](https://www.un.org/unispal/document/auto-insert-189331/?ref=beyondthelines.news) **4\. United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL)** *Background and Historical Mandate.* Historical overview of the 1978 conflict in southern Lebanon, the establishment of UNIFIL and international efforts to restore security and Lebanese state authority. [https://unifil.unmissions.org/en/background](https://unifil.unmissions.org/en/background?ref=beyondthelines.news) ### The Black September Organisation and Munich 1972 **5\. Olympic Committee of Israel** *Munich 1972.* Historical account of the Black September Organisation's attack during the 1972 Summer Olympics and the murder of eleven members of the Israeli delegation. [https://www.olympicsil.co.il/en/munich-1972/](https://www.olympicsil.co.il/en/munich-1972/?ref=beyondthelines.news) **6\. Olympic Committee of Israel** *Munich 1972 — The 11 Terror Victims.* Biographical and historical information about the eleven Israeli athletes, coaches and officials murdered during the Munich attack. [https://www.olympicsil.co.il/en/munich-1972-the-11-terror-victims/](https://www.olympicsil.co.il/en/munich-1972-the-11-terror-victims/?ref=beyondthelines.news) ### Kuwait, the Gulf War and Palestinian Communities **7\. Human Rights Watch** *A Victory Turned Sour: Human Rights in Kuwait since Liberation (1991).* Investigation into human rights abuses following Kuwait's liberation, including the treatment of Palestinian residents, expulsions and collective accusations of political disloyalty. [https://www.hrw.org/report/1991/09/01/victory-turned-sour-human-rights-kuwait-liberation](https://www.hrw.org/report/1991/09/01/victory-turned-sour-human-rights-kuwait-liberation?ref=beyondthelines.news) **8\. Human Rights Watch** *World Report 1992 — Kuwait.* Documentation of the treatment of Palestinians and other non-citizen residents following the Gulf War, including population displacement and government restrictions. [https://www.hrw.org/reports/1992/WR92/MEW1.htm](https://www.hrw.org/reports/1992/WR92/MEW1.htm?ref=beyondthelines.news) --- *Editorial note: Historical accounts of Black September differ in their casualty estimates and interpretations of political and military responsibility. This article distinguishes the actions of Palestinian armed organisations from the experiences and rights of Palestinian civilians. The sources listed provide historical documentation and context; not every interpretation presented in the article is necessarily endorsed by every source.*